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IntroductionTHE EURO AREA IN CRISIS
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak
The 9th EUROFRAME1 Conference on economic policy issues in the 
European Union was held in Kiel on 8 June 2012. The Conference 
topic was: “The euro area in crisis: challenges for monetary and fiscal 
policies and prospects for monetary union”. Twelve of the papers 
given at the Conference are released in this issue of the Revue de 
l’OFCE/Debates and Policies.
In 2012, the euro is a failure from many aspects: the euro area is 
unable to recover the nine percentage points of GDP lost because of 
the financial crisis; GDP will fall slightly in 2012 and is expected to be 
stagnant in 2013. In recession times, Member States (MS) are 
constrained to run austerity policies. Three countries have had to 
request support from the IMF and Europe, and must implement drastic
adjustment plans under the supervision of the Troika (the Commis-
sion, the ECB and the IMF). Euro area MS public debts are no longer
considered as safe assets; euro-denominated debts have become hete-
rogeneous with financial markets requesting high risk premia on 
Southern MS government debts. MS economic policies are under 
permanent financial markets pressure.
The single currency suffers from six original sins, which are diffi-
cult to correct:
— According to economic theory, there cannot be a single currency 
between countries with different economic situations and who wish to 
keep independent economic policies. The single currency entails 
introducing economic policy coordination or solidarity mechanisms. 
Otherwise how to prevent the emergence and persistence of imba-
1. EUROFRAME is a network of ten independent European research institutes: WIFO (Austria), 
ETLA (Finland), OFCE (France), DIW and IFW (Germany), ESRI (Ireland), PROMETEIA (Italy), 
CPB (Netherlands), CASE (Poland), NIESR (United Kingdom). Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 127 (2013)
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak10lances between countries running large external deficits and other 
countries running large surpluses? How to handle these situations?
— These mechanisms cannot consist in rigid numerical rules 
enshrined in a Treaty (such as: public deficits should not exceed 3% of 
GDP, public debts should not exceed 60% of GDP, structural budgets 
should be run in balance in the medium term). These mechanisms 
must be flexible (objectives should be agreed between countries 
accounting for the economic context) and binding (everyone must 
comply with commonly agreed decisions). But how may governments 
with different interests and analyses reach agreement on economic 
policy strategies? 
— There cannot be unconditional solidarity between countries 
with different social and economic systems. For example, Northern 
countries may refuse to support Southern countries, blaming them for 
not having undertaken the necessary reforms, for having let imba-
lances grow and for being unable to meet their commitments.
— The ECB is not entitled to finance directly governments (Article 
123, TFEU); financial solidarity between MS is forbidden (Article 125, 
TFEU). Thus, each MS has to borrow on financial markets without any 
guaranteed support from a central bank acting as a “lender of last 
resort”. This raises the risk that some MS may not be able to fulfil their 
commitments and may default. MS public debt is no longer a safe 
asset. Financial markets started to realise this from mid-2009. Today, 
after the experience the Greek default, they request unsustainable 
interest rates to lend to the most fragile countries, increasing thereby 
the difficulties of the latter.
— Euro area MS are now under financial markets’ judgement and 
they do not control anymore their interest rates unlike Anglo-Saxon 
countries or Japan. But financial markets have no macroeconomic 
expertise, they are, and know that they are, self-fulfilling. However, 
Northern countries refused a collective guarantee of MS public debts. 
They consider that the discipline imposed by financial markets is 
necessary. But disparity among interest rates is arbitrary and costly. In 
the long term, for instance, a country like Italy should pay on financial 
markets a premium of around 3% of its GDP as a guarantee to an 
alleged default risk. 
— The 2007-2012 crisis is a deep crisis of financial capitalism, 
which was calling for a strong policy response from governments to 
lower the weight of finance and the reliance on public and private 
debts, to implement a macroeconomic strategy aiming at a return to 
full employment. But European authorities have denied any question-
ning of the pre-crisis strategy.
Introduction: The euro area in crisis 11A number of divergences of analyses and policy recommendations 
emerged during the conference:  
— According to some authors, euro area imbalances are due to 
unwise policies in Southern countries; the latter allowed housing and 
wage bubbles to rise, while northern countries were carrying out 
virtuous policies of wage moderation and structural reforms. Southern 
countries should adopt Northern countries’ strategies and implement 
prolonged austerity policies. For other authors, the single currency 
allowed for the emergence of twin imbalances: it led to under-valua-
tion of Northern economies, which enabled them to offset excessive 
fiscal, wage and social domestic austerity by excessive external 
account surpluses and allowed for the persistence of external deficits 
in the South; what is needed now is a convergence within the euro 
area where economic stimulus in the North will facilitate the reduc-
tion of external imbalances in the South. 
— For some authors, each country should implement policies 
combining strong fiscal consolidation through public spending cuts 
and structural reforms (liberalisation of goods and services markets, 
labour market deregulation), which will offset its depressive effect. For 
other authors, public deficits should be maintained as long as needed 
to support output, MS public debts should be guaranteed by the ECB 
so as to entail a downward convergence of domestic interest rates and 
to implement a EU-wide growth strategy (in particular through finan-
cing environmental transition). 
— Some authors even consider that EU solidarity should not be 
strengthened since it would allow some countries to postpone the 
necessary reforms and would lead to persistent imbalances, which 
would induce money creation and inflation. The euro area should 
implement the Maastricht Treaty more strictly, without solidarity 
between countries and without government bonds’ purchases by the 
ECB. Germany is already at full employment and hence cannot stimu-
late its economy. Moreover, it would be of little use to the South, 
which would not be in a position to sell much more in Germany, 
given the weakness of their industries. Germany cannot provide a 
guarantee or finance the whole area. Other authors consider that 
economic policies errors have been made since the inception of the 
euro area, generating large disparities within the area, which policy 
makers should try to reduce today by a coherent strategy embedding 
solidarity. Europe is a big family, which should show solidarity and 
accept compromises to continue to live together.
— For some authors, a fiscal union is a prerequisite to the end of 
the euro area debt crisis, which implies implementing the binding 
rules enshrined in the Fiscal Pact and some degree of fiscal federalism, 
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak12where the Commission and the European Council would control MS
fiscal policies. For other authors, MS should keep a large degree of
autonomy to run the fiscal policy of their choice, for both democratic
and economic efficiency reasons: MS economic situations are too
diverse to allow a single fiscal policy. The euro area needs open
economic policy coordination, without pre-designed and rigid public
finance rules, with the objective of reaching a satisfactory growth,
leading to full employment and reducing external imbalances.
Real exchange rate imbalances 
The single currency has led to the emergence of permanent
exchange rates misalignments within Europe and to the polarisation
of external balances. The article by Virginie Coudert, Cécile Couharde
and Valérie Mignon: “Currency misalignments within the euro
area” compares real exchange rates in euro area countries with econo-
metrically estimated equilibrium levels depending on relative labour
productivity and external assets. The article shows that in 2010 Greece
was overvalued by 20%, Portugal by 14%, Spain by 10%, Italy and
6.5%. Conversely, the real exchange rate was undervalued by 7% in
Finland, and by 0.5% in France and Germany. Currency misalign-
ments have widened and become more persistent since the launch of
the single currency. They are particularly large in peripheral countries.
However, the theoretical basis of this method can be questioned: it
does not account for growth and employment needs, especially as
concerns the unemployment rate. It takes into account the stock of
foreign assets and not the current account balance. This may explain
the somewhat surprising result for France.
The article by Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier and Jamel
Saadaoui: “Exchange Rate Misalignments, Fiscal Federalism and
Redistribution: How to Adjust in a Monetary Union” estimates the
real exchange rates variations which would allow simultaneously to
reach full employment and a current account in balance. The paper
finds that in 2010, Portugal was overvalued by 25%, Greece by 18%,
Spain by 15%, France by 12%, while the Netherlands were underva-
lued by 9%, Austria by 11%, Germany by 22%. One may argue that the
equilibrium described by the authors does not take account of require-
ments from Northern countries who wish to run external surpluses to
accumulate foreign assets and finance their pension system in the
future. This highlights an economic policy coordination problem:
how to manage a monetary system where some countries wish to own
large external assets, while financial markets deny that the other
countries run high debts. The authors propose to facilitate adjust-
Introduction: The euro area in crisis 13ments in the euro area either by a transfers system from countries in a 
better situation to countries in a difficult situation, either by 
increasing the EU budget, which would introduce automatic transfers 
to countries in difficulty. Of course imbalances would smaller after an 
asymmetrical shock. But Northern countries refuse a system where 
they may be permanent contributors, they refuse that countries 
having made adjustment efforts are forced to subsidise countries 
which they blame for not having undertaken similar efforts. Another 
strategy would be to finance by Eurobonds productive investments in 
the countries in recession. This would not, however, reduce durably 
imbalances resulting from competitiveness gaps.
Indicators of the crisis 
The article by Jasper Lukkezen and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa: 
“Stochastic debt sustainability indicators” reminds us that the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio remains stationary if GDP growth is higher 
than the interest rate paid on debt or if the government responds to 
the increase in debt by reducing the public deficit. Until 1980, 
nominal interest rates were low relatively to the inflation rate and the 
growth rate; debt sustainability was not an issue. Since then, the UK, 
the US, Belgium and the Netherlands have accounted for the debt level 
in the conduct of their fiscal policy; this would not be the case for 
Spain and Portugal, where debt has therefore become unsustainable. 
However, the econometric estimations are run on a very long time 
period (1946-2010), which weakens the conclusions on Spain: until 
recently, GDP growth was higher than the interest rate in Spain; debt 
sustainability has become an issue only since 2009-2010.
The article by Christophe Van Nieuwenhuyze: “Debts, assets and 
imbalances in the euro area: An aggregate view” provides an 
analysis of assets and liabilities of public and private agents in the euro 
area. It appears that the area as a whole is in balance. Since the begin-
ning of the crisis, rising public deficits have only offset households’ 
and firms’ rising surpluses. On the whole, the euro area suffers from 
rising disparities of external balances and net external positions rather 
than from public debt problems. The author proposes a policy consis-
ting in the short term to finance these imbalances by financial flows 
organised by the ESCB and by budgetary transfers; in the medium 
term to undertake structural policies (increasing Southern countries’ 
competitiveness, …).
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak14Fiscal rules 
The sovereign debt crisis has led the European Commission and 
Northern countries to advocate the strengthening of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) and to adopt a fiscal pact, which obliges MS to 
target medium-term structural budgets in balance (or, at least, struc-
tural deficits of below 0.5% of GDP) and in the short term to cut their 
public deficits and debt ratios, if the latter exceed 60% of GDP.
The article by Achim Truger and Henner Will: “Open to manipula-
tion and pro-cyclical: A detailed analysis of Germany’s debt brake”
makes a critical assessment of the German “debt brake” which inspired 
the European fiscal pact. According to the authors, the 0.35% of GDP 
limit for structural deficits is arbitrary and will lead public debt to 
amount to 11.7% of GDP only in the long-term which is neither 
credible nor optimal. The rule prevents to finance public investment 
by borrowing. Above all, the rule is neither simple nor transparent, 
due to the difficulty in assessing structural balances: the Commission 
is constantly revising its calculation method. Finally, this method 
underestimates the output gap. It may therefore lead to run pro-
cyclical fiscal policies in times of recessions.
The article by Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak: “Do we 
need fiscal rules?” addresses the arguments put forward justify fiscal 
rules. The concern about excessively expansionary fiscal policies advo-
cates for the introduction of a “true” golden rule of public finances, 
where the structural deficit should be equal to public investment. 
Macroeconomic stabilisation concerns suggest a rule such as: “public 
balance must ensure the level of maximum demand, consistent with 
price stability and an interest rate equal to the rate of growth.” Accor-
ding to the authors, there is no evidence that deficits were on the 
whole excessive, before and since the beginning of the crisis. Most of 
the proposed fiscal rules are not satisfactory from an economic point 
of view, since they do not allow to run optimal policies after a shock. 
The article analyses the experiences of the “golden rule” in the UK and 
of the SGP in Europe: the UK abandoned the rule during the crisis; the 
SGP created unnecessary tensions before the crisis, it did not prevent 
the rise in imbalances in the euro area since it was taking account of 
external balances and private debts. The article criticises the European 
fiscal Treaty, based on potential GDP and structural balance concepts, 
which are theoretically and empirically questionable. The Treaty 
imposes too rigid medium-term constraints, not allowing public 
investment to be financed by borrowing, which may impose pro-
cyclical fiscal policies and prohibits discretionary fiscal policies needed 
for full stabilisation. The Treaty requires MS to establish independent 
Introduction: The euro area in crisis 15fiscal policy councils, as if economic policy should be run out of the 
democratic debate.
Monetary and banking issues
Banking regulation is a particularly acute issue today. Here too, 
there are two opposing views. Does Europe needs to “return to the 
past”, where banks would have to focus their activities in their 
countries of origin and reduce their activities on financial markets in 
the benefit of credit distribution, under close supervision of their 
national authorities? Should Europe instead establish a banking 
union, where banks would be encouraged to diversify across the EU to 
spread risks, where supervision would be at the European level, where 
prudential rules based on balance sheet ratios would be implemented? 
The first solution draws lessons from the losses suffered by European 
banks in developing their activities outside their country of origin and 
in financing speculative activities, but it is not consistent with the 
Single Market. The second solution induces the risk of a lack of control 
of the banking system, which would keep large leeway to accommo-
date prudential standards regardless of the financing needs of the real 
economies.
The article by Dominique Perrut: “Global and European Financial 
Reforms: Assessment and perspectives” describes and makes a 
critical assessment of the reforms introduced by the G20 and the EU to 
improve financial stability after the crisis. Drawing lessons from the 
financial crisis, their goal is to develop a new prudential model both a 
macro and micro levels. They include the Basel III ratios, the counter-
cyclical prudential norms, some separation between retail banking 
and market activities, the establishment of clear procedures to solve 
banking crises and closer supervisions. The author is concerned with 
the margins of interpretation left to financial institutions, by the 
complexity of the system put in place in Europe, by the risk of compe-
tition between institutions subject to regulation and those who can 
escape from it, between banks established in the euro area, in the UK 
or in the US.
Exit strategies 
The article by John FitzGerald: “Financial crisis, economic adjust-
ment and a return to growth in the EU” analyses the experience of 
some EU countries having implemented crisis exit strategies in the 
1980-1995. The paper shows that growth was often driven by foreign 
trade through exchange rate depreciation and buoyant economic 
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak16environment, both of which are lacking today. The article then 
analyses the situation of the countries most affected by the crisis. 
Countries with a largely foreign owned banking sector (Hungary, 
Estonia) have not experienced the rise in debt experienced by 
countries where the banking sector was largely domestically owned 
(Ireland, Spain). The crisis has shown that large external deficits were a 
source of weakness, even they could be easily financed before 2007. 
Countries in crisis experienced huge falls in consumption and invest-
ment. The collapse of the construction sector strongly increased the 
unskilled workers’ unemployment rate. Public finance improvement is 
very slow as restrictive policies lower GDP growth and therefore tax 
revenues. According to the author, consolidating public finances is the 
priority but the author also recognises that a significant growth 
rebound is needed, which seems inconsistent with widespread auste-
rity policies. The author estimates that countries must improve their 
competitiveness by reducing their wages level. The author warns 
against moving back to a purely national banking system; he considers 
that an integrated banking system in Europe provides significant effi-
ciency gains. In the long term, the lack of human capital is the main 
obstacle to growth, particularly in Southern countries where unskilled 
unemployment is already high, where a strong rebound in the 
construction sector is not desirable, where generations arriving on the 
labour market are not sufficiently educated. A huge training effort 
seems necessary.
Kari Alho’s article: "How to restore the sustainability of the euro 
zone?” builds a two-country model with a monetary union and the 
rest of the world. It determines conditions under which the monetary 
union is stable in the event of asymmetric shocks. Theoretically, stabi-
lity is ensured by the price/competitiveness dynamic: the less 
competitive country sees a fall in domestic output, which lowers 
domestic wages and restores competitiveness. However, this requires 
that it does not run simultaneously expansionary fiscal or credit poli-
cies. If markets do not discriminate between national debts, a pseudo-
equilibrium can be reached where the less competitive country 
constantly borrows from his partner. In case of markets’ discrimina-
tion, unstable episodes may take place where a country's debt 
increases permanently as well the interest rate on government bonds. 
It is therefore necessary to impose a fiscal rule such as a country must 
run a restrictive policy when its public debt increases. This may have 
pervasive effects if the rise in debt is due to a fiscal policy aiming at 
offsetting the weakness in domestic demand or if a restrictive fiscal 
policy induces a sharp drop in output leading to an increase of the 
debt ratio. In case of unsustainable external deficits, the solution lies 
Introduction: The euro area in crisis 17in internal devaluation (tax reform improving competitiveness at the 
expense of lower wages) or in structural reforms (expected to increase 
competitiveness). The article shows that it is necessary to rethink the 
euro area functioning rules. However, it does not propose new rules: 
should they bear on public balances or on external balances? In case of 
imbalances, should adjustment bear only on the deficit country or 
should not we consider the responsibility of the surplus country too?
The article of the German Council of Economic Experts: “The 
European redemption pact: An illustrative guide” proposes to esta-
blish a fund to guarantee the repayment of public debt above 60% of 
GDP. Countries with debts above this limit (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Spain, France, Malta and the Netherlands), with the exception of 
countries under an adjustment programme (Greece, Ireland, Portugal), 
would put together in a fund the share of their debt that exceeds 60% 
of GDP and, in return, would permanently transfer fiscal resources for 
repayment in 25 years. Financial markets, reassured, would agree to 
hold this debt at a rate lower than current rates (the authors consider a 
rate of 4%, which is pessimistic since France borrowed at 2% in mid-
2012). In addition, countries should commit to the fiscal Pact, hence 
should quickly bring their structural deficit below 0.5% of GDP. Thus, 
the debt ratio would fall quickly: in 2035, it would reach 58.5% in 
Belgium (against 97% today), 53.5% in France (instead of 88%), 50% 
Germany (instead of 82%), 60% in Italy (instead of 120%). However, 
countries should run strongly restrictive fiscal policies in 2012-2015, 
which according to the authors’ calculations amount to 7 percentage 
points of GDP for Spain, 5.6 percentage points for France, 4 for the 
Netherlands, 3 for Italy and Belgium. The article does not analyse the 
impact of such restrictive policies on activity, making the implicit 
assumption that the fiscal multiplier is zero. Similarly, it does not 
consider that Europe may experience episodes of economic downturn 
over the next 25 years, which may require a softening in the fiscal 
stance. It does not question the factors which led public debts to rise. 
Were they a sin that MS should expiate? Or were the rises in public 
debts necessary in the economic context?
The article by Pier Carlo Padoan, Urban Sila and Paul van den 
Noord: “Good and bad equilibria: What can fiscal (and other) poli-
cies do?” builds an analytical model with two equilibria: a good one 
with high growth, low interest rates and low debt/GDP ratios; a bad 
one, with low growth, high interest rates and high debt ratio. After a 
financial shock (such as a sharp increase in public debt), a country 
may experience a race to the bad equilibrium: the increase in debt 
worries financial markets and causes a rise in interest rates, it reduces 
growth, which further increases public debt, where a new interest rate 
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak18increases... The authors propose to escape from this spiral by three 
ways: introducing structural reforms that would boost growth (but do 
such miraculous reforms really exist?), undertaking an expansionary 
monetary policy to keep interest rates at a low level, but the case of 
Southern countries in the euro area, victims of speculation should be 
distinguished from the case of other countries (Germany, France, UK, 
US, Japan) which do not suffer from high interest rates; and finally 
restrictive fiscal policies. The fiscal policy impact is ambiguous in the 
model. If the fiscal multiplier is high, expansionary policy supports 
growth, reduces the debt ratio and thereafter interest rates. On the 
contrary, if the multiplier is low, fiscal consolidation is expansionary 
as it reduces debt and interest rates. The authors have chosen a multi-
plier of 0.1, substantially lower than the 0.8 to 1.2 range which can be 
found in recent works (this evaluation should be increased in the case 
of policies implemented simultaneously throughout the area). This 
leads the authors to support current consolidation fiscal policies, 
which may have depressive effects in the short term but become 
expansionary in the medium term. According to us, the risk is that this 
cure will kill the patient before being effective. This is what the 
examples of Greece, Spain and Portugal in 2012 suggest. Austerity does 
not reassure financial markets and structural policies have little impact 
in a situation of economic and social distress.
The article by Stephan Schulmeister: “The European Monetary 
Fund: A systemic problem needs a systemic solution” explains the 
current crisis by the expansion of financial capitalism which led public 
debts to rise by imposing higher interest rates than GDP growth rates; 
companies prefer financial investments to productive investment; 
they refuse to be more indebted in net terms while households 
continue to save; hence governments must accept higher public debt; 
financial instability and speculation increase simultaneously. Fiscal 
austerity policies lead to recession and cannot reduce the public debt 
burden. Monitoring by the financial markets is currently contra-
productive and self-fulfilling. The paper proposes to launch a Euro-
pean Monetary Fund (EMF) lending to MS by issuing euro-bonds 
guaranteed by MS and by the ECB. The EMF would have to maintain 
long-term interest rates slightly below the long-term growth rate. Each 
country’s financing would not be subject to a numerical constraint, 
but would be agreed within the EMF by the MS finance ministers. 
According to simulations with a macro-econometric model, this agree-
ment would lead to higher growth and lower debt ratios than current 
austerity policies. But can long-term interest rates be stabilised at a low 
level, independently of monetary policy? Finance ministers would 
have the responsibility to agree on deficit targets for each country, 
Introduction: The euro area in crisis 19which is problematic (what to do in case of diverging interests or 
macroeconomic strategies between countries?), not democratic (each 
finance minister would have to impose to the national Parliament the 
fulfilment of an objective set at the European level), difficult to imple-
ment (what to do in case of a specific or global shock?).
Is the crisis over? 
In late 2012, two contrasting assessments can be made of the crisis. 
On the one hand, the euro survived. Of course, European Institutions 
and MS policy answers have been slow and hesitant; their hesitation 
often fed speculation. But European Institutions have gradually 
managed to develop solidarity mechanisms, such as the EFSF and the 
ESM, they succeeded to impose MS a strong fiscal discipline 
(strengthening of the Stability Pact, adjustment programmes, fiscal 
Treaty). MS have agreed to implement austerity policies and structural 
reforms. From the beginning of the crisis, the ECB has agreed to imple-
ment unconventional monetary policies and has supported public 
debt in countries in difficulty by intervening in secondary markets. 
Later on, the ECB made a commitment to support without limit trou-
bled countries accepting to implement the requested policies, which 
helped to reassure financial markets and lowered risk premia.
On the other hand, the euro area is unable to find a satisfactory 
growth, unable to recover the nine percentage points of activity lost 
because of the crisis. MS have been forced to implement austerity poli-
cies during a recession. According to the Commission’s own forecasts, 
the unemployment rate will remain at 11.8% in 2013. Imbalances 
between countries persist, even if they are somewhat reduced by the 
huge depression in Southern countries. Rigid rules lacking economic 
foundation imposed on MS cannot replace real economic policy coor-
dination. Solidarity is conditional to the loss of domestic autonomy 
and to the implementation of drastic austerity plans in helped 
countries. In the future, national policies will be paralysed by Euro-
pean constraints and financial markets’ threats. Social Europe does not 
make any progress. Even worse, Europe imposes countries in difficulty 
to undermine health insurance universality, to reduce unemployment 
and family benefits and pensions. Tax competition continues. The 
crisis has not been an opportunity to question tax havens and tax 
evasion. Certainly, Europe is at the forefront of the fight against 
climate change, but it does not clearly move forward in terms of envi-
ronmental transition. Many MS suffer from deindustrialisation 
without any EU industrial policy strategy being implemented. A 
banking union will be established, without being democratically 
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak20debated. European authorities persist in a strategy (paralysing national 
policies, imposing liberal structural reforms) which has so far failed to 
boost growth and have made Europe unpopular. Europe is missing a 
social project, a clear economic strategy and a democratic functioning.
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IntroductionLA ZONE EURO EN CRISE
Catherine Mathieu et Henri Sterdyniak
Le 8 juin 2012, s’est tenue à Kiel la 9e Conférence EUROFRAME1 sur 
les questions de politique économique de l’Union européenne. Son 
sujet était : « La zone euro en crise : quelles perspectives pour la poli-
tique monétaire et les politiques budgétaires ? ». Le présent numéro de 
la collection « Débats et Politiques » de la Revue de l’OFCE regroupe 
douze des communications présentées.
La conférence a été dominée par la question de la crise des dettes 
publiques de certains pays de la zone euro. Comment est-on arrivé à 
cette situation ? Faut-il incriminer des erreurs des politiques écono-
miques nationales ? Faut-il mettre en cause la mauvaise organisation 
de la zone euro ? Comment sortir de cette crise ? 
En 2012, il est difficile de ne pas considérer que l’expérience de 
l’euro se solde par un échec : la zone est incapable de récupérer les 9 
points d’activité perdus du fait de la crise financière ; sa croissance a 
été légèrement négative en 2012 ; elle devrait être nulle en 2013. En 
situation de récession, les pays de la zone sont contraints de pratiquer 
des politiques d’austérité. Trois pays membres ont dû faire appel à 
l’assistance de l’Europe et du FMI et doivent mettre en œuvre de dras-
tiques plans d’ajustements sous la surveillance de la troïka (la 
Commission, la BCE et le FMI). Les dettes publiques des pays membres 
ne sont plus considérées comme des actifs sans risque ; l’homogénéité 
des dettes libellées en euro est rompue puisque les marchés financiers 
imposent de fortes primes de risques aux dettes des pays du Sud. Les 
politiques économiques des pays membres sont en permanence sous la 
surveillance des marchés financiers. 
1.  EUROFRAME est un réseau d’instituts économiques européens qui regroupe : DIW et IFW 
(Allemagne), WIFO (Autriche), ETLA (Finlande), OFCE (France), ESRI (Irlande), PROMETEIA 
(Italie), CPB (Pays-Bas), CASE (Pologne), NIESR (Royaume-Uni).Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 127 (2013)
Catherine Mathieu et Henri Sterdyniak22La monnaie unique souffre de six péchés originels, auxquels il est 
difficile de remédier :
— Selon la théorie économique, il ne peut y avoir de monnaie 
unique entre des pays qui ont des situations économiques diffé-
rentes et qui veulent garder des politiques économiques 
autonomes. La monnaie unique suppose de mettre en place des 
mécanismes de coordination des politiques économiques ou des 
mécanismes de solidarité. Sinon comment éviter l’apparition et la 
persistance de situation de déséquilibres où certains pays sont 
fortement déficitaires, d’autres fortement excédentaires ? 
Comment gérer ces situations ? 
— Ces mécanismes ne peuvent consister en des règles numé-
riques rigides inscrites dans un traité (comme le déficit budgétaire 
ne doit pas dépasser 3 % du PIB ; la dette publique ne doit pas 
dépasser 60 % du PIB ; le solde structurel doit être équilibré à 
moyen terme). Ils doivent être à la fois souples (les objectifs 
doivent être négociés entre pays compte tenu de la conjoncture) et 
contraignants (chacun doit se plier aux décisions prises en 
commun). Mais comment aboutir à un accord sur la stratégie de 
politique économique entre des gouvernements dont les intérêts et 
les analyses diffèrent ?
— Il ne peut y avoir de solidarité inconditionnelle entre des 
pays dont les systèmes économiques et sociaux diffèrent. Par 
exemple, les pays du Nord peuvent refuser d’aider les pays du Sud, 
leur reprochant de n’avoir pas fait les réformes nécessaires, d’avoir 
laissé gonfler leurs déséquilibres, d’être incapables de tenir leurs 
engagements.
— La BCE n’a pas le droit de financer directement les États 
(article 123 du TFUE) ; la solidarité financière entre les États 
membres est interdite (article 125 du TFUE). Ainsi, chaque État 
membre doit se financer sur les marchés financiers sans recours 
garanti à une banque centrale « prêteuse en dernier ressort ». Le 
risque existe alors  qu’il ne puisse tenir ses engagements et fasse 
défaut. Sa dette n’est plus sans risque. Les marchés financiers n’en 
avaient pas pris conscience jusqu’à la mi-2009. Aujourd’hui, 
échaudés par le défaut de la Grèce, ils imposent des taux insoute-
nables aux pays en difficulté, ce qui augmente encore leurs 
difficultés. 
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des marchés financiers et, contrairement aux pays anglo-saxons et 
au Japon, ils ne contrôlent plus leur taux d’intérêt. Or les marchés 
financiers n’ont pas de compétence macroéconomique, sont auto-
réalisateurs et savent qu’ils le sont. Pourtant, les pays du Nord refu-
sent que les dettes publiques des pays membres soient 
collectivement garanties. Ils estiment que la discipline imposée par 
les marchés financiers est nécessaire. Or, la disparité des taux 
d’intérêt est d’un coût élevé et arbitraire. À terme, par exemple, un 
pays comme l’Italie devrait payer aux marchés financiers un tribut 
de l’ordre de 3 % de son PIB pour les garantir contre un présumé 
risque de défaut.
— La crise de 2007-2012 est une crise profonde du capitalisme 
financier qui aurait demandé une riposte forte de la part des 
gouvernements pour réduire l’importance de la finance et la 
dépendance à l’endettement public ou privé, pour élaborer une 
stratégie macroéconomique de retour au plein emploi. Or les 
instances européennes se sont refusées à toute remise en cause de 
leur stratégie.
Plusieurs lignes de fracture sont apparues au cours du colloque :
— Pour les uns, ce sont les politiques irresponsables des pays du 
Sud qui sont la cause des déséquilibres : ceux-ci ont laissé se déve-
lopper des bulles immobilières et salariales tandis que les pays du 
Nord pratiquaient des politiques vertueuses d’austérité salariale et 
de réformes structurelles. Les pays du Sud doivent donc adopter la 
stratégie des pays du Nord et accepter une longue cure d’austérité. 
Pour les autres, la monnaie unique a permis le développement de 
déséquilibres jumeaux et opposés : elle a conduit à la sous-évalua-
tion des économies des pays du Nord, ce qui les a autorisés à 
compenser leurs politiques excessives d’austérité salariale et 
sociales par des excédents extérieurs excessifs ; elle a autorisé la 
persistance de déficits extérieurs au Sud ; il faut une convergence 
contrôlée où la relance au Nord facilite la résorption des déséqui-
libres extérieurs au Sud.
— Pour les uns, chaque pays doit mettre en œuvre des poli-
tiques alliant une forte réduction des dépenses publiques – afin de 
résorber les déficits budgétaires et réduire le poids de la dette 
publique – et des réformes structurelles (libéralisation des marchés 
des biens et des services, déréglementation du marché du travail) 
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faut laisser les marchés financiers imposer aux pays la discipline 
nécessaire. Pour les autres, il faut maintenir les déficits publics tant 
qu’ils seront nécessaires pour soutenir l’activité, faire garantir les 
dettes publiques par la BCE afin de faire converger les taux 
d’intérêt nationaux vers le bas et mettre en œuvre une stratégie de 
croissance à l’échelle de l’UE (en particulier par le financement des 
investissements nécessaires à la transition écologique).
— Certains estiment même qu’il faut éviter l’extension de la 
solidarité européenne qui permettrait à certains pays de retarder les 
réformes nécessaires, qui rendrait persistants les déséquilibres, qui 
induirait de la création monétaire et donc de l’inflation. Il faut 
revenir à une application plus stricte du traité de Maastricht, sans 
solidarité entre pays, sans achat de titres publics par la BCE. L’Alle-
magne, déjà au plein emploi, ne peut relancer son économie. 
D’ailleurs, cela serait de peu d’utilité pour les pays du Sud qui ne 
vendraient pas beaucoup plus à l’Allemagne, compte tenu de la 
faiblesse de leur secteur industriel. L’Allemagne ne peut jouer le 
rôle de garantie ou de financeur pour l’ensemble de la zone. 
D’autres jugent que des erreurs de politiques économiques ont été 
commises depuis la création de la zone euro, qu’elles ont abouti à 
de fortes disparités dans la zone, qu’il faut essayer de résorber 
aujourd’hui par une stratégie solidaire et cohérente. L’Europe est 
une grande famille ; il faut manifester de la solidarité et accepter 
des compromis pour continuer à vivre ensemble.
— Pour les uns, la fin de la crise des dettes des pays de la zone 
euro suppose la mise en place d’une union budgétaire, ce qui 
signifie la mise en place de règles contraignantes inscrites dans le 
Pacte budgétaire et un certain fédéralisme budgétaire ; la Commis-
sion et le Conseil européen doivent avoir un droit de regard sur les 
politiques budgétaires des États membres. Pour les autres, il faut 
laisser aux États membres un degré d’autonomie nécessaire pour 
pratiquer la politique budgétaire de leur choix ; c’est à la fois une 
question de démocratie et d’efficacité économique : les situations 
économiques des pays sont trop diverses pour qu’une politique 
budgétaire uniforme soit possible ; il faut une coordination ouverte 
des politiques économiques, sans normes préétablies et rigides de 
finances publiques, ayant pour objectif une croissance satisfaisante 
et la résorption des déséquilibres extérieurs. 
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L’existence de la monnaie unique a conduit à l’apparition de désa-
justements permanents des taux de change intra-européens et à la
polarisation des soldes extérieurs. L’article de Virginie Coudert, Cécile
Couharde et Valérie Mignon : « Les mésalignements de taux de
change à l’intérieur de la zone euro » compare les taux de change
réels des pays de la zone euro avec des niveaux d’équilibre estimés
économétriquement qui dépendent de la productivité du travail et du
stock d’avoirs (ou de dettes) extérieurs. Il apparaît que la Grèce
connaissait en 2010 une surévaluation de 20 %, le Portugal de 14 %,
l’Espagne de 10 %, l’Italie de 6,5 %. En sens inverse, le taux de change
réel de la Finlande était sous-évalué de 7 %, celui de la France et l’Alle-
magne de 0,5 %. Les mésajustements des taux de change sont plus
prononcés et plus persistants durant la mise en place de la monnaie
unique ; ils sont particulièrement forts pour les pays périphériques.
Cependant, les fondements théoriques de cette méthode sont discu-
tables : elle ne prend pas en compte le besoin de croissance et
d’emploi, et en particulier le taux de chômage. Elle prend en compte le
stock d’actifs étrangers et non le solde courant. Ceci peut expliquer le
résultat plutôt surprenant pour la France. 
L’article de Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui :
« Désajustements de change, fédéralisme budgétaire et redistribu-
tion : Comment s'ajuster en union monétaire » évalue les
modifications de taux de change réel qui permettraient d’obtenir
simultanément le plein emploi et l’équilibre du solde extérieur. Il
obtient, pour l’année 2010, que le Portugal est surévalué de 25 %, la
Grèce de 18 %, l’Espagne de 15 %, la France de 12 % tandis que les
Pays-Bas sont sous-évalués de 9 %, l’Autriche de 11 %, l’Allemagne de
22 %. Le problème est que les pays d’Europe du Nord souhaitent avoir
un excédent pour accumuler des avoirs extérieurs pour financer  leurs
retraites futures ; l’équilibre décrit par les auteurs ne tient pas compte
de ces souhaits. Ceci met en évidence un problème de coordination
des politiques économiques : comment gérer un système monétaire où
certains pays souhaitent avoir de forts avoirs extérieurs tandis que les
marchés financiers refusent que les autres aient de fortes dettes. Les
auteurs proposent de faciliter les ajustements dans la zone euro soit
par un système de transferts des pays en meilleure situation que la
moyenne vers ceux en situation difficile, soit par un élargissement du
budget européen, qui introduirait des transferts automatiques vers les
pays en difficulté. Certes, les déséquilibres, après un choc dissymé-
trique, seraient moins importants. Mais les pays du Nord refusent un
système où ils risquent d’être en permanence contributeurs ; ils refu-
sent que les pays qui ont fait des efforts d’ajustement soient obligés de
Catherine Mathieu et Henri Sterdyniak26subventionner des pays qu’ils accusent de n’avoir pas fait d’efforts 
équivalents. Une autre stratégie également délicate à mettre en œuvre 
serait de financer par des euro-obligations des investissements produc-
tifs dans les pays en récession. Ceci ne règle cependant pas 
durablement les déséquilibres induits par le creusement des écarts de 
compétitivité.
Des indicateurs de la crise
L’article de Jasper Lukkezen et Hugo Rojas-Romagosa : « Indica-
teurs stochastiques de la soutenabilité de la dette » rappelle que le 
ratio dette publique/PIB reste stationnaire si le taux de croissance est 
supérieur au taux d’intérêt payé sur la dette ou si le gouvernement 
réagit à la hausse de la dette en réduisant le déficit public. Jusqu’en 
1980, les taux d’intérêt nominaux étaient faibles relativement au taux 
d’inflation et au taux de croissance ; la soutenabilité de la dette ne 
posait pas de problème. Depuis, si le Royaume-Uni, les États-Unis, la 
Belgique et les Pays-Bas tiennent compte du niveau de dette dans la 
conduite de leur politique budgétaire, ce ne serait pas le cas de 
l’Espagne et du Portugal, dont la dette serait donc devenue insoute-
nable. Cependant, les estimations économétriques sont conduites sur 
très longue période (1946-2010), ce qui fragilise le diagnostic sur 
l’Espagne : l’Espagne avait naguère une croissance supérieure à son 
taux d’intérêt ; ce n’est qu’à partir de 2009-2010 que la question de 
soutenabilité de sa dette se pose. 
L’article de Christophe Van Nieuwenhuyze : « Dettes, actifs et 
déséquilibres dans la zone euro, une vue globale » propose une 
analyse des actifs et des dettes des agents publics et privés de la zone 
euro. Il apparaît que la zone est globalement équilibrée ; durant la 
crise, le gonflement des déficits publics n’a fait que compenser la 
hausse des excédents des ménages et des entreprises. Au total, la zone 
euro souffre du creusement des disparités des soldes extérieurs et des 
situations nettes vis-à-vis de l’extérieur plutôt que d’un problème de 
dettes publiques. L’auteur propose donc une politique consistant, à 
court terme à financer ces déséquilibres par des flux financiers orga-
nisés par le SEBC et par des transferts budgétaires ; à moyen terme par 
des politiques structurelles (hausse de la compétitivité des pays du 
Sud,…). 
Les règles budgétaires
La crise des dettes souveraines des pays du Sud a conduit la 
Commission européenne et les pays du Nord de l’Europe à prôner le 
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adopter un Pacte budgétaire, qui impose aux pays membres de se 
donner l’objectif de moyen terme d’équilibrer leur solde structurel (ou, 
du moins, d’avoir un déficit structurel inférieur à 0,5 % du PIB) et à 
court terme de réduire chaque année leur déficit et leur ratio de dette, 
si ce dernier dépasse 60 % du PIB. 
L’article d’Achim Truger et Henner Will : « Manipulable et pro-
cyclique, une analyse détaillée du « frein à l’endettement » alle-
mand » critique le « frein à l’endettement » allemand qui a inspiré le 
Pacte budgétaire. Selon les auteurs, la limite de 0,35 % du PIB pour les 
déficits structurels est arbitraire et conduirait à long terme à une dette 
publique de 11,7 % du PIB, ce qui n’est ni crédible, ni optimal ; elle ne 
permet pas de financer les investissements publics par l’emprunt. 
Surtout, la règle n’est pas simple et transparente, en raison de la diffi-
culté à évaluer le solde structurel : d’ailleurs, la Commission change en 
permanence sa méthode de calcul. Enfin, cette méthode sous-évalue 
l’écart de production. Elle risque donc d’obliger à pratiquer des poli-
tiques budgétaires pro-cycliques en période de récession. 
L’article de Catherine Mathieu et Henri Sterdyniak : « Faut-il des 
règles de politique budgétaire ? » discute des justifications mises en 
avant pour instaurer des règles de politique budgétaire. La préoccupa-
tion d’éviter des politiques budgétaires trop expansionnistes milite 
pour l’introduction d’un « vraie » règle d’or des finances publiques, où 
le déficit public structurel serait égal à l’investissement public. Les 
préoccupations de stabilisation macroéconomique militent plutôt 
pour une règle du type : « le solde public doit assurer le niveau de 
demande maximum, compatible avec la stabilité des prix et un taux 
d’intérêt égal au taux de croissance ». Selon les auteurs, rien ne prouve 
que les déficits publics aient été globalement trop importants, avant et 
depuis la crise. La plupart des règles budgétaires proposées ne sont pas 
économiquement satisfaisantes, puisqu’elles ne permettent pas de 
suivre la politique optimale après un choc. L’article analyse les expé-
riences de la « règle d’or » au Royaume-Uni et du PSC dans la zone 
euro : le Royaume-Uni a abandonné sa règle durant la crise ; le PSC a 
créé des tensions inutiles avant la crise ; il n’a pas permis d’éviter la 
croissance des déséquilibres dans la zone puisqu’il ne tenait pas 
compte du solde extérieur et de l’endettement privé. L’article critique 
le traité budgétaire européen, qui repose sur les concepts théorique-
ment et empiriquement vagues de production potentielle et de solde 
structurel, qui impose une contrainte de moyen terme trop rigide ne 
permettant pas de financer les investissements publics par de l’endet-
tement, qui risque d’imposer des politiques budgétaires pro-cycliques, 
qui interdit les politiques budgétaires discrétionnaires pourtant indis-
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des conseils indépendants de politique budgétaire, comme si la poli-
tique économique devait échapper aux débats démocratiques.
Questions bancaires et monétaires
La question de la régulation des banques se pose avec acuité à 
l’heure actuelle. Là-aussi, deux points de vue s’opposent. Faut-il un 
« retour vers le passé », où les banques seraient appelées à concentrer 
leurs activités dans leur pays d’origine et à réduire leurs activités de 
marché au profit de leur rôle de distribution du crédit, sous la 
surveillance étroite d’autorités nationales ? Faut-il, au contraire, une 
union bancaire, où les banques seraient incitées à se diversifier à 
l’échelle de l’UE pour se répartir les risques, où le contrôle serait euro-
péen, où des normes prudentielles basées sur des ratios de bilan 
seraient mises en place ? La première solution tire les leçons des pertes 
qu’ont subies les banques européennes en se développant à l’extérieur 
de leur pays d’origine et en finançant des activités spéculatives, mais 
n’est guère conforme au Marché unique. La seconde fait courir le 
risque d’un manque de contrôle du système bancaire, qui conserverait 
de grandes marges de manœuvre pour s’accommoder des normes 
prudentielles sans tenir compte des besoins de financement des écono-
mies nationales.
L’article de Dominique Perrut : « Les réformes financières euro-
péennes et mondiales : bilan et perspectives » décrit et critique les 
réformes que le G20 et l’UE mettent en place pour améliorer la stabilité 
financière après la crise. Tirant les leçons de la crise financière, leur 
objectif est de mettre en place un nouveau modèle prudentiel, tant au 
niveau macro que microéconomique. Elles comportent ainsi les ratios 
de Bâle III, des normes prudentielles contra-cycliques, une certaine 
séparation entre les activités bancaires de détail et les activités de 
marché, la mise en place de procédures explicites de résolution des 
crises bancaires, une supervision plus étroite. L’auteur s’inquiète des 
marges d’interprétation laissées aux institutions financières ; de la 
concurrence entre les institutions soumises à la régulation et celles qui 
y échapperaient, de la complexité du dispositif mis en place en Europe, 
du risque de concurrence par le moins-disant réglementaire entre 
l’Union bancaire mise en place dans la zone euro, le Royaume-Uni et 
les États-Unis. 
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L’article de John FitzGerald : « Crise financière, ajustement 
économique et retour de la croissance dans l’Union européenne » 
analyse les expériences de sortie de récession qu’ont connues certains 
pays européens dans les années 1980-1995 ; il montre que la crois-
sance a souvent été impulsée par le commerce extérieur grâce à des 
changements de parité et au dynamisme de l’environnement écono-
mique, deux facteurs qui manquent aujourd’hui. L’article analyse 
ensuite la situation des pays les plus touchés par la crise. Il remarque 
que les pays qui avaient un secteur bancaire dominé par des banques 
étrangères (Hongrie, Estonie) n’ont pas connu l’alourdissement de 
dettes qu’ont connu des pays dont le secteur bancaire était national 
(Irlande, Espagne). La crise a montré que des déficits extérieurs impor-
tants étaient une source de fragilité, même s’il était possible, avant 
2007, de les financer sans difficulté. Les pays en crise ont connu des 
baisses impressionnantes de leur consommation et de leur investisse-
ment. La chute du secteur de la construction a fortement augmenté le 
taux de chômage des travailleurs non qualifiés. L’amélioration des 
finances publiques est très lente puisque les politiques restrictives 
réduisent l’activité et donc les rentrées fiscales. Selon l’auteur, la prio-
rité est de consolider les finances publiques ; mais, il reconnaît en 
même temps que cela demande une nette reprise de la croissance, ce 
qui nous semble peu compatible avec des politiques généralisées 
d’austérité. Il estime ensuite que les pays doivent améliorer leur 
compétitivité en réduisant le niveau des salaires. L’auteur met en garde 
contre la tendance actuelle de reconcentration des banques sur leur 
marché national ; il considère qu’un système bancaire intégré en 
Europe fournit des gains importants d’efficience. À long terme, il 
considère que c’est le manque de capital humain qui est le principal 
obstacle à la croissance, en particulier dans les pays du Sud où le 
chômage des non qualifiés est déjà élevé, où une forte reprise de l’acti-
vité dans la construction n’est pas souhaitable, où les générations qui 
arrivent sur la marché du travail ne sont pas assez formées ; un effort 
de formation continue lui semble indispensable. 
L’article de Kari Alho : « Comment restaurer la soutenabilité de 
la zone euro ? » construit un modèle comprenant deux pays en union 
monétaire et le reste du monde. Il cherche les conditions sous 
lesquelles la zone monétaire est stable face à des chocs dissymétriques. 
Théoriquement, la stabilité est assurée par la dynamique prix/compéti-
tivité : le pays le moins compétitif voit sa production baisser, ce qui 
fait diminuer ses salaires et restaure progressivement sa compétitivité. 
Cependant, ceci suppose qu’il ne pratique pas simultanément des poli-
tiques budgétaires ou de crédit expansionnistes. Si les marchés ne 
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pseudo-équilibre où le pays peu compétitif s’endette en permanence 
auprès de son partenaire. En cas de discrimination, on peut aboutir à 
des enchaînements instables où la dette d’un pays augmente sans cesse 
comme les taux d’intérêt qu’il supporte. Il faut donc imposer une règle 
budgétaire où un pays doit pratiquer une politique restrictive quand sa 
dette publique augmente, mais ceci peut induire des effets pervers si la 
hausse de la dette provient d’une politique budgétaire visant à 
compenser la faiblesse de la demande interne ou si la politique restric-
tive induit une forte baisse de la production qui entraîne une hausse 
du ratio de dette. En cas de déficit extérieur insoutenable, la solution 
réside dans la dévaluation interne (une réforme fiscale améliorant la 
compétitivité au prix de la baisse des salaires) ou dans des réformes 
structurelles (censées augmenter la compétitivité). L’article montre 
donc qu’il faut repenser les règles de fonctionnement de la zone. 
Toutefois, il ne propose pas de nouvelles règles : doivent-elles porter 
sur le solde public ou sur le solde extérieur ? En cas de déséquilibres, 
l’ajustement ne doit-il porter que sur le pays déficitaire ou ne faut-il 
pas examiner s’il y a une responsabilité du pays excédentaire ? 
L’article du Conseil des experts économiques allemands : « Un 
Pacte européen de rachat : mode d’emploi » propose de constituer 
un fonds pour garantir le remboursement de la part de la dette 
publique supérieure à 60 % du PIB. Les pays dont la dette dépasse ce 
montant (Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, Chypre, Espagne, France, 
Malte et Pays-Bas), à l’exception des pays soumis à un programme 
d’ajustement (Grèce, Irlande, Portugal), mettraient en commun dans 
un fonds la part de la dette qui dépasse 60 % du PIB et, en contrepartie, 
y transféreraient irrémédiablement des ressources fiscales permettant 
un remboursement en 25 ans. La France pourrait ainsi se faire financer 
une dette de 27 % de son PIB en transférant des recettes d’un montant 
de 1,3 % du PIB. Les marchés financiers, rassurés, accepteraient de 
détenir cette dette à un taux plus bas que les taux actuels (les auteurs 
envisagent un taux de 4 %, ce qui est pessimiste puisque la France 
s’endettait à la mi-2012 à 2 %). Par ailleurs, les pays devraient 
s’engager dans le Pacte budgétaire, donc ramener rapidement leur 
déficit structurel à 0,5 % du PIB. Ainsi, le ratio de dette diminuerait-il 
rapidement : en 2035, il serait de 58,5 % en Belgique (contre 97 % 
aujourd’hui), de 53,5 % en France (au lieu de 88 %), de 50 % en Alle-
magne (au lieu de 82 %), de 60 % en Italie (au lieu de 120 %). 
Cependant, les pays devraient engager des politiques budgétaires 
fortement restrictives en 2012-2015, qui représenteraient, selon le 
calcul des auteurs, 7 points de PIB pour l’Espagne, 5,6 points pour la 
France ; 4 points pour les Pays-Bas ; 3 points pour l’Italie et la Belgique. 
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sur l’activité, faisant l’hypothèse implicite que le multiplicateur 
budgétaire est nul. De même, il n’envisage pas que l’Europe puisse 
connaître des épisodes de ralentissement économique dans les 25 
prochaines années, qui pourraient nécessiter d’infléchir les politiques 
restrictives. Il ne s’interroge pas non plus sur les facteurs qui ont 
provoqué ces hausses des dettes publiques. Sont-ce des pêchés dont les 
États membres doivent se racheter ? Ou ces hausses étaient-elles néces-
saires compte tenu de la situation économique ? 
L’article de Pier Carlo Padoan, Urban Sila et Paul van den Noord : 
« Éviter les pièges de la dette, cran de sécurité monétaire et 
réformes structurelles » propose une maquette analytique qui 
présente deux équilibres : un bon avec une forte croissance, un faible 
taux d’intérêt et un bas ratio dette/PIB ; un mauvais, avec une crois-
sance médiocre, un taux d’intérêt élevé et un fort niveau de dette. À la 
suite d’un choc financier (comme une forte hausse de la dette), un 
pays peut connaître une spirale vers le mauvais équilibre : la hausse de 
la dette inquiète les marchés et provoque une hausse des taux 
d’intérêt, celle-ci pèse sur la croissance, ce qui augmente encore la 
dette, d’où une nouvelle hausse des taux… Les auteurs proposent 
d’échapper à cette spirale de trois façons : introduire des réformes 
structurelles qui permettraient d’impulser la croissance (mais ces 
réformes miracles existent-elles vraiment ?) ; pratiquer une politique 
monétaire expansionniste pour maintenir les taux d’intérêt à un bas 
niveau, mais, il faudrait distinguer le cas des pays du Sud de la zone 
euro, victimes de la spéculation du cas des autres pays (Allemagne, 
France, Royaume-Uni, États-Unis, Japon), qui ne souffrent pas de taux 
d’intérêt élevés, enfin des politiques budgétaires restrictives. L’impact 
de la politique budgétaire est ambigu dans la maquette. Si le multipli-
cateur budgétaire est élevé, une politique expansionniste soutient la 
croissance et permet une sortie vers le haut : la croissance réduit le 
ratio de dette et les taux d’intérêt. Au contraire, s’il est bas, la consoli-
dation budgétaire est expansionniste puisqu’elle réduit la dette et les 
taux d’intérêt. Les auteurs ont pris un multiplicateur de 0,1 beaucoup 
plus bas que la fourchette 0,8-1,2 sur laquelle s’accordent les travaux 
récents (évaluation qui devrait encore être augmentée pour des poli-
tiques mises en œuvre simultanément dans toute la zone). Ceci les 
amène à soutenir les politiques actuelles de consolidation budgétaire 
qui, selon eux, peuvent avoir des effets dépressifs à court terme, mais 
deviendraient expansionnistes à moyen terme. Le risque, selon nous, 
est que le remède tue le malade, avant d’être efficace. C’est ce que 
semblent montrer en 2012 les exemples de la Grèce, de l’Espagne et du 
Portugal. L’austérité ne rassure pas les marchés financiers et les poli-
Catherine Mathieu et Henri Sterdyniak32tiques structurelles ont peu d’impact dans une situation de détresse 
économique et sociale. 
L’article de Stephan Schulmeister : « Pour un Fonds monétaire 
européen, un problème systémique requiert une solution systé-
mique » explique la crise actuelle par le développement du capitalisme 
financier qui a fait gonfler les dettes publiques en imposant des taux 
d’intérêt supérieurs au taux de croissance ; les entreprises préfèrent les 
placements financiers aux investissements productifs ; elles ne 
s’endettent plus en termes nets alors que les ménages épargnent ; les 
gouvernements doivent alors accepter un gonflement de leur dette ; 
l’instabilité financière et la spéculation se nourrissent l’une de l’autre. 
Les politiques d’austérité budgétaire mènent à la récession et ne 
permettent pas de réduire le poids des dettes publiques. La prétendue 
surveillance effectuée par les marchés financiers est actuellement 
contre-productive et auto-réalisatrice. L’article propose de créer un 
Fonds Monétaire Européen (FME) qui financerait les pays membres en 
émettant des euro-obligations garanties par les pays et la BCE. Le FME 
maintiendrait un taux d’intérêt de long terme légèrement inférieur au 
taux de croissance. Le financement de chaque pays ne serait pas 
soumis à une contrainte numérique, mais serait décidé, au sein du 
FME, par les ministres des Finances des pays membres. Selon des simu-
lations réalisées avec un modèle macroéconométrique, cet accord 
permettrait d’aboutir à une croissance plus forte et à des ratios de dette 
plus faibles que la politique d’austérité actuelle. Mais, est-il possible de 
stabiliser les taux d’intérêt de long terme à un bas niveau, indépen-
damment de la politique monétaire ? Ce projet confie aux ministres 
des Finances la responsabilité de s’entendre sur les objectifs de déficit 
public pour chaque pays, ce qui est problématique (que faire en cas de 
divergences d’intérêt ou de stratégie macroéconomique entre pays ?), 
peu démocratique (le ministre des Finances devrait imposer au Parle-
ment le respect de l’objectif ainsi fixé), difficile à mettre en œuvre (que 
faire en cas de choc spécifique ou global ?).
La crise est-elle finie ? 
À la fin 2012, deux bilans contrastés peuvent être tirés de la crise. 
D’un côté, l’euro a survécu. Certes, les réactions des institutions euro-
péennes et des pays membres ont été lentes et hésitantes ; leurs 
réticences ont souvent nourri la spéculation. Mais les institutions 
européennes ont progressivement réussi à mettre en place des méca-
nismes de solidarité, comme le Fonds Européen de Stabilité Financière 
puis le Mécanisme Européen de Stabilité ; elles ont réussi à imposer 
aux États membres une forte discipline budgétaire (renforcement du 
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ont accepté de mettre en œuvre des politiques d’austérité et de 
réformes structurelles. Dès le début de la crise, la BCE a accepté de 
mettre en place des politiques non-conventionnelles ; elle a soutenu 
les dettes publiques des pays en difficulté en intervenant sur les 
marchés secondaires. Puis, elle a pu s’engager à venir en aide sans 
limite aux pays en difficulté qui mettaient en œuvre des politiques 
satisfaisantes, ce qui a permis de rassurer les marchés financiers et de 
faire baisser les primes de risques. 
De l’autre côté, la zone euro est incapable de retrouver une crois-
sance satisfaisante comme de récupérer les neufs points d’activité 
perdus du fait de la crise. Les pays membres ont été contraints de 
mettre en œuvre des politiques d’austérité en période de récession. 
Selon les perspectives de la Commission elle-même, le taux de 
chômage devrait rester à 11,8 % en 2013. Les déséquilibres entre pays 
persistent, même s’ils sont quelque peu atténués par la dépression 
profonde dans laquelle sont plongés les pays du Sud. Les normes 
rigides et sans fondements économiques imposées aux États membres 
ne remplacent pas une vraie coordination des politiques économiques. 
Les solidarités mises en place sont conditionnelles à la perte de toute 
autonomie et à l’instauration de politiques d’austérité drastiques. À 
l’avenir, les politiques nationales seront paralysées par les contraintes 
européennes et les menaces des marchés financiers. L’Europe sociale 
ne progresse pas ; pire, l’Europe impose aux pays en difficulté de 
mettre en cause l’universalité de l’assurance-maladie, de réduire les 
prestations de retraite, de chômage, de famille. La concurrence fiscale 
persiste ; la crise n’a pas été l’occasion pour mettre en cause les paradis 
fiscaux et l’évasion fiscale. Certes, l’Europe est à la pointe du combat 
contre le changement climatique, mais elle peine à s’engager résolu-
ment dans la transition écologique. De nombreux pays de la zone 
souffrent d’une désindustrialisation persistante, sans qu’une stratégie 
européenne de politique industrielle ne soit mise en œuvre. L’Union 
bancaire va être mise en place, sans que son contenu soit démocrati-
quement décidé. Les instances européennes persistent dans une 
stratégie – paralyser les politiques nationales, imposer des réformes 
structurelles libérales – qui jusqu’à présent n’a pas réussi à impulser la 
croissance et qui ont rendu l’Europe impopulaire. L’Europe manque 
cruellement d’un projet social fédérateur, d’une stratégie économique 
et d’un fonctionnement démocratique.
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LES MÉSALIGNEMENTS DE TAUX DE CHANGE 
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Malgré les parités fixes à l’intérieur de la zone euro, les taux de change effec-
tifs réels des pays membres ont suivi des trajectoires divergentes en raison des 
écarts d’inflation, conduisant notamment à une forte appréciation réelle dans 
les pays périphériques. Dans cet article, nous évaluons les mésalignements de 
taux de change sur la période 1980-2010 en recourant à l’approche BEER (Beha-
vioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate). Les résultats montrent que les pays 
périphériques de la zone euro souffrent d’un taux de change surévalué depuis 
le milieu des années 2000, leur appréciation réelle ne provenant pas d’une 
amélioration de leurs fondamentaux tels que la productivité ou la position 
extérieure nette. En moyenne au sein de la zone euro, les mésalignements de 
taux de change se sont accrus depuis la mise en place de l’union monétaire et 
sont devenus plus persistants. Plus fondamentalement, nos résultats montrent 
des trajectoires divergentes selon les pays membres, les mésalignements étant 
plus larges et plus persistants dans les pays périphériques que dans les pays du 
cœur de la zone euro.
Mots-clés : Zone euro, Taux de change réel d’équilibre, Mésalignements, Cointégration en panel.
La zone euro dans son ensemble présente un  compte extérieur 
équilibré, mais cette situation masque de profonds déséquilibres 
1. Nous remercions Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Gunther Capelle-Blancard, Benjamin Carton, 
Laurent Clerc et Henri Sterdyniak pour leurs commentaires sur une version antérieure de 
cet article.
2. Cet article reflète les idées personnelles des auteurs, mais ne rend pas compte de la position 
de la Banque de France. Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 127 (2013)
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sont en effet très divergentes entre l’Allemagne qui accumule des 
excédents et les pays du Sud comme l’Espagne, le Portugal et la 
Grèce dont  les déficits sont persistants. 
Au début des années 2000, la plupart des économistes pensaient 
que l’union monétaire faciliterait le financement des pays défici-
taires, en supprimant le risque de change à l’intérieur de la zone. 
Les déficits extérieurs seraient ainsi financés sans douleur, au taux 
d’intérêt commun (Blanchard et Giavazzi, 2002). L’intensification 
des mouvements de capitaux entre les pays membres permettrait à 
la zone euro de remplir automatiquement le critère d’intégration 
financière, nécessaire pour former une zone monétaire optimale 
selon Mundell (1961) ; la zone euro deviendrait alors une zone 
monétaire optimale de manière endogène (Frankel et Rose, 1998 ; 
Rose et Engel, 2000). À cette époque, l’approfondissement de 
l’intégration financière était censé aplanir les difficultés de finan-
cement des pays périphériques mais aussi faciliter leur convergence 
réelle. Non seulement, la contrainte extérieure des pays déficitaires 
allait être assouplie, mais les entrées de capitaux dont ils bénéficie-
raient viendraient renforcer leur productivité et accélérer leur 
rattrapage économique. 
La première décennie de l’union monétaire a donné raison aux 
optimistes quant à l’approfondissement de l’intégration finan-
cière : les flux de capitaux transfrontaliers à l’intérieur de la zone se 
sont beaucoup accrus et les pays déficitaires ont pu s’émanciper de 
la pression des marchés des changes qu’ils subissaient de plein 
fouet auparavant. Cependant depuis 2010, la crise de la dette a 
révélé la fragilité financière des pays déficitaires et montré que leur 
appartenance à une union monétaire ne leur garantissait nulle-
ment de pouvoir se financer à un taux d’intérêt commun. Non 
seulement, les taux d’intérêt sur la dette souveraine des pays du 
Sud se sont fortement accrus, mais ils ont emporté avec eux 
l’ensemble des taux d’intérêt débiteurs pour les agents privés de ces 
pays. Un processus de fragmentation est donc maintenant à 
l’œuvre dans l’espace financier européen. 
Comment expliquer ce retournement soudain ? En réalité, la 
crise a révélé des disfonctionnements à l’œuvre depuis le début de 
l’union monétaire, mais qui étaient restés masqués jusqu’alors par 
un climat de confiance excessive. Premièrement, les entrées de 
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productivité relative, mais plutôt à soutenir leur demande, notam-
ment en consommation et logement, contribuant à alimenter les 
pressions inflationnistes, mais aussi des bulles immobilières 
(Giavazzi et Spaventa, 2010). Cette situation s’est trouvée aggravée 
par les taux d’intérêt réels négatifs – résultant des taux d’intérêt 
nominaux assez bas communs à la zone euro – et de l’inflation plus 
élevée dans les pays du Sud. Deuxièmement, le risque de défaut 
souverain était considéré comme négligeable pour la plupart des 
pays développés avant la crise de 2010. Par conséquent, il y avait 
peu de différences entre les taux d’intérêt sur les obligations souve-
raines des pays de la zone euro, ce qui a contribué à faciliter 
l’endettement de ces économies. Les renflouements successifs de 
l’Etat grec, puis la restructuration de sa dette en début d’année 
2012, ont montré que le défaut d’un Etat développé à l’intérieur 
même de la zone euro était tout-à-fait possible. Ce risque devait 
donc être compensé par des taux d’intérêt plus élevés dans les pays 
risqués. Pire encore, un pays à l’intérieur d’une union monétaire 
avait une probabilité de défaut plus élevée qu’un pays ayant 
conservé sa monnaie, puisqu’il n’y avait ni mécanisme coercitif 
pour contraindre ses finances publiques, ni renflouement automa-
tique prévu en cas de difficultés. En l’état actuel du 
fonctionnement de la zone euro, la dette souveraine des pays peut 
être assimilée à une dette en monnaie étrangère, traditionnelle-
ment moins bien notée par les agences de notation qu’une dette en 
monnaie nationale, puisque le pays en risque de défaut ne peut pas 
utiliser directement la création monétaire pour rembourser (Boone 
et Johnson, 2011 ; Gros, 2011 ; de Grauwe, 2011 ; Pisani-Ferry, 
2012). Le risque de défaut souverain à l’intérieur de l’union moné-
taire, maintenant pris en compte par les marchés, a conduit à 
creuser profondément les écarts de taux d’intérêt entre les pays. 
Cependant, cette montée des spreads a été tellement violente, 
que l’on peut se demander si elle ne reflète pas davantage qu’un 
risque de défaut des États. En effet, une partie des spreads pourrait 
aussi être destinée à compenser les investisseurs contre le risque 
d’investir dans un pays qui abandonnerait ensuite l’euro. La prime 
de risque de change qui était censée être éradiquée par l’union 
monétaire serait ainsi réapparue, avec les mêmes consé-
quences « désagréables », c’est-à-dire des taux d’intérêt nettement 
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prime de risque de change venait alourdir les taux d’intérêt des pays 
déficitaires, pour compenser les pertes des investisseurs en cas de 
dévaluation. La prime de change était liée au fait que les pays défici-
taires, notamment les pays du Sud, ayant davantage d’inflation que 
l’Allemagne, se trouvaient régulièrement avec des monnaies suré-
valuées si le taux de change était maintenu fixe trop longtemps. Or 
cette situation pourrait se retrouver en union monétaire. 
En effet, bien que les taux de change soient complètement fixes 
entre les pays membres depuis l’adoption de l’euro, les taux de 
change réels continuent d’évoluer tant que l’inflation diffère d’un 
pays à l’autre. Ils se sont appréciés dans les pays du Sud, sous l’effet 
d’une inflation plus forte, entraînant une perte de compétitivité et 
une dégradation du commerce extérieur. Une question importante 
est de savoir si cette appréciation a conduit à une surévaluation des 
taux de change réels dans cette partie de la zone euro. Plusieurs 
études se sont penchées récemment sur cette question en utilisant 
une approche de taux de change d’équilibre fondamental (Funda-
mental Equilibrium Exchange Rate) ; leur conclusion révèle une 
grande divergence des pays membres quant aux mésalignements 
de leurs taux de change réels (Jeong et al. 2010 ; Cline et 
Williamson, 2011 ; Carton et Hervé, 2012).
Notre but dans cet article est de déterminer si les mésaligne-
ments des taux de change réels des pays membres se sont aggravés 
depuis l’union monétaire. Pour y répondre, nous évaluons les taux 
de change d’équilibre pour l’ensemble des pays membres en recou-
rant à une approche de taux de change d’équilibre 
comportementale (Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate) introduite 
par Clark et MacDonald (1998) et suivie par exemple par Alberola 
et al. (1999, 2002), Alberola (2003) et Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2009, 
2010). Plus précisément, nous estimons leur valeur d’équilibre par 
une méthode de cointégration en panel reliant les taux de change à 
leurs fondamentaux économiques sur la période 1980-2010. Nous 
calculons ensuite les mésalignements comme la différence entre les 
parités observées et les parités estimées par le modèle. Cette 
méthode nous permet de comparer les mésalignements entre pays 
membres en termes d’ampleur et de persistance. 
Dans la suite de cet article, nous fournissons une brève revue de 
la littérature sur la question des taux de change réels et des déséqui-
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d’estimation ainsi que les données sont présentées en partie 2. 
Nous commentons les résultats trouvés en termes de mésaligne-
ments des taux de change réels pour l’ensemble des pays membres 
dans la partie 3. Nous comparons ensuite les mésalignements 
avant et après l’union monétaire en termes d’ampleur et de persis-
tance dans la partie 4.
1. Revue de la littérature
1.1. Les divergences d’inflation et de taux de change réels  
dans la zone euro
Comme les parités nominales sont fixes à l’intérieur d’une 
union monétaire, une inflation plus forte dans un pays génère 
nécessairement une appréciation du taux de change réel de ce pays, 
qui peut susciter une perte de compétitivité et un creusement du 
déficit extérieur. Le critère d’inflation du Traité de Maastricht était 
destiné à éviter ce biais en faisant de la convergence des taux 
d’inflation un préalable à l’union monétaire. La politique moné-
taire commune était aussi censée compléter ce processus de 
convergence nominale. Cependant, les écarts d’inflation entre les 
pays ont persisté après l’union monétaire. 
Premièrement, l’union monétaire elle-même pourrait être à 
l’origine des divergences d’inflation et de croissance entre les pays. 
En effet, durant la première décennie de l’union monétaire, les 
pays du sud de la zone euro ont connu une forte baisse de leur taux 
d’intérêt liée à la disparition de leur prime de change. Cette situa-
tion favorable à l’endettement a renforcé la demande et les 
pressions inflationnistes. Les différentiels d’inflation seraient ainsi 
imputables aux écarts des cycles économiques, comme le montrent 
Andersson et al. (2009) en utilisant un panel de 12 pays membres 
sur la période 1999-2006. Ils pourraient aussi avoir été aggravés par 
des différences dans la transmission de la politique monétaire liées 
à la structure du marché des biens (Bulir et Hurnik, 2008). Plus 
fondamentalement, l’inflation a été tirée par les augmentations de 
salaires et les hausses de prix immobiliers dans les pays en rattra-
page, alors qu’elle est restée très contenue en Allemagne, 
notamment grâce aux réformes structurelles du gouvernement 
Schröder visant à limiter les salaires. 
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avaient encore des niveaux de revenus et de prix plus bas que ceux 
des pays du cœur de la zone euro. Par conséquent, il était logique 
d’attendre une inflation plus forte et une appréciation du taux de 
change réel dans ces pays tant que durerait leur rattrapage écono-
mique, ainsi que le prévoit l’effet Balassa-Samuelson. Cette 
convergence attendue des niveaux de prix expliquerait les écarts 
d’inflation dans les toutes premières années de l’union monétaire 
(Honohan et Lane, 2003). Cependant, l’effet Balassa-Samuelson 
n’est pas corroboré dans les années suivantes. Il n’expliquerait 
qu’une petite partie des écarts d’inflation, la productivité relative 
des biens échangeables ayant peu progressé dans les pays du Sud 
(Bulir et Hurnik, 2008). De même, la relation négative entre l’infla-
tion et le niveau de prix initial est difficile à établir (Beck et al., 
2009). L’effet Balassa ne semble pas décisif non plus pour expliquer 
l’inflation dans les pays pris individuellement, comme l’Espagne 
(Rabanal, 2009), ou l’Irlande (Honohan et Lane, 2003). 
1.2. Les déséquilibres extérieurs dans la zone euro 
Toujours dans cette première décennie de l’union monétaire, 
l’intégration financière accrue ainsi que le bas niveau des taux 
d’intérêt nominaux et réels dans les pays périphériques ont favo-
risé l’endettement et stimulé la demande dans les pays 
périphériques tout en décourageant l’épargne. Cette situation était 
alors perçue comme salutaire car les flux de capitaux étaient censés 
financer de « bons déséquilibres », dans le sens où ils permettraient 
une allocation efficiente des ressources à l’intérieur de la zone. Il 
semblait en effet normal que des pays en phase de rattrapage, avec 
un plus faible revenu par tête, aient des balances courantes défici-
taires. C’était le cas en zone euro, davantage que pour l’ensemble 
des pays de l’Union européenne (UE) ou de l’OCDE (Blanchard et 
Giavazzi, 2002). Ces résultats sont confirmés par Schmitz et von 
Hagen (2009) qui ont estimé une relation entre balances commer-
ciales et niveaux de revenu par tête pour un échantillon de 15 pays 
de l’UE sur la période 1981-2005. Les flux de capitaux ont été 
davantage orientés vers les pays à plus faibles revenus à l’intérieur 
de la zone euro, en comparaison avec l’ensemble des pays de l’UE 
— même s’il existe des différences entre les pays du Sud et les pays 
d’Europe centrale et orientale.  
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de la zone, allant de -14 % du PIB dans certains pays à 8 % dans 
d’autres. Leur valeur absolue atteignait 6 % du PIB en moyenne 
après l’union monétaire contre 3 % sur la période précédente 
(Barnes et al., 2010). Les différences de conjoncture et de compétiti-
vité expliquent ce phénomène. La dérive des coûts salariaux 
unitaires dans les pays en rattrapage s’est traduite par une détério-
ration de leur commerce extérieur puisque les pays les plus 
avancés, notamment l’Allemagne, menaient dans le même temps 
une politique visant à maîtriser les salaires afin de gagner en 
compétitivité. Selon Berger et Nitsch (2010), les déséquilibres 
courants des pays de la zone euro se sont accrus au début de 
l’union monétaire tout en devenant plus persistants. 
Ainsi, peu à peu s’est insinuée l’idée selon laquelle l’union 
monétaire pourrait aussi favoriser la formation de « mauvais désé-
quilibres », les entrées de capitaux dans les pays périphériques 
apparaissant excessifs par rapport à l’allocation optimale des 
ressources entre les pays membres. Pour le vérifier, il est possible de 
s’appuyer sur la méthode proposée par Chinn et Prasad (2003) qui 
expliquent les comptes courants en fonction de variables fonda-
mentales au moyen de régressions en panel sur un grand ensemble 
de pays. Toutes les variables étant prises en moyenne sur 5 ans 
pour éviter les effets cycliques, l’estimation du modèle fournit une 
norme pour un compte courant compatible avec les fondamentaux 
structurels du pays. Cette norme fournit une indication utile, bien 
qu’elle dépende des fondamentaux retenus dans le modèle et de 
l’échantillon choisi. En appliquant cette méthode sur un ensemble 
de pays de l’OCDE de 1969 à 2008, Barnes et al. (2010) montrent 
que les soldes courants à l’intérieur de la zone euro ont eu une 
ampleur bien plus importante que ceux prévus par le modèle entre 
2004 et 2008, qu’il s’agisse des excédents allemands, néerlandais 
ou bien des déficits grecs, portugais ou espagnols. Ce résultat est 
confirmé au moins pour les pays déficitaires par l’introduction 
dans le modèle d’une variable muette représentant les pays péri-
phériques de la zone euro qui s’avère significativement négative. 
Jaumotte et Sodsriwiboon (2010) concluent aussi que les déficits 
courants des pays du sud de la zone euro dépassent leur valeur 
estimée, même s’il y a de fortes différences entre les pays. Tous ces 
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monnaies des pays périphériques. 
2. Estimation des mésalignements : aspects méthodologiques
Nous calculons d’abord des taux de change réels d’équilibre 
pour les pays de la zone euro en estimant une relation de long 
terme entre leurs taux de change effectifs réels et les fondamentaux 
économiques. Nous déduisons ensuite les mésalignements – c’est-
à-dire les surévaluations ou sous-évaluations – comme les écarts 
entre les taux de change réels observés et leurs valeurs estimées par 
le modèle.  
2.1. La relation de long terme entre taux de change réels  
et fondamentaux
Nous suivons ici une approche comportementale du taux de 
change d’équilibre (Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate) et utili-
sons un modèle semblable à celui proposé par Alberola et al. (1999, 
2002) et Alberola (2003). Le taux de change réel effectif dépend de 
deux variables : (i) la productivité du secteur échangeable par 
rapport au secteur non échangeable – exprimée en termes relatifs 
par rapport aux partenaires – qui représente l’effet Balassa-
Samuelson ; une hausse de cette variable est censée améliorer la 
compétitivité extérieure du pays et faire s’apprécier son taux de 
change d’équilibre ; (ii) la position extérieure nette du pays, qui en 
s’améliorant augmente les revenus des capitaux entrant dans le 
pays, permettant ainsi une appréciation du taux de change réel 
sans dégradation de la balance courante. Nous retenons ces deux 
variables fondamentales car leur effet à long terme sur le taux de 
change réel est attesté par de nombreuses études empiriques (voir 
par exemple Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2009, 2010), ce qui nous conduit 
à estimer l’équation suivante : 
(1) 
où rit désigne le taux de change réel effectif du pays i à la période t
(pris en logarithme), yit représente la productivité relative du 
secteur échangeable (en logarithme) et NFAit sa position extérieure 
nette en pourcentage du PIB. αi est un coefficient destiné à capter 
des effets fixes et εit désigne le terme d’erreur de la régression. 
itititiit NFAyr εββα +++= 21
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2010 pour onze pays de la zone euro (Allemagne, Autriche, 
Belgique, Espagne, Finlande, France, Grèce, Irlande, Italie, Pays-
Bas, Portugal) ainsi que pour la zone euro elle-même prise dans son 
ensemble. Les taux de change effectifs réels, extraits de la base de 
données fournie par la Banque des Règlements Internationaux 
(BRI), sont des moyennes pondérées de 27 taux de change bilaté-
raux déflatés par les prix à la consommation ; les pondérations 
reflètent le poids du commerce bilatéral ainsi que la concurrence 
exercée sur les marchés tiers (Klau et Fung, 2006). La productivité 
relative du secteur échangeable est approximée par le PIB par tête 
rapporté à celui d’une moyenne pondérée des partenaires commer-
ciaux (source : WEO, FMI)3. Les positions extérieures nettes sont 
extraites de la base de Lane et Milesi-Ferretti (2007) pour la période 
1980-2007, actualisées ensuite en cumulant les comptes courants 
en dollars et rapportées au PIB en dollars (source : WEO, FMI). 
L’application de divers tests de racine unitaire et de cointégra-
tion en panel montre qu’il existe bien une relation de long terme 
entre nos variables. Nous estimons ensuite le vecteur de cointégra-
tion, qui nous fournit les coefficients β1 et β2 sur les variables 
explicatives de l’équation (1). Les constantes αi sont calculées de 
façon à ce que la moyenne des résidus estimés soit nulle. Une fois 
la relation de long terme établie, nous effectuons des tests afin de 
vérifier que ces coefficients sont stables sur la période et notam-
ment n’ont pas été affectés par l’union monétaire elle-même. Les 
détails et l’ensemble des résultats de ces tests sont fournis dans le 
document de travail (Coudert et al., 2012). 
2.2. Le calcul des mésalignements  
La méthode repose sur l’hypothèse que le taux de change réel 
estimé par le modèle correspond bien à l’équilibre de long terme 
compatible avec les fondamentaux économiques du pays. Les 
mésalignements sont calculés comme les écarts entre les valeurs 
3. Les statistiques disponibles ne permettent pas d’appréhender précisément la variable de 
productivité adéquate, qui nécessiterait de connaître l’évolution des heures travaillées et de la 
valeur ajoutée par secteur pour tous les pays de l’échantillon. En conséquence, nous choisissons 
de retenir ici le PIB par tête en PPA comme mesure de la productivité d’un pays. Bien que n’étant 
pas exempte de biais dus aux effets demande, cet indicateur apparaît comme l’un des plus 
fiables. 
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par le modèle. Un signe positif (négatif) indique une surévaluation 
(sous-évaluation). Ainsi, par construction, le taux de change réel 
d’un pays peut devenir surévalué pour deux catégories de raisons : 
soit simplement parce qu’il s’est apprécié, soit parce que le taux de 
change d’équilibre s’est déprécié sous l’effet d’une dégradation des 
fondamentaux du pays. La surévaluation d’un pays peut donc 
provenir de quatre facteurs : les deux premiers sont les causes 
d’appréciation du taux de change réel à l’intérieur d’une union 
monétaire : (i) l’appréciation de l’euro contre les monnaies tierces, 
(ii) ou bien une inflation plus élevée dans le pays par rapport aux 
partenaires ; les deux suivants sont liés à la dépréciation du taux de 
change d’équilibre d’un pays : (iii) une baisse de sa productivité 
relative, (iv) ou bien une dégradation de sa position extérieure nette 
résultant généralement de l’accumulation de déficits extérieurs.  
Par construction aussi, notre méthode impose de fixer un point 
d’équilibre au cours de la période sous revue. Nous avons choisi ici 
d’imposer que le taux de change observé soit égal au taux de 
change d’équilibre en moyenne sur l’ensemble de la période pour 
chacun des pays de l’échantillon. Ce choix se justifie par le fait que 
cette moyenne est calculée sur une période suffisamment longue, 
plus de trente ans. En effet, en raison de la relation de cointégra-
tion que nous avons mise en évidence, le taux de change réel 
observé ne peut s’écarter durablement de son équilibre. Plus la 
période est longue, plus l’équilibre sera atteint souvent au cours de 
la période, le taux de change réel alternant périodes de sur-évalua-
tion et sous-évaluation. C’est pourquoi considérer que l’équilibre 
est atteint en moyenne sur longue période est sans doute une 
hypothèse plus satisfaisante que de choisir arbitrairement une 
période, où cet équilibre serait réalisé.   
3. Les résultats 
Les résultats de nos calculs de mésalignements sont représentés 
dans le graphique 1 en ce qui concerne les pays du cœur de la zone 
(Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, France et Pays-Bas). Le mésaligne-
ment du taux de change réel de l’euro figure aussi sur le graphique 
pour fournir un élément de comparaison. Les mésalignements 
calculés pour ces pays ont évolué parallèlement à ceux de l’euro, 
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surprenant car, par construction, le taux de change effectif réel des 
pays de la zone euro est beaucoup moins volatil que celui de l’euro 
lui-même. En effet, il est calculé par rapport à des partenaires 
commerciaux dont la majorité est aussi à l’intérieur de la zone euro 
et donc en change nominal fixe, alors que le taux de change 
effectif de l’euro lui-même est calculé par rapport à des pays exté-
rieurs à la zone euro dont les monnaies sont pour la plupart en 
changes flexibles. Par exemple, quand l’euro s’est déprécié de 16 % 
entre 1998 et 2000 en termes effectifs réels, la dépréciation n’a 
excédé 8 % dans aucun des pays membres, en termes effectifs réels. 
Cependant, alors que le taux de change effectif réel observé de 
l’euro est plus volatil que ceux des pays membres, son taux de 
change d’équilibre est plus stable puisqu’il est estimé par le modèle 
sur la base de la moyenne des données des pays membres pour la 
productivité et la position extérieure nette. Cette situation 
explique pourquoi les mésalignements que nous calculons pour 
l’euro sont plus importants que ceux des pays membres.  
Au début des années 2000, les  pays ont bénéficié de la déprécia-
tion de l’euro, leurs taux de change réels devenant sous-évalués. La 
situation s’est inversée ensuite, lorsque l’euro s’est fortement 
apprécié contre les devises tierces (de 41 % de 2000 à 2009, avant 
une dépréciation de 7 % en 2010).  En fin de période, l’euro est 
surévalué d’environ 15 % en 2009 et 8 % en 2010. Pourtant, les 
pays du cœur de la zone euro n’en sont guère affectés : les taux de 
change réels sont à peu près à l’équilibre en France et en Alle-
magne, tandis que l’Autriche, la Belgique et les Pays-Bas ne 
connaissent qu’une très faible surévaluation (moins de 5 %) ; la 
Finlande bénéficie même d’un taux de change réel sous-évalué, du 
fait de l’amélioration continue de ses fondamentaux depuis le 
début de l’union monétaire4. 
La situation est bien différente dans les pays périphériques 
(Espagne, Grèce, Irlande, Portugal) dont les taux de change réels 
sont fortement surévalués en fin de période (graphique 2). 
4. La forte surévaluation de la monnaie finlandaise au début des années 1990 provient de la 
crise financière violente qui a frappé le pays à cette époque.
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Portugal, bénéficiaient pourtant de monnaies très sous-évaluées en 
début de période mais la surévaluation a été continue et croissante 
depuis 2000. La trajectoire est un peu différente pour l’Espagne et 
l’Italie, même si le résultat est similaire en fin de période. Ces deux 
pays pâtissaient déjà d’une certaine surévaluation au début des 
années 1990 lorsque leurs monnaies adhéraient au système moné-
taire européen. La dévaluation de leurs monnaies en 1992-1993 
Graphique 1. Mésalignements des taux de change réels effectifs de l’euro 
et des pays du cœur de la zone euro, en %
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Les mésalignements de taux de change réels à l’intérieur de la zone euro 49leur a fourni un gain de compétitivité durable, leur permettant 
d’entrer dans l’union monétaire avec des taux de change réels 
sous-évalués. Cependant, comme pour la Grèce et le Portugal, la 
persistance d’une inflation légèrement supérieure à celle des autres 
pays de la zone euro et la dégradation des fondamentaux ont peu à 
peu érodé cet avantage et conduit de nouveau à la surévaluation 
des monnaies.  
Graphique 2. Mésalignements des taux de change réels effectifs de l’euro 
et des pays périphériques, en %
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n’a pas vraiment été corrigée après la crise de 2008 malgré la dépré-
ciation de l’euro en fin de période. La position extérieure des pays 
périphériques a continué à se dégrader, la productivité ne s’est pas 
améliorée et, au moins jusqu’en 2010, fin de notre échantillon, 
l’inflation est restée supérieure dans les pays périphériques à 
l’exception de l’Irlande. Les surévaluations restent importantes 
pour la Grèce (20 %), le Portugal (14 %), l’Espagne (10 %) et l’Italie 
(7 %). Seule l’Irlande a réussi à résorber sa surévaluation pendant la 
crise (de 14 % en 2008 à 5 % en 2010) au prix d’une politique de 
rigueur drastique qui a fait baisser les salaires et les prix. 
Lorsque l’on compare les pays à l’intérieur de la zone euro en 
2010, la surévaluation apparaît particulièrement forte dans le 
groupe des pays du Sud (Espagne, Portugal et Grèce)  (graphique 3). 
Leur taux de change réel est davantage surévalué que celui de 
l’euro lui-même, alors que les taux de change fixes à l’intérieur de 
la zone euro devraient amortir les mésalignements de l’euro par 
rapport au reste du monde.  
Graphique 3. Mésalignements des taux de change réels effectifs de l’euro 
et des pays membres, en 2010
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4.1. Les mésalignements se sont-ils amplifiés ? 
Nous comparons maintenant les deux périodes avant et après 
l’union monétaire, de façon à déterminer si les mésalignements se 
sont réduits ou amplifiés après l’adoption de l’euro. D’un côté, 
l’union monétaire aurait pu stabiliser les parités effectives réelles 
puisque la majeure partie des partenaires sont en changes fixes. 
D’un autre côté, les changes fixes pourraient avoir suscité une suré-
valuation dans les pays du sud de l’Europe où l’inflation est restée 
plus forte. 
Le graphique 4 compare la moyenne des mésalignements en 
valeur absolue pour les deux sous-périodes avant et après l’union 
monétaire : 1988-1998 et 1999-2010. Trois résultats ressortent de 
ce graphique. Premièrement, les mésalignements sont plus élevés 
depuis l’union monétaire pour 8 pays sur 11. Deuxièmement, les 
mésalignements sont plus grands en moyenne pour les pays dits 
périphériques et la Finlande dans les deux périodes considérées par 
rapport aux pays du cœur de la zone euro. 
Graphique 4. Mésalignement moyen en valeur absolue avant et après 
l’union monétaire








AUT BEL FIN FRA DEU NLD GRC IRL ITA PRT ESP
1988-1998
1999-2010
Virginie Coudert, Cécile Couharde et Valérie Mignon524.2. Les mésalignements sont-ils devenus plus persistants ?
Un autre élément important à considérer est la vitesse à laquelle 
ces mésalignements se résorbent. Une surévaluation est certaine-
ment plus néfaste pour le commerce extérieur et l’économie du 
pays si elle persiste pendant de nombreuses années par rapport à 
une situation où elle serait rapidement corrigée. Or, avant l’union 
monétaire, la surévaluation pouvait être rapidement effacée par une 
dévaluation. Il faut donc se demander si la fixité des taux de change 
nominaux à l’intérieur de la zone euro a ralenti l’ajustement. 
Pour mesurer la persistance, nous considérons les coefficients 
d’auto-corrélation du premier ordre de la série des mésalignements 
au cours des deux périodes (tableau 1). Plus l’auto-corrélation est 
forte, plus les mésalignements ont tendance à persister dans le 
temps. Deux conclusions ressortent de la comparaison de ces coef-
ficients. Premièrement, les mésalignements sont plus persistants 
après l’union monétaire qu’ils ne l’étaient auparavant. Le coeffi-
cient d’auto-corrélation pour l’ensemble de l’échantillon est en 
effet supérieur sur la dernière période (0,78) à sa valeur sur la 
période précédente (0,64). Ceci est le cas pour les pays du cœur et 
les pays périphériques. Deuxièmement, les mésalignements sont 
plus persistants dans les pays périphériques que dans les pays du 
cœur de la zone. En d’autres termes, les déséquilibres de taux de 
change réels sont plus lents à être corrigés dans ces pays. Il faut plus 
de 4 ans pour résorber la moitié d’une surévaluation dans ces pays 
(coefficient d’autocorrélation 0,85), contre un peu plus d’un an 
seulement dans les pays du cœur (coefficient de 0,54). 
Tableau 1. Coefficient d’auto-corrélation du premier ordre 
pour les mésalignements
1980-2010 1980-1998 1999-2010
Total de l’échantillon 0,8050 0,6447** 0,7817**
Pays du cœur 0,6510 0,4034* 0,5410*
Pays périphériques 0,8668 0,7512* 0,8510*
Note : ** (resp. *) : les coefficients sont significativement différents entre les deux périodes, au seuil de 5 % (resp. 
10 %).
Source : Estimations des auteurs.
Les mésalignements de taux de change réels à l’intérieur de la zone euro 535. Conclusion
L’union monétaire était censée stabiliser le taux de change 
effectif des pays membres en fixant leurs parités nominales bilaté-
rales. Cependant, les taux de change réels ont continué à diverger 
en raison des écarts d’inflation entre les pays et de leur exposition 
différente aux pays tiers. Leurs divergences s’expliquent surtout par 
les taux d’inflation plus élevés dans les pays périphériques. 
Nos résultats montrent que les taux de change effectifs réels 
sont surévalués pour les pays périphériques depuis la seconde 
moitié des années 2000. Cette situation tient à plusieurs facteurs : 
(i) l’inflation plus forte dans ces pays qui a provoqué une apprécia-
tion de leur taux de change réel ; (ii) l’appréciation de l’euro contre 
les pays tiers qui a aggravé les problèmes de compétitivité ; (iii) la 
dégradation de la position extérieure nette de ces pays qui a 
conduit à une dépréciation de leur taux de change réel d’équilibre ; 
(iv) leur productivité relative qui n’a pas progressé suffisamment 
pour enrayer cette dépréciation du taux de change d’équilibre.  
Selon nos estimations, l’ampleur des mésalignements a 
augmenté depuis l’adoption de l’euro et ce phénomène est particu-
lièrement marqué dans les pays périphériques. Les déséquilibres de 
taux de change réels sont aussi plus lents à se résorber en union 
monétaire par rapport à la période précédente, où les dévaluations 
nominales étaient encore pratiquées. Les ajustements par les prix et 
les salaires sont bien plus longs à mettre en œuvre et difficiles à 
accepter par les populations. 
Les trois pays membres les plus frappés par la crise en 2010-
2011, la Grèce, l’Irlande et le Portugal, sont ceux qui présentent 
aussi la plus forte surévaluation de leur taux de change réel effectif 
en 2010. Les problèmes de la dette souveraine et bancaire, qui ont 
concentré tous les regards ces dernières années, ne sont donc pas 
les seuls défis auxquels la zone euro doit maintenant faire face. Les 
écarts de compétitivité à l’intérieur de la zone constituent aussi un 
enjeu majeur pour sa pérennité. Une meilleure surveillance des 
écarts de conjoncture et d’inflation entre les pays membres est 
nécessaire pour éviter de nouvelles dérives. 
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DÉSAJUSTEMENTS DE CHANGE, FÉDÉRALISME 
BUDGÉTAIRE ET REDISTRIBUTION
COMMENT S’AJUSTER EN UNION MONÉTAIRE1
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CEPN-CNRS, Université Paris Nord
La crise de la zone euro illustre les carences des mécanismes d’ajustement 
dans une union monétaire caractérisée par une forte hétérogénéité. Cette situa-
tion reflète un diagnostic simple. Au niveau de l’ensemble de la zone, l’euro est 
proche de son taux d’équilibre. Mais l’euro est fortement surévalué pour les pays 
d’Europe du Sud, y compris la France, et largement sous-évalué pour les pays 
d’Europe du Nord, en particulier l’Allemagne (Jeong et al., 2010). Dans un 
premier temps, cet article donne une évaluation de ces mésalignements de 
change au sein de la zone euro, en utilisant une approche FEER. De plus, en utili-
sant des données de panel sur la période 1994-2010, nous confirmons que les 
mésalignements de taux de change ont divergé, reflétant des évolutions insou-
tenables. Enfin, nous estimons les augmentations ou les réductions de coûts en 
pourcentage du PIB induits par ces désajustements pour les différents pays euro-
péens. Dans un second temps, nous utilisons une modélisation « stock-flux 
cohérente » à deux pays d’une union monétaire dans la lignée de Godley et 
Lavoie (2007) et de Duwicquet et Mazier (2010). Un budget fédéral est introduit 
avec des dépenses fédérales et des transferts sociaux financés par des impôts 
fédéraux et par l’émission d’euro-obligations. Le rôle stabilisateur d’un tel 
budget fédéral est confirmé face à des chocs asymétriques au sein de l’union. 
Parallèlement, le rôle stabilisateur d’euro-obligations destinées à des projets 
d’investissement est illustré.
Mots-clés : Mésalignements de taux de change, Ajustements, Union monétaire, Crise de la zone euro.
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Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui58La crise de la zone de la zone euro illustre les carences des 
mécanismes d’ajustement dans une union monétaire caractérisée 
par une forte hétérogénéité. Les mécanismes d’ajustement sont 
définis au sens large comme des mécanismes qui permettent à un 
pays à la suite d’un choc de retourner à la situation initiale.
Les ajustements de taux de change étant impossibles, il existe 
peu de mécanismes alternatifs. La politique budgétaire commune 
pourrait jouer un rôle actif dans le cadre d’un Etat fédéral mais elle 
est inexistante actuellement dans le cas européen. Des marchés de 
capitaux mieux intégrés, avec une diversification accrue des porte-
feuilles et des crédits intra-zone, ont été proposés comme un 
mécanisme d’ajustement puissant par l’approche du risk sharing
international. Le crédit intra-zone et les revenus de capitaux tirés 
des portefeuilles internationaux auraient des coefficients de stabili-
sation de l’ordre de 20 à 30 % chacun (Asdrubali et Kim, 2004). Ces 
résultats ont été utilisés dans les années 2000 par les partisans 
d’une politique économique libérale dans l’Union européenne afin 
de promouvoir une intégration financière accrue sans développer 
de budget fédéral (Commission européenne, 2007 ; Trichet, 2007). 
Néanmoins, les fondements théoriques et les résultats empiriques 
apparaissent très contestables (Clévenot et Duwicquet, 2011).
Reste la flexibilité des prix et des salaires afin de remplacer, au 
moins en partie, les ajustements de taux de change. En fait, celle-ci 
permet uniquement un retour très lent et partiel vers l’équilibre 
avec d’importants coûts en termes de croissance et d’emploi et de 
grandes différences entre pays, en raison de fortes spécificités struc-
turelles. Elle est moins efficace lorsqu’elle est mise en œuvre dans 
des pays interdépendants, comme c’est le cas dans la zone euro et 
plus particulièrement pour les pays d’Europe du Sud (Mazier et 
Saglio, 2008). Un diagnostic simple peut être porté sur les déséqui-
libres actuels. Au niveau de l’ensemble de la zone euro, la balance 
courante est proche de l’équilibre et le déficit budgétaire est plus 
faible que dans plusieurs autres pays de l’OCDE. L’euro est proche 
de son taux d’équilibre. Mais les déséquilibres intra-européens sont 
très importants. L’euro est fortement surévalué pour les pays 
d’Europe du Sud, y compris la France, et largement sous-évalué 
pour les pays d’Europe du Nord, en particulier l’Allemagne (Jeong
et al., 2010).
Désajustements de change, fédéralisme budgétaire et redistribution 59Ces mésalignements de change freinent la croissance et indui-
sent des déficits courants au Sud alors que la croissance est 
accélérée au Nord par les exportations, en particulier vers le reste 
de la zone euro. Cette situation est équivalente à des réductions de 
coût en faveur du Nord et à des augmentations de coût au détri-
ment du Sud, ce qui est largement ignoré dans le débat public.
Cet article est organisé de la manière suivante. Dans un premier 
temps, nous estimons ces mésalignements de change au sein de la 
zone euro, en utilisant une approche FEER, et nous les comparons 
avec d’autres estimations. En utilisant des données de panel sur la 
période 1994-2010, nous confirmons que les désajustements de 
taux de change dans la zone euro ont divergé, reflétant des évolu-
tions insoutenables. 
Dans un second temps, nous utilisons une modélisation « stock-
flux cohérente » à deux pays d’une union monétaire dans la lignée 
de Godley et Lavoie (2007) et de Duwicquet et Mazier (2010). Un 
budget fédéral est introduit avec des dépenses fédérales et des 
transferts sociaux financés par des impôts fédéraux et par l’émis-
sion d’euro-obligations. Le rôle stabilisateur d’un tel budget fédéral 
est confirmé face à des chocs asymétriques au sein de l’Union. 
Parallèlement, le rôle stabilisateur d’euro-obligations destinées à 
des projets d’investissement est illustré.
1. Désajustements de change intra-européens  
et modifications des coûts
1.1. Hétérogénéité des désajustements au sein de la zone euro
Depuis le milieu des années 2000, on observe un accroissement 
marqué des déséquilibres de balance courante dans la zone euro en 
dépit d’une balance courante proche de l’équilibre pour l’ensemble 
de la zone. D’une part, les pays d’Europe du Nord ont accumulé de 
larges excédents courants et d’autre part, les pays d’Europe du Sud 
ont connu d’importants déficits courants (graphique 1). Ces évolu-
tions reflètent, au moins en partie, une hétérogénéité croissante 
des mésalignements de taux de change au sein de la zone euro.
En utilisant une approche FEER introduite par Williamson 
(1994), Jeong et al. (2010) montrent que les taux de change des 
Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui60pays d’Europe du Nord sont de plus en plus sous-évalués et que 
ceux des pays d’Europe du Sud sont de plus en plus surévalués.
Dans cette section, nous estimons des FEERs pour dix pays euro-
péens (Allemagne, Autriche, Espagne, Finlande, France, Grèce, 
Italie, Irlande, Pays-Bas, Portugal) sur la période 1994-2011. Le 
FEER2 est défini comme le taux de change d’équilibre qui prévaut 
lorsque l’économie mondiale atteint simultanément les équilibres 
internes et externes pour tous les partenaires commerciaux. Cette 
mesure est obtenue à l’aide d’un modèle de commerce interna-
tional. On calcule les taux de change qui seraient nécessaires pour 
que tous les pays puissent atteindre l’équilibre externe (une 
balance courante égale à un niveau objectif) et l’équilibre interne 
(la pleine utilisation du potentiel productif). Pour chaque pays, 
l’objectif de balance courante est fonction de déterminants fonda-
mentaux tels que les actifs nets extérieurs (en pourcentage du PIB) 
ou le ratio de dépendance démographique (part de la population 
âgée de moins de 15 ou de plus de 65 ans rapportée à la population 
Graphique 1. Déséquilibres courants en pourcentage du PIB de la zone euro
Pays excédentaires : Allemagne, Pays-Bas, Autriche, Finlande. Pays déficitaires : France, Italie, Espagne, Portugal, 
Irlande, Grèce.
Sources : Perspectives de l’économie mondiale, FMI, avril 2012. Calculs des auteurs.
2. Taux de change d’équilibre fondamental, « Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate » en 
anglais. La méthode utilisée est présentée d’une manière détaillée dans Jeong et al. (2010). C’est 
une synthèse de travaux précédents sur le FEER (Borowski et Couharde, 2003 ; Jeong et Mazier, 
2003) et de la méthode d’inversion des matrices symétriques, SMIM (Symmetric Matrix Inversion 












Désajustements de change, fédéralisme budgétaire et redistribution 61âgée de 15 à 64 ans)3. L’objectif est estimé économétriquement sur 
données de panel pour les pays industrialisés. L’équilibre interne 
est défini comme un écart de production nul.
Les taux de change d’équilibre sont d’abord calculés pour les 
principales devises (dollar, euro, yuan, yen, livre sterling, reste du 
monde) à l’aide du modèle de commerce international. Les taux de 
change d’équilibre sont ensuite calculés pour chaque pays euro-
péen en utilisant un modèle de commerce extérieur propre à 
chaque pays. La cohérence des taux de change d’équilibre de 
chaque « euro national » avec le taux de change d’équilibre de 
l’euro est obtenue en répartissant au prorata (du poids du PIB du 
pays dans celui de la zone) le faible résidu existant.
3. En fait, les objectifs de balance courante peuvent ne pas être cohérents à l’échelle mondiale 
si leur somme n’est pas égale à zéro. Cette cohérence devrait être assurée par un processus 
mondial de coordination. La méthode d’inversion des matrices symétriques utilisée ici fait jouer, 
à tour de rôle, à chaque pays, le rôle du pays résiduel. Pour ce pays résiduel, le taux de change 
d’équilibre n’est pas associé à sa balance courante d’équilibre. La valeur moyenne des taux de 
change d’équilibre pour chaque pays est calculée en excluant la valeur du taux de change du 
pays traité comme résiduel. Cette méthode a l’avantage d’être symétrique. Au final, la balance 
courante de chaque pays s’écarte un peu de son niveau désiré pour que la cohérence mondiale 
soit assurée, le processus de négociation qui aboutit à cet accord n’est pas modélisé.
Tableau 1. Désajustements en termes effectifs réels 
En %
EUZ AUT FIN FRA DEU IRL ITA NLD PRT ESP GRC
1994 -3,4 -5,9 -4,6 0,3 -13,4 0,9 6,3 -2,1 6,7 3,8 16,8
1995 1,2 -5,8 9,7 3,9 -6,9 6,3 13,7 3,3 17,1 13,4 9,0
1996 4,2 -3,6 14,9 9,5 0,9 6,4 15,0 6,1 0,8 7,1 0,5
1997 3,5 -6,5 19,2 17,4 -1,0 2,8 10,5 4,0 -13,8 5,5 -5,0
1998 0,6 -3,0 18,0 15,9 -4,7 -0,2 5,6 -1,6 -19,7 0,5 -2,3
1999 2,0 0,3 20,7 22,7 -4,9 3,6 5,0 2,5 -25,0 -4,7 -8,6
2000 0,1 6,7 27,1 13,0 -2,8 3,4 5,0 1,9 -29,9 -7,4 -11,7
2001 6,9 8,6 34,3 19,6 8,6 6,6 10,9 5,6 -28,6 -4,6 -5,7
2002 6,6 19,9 33,1 12,4 13,5 3,9 5,9 1,9 -20,7 -5,1 -6,1
2003 2,2 8,8 17,9 2,9 8,1 -0,9 -1,0 3,0 -14,5 -9,8 -8,1
2004 6,6 9,7 21,4 1,6 17,8 1,3 6,8 7,8 -22,7 -16,1 3,5
2005 1,8 9,2 11,2 -7,0 17,3 -1,8 4,6 7,4 -36,1 -30,3 -5,1
2006 0,3 10,6 12,2 -7,4 19,3 -2,5 2,1 9,0 -37,3 -40,0 -20,9
2007 0,1 15,4 16,7 -9,0 23,6 -6,2 4,9 8,4 -31,5 -48,3 -31,4
2008 -2,6 20,3 12,0 -13,9 22,2 -7,6 1,9 7,8 -41,9 -48,8 -33,4
2009 0,6 12,2 4,4 -9,6 21,4 0,3 2,9 6,3 -30,8 -17,1 -20,7
2010 1,6 10,9 4,8 -11,8 21,8 7,6 -1,2 9,1 -25,1 -15,2 -18,5
2011 3,3 14,4 1,5 -13,0 23,1 7,0 3,1 11,5 -7,9 -5,5 -21,8
Estimations pour 2011 basées sur les Perspectives de l’économie mondiale, FMI, avril 2012. Taux de change effectifs 
réels basés sur les prix à la consommation.  
Source : Calculs des auteurs.
Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui62Depuis le début des années 2000, nous assistons à une augmen-
tation importante de l’hétérogénéité des désajustements dans la 
zone euro (tableau 1). Nous pouvons observer une scission entre 
certains pays qui sont de plus en plus sous-évalués (comme l’Alle-
magne, l’Autriche, les Pays-Bas et la Finlande) et les autres qui sont 
de plus en plus surévalués (comme la Grèce, le Portugal, l’Espagne 
et la France). En moyenne depuis 2005, l’Allemagne, l’Autriche, les 
Pays-Bas et la Finlande ont été sous-évalués de 13 % alors que la 
Grèce, le Portugal, l’Espagne et la France ont été surévalués de 
23 %. Cette hétérogénéité structurelle est au cœur des problèmes 
actuels de l’euro.
Depuis 2008, nous observons une réduction des désajustements 
pour certains pays du Sud de l’Europe (Portugal, Irlande et, dans 
une certaine mesure, Grèce). Ces mouvements ont été induits prin-
cipalement par de larges dévaluations effectives réelles en Irlande, 
Espagne et Grèce, comme le montre l’évolution des taux de change 
effectifs réels basés sur les coûts unitaires de la main-d’œuvre dans 
le graphique 2. Ces politiques de dévaluations internes sont très 
coûteuses en termes de croissance et d’emploi et ont mené à une 
aggravation de la crise en Europe du Sud. Ce point important sera 
discuté dans la troisième partie de cette section.
Graphique 2. Taux de change effectifs réels relatifs à la zone euro 
(base 100 en 1999)
Taux de change effectifs réels basés sur les coûts unitaires de la main-d’œuvre. Base de données de la Commission 
européenne sur les prix et la compétitivité-coût. 
Données disponibles sur ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/competitiveness/documents/areea17.xls



















Désajustements de change, fédéralisme budgétaire et redistribution 631.2. Comparaison avec d’autres estimations de désajustements  
de change
Premièrement, nous comparons nos résultats avec ceux de Cline 
et Williamson (2011b). Ces auteurs utilisent une approche FEER 
basée sur la méthode d’inversion des matrices symétriques décrite 
dans Cline (2008). Les principales différences avec notre approche 
sont, d’une part, un traitement plus simple du commerce extérieur 
(pour chaque pays, la balance courante ne dépend que du taux de 
change réel), et d’autre part, une cible de balance courante ad hoc. 
Dans le cas des pays de la zone euro du tableau 2, Cline et 
Williamson proposent deux estimations. Dans la première, ils 
calculent la variation de taux de change effectif réel nécessaire 
pour atteindre une cible de balance courante qui stabilise la posi-
tion extérieure nette en 2011. Dans la deuxième, ils calculent la 
variation de taux de change effectif réel nécessaire pour atteindre 
une cible de balance courante de -3 % du PIB pour les pays défici-
taires qui dépassent ce niveau et de +3 % du PIB pour les pays 
excédentaires qui dépassent ce niveau ; cette norme de 3 % est 
arbitraire. Dans l’ensemble, les résultats sont largement similaires 
aux nôtres, la Grèce et le Portugal montrent de larges surévalua-
tions. L’Allemagne est plus sous-évaluée dans nos résultats, 
principalement en raison d’un vieillissement marqué de sa popula-
tion. Dans notre approche, nous estimons les objectifs de balances 
courantes à l’aide de données de panel avec des variables explica-
tives parmi lesquelles figurent les ratios de dépendance 
démographique. Une part plus importante de population dépen-
dante réduit l’épargne nationale désirée et donc l’objectif 
d’excédent de balance courante4.
Deuxièmement, nous comparons nos résultats obtenus avec 
une approche FEER avec des désajustements obtenus avec une 
approche BEER5 (Coudert et al., 2012). Cette approche introduite 
par Clark et MacDonald (1998) consiste à estimer l’impact des 
déterminants de long terme sur la dynamique du taux de change à 
4. La prise en compte dans le calcul de la balance courante d’équilibre d’un ratio de 
dépendance anticipé (et non plus actuel) conduirait toutes choses égales par ailleurs à une 
moindre sous-évaluation de l’« euro allemand ». Mais le même phénomène jouerait pour les 
pays du Sud aux populations vieillissantes (Espagne, Italie) ce qui accroîtrait leur surévaluation.
5. Taux de change d’équilibre comportemental, « Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate » en 
anglais.
Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui64l’aide de techniques économétriques. Plusieurs auteurs ont sélec-
tionné des spécifications parcimonieuses avec des variables telles 
que la position extérieure nette et la productivité relative. Une 
accumulation d’actifs extérieurs induit une appréciation du taux 
de change ; une augmentation de la productivité dans le secteur 
des biens échangeables relativement au secteur des biens non-
échangeables implique une appréciation du taux de change (cette 
variable capture le fameux effet Balassa-Samuelson). Après l’esti-
mation de la relation de cointégration, les mésalignements sont 
obtenus par la différence entre le taux de change observé et le taux 
de change d’équilibre (i.e. le produit du vecteur de cointégration et 
des valeurs observées des variables explicatives). Cette approche a 
le défaut de faire l’hypothèse implicite que le taux de change réel 
effectif était à l’équilibre en moyenne sur la période observée.
Les désajustements BEER sont, principalement, des écarts par 
rapport à une valeur moyenne du taux de change effectif réel sur la 
période étudiée. Les pays ayant des taux d’inflation élevés, dans 
une union monétaire, vont subir une plus forte appréciation effec-
tive réelle. Si cette appréciation ne provient pas d’une amélioration 
de la position extérieure nette ou de la productivité relative, ces 
pays seront de plus en plus surévalués. À l’inverse, les désajuste-
ments FEER sont, principalement, des écarts à une valeur moyenne 
de la balance courante sur la période étudiée. Dans une union 
monétaire, un accroissement du déficit de balance courante va 
produire une surévaluation croissante.
Dans l’approche BEER, la France et l’Allemagne sont proches de 
l’équilibre en raison de taux d’inflation inférieurs à ceux des pays 
périphériques (tableau 3). Dans l’approche FEER, la France est de 
Tableau 2. Comparaison avec les estimations de Cline et Williamson 
pour 2011 
En %
Allemagne Italie Espagne Irlande Portugal Grèce
2011a 23,1 3,1 -5,5 7,0 -7,9 -21,8
2011b 10,8 -11,2 -3,2 0,0 -22,0 -27,0
2011c 5,4 -2,0 -3,5 0,0 -20,7 -27,0
Sources :  a. Nos estimations sont basées sur les Perspectives de l’économie mondiale du FMI, avril 2012.
b. Prévisions de Cline et Williamson basées sur les Perspectives de l’économie mondiale du FMI, avril 2011 (Cline et 
Williamson 2011b). Les balances courantes stabilisent la position extérieure nette de 2011.
c. Prévisions de Cline et Williamson basées sur les Perspectives de l’économie mondiale du FMI, avril 2011 (Cline et 
Williamson 2011b). Les balances courantes ne dépassent pas 3% du PIB en valeur absolue.
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7 % en 2005 à 13 % en 2011) en raison de déficits courants persis-
tants. À l’inverse, l’Allemagne est de plus en plus sous-évaluée (de 
8 % en 2003 à 23 % en 2011) à cause de larges excédents courants, 
même durant la crise (autour de 6 % depuis 2008). De notre point 
de vue, la divergence entre les approches FEER et BEER reflète le fait 
que le FEER prend en compte des évolutions structurelles qui sont 
largement ignorées dans l’approche BEER. En particulier, le déclin 
de la compétitivité française contraste avec les bonnes perfor-
mances allemandes, comme en témoigne l’évolution des balances 
courantes observées et d’équilibre. L’approche BEER semble ne pas 
être adaptée pour décrire des problèmes structurels de balance 
courante dans la zone euro en raison de son horizon temporel 
(López-Villavicencio et al., 2012).
Pour les pays périphériques, les résultats sont plus convergents. 
Ils indiquent des surévaluations à deux chiffres lors des années 
2000. Pour l’Espagne (surévaluée de près de 10 %), le Portugal 
(surévalué de près de 15 %) et la Grèce (surévaluée de près de 
20 %), les deux mesures de taux de change d’équilibre sont proches 
en raison de déficits courants qui s’écartent de leurs valeurs 
moyennes et de fortes appréciations effectives réelles qui écartent 
les taux de change réels effectifs de leurs valeurs moyennes.
Tableau 3. Comparaison avec les estimations de Coudert et al. pour 2010 
En %
2010a 2010b











Sources :  a. Nos désajustements effectifs réels obtenus par une approche FEER.
b. Désajustements effectifs réels obtenus par une approche BEER (Coudert et al., 2012).
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Dans certaines approches de taux de change d’équilibre comme 
le BEER ou la PPA, les désajustements sont nécessairement station-
naires sur la période étudiée. En effet, dans ces approches, les 
désajustements sont des résidus d’une relation de long terme entre 
le taux de change effectif réel et ses déterminants, ce qui rend le 
désajustement stationnaire par définition. Dans le cas des pays 
européens sur la période 1994-2010, l’hypothèse de taux de change 
à l’équilibre sur la période étudiée (i.e. d’un désajustement station-
naire) semble irréaliste puisque ces pays ont suivi des trajectoires 
divergentes concernant leur compétitivité, comme le montrent les 
évolutions des déséquilibres courants (graphique 1).
Dans le long terme et au niveau mondial, les FEERs et les taux de 
change effectifs réels sont intégrés et cointégrés. En d’autres 
termes, les désajustements sont stationnaires pour un panel de 
pays industrialisés et émergents sur la période 1982-2007 pour des 
raisons de soutenabilité de la dette extérieure (Saadaoui, 2011). 
Néanmoins pour les pays européens sur la période 1994-2010, il 
semble improbable que les désajustements aient été stationnaires.
Dans un premier temps, nous effectuons plusieurs tests de 
racine unitaire en panel sur les séries de FEERs et de taux de change 
effectifs réels (TCER)6. Cette étape nous permet de déterminer si les 
FEERs et les TCERs sont des séries non stationnaires de type I(1). 
Une série est non stationnaire de type I(1) si elle devient station-
naire après avoir été différenciée une fois. Comme dans les études 
empiriques précédentes (Zhou, 1993 ; Barisone et al., 2006 ; 
Saadaoui, 2011), nous détectons la présence de racines unitaires 
dans les séries de FEERs et de TCERs.
Comme nous pouvons le voir, dans le tableau 4, les séries de 
FEERs et de TCERs sont non stationnaires en niveau puisque nous 
acceptons la présence de racine unitaire dans tous les tests (excepté 
le test LLC à 5 % pour les séries de FEERs). En outre, les séries de 
FEERs et TCERs sont stationnaires en première différence puisque 
nous rejetons l’hypothèse nulle de présence de racine unitaire dans 
tous les tests.
6. Nous utilisons les logarithmes naturels des séries dans les tests. Les taux de change effectifs 
réels proviennent de la BRI et sont en base 100 en 2000.
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thèse d’indépendance inter-individuelle. Cette hypothèse est 
clairement trop restrictive pour un panel de pays européens qui 
partagent la même monnaie. Pour s’assurer de la robustesse des 
résultats, nous appliquons le test CADF introduit par Pesaran 
(2007) en soustrayant les moyennes inter-individuelles retardées 
aux équations ADF usuelles, ce test est robuste aux dépendances 
inter-individuelles (i.e. l’existence de chocs communs).  
Comme nous pouvons le voir dans le tableau 5, les séries de 
FEERs et de TCERs sont non stationnaires en niveau et station-
naires en première différence. Nous pouvons conclure que les 
séries sont non stationnaires de type I(1). Après avoir établi ces 
premiers résultats, la seconde étape consiste à tester s’il existe une 
relation de long terme entre ces deux variables (i.e. si le désajuste-
ment est stationnaire) durant la période étudiée.
Tableau 4. Tests de racine unitaire en panel
Test: LLC Breitung F_ADF F_PP LLC Breitung F_ADF F_PP
Différence : Non Non Non Non Oui Oui Oui Oui
Variable 
exogènes : Aucune Aucune Aucune Aucune Aucune Aucune Aucune Aucune
Hypothèse nulle : RU RU RU RU RU RU RU RU
RU commune : Oui Oui Non Non Oui Oui Non Non
TCER 0,77 0,87 8,60 9,02 -1,90** -2,97*** 36,53** 49,38***
FEER -1,75** -0,57 22,48 21,68 -6,07*** -2,95*** 49,32*** 84,14***
«RU» indique l’hypothèse nulle de présence de racine unitaire. Les symboles **, *** indiquent la stationnarité au sens 
statistique à 5 % et à 1 %, respectivement. Le tableau présente différents tests de racine unitaire en panel : Levin, 
Lin, et Chu (2002) (LLC); Breitung (2000); Maddala et Wu (1999) et Choi (2001) pour les tests de racine unitaire en 
panel de type Fisher (F_ADF et F_PP). 
Source : Calculs des auteurs.
Tableau 5. Intégration des TCERs et des FEERs







Les p-values sont entre parenthèses. Les symboles **, *** indiquent la stationnarité au sens statistique à 5 % et à 1 %, 
respectivement.
Source: Calculs des auteurs.
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gente sans hypothèse sur le vecteur de cointégration, nous 
utilisons les tests de cointégration de Pedroni (1999).
Dans le tableau 6, nous acceptons l’hypothèse nulle d’absence 
de cointégration dans la plupart des tests (à l’exception des tests 
panel ADF et group ADF à 5 %). Les résultats indiquent, clairement 
une divergence sur la période étudiée pour ces pays européens. 
Pour s’assurer de la qualité des résultats, nous appliquons des tests 
de cointégration qui autorisent les dépendances inter-individuelles 
(Westerlund, 2007). L’existence d’un terme à correction d’erreur 
négatif et significatif est considérée comme une preuve de cointé-
gration. En cas de dépendances inter-individuelles entre les 
membres du panel, les valeurs critiques peuvent être obtenues par 
la méthode du « bootstrap ».
Les statistiques en panel et « group mean » suggérées par 
Westerlund (2007) indiquent clairement que l’hypothèse nulle 
d’absence de cointégration est rejetée, même en présence de 
dépendances inter-individuelles (tableau 7).
Les tests de racine unitaire et de cointégration en panel 
montrent que les désajustements de change ont divergé au sein de 
la zone euro. Nous ne détectons pas de relation de long terme entre 
TCERs et FEERs (les désajustements sont non stationnaires). Ce 
résultat indique que les pays européens ont connu des évolutions 
insoutenables de leur compétitivité sur cette période. Ceci soulève 
la question des ajustements nécessaires à la restauration de la 
compétitivité des pays surévalués.
Selon Belke et Dreger (2011), une réduction du coût relatif du 
travail est une priorité pour les pays surévalués. Une dégradation de 
la compétitivité pour les pays excédentaires serait nécessaire pour 
réduire les déséquilibres intra-européens mais elle serait difficile à 
faire accepter par ces pays. Dès lors, la seule voie possible consiste 
en une réduction des coûts unitaires du travail des pays d’Europe 
du Sud afin de réduire les déséquilibres au sein de la zone euro.
Une telle proposition soulève plusieurs types de questions 
(Mazier et Saglio, 2008). En réduisant la demande interne, elle est 
coûteuse en termes de croissance et d’emploi, particulièrement 
dans les pays de taille relativement grande comme l’Espagne ou 
l’Italie. Elle est peu efficace dans les pays peu ouverts sur l’exté-
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pays plus largement ouverts, comme l’Irlande ou, plus encore, 
comme les pays baltes ou la Slovaquie. Elle est d’autant moins effi-
cace qu’elle est mise en œuvre simultanément dans un ensemble 
de pays interdépendants. Du fait de son impact négatif sur la crois-
sance dans les pays surévalués, l’effet total d’une telle mesure sur 
les ratios dette extérieure ou dette publique sur PIB est ambigu 
puisqu’une croissance plus lente tend à augmenter ces ratios.  
Depuis les dix dernières années, l’évolution des désajustements 
de change dans la zone euro a reflété des trajectoires divergentes en 
termes de compétitivité. Ces évolutions sont une des causes 
majeures de la crise actuelle de la zone euro. Afin de faire face à ces 
évolutions asymétriques, un budget fédéral important pourrait 
Tableau 6. Tests de cointégration en panel
Test de cointégration en panel 
Hypothèse nulle : absence de cointégration
Nombre d’observations 170
Nombre d’individus 10





Hypothèse alternative : Coefficients autorégressifs individuels
Group rho 1,62 (0,94)
Group PP 0,48 (0,68)
Group ADF -2,13 (0,02) 
Les p-values sont entre parenthèses. 
Source : Calculs des auteurs.
Tableau 7. Cointégration entre TCERs et FEERs
Gτ Gα Pτ Pα







Les p-values pour les tests de cointégration sont basés sur des méthodes de « bootstrap », Persyn et Westerlund 
(2008).
Source : Calculs des auteurs.
Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui70aider les pays surévalués à compenser les handicaps de coûts et à 
aller vers des nouvelles activités en améliorant leur spécialisation 
internationale.
1.4. Réduction et accroissement des coûts liés aux désajustements 
de change
Le désajustement de change est un concept pertinent au niveau 
intra-européen si on admet qu’un taux de change d’équilibre peut 
être déterminé pour chaque pays membre.
 Dans une telle hypothèse le désajustement de change génère 
un gain (une réduction des coûts) ou une perte (un accroissement 
des coûts) en termes de compétitivité pour chaque pays concerné. 
Sur cette base, un équivalent transfert associé au désajustement de 
change et correspondant à cette réduction ou à cet accroissement 
des coûts peut être calculé dans une union monétaire. Une poli-
tique de sous-évaluation de la monnaie (ou de maintien d’un taux 
de change déprécié) est formellement équivalente à une combi-
naison de taxes sur les importations et de subventions à 
l’exportation. Pour évaluer ces réductions et accroissements de 
coûts liés aux désajustements de change, on se limite au cas simple 
d’un taux de change bilatéral avant de donner une évaluation 
empirique7.
1.4.1. Variations de coûts dans le cas bilatéral
Le désajustement de change est exprimé en écart relatif entre le 
taux de change observé E et le taux de change d’équilibre Ee:
Avec E, taux de change bilatéral observé8, Ee, taux de change 
d’équilibre bilatéral nominal, e, désajustement bilatéral, p, prix 
domestiques, p*, prix étrangers.
Comme nous pouvons le voir dans l’équation ci-dessus, la suré-
valuation (e < 0), se traduit par une compétitivité prix plus faible ; 
une sous-évaluation (e > 0) par une compétitivité-prix plus élevée. 
7. Le cas de deux pays de la zone euro face au reste du monde est présenté dans le Document de 
travail du CEPN n° 2012-04.
8. Une augmentation de E correspond à une dépréciation bilatérale nominale.
 ( ) ** 1 . eE pEp e
p p
= +
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au désajustement de change peut être obtenu en égalisant le 
niveau observé de compétitivité (Ep*/p) et le niveau de compétiti-
vité associé au taux de change d’équilibre (Eep*/p), corrigé des 
variations de coût T, soit Eep*/p(1+T). Nous obtenons :
La surévaluation (e < 0, T > 0) provoque un coût unitaire addi-
tionnel (p(1+T)). Le pays souffre d’une perte de compétitivité. La 
sous-évaluation (e > 0, T < 0) induit une réduction du coût unitaire 
et une subvention pour les entreprises. Le pays bénéficie d’une 
amélioration de sa compétitivité.
En niveau, ex ante, la surévaluation impose un coût additionnel 
pour les exportations (T.pxX) et, de manière symétrique, un coût 
additionnel pour les producteurs locaux en compétition avec les 
produits importés (T.pmM). Pour le pays surévalué, le coût addi-
tionnel total, en pourcentage du PIB est égal à [T.(pxX+pmM)]/pY. 
En pratique, une part importante de produits importés n’est pas en 
compétition avec les producteurs locaux (matières premières, biens 
non produits localement). Cette part dépend de la spécialisation 
internationale de chaque pays. En première approximation nous 
supposons dans l’évaluation empirique que seulement la moitié 
des importations est en compétition avec les produits domes-
tiques. Cela donne un coût additionnel en pourcentage du PIB égal 
à [T.(pxX+0,5pmM)]/pY. Il est important de noter que le coût 
supplémentaire est une fonction positive du taux d’ouverture. 
Pour un même désajustement de change, un pays très ouvert 
comme l’Irlande va souffrir d’un accroissement de coût plus 
marqué en cas de surévaluation qu’un pays moins ouvert comme 
la Grèce ou le Portugal.
À titre d’illustration, une surévaluation de 10 % (T=1/9), avec 
un degré d’ouverture « corrigé » de 30 % ((pxX+0.5pmM)/pY = 30%) 
donne un prélèvement de 3,3 % du PIB (1/9*0,3= 0,033).
 
( ) ( )
* **1. 1 .
1
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désajustements
Les variations de coûts entre pays européens engendrées par les 
désajustements de change intra-européens estimés ci-dessus 
peuvent être calculées en utilisant la formule précédente. Deux 
évaluations sont données, la première par pays en moyenne pour 
trois sous-périodes entre 2000 et 2011, compte tenu des désajuste-
ments de change observés et des degrés d’ouverture des pays 
(tableau 8), la deuxième, en agrégeant, pour les deux groupes de 
pays de l’Europe du Nord et du Sud les coûts supplémentaires qui 
ont été enregistrés au cours des années 2000 (graphique 3).
La sous-évaluation de l’euro pour les pays du Nord de la zone 
euro (Allemagne, Finlande, Autriche et Pays-Bas) se traduit ex ante
par des réductions de leurs coûts unitaires pour des montants de 
grande ampleur (de l’ordre de 10 % du PIB en moyenne par an au 
milieu des années 2000). Les pays du Sud de la zone euro (Portugal, 
Espagne et Grèce) se trouvent dans la situation opposée. Du fait de 
la surévaluation de leurs monnaies, ils supportent des coûts de 
production additionnels ayant atteint des montants considérables 
pour l’Espagne et le Portugal au milieu des années 2000. La France, 
bien que moins touchée, n’en subit pas moins des coûts supplé-
mentaires de l’ordre de 5 % de PIB depuis le milieu des années 
Tableau 8. Variations des coûts liées aux désajustements de change observés 
En % PIB
2000-2004 2005-2008 2009-2011
Allemagne -4,2 -11,2 -12,1
Pays-Bas -3,7 -8,0 -9,3
Autriche -6,8 -10,1 -8,7
Irlande -3,7 5,7 -6,8
Finlande -12,0 -7,5 -2,0
Italie -2,0 -1,4 -0,6
France -3,6 4,3 5,1
Espagne 4,1 31,9 5,7
Grèce 2,6 12,9 9,2
Portugal 14,6 29,8 13,9
Coûts moyens par sous-périodes exprimés en % du PIB de chaque pays. 
Source : Calculs des auteurs.
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depuis l’ouverture de la crise, une politique drastique de dévalua-
tion réelle qui a inversé la situation. L’Italie n’a pas été pénalisée 
par la surévaluation de l’euro et est demeurée en matière de change 
et de compétitivité dans une situation plus proche de l’équilibre.
Les coûts supplémentaires effectivement observés au cours des 
années 2000 entre pays européens ont été calculés en sommant 
d’une part, les pays surévalués de l’Europe du Sud et d’autre part, 
les pays sous-évalués de l’Europe du Nord, compte tenu des désa-
justements de change estimés pour chaque année et des degrés 
d’ouverture de chaque pays9. Pour des raisons institutionnelles 
l’Italie a été laissée dans l’Europe du Sud bien qu’elle soit moins 
affectée par le phénomène de surévaluation. Depuis l’introduction 
de l’euro, les coûts supplémentaires au sein de la zone euro ont été 
favorables aux pays du Nord et de plus en plus défavorables aux 
pays du Sud (graphique 3).
Entre 2000 et 2004, les pays du Sud étaient déjà surévalués et 
ont été pénalisés par des surcoûts équivalents à 2 % de leur PIB 
chaque année. Inversement les pays du Nord sous-évalués ont 
bénéficié de réductions de leurs coûts équivalents à 6 % du PIB en 
moyenne à la même période. Depuis 2005, nous observons une 
augmentation brusque de la surévaluation des pays du Sud qui 
atteint en moyenne 25 % en 2008. Ces désajustements de change 
intra-européens ont eu un impact considérable avec des surcoûts 
équivalents à 14 % du PIB pour les pays du Sud en 2008 tandis que 
les pays du Nord bénéficiaient d’une situation inverse avec des 
réductions de leurs coûts de l’ordre de 10 % de leur PIB à cette 
même date. Depuis 2009, ces surcoûts ont diminué du fait de la 
réduction des désajustements de change, partiellement induite par 
la compression des coûts unitaires du travail en Irlande, Espagne et 
Grèce. Néanmoins les pays du Nord bénéficient toujours d’impor-
tantes réductions de leurs coûts (autour de 6 % du PIB) alors que les 
pays du Sud subissent des surcoûts pour des montants similaires 
(graphique 3). Cette situation de déséquilibres persistants entre 
pays du Sud et pays du Nord provient de l’hétérogénéité structu-
relle en termes de compétitivité. Les mécanismes de stabilisation 
9. Comme les désajustements de change sont inversement reliés au degré d’ouverture du pays, 
les deux effets se compensent en partie dans le calcul de l’impact des modifications de coût.
Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui74mis en œuvre à travers les politiques d’austérité et de compression 
des coûts sont à la fois peu efficaces et très pénalisants en termes de 
croissance et d’emploi.
Il importe de rappeler que l’évaluation de l’impact de ces modi-
fications de coûts liées aux désajustements de change entre pays 
européens est de nature ex ante. Évaluer leur impact ex post suppo-
serait l’utilisation d’un modèle décrivant explicitement les 
échanges intra et extra-européens. Cette question ne pourra être 
que partiellement traitée dans la section suivante. Nous nous limi-
terons à ce stade à une remarque. Selon le théorème des élasticités 
critiques, un pays qui subit une appréciation réelle de sa monnaie 
voit son solde commercial en valeur se détériorer car les effets 
volume l’emportent sur les effets prix, à condition que la somme 
des élasticités prix à l’exportation et à l’importation soit supérieure 
à 1 en valeur absolue, ce qui est le cas dans les estimations utilisées 
(Jeong et al., 2010). Un pays surévalué, pénalisé par un accroisse-
ment de ses coûts de production, voit son commerce en valeur se 
détériorer et sa croissance en volume freinée.
1.5. Transferts et système d’assurance budgétaire
Ces modifications de coûts dues aux désajustements de change 
ont un impact sur les niveaux d’activité qui pourrait être compensé 
Graphique 3. Accroissement ou réduction des coûts induits par les désajustements
   En % du PIB
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les années 1990 par la Commission européenne elle-même. Pour 
simplifier, nous retenons le mécanisme suggéré par Italianer et 
Pisani-Ferry (1992)10. En cas d’augmentation du taux de chômage 
plus élevée dans un pays que dans le reste de l’Union, ce pays béné-
ficie de transferts via un budget européen. Ces transferts sont 
calculés de la manière suivante :
Avec Ui, le taux de chômage en pourcentage du pays i, UiEU, le 
taux chômage du reste de l’Union.
Les estimations effectuées sur les années 1980, avec des trans-
ferts plafonnés à 2 % du PIB, donnaient un coût moyen annuel 
modeste (de l’ordre de 0,23 % du PIB européen). Les calculs ont été 
repris sur les années 1996-2011. Ils donnent des résultats assez 
proches : un coût moyen de 0,21 % du PIB avec plafonnement des 
transferts à 2 % du PIB, 0,26 % du PIB sans plafonnement pour les 
pays membres de la zone euro ; 0,26 % et 0,28 % du PIB (avec ou 
sans plafonnement) lorsque le mécanisme concerne tous les pays 
de l’UE, y compris le Royaume-Uni. Le tableau 9 donne les calculs 
pour l’Europe à 27 sans plafonnement11. Les transferts sont en 
moyenne plus importants pour les pays de l’Europe du Sud (Grèce, 
0,75 %, Portugal, 0,71 %, Espagne, 1,05 %, Irlande, 0,87 %), à 
l’exception de la France et de l’Italie, ainsi que pour les pays baltes. 
L’Allemagne est également bénéficiaire (0,27 % en moyenne, 
concentré au début des années 2000). Certaines années les trans-
ferts non plafonnés peuvent atteindre des montants importants de 
l’ordre de 4 à 5 % du PIB.
En cas d’un choc négatif de 1 % du PIB, l’effet stabilisateur (et 
redistributif) de ce Fonds de stabilisation de l’emploi serait de 
l’ordre de 0,18 % du PIB, c’est-à-dire comparable à l’effet obtenu 
10. Une version voisine a été récemment proposée par le ministre français de l’Économie et des 
Finances (The Economist, 2012).
11. Les autres calculs sont disponibles avec plafonnement et en se limitant à la zone euro. Ils 
donnent des résultats avec les mêmes ordres de grandeur. Il faut souligner qu’il s’agit de 
transferts bruts. Le calcul des transferts nets supposerait la définition des modalités de 
financement de ces transferts au niveau européen.
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Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui76aux États-Unis par l’intermédiaire du budget fédéral. Ce méca-
nisme d’assurance budgétaire ne peut fonctionner qu’en cas de 
chocs négatifs n’affectant qu’une minorité de pays.
Bien que proposé de longue date, ce mécanisme d’assurance 
budgétaire n’a jamais reçu beaucoup d’échos favorables pour 
plusieurs raisons. Ce mécanisme n’a été présenté qu’à titre d’illus-
tration et devrait être amélioré dans sa formulation. Tel qu’il est 
spécifié avec une dépendance à la hausse relative du taux de 
chômage, l’impact ne peut être que transitoire. Ce mécanisme est 
Tableau 9. Estimation des transferts associés au mécanisme d’assurance budgétaire
T/GDP AUT BEL CYP EST FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL
2001 0,20 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
2002 0,30 0,60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,30
2003 0,00 0,50 0,40 0,00 0,00 0,40 0,90 0,00 0,00
2004 0,50 0,10 0,40 0,00 0,00 0,30 0,60 0,70 0,00
2005 0,50 0,30 0,90 0,00 0,00 0,20 1,00 0,00 0,00
2006 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,80
2007 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,20
2008 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,90 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,80
2009 0,00 0,00 0,00 6,40 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,70
2010 0,00 0,00 0,20 2,40 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,40 1,10
2011 0,00 0,00 1,60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 5,10 0,70
Moyenne 0,14 0,14 0,32 0,88 0,00 0,08 0,27 0,75 0,87
T/GDP ITA LUX MLT NLD PRT SVK SVN SPN BGR
2001 0,00 0,00 1,10 0,00 0,30 0,70 0,00 0,00 3,30
2002 0,00 0,40 0,00 0,30 0,80 0,00 0,00 0,60 0,00
2003 0,00 1,00 0,10 0,90 1,20 0,00 0,20 0,00 0,00
2004 0,00 1,10 0,00 0,80 0,30 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00
2005 0,00 0,00 0,30 0,40 1,30 0,00 0,40 0,00 0,00
2006 0,00 0,70 0,00 0,00 0,70 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
2007 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,40 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
2008 0,70 0,80 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,10 0,00
2009 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,20 0,60 0,00 4,80 0,00
2010 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10 0,70 1,70 0,70 1,40 2,70
2011 0,00 0,20 0,00 0,00 0,90 0,00 0,90 1,60 1,00
Moyenne 0,06 0,38 0,14 0,23 0,71 0,32 0,20 1,05 0,64
Désajustements de change, fédéralisme budgétaire et redistribution 77en outre biaisé car il pénalise les pays qui mènent une lutte plus 
active contre le chômage, comme l’Allemagne avec sa politique de 
chômage partiel. 
Plus généralement, les adversaires de ce type de mécanisme 
considèrent que celui-ci encourage les mauvaises pratiques 
puisqu’en cas de dérapage de chômage, le reste de l’Union inter-
vient pour limiter les effets négatifs. Cet argument ne doit pas être 
ignoré mais n’est pas essentiel.
Ce type d’assurance peut en fait jouer en permanence en faveur 
des mêmes pays si ceux-ci enregistrent durablement des perfor-
mances plus médiocres. Il s’agit alors d’un mécanisme de transfert 
permanent et non plus d’assurance budgétaire. L’argument est plus 
important mais n’est pas justifié au vu des calculs effectués. 
Cette question est cependant sensible dans le contexte de crise 
de la zone euro où les pays du Sud sont affectés structurellement 
par un problème de surévaluation et de perte de compétitivité. 
Dans ce cas le coût peut effectivement être plus élevé et pose la 
question de la prise en charge par les autres pays de l’union moné-
taire de ces déséquilibres structurels, surtout si le plafond de 2 % 
envisagé initialement est levé. Les transferts auraient pu atteindre 3 
à 5 % du PIB en Grèce, en Espagne et en Irlande à la fin des années 
2000. Ces résultats ne sont pas sans rapport, en termes d’ordre de 
grandeur, avec les calculs effectués plus haut qui montraient 
T/GDP CZE DNK HUN LVA LTU POL ROU SWD GBR
2001 0,00 0,40 0,00 0,00 0,30 2,40 0,00 0,40 0,00
2002 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,40 0,60 0,00 0,00
2003 0,30 0,60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,40 0,00
2004 0,40 0,00 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,10 0,70 0,00
2005 0,00 0,00 1,30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,30
2006 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,80 0,00 1,30
2007 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
2008 0,00 0,00 0,50 1,60 1,60 0,00 0,00 0,20 0,40
2009 0,40 0,70 0,30 7,70 6,00 0,00 0,00 0,20 0,10
2010 0,00 0,80 0,50 0,90 3,40 0,70 0,00 0,00 0,00
2011 0,00 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10 0,10 0,00 0,20
Moyenne 0,10 0,24 0,34 0,93 1,03 0,42 0,24 0,22 0,21
Les transferts sont exprimés en % du PIB et ne sont pas plafonnés. 
Sources : Eurostat, BIT, calculs des auteurs.
Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui78l’ampleur des coûts supportés par les pays du Sud du fait de leurs 
surévaluations12. Il n’est dès lors pas choquant que de tels trans-
ferts soient supportés par le reste de l’Union monétaire pour éviter 
que les pays du Sud ne s’enferment dans une ou deux décennies de 
récession ou de croissance zéro. Ceci a en outre l’avantage de 
préserver la croissance de la zone et de faciliter la résolution des 
problèmes d’endettement public. Ces transferts sont préférables 
aux crédits intra-zone (seule forme d’aide pratiquée au sein de la 
zone euro, à l’exception de l’annulation partielle de la dette 
grecque) qui ne font que reporter les problèmes dans le temps, en 
les augmentant de plus de la charge de la dette.
Mais un tel mécanisme pose le problème de sa durée et de son 
efficacité. Les expériences passées montrent que si ces transferts 
sont bien un gain net pour les bénéficiaires, ils ne suffisent pas à 
résoudre les problèmes structurels. Les expériences de l’Allemagne 
de l’Est et du Mezzogiorno sont mitigées de ce point de vue. Ces 
transferts doivent être complétés par des politiques structurelles 
dans les domaines de la recherche et de l’innovation, de l’industrie 
et des infrastructures. L’effet des transferts fédéraux va maintenant 
être examiné à l’aide d’un modèle SFC d’une union monétaire pour 
avoir une estimation de leur impact macroéconomique et de leur 
rôle stabilisateur.
2. Modélisation SFC avec budget fédéral et euro-obligations
Un modèle stock-flux cohérent (SFC) d’une union monétaire à 
deux pays permet une description cohérente des actifs et passifs 
ainsi que de tous les flux réels et financiers associés. L’union moné-
taire est composée de deux pays (N et S) de taille asymétrique. Le 
pays N est cinq fois plus grand que le pays S. Cette configuration 
facilite l’analyse des mécanismes d’ajustement du pays S face au 
reste de l’union. Nous introduisons un budget fédéral avec des 
transferts sociaux fédéraux, des dépenses publiques fédérales et des 
euro-obligations. Cela permet d’étudier l’effet stabilisateur du 
budget fédéral.
12. À l’exception de la France et du Portugal, très pénalisés par la surévaluation de leurs euros 
mais qui bénéficient peu du mécanisme proposé du fait d’une évolution plus moyenne de leur 
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Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui80Ce modèle est inspiré par Godley et Lavoie (2006, 2007), Lavoie 
(2003), Duwicquet et Mazier (2010, 2011). Les prix sont fixes. Les 
firmes accumulent à la fois du capital réel et financier. Elles 
peuvent financer leurs investissements avec des profits non-distri-
bués, des crédits bancaires ou des actions. Les banques 
commerciales distribuent les crédits en fonction des besoins des 
firmes et la banque centrale assure le refinancement. Les ménages 
détiennent des dépôts bancaires, des obligations et des actions. Les 
deux gouvernements émettent des obligations et des bons du 
Trésor. Les taxes sur les revenus du capital (profit des firmes et des 
banques commerciales et de la banque centrale, revenus du capital 
des ménages) financent le budget fédéral. 
Le tableau 10 décrit la matrice des stocks en termes d’actifs 
(écrits avec un signe positif) et de passifs (écrits avec un signe 
négatif) de chaque secteur : ménages, firmes, gouvernements 
nationaux, banques commerciales, une banque centrale unique et 
un budget fédéral13. Au-delà du capital fixe (K), huit types d’actifs 
sont distingués14 : les dépôts bancaires (BD) détenus par les 
ménages, les obligations émises par les gouvernements (pb.B) et 
détenues par les ménages des deux pays, les prêts (L) offerts par 
chaque banque commerciale aux firmes des deux pays, les actions 
émises par les firmes (pe.E) et détenues par les ménages et les firmes 
des deux pays, les bons du Trésor émis par chaque Etat (BT) et 
détenus par les banques commerciales des deux pays, la monnaie 
banque centrale (H) détenue par les ménages ainsi que par les 
banques commerciales (réserves obligatoires), le refinancement 
offert aux banques commerciales par la banque centrale (RF) et, 
finalement, les euro-obligations (BTE) émises par le gouvernement 
fédéral et détenues par les banques et les ménages.
Une description détaillée du système monétaire et financier est 
retenue pour étudier les comportements de diversification avec 
primes de risque sur les obligations et les bons du Trésor lorsque 
celles-ci seront introduites. Cette version avec taux d’intérêt endo-
gènes a été examinée dans une publication antérieure, mais sans 
13. La matrice des flux ainsi que l’ensemble des équations sont disponibles dans le Document de 
travail du CEPN n° 04-2012.
14. Lorsqu’il y a deux symboles (N et S), l’indice indique où l’actif est détenu, l’exposant 
indique où l’actif est émis. Par exemple, BTNS  représentent les bons du Trésor détenus par le pays 
N et émis dans le pays S.
Désajustements de change, fédéralisme budgétaire et redistribution 81budget fédéral (Duwicquet et Mazier, 2011). Elle sera reprise ulté-
rieurement pour étudier le rôle des euro-obligations dans la 
mutualisation des dettes publiques.
Ménages
Les ménages ont un comportement de consommation tradi-
tionnel avec un effet richesse qui prend en compte les plus-values 
sur les obligations et actions détenues. Les choix de portefeuille des 
ménages suivent l’approche développée par Godley (1999) et 
Tobin (1969) avec un arbitrage entre monnaie (Hh), dépôts 
bancaires (BD), obligations (pb.B), actions (pe.Eh), et euro-obliga-
tions (BThE) selon les taux de rendement relatifs de chaque actif : rb, 
taux d’intérêt des obligations de chaque pays ; id, taux d’intérêt sur 
les dépôts bancaires qui est le même dans les deux pays ; ree, taux de 
rendement sur les actions de chaque pays et re, taux d’intérêt des 
euro-obligations. La demande de monnaie suit un simple motif de 
transaction. La demande de dépôts bancaires n’est pas écrite et est 
déterminée comme un résidu en utilisant l’équation comptable du 
bilan des ménages. Les ménages paient des impôts au niveau 
national (T) et au niveau fédéral (ThE). De plus, les ménages reçoi-
vent des transferts sociaux nationaux (ST) et fédéraux (FT).
Équations des ménages pour le pays N
Consommation
(VHN = richesse des ménages, YHShN = revenu disponible avec les 
gains en capital)
Revenu disponible
(YD = revenu disponible, W = rémunération des salariés, id.BD = 
intérêts sur les dépôts bancaires, BNN = intérêt sur les obligations 
domestiques et étrangères, re.BTNhE = intérêts sur les euro-obliga-
tions, DIVhNN, DIVhNS= dividendes reçus sur les actions domestiques 
et étrangères, ST = transferts sociaux nationaux, T = impôts natio-
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Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui82naux, CL = contributions sociales nationales, FT = transferts 
fédéraux, TE = impôts fédéraux sur les revenus du capital, CGh = 
gains en capital des ménages)
Impôts payés par les ménages
(avec θN = 12,5 % et θNhE = 10 %)
Transferts sociaux et contributions
(avec τ = 36 %)
Transferts fédéraux
Les transferts fédéraux FT sont entièrement financés par des 
impôts fédéraux TE (impôts sur les ménages, les firmes, les banques 
et la banque centrale) et représentent 3 % du PIB de la zone euro.
L’allocation des transferts entre le Sud et le Nord est réalisée en 
fonction des écarts de PIB :
(FTS = transferts fédéraux reçus par les ménages du Sud, FTN = trans-
ferts reçus par les ménages du Nord)
Demande d’obligations des ménages
(pbN.BNN = obligations du gouvernement N détenues par les 
ménages du pays N, pbS.BNS = obligations du gouvernement S déte-
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Désajustements de change, fédéralisme budgétaire et redistribution 83nues par les ménages du pays N, rb = taux d’intérêt des obligations, 
id = taux d’intérêt sur les dépôts bancaires, ree = taux de rendement 
sur les actions, re = taux d’intérêt des euro-obligations)
Demande d’euro-obligations des ménages
(BTNhE = euro-obligations émises par le gouvernement fédéral et 
détenues par les ménages)
Demande d’actions des ménages
(peN.EhNN = actions émises par les entreprises du pays N et détenues 
par les ménages du pays N, peS.EhNS = actions émises par les entre-
prises du pays S et détenues par les ménages du pays N)
Demande de monnaie
Firmes
Les firmes accumulent du capital réel et financier selon un cadre 
théorique post-keynésien (Clévenot et al., 2010). Leur investisse-
ment désiré (Id) dépend positivement du taux de profit (rf = UP / K-1) 
et négativement de la structure de la dette (L / K-1) et du coût du 
crédit (rl) avec un effet demande positif possible. Leur accumula-
tion financière, c’est-à-dire leur demande d’actions (pe.Ee), est 
principalement déterminée par le taux de rendement des actions 
détenues (re) avec un arbitrage entre les actifs domestiques et étran-
gers et un effet positif du taux de profit reflétant l’environnement 
global. Les firmes peuvent financer leurs investissements par des 
profits non-distribués (UP), du crédit bancaire ou par l’émission de 
nouvelles actions. Les émissions d’actions nouvelles des firmes 
(pe.ΔE) sont déterminées comme un pourcentage de l’investisse-
ment total (réel et financier), avec des effets positifs à la fois du 
coût du crédit et du ratio de dette dont les augmentations respec-
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Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui84tives conduisent les firmes à émettre plus d’actions. Le taux de 
rendement des actions est déterminé par les dividendes et les gains 
en capital. La répartition des revenus est analysée de manière 
simple avec une part des salaires constante. Les firmes paient des 
impôts nationaux et fédéraux sur leurs profits. Les profits non-
distribués sont déterminés par un taux constant d’épargne des 
entreprises (sf). Les dividendes distribués entre actionnaires 






(avec θfN = 35 % et θNfE = 5,5 %)
Banques
Les banques accordent tous les crédits demandés par les firmes. 
Le partage entre crédit domestique et étranger est fonction du taux 
d’ouverture de l’économie. Les réserves obligatoires en monnaie 
banque centrale représentent une part fixe des dépôts bancaires et 
ne donnent pas lieu à intérêt. La banque centrale fournit des 
avances (RF) aux banques commerciales en fonction de leurs 
besoins. Ces avances sont faites au taux d’intérêt directeur (ib) qui 
est l’instrument central de la politique monétaire. La banque 
centrale reverse au budget fédéral la totalité de ses profits sous 
forme d’impôt (T€B).
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Désajustements de change, fédéralisme budgétaire et redistribution 85Équations des banques pour le pays N
Réserves obligatoires
(H = réserves obligatoires en monnaie banque centrale, BD = dépôts 
bancaires)
Impôts payés par les banques commerciales au gouvernement fédéral
(avec θb = 18%)
Profits bancaires
Impôts payés par la banque centrale au gouvernement fédéral
Taux d’intérêt
(ib = taux d’intérêt directeur de la banque centrale, exogène, rl = 
taux d’intérêt sur les crédits, r = taux d’intérêt sur les bon du Trésor, 
re = taux d’intérêts sur les euro-obligations, rb = taux d’intérêt sur les 
obligations, pb = prix des obligations)
Gouvernement national
Les finances publiques sont décrites d’une manière simple avec 
des dépenses exogènes et des impôts sur les revenus payés par les 
ménages et les firmes. Les bons du Trésor sont achetés par les 
banques commerciales sans restriction pour financer le solde 
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Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui86budgétaire après émission des obligations. La répartition entre 
bons domestiques et étrangers est fonction du taux d’ouverture.
Solde budgétaire du gouvernement du pays N
(BT = bon du trésor, G = dépenses publiques exogènes, T = impôts 
sur le revenu des ménages, Tf = impôts sur les revenus des firmes, 
r = taux d’intérêt sur les bon du Trésor, B = taux d’intérêt sur les 
obligations, pb.ΔB = obligations nouvelles émises par le gouverne-
ment, ST = transferts sociaux, CL = Contributions sociales)
Gouvernement fédéral
Le budget fédéral est alimenté en impôts fédéraux (TE) payés 
par les ménages, les firmes, les banques commerciales et la banque 
centrale. Ces impôts fédéraux représentent environ 3 % du PIB de 
l’union monétaire. L’État fédéral finance des investissements euro-
péens (GE) en direction des deux pays qui représentent une 
fraction constante du PIB de ces pays. Les transferts fédéraux (FT) 
sont financés par les impôts, ce qui implique l’équilibre du budget 
courant avant paiement des intérêts. Des euro-obligations (BTE) 
sont émises pour financer le déficit du budget européen. Ces euro-
obligations sont achetées par les ménages des deux pays (BT ENh) et 
le solde intégralement souscrit par les banques commerciales des 
deux pays (BT ENb ), le partage entre les deux pays se faisant au pro 
rata du poids de leur PIB.
Solde budgétaire du gouvernement fédéral
(FT = transferts fédéraux, GEN = investissement européen au Nord, 
GES = investissement européen au Sud, re.BT-1
E  = service de la dette 
fédérale, TE = impôts fédéraux)
Euro-obligations
(BTE = émission totale d’euro-obligations, BTbE = euro-obligations 
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Désajustements de change, fédéralisme budgétaire et redistribution 87La répartition de la dette fédérale détenue par les banques entre 
Nord et Sud dépend du poids du PIB relatif.
Commerce extérieur et balance courante
Équations de balance courante
Commerce extérieur
(IM = importations, X = exportations)
Équilibre des biens et services
Dans l’ensemble, le modèle comporte 107 équations pour 107 
variables endogènes. GN, GS (dépenses publiques) et ib (taux direc-
teur de la banque centrale) sont exogènes.
Calibrage
Le modèle a été calibré en utilisant les comptes nationaux en 
stock et en flux d’Eurostat pour les pays européens. Le calibrage 
retient une part importante des actions (350 % du PIB comme en 
France en 2010) qui reflète un haut degré de financiarisation. Le 
scénario de base suit un taux de croissance de 2 % et un taux 
d’accumulation brut de 7 %.
3. Ajustements en union monétaire et coefficients  
de stabilisation
Les mécanismes d’ajustement en union monétaire face à des 
chocs asymétriques d’offre ou de demande peuvent être analysés 
en s’intéressant au rôle joué par le budget fédéral ou les euro-obli-
gations et en calculant dans chaque cas de figure des coefficients de 
stabilisation. Les résultats sont présentés avec une version simpli-
fiée du modèle où les taux de croissance du prix des actions sont 
exogènes et où les euro-obligations sont entièrement détenues par 
les banques.
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Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui88Nous utilisons quatre versions successives du modèle afin 
d’identifier les effets de stabilisation spécifiques à chaque facteur :
■ Le modèle 1 comporte ni budget fédéral, ni euro-obligations ;
■ Le modèle 2 inclut un budget fédéral d’environ 3 % du PIB de 
la zone euro. Ce modèle est divisé en deux sous-modèles selon 
la valeur du paramètre β dans l’équation suivante qui retrace 
les transferts fédéraux en faveur du petit pays S :
—Dans le modèle 2-a, β = 0. Dans ce cas, l’ajustement est 
réalisé simplement par des transferts fiscaux de nature 
fédérale. Si le petit pays S est affecté négativement par un 
choc sur sa production, il paiera moins d’impôts et le reste 
de l’union (pays N) paiera plus d’impôts.
—Dans le modèle 2-b, β = 50. L’ajustement du choc est 
réalisé, ici, par des transferts du pays N vers le pays S, c’est-
à-dire par des transferts de revenus de type fédéraux, en 
plus des transferts fiscaux.
■ Le modèle 3 ne comporte pas de budget fédéral, mais contient 
des euro-obligations destinées à financer des projets euro-
péens d’investissement GEN et GES dans les deux pays. Ces 
euro-obligations sont achetées par les ménages et le solde par 
les banques commerciales avec refinancement auprès de la 
banque centrale.
Simulations : Perte de compétitivité due aux désajustements de 
change
Nous comparons les modèles 2 et 3 au modèle 1 (modèle sans 
budget fédéral, ni euro-obligations) face à un choc de perte de 
compétitivité due à un désajustement de change intra-européen au 
détriment du petit pays S. Ce désajustement de change se traduit, 
comme nous l’avons vu dans la partie précédente, par des coûts 
unitaires additionnels pour le pays S surévalué et, inversement, par 
des coûts réduits pour le reste de l’union (pays N) qui est sous-
évalué. En conséquence, dans les équations de commerce extérieur 
(à prix constants, rappelons-le), nous introduisons un effet 
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Désajustements de change, fédéralisme budgétaire et redistribution 89uniquement les coûts salariaux) dans le pays du Sud relativement 
au pays du Nord. Le terme TI est égal à zéro dans le scénario de 
base. Pour illustrer la perte de compétitivité, le terme TI est égal à 
10 entre les périodes 10 et 50. Il s’agit d’un choc reflétant un désa-
justement de change réel sans impact direct sur les salaires.
Ce choc détériore la balance courante du pays du Sud et 
améliore celle du Nord, entraînant une diminution du PIB dans le 
Sud et une hausse au Nord. Nous comparons les effets du choc dans 
les trois variantes du modèle. Le graphique 4 décrit la variation 
relative du PIB du pays S, en écart par rapport au cheminement de 
base, pour ces trois variantes du modèle. 
Le rôle stabilisateur joué par les transferts fédéraux ou les euro-
obligations face à la dégradation de la compétitivité, c'est-à-dire 
l’ampleur des ajustements permis par ces mécanismes fédéraux, 
peut être résumé par le calcul d’un coefficient de stabilisation. Ce 
coefficient de stabilisation s’obtient en comparant, pour un même 
choc et à un même moment, la variation relative du PIB par 
rapport au cheminement de référence, dans la version du modèle 
avec mécanismes fédéraux et dans la version sans mécanismes 
fédéraux (mais identique pour tout le reste). Ces coefficients de 
stabilisation sont donnés dans le tableau 11 et le graphique 4.
Coefficient de stabilisation des mécanismes fédéraux :
où (ΔYN/YNr)= (YN – YNr)/YNr = (YN après le choc -YN avant le choc) 
/ YN avant le choc est la variation relative du PIB par rapport au 
cheminement de référence avant le choc.
De manière logique, le coefficient de stabilisation dépend positi-
vement de l’ampleur des mécanismes fédéraux. Dans le modèle 2-a, 
la stabilisation est faible dans le court terme (2,9 % en t=13) et la 
baisse de la production n’est que faiblement atténuée. Après le 
choc, le pays S paie moins d’impôts fédéraux et le pays N en paie 
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Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui90plus mais cet effet correcteur est limité en raison du faible poids du 
budget fédéral (de l’ordre de 3 % du PIB de la zone). Dans le modèle 
2-b, la stabilisation est plus importante que dans le modèle 2-a. 
Après le choc, les pays du Sud reçoivent des transferts de revenus 
financés par le budget fédéral. Ce montant est réparti entre les deux 
pays en fonction de leur rythme de croissance.
La diminution relative du PIB dans le pays S induit des transferts 
en provenance du Nord. Chaque année, en moyenne, le pays N
transfère environ 0,4 % du PIB. En termes de PIB du pays S, les 
transferts représentent près de 2 % du PIB. Cette redistribution 
peut stabiliser 40 % du choc à court terme et 52 % à long terme.
Tableau 11. Coefficients de stabilisation après une perte de compétitivité 
due à une surévaluation du pays S
En %
t=10 t=13 t=20 t=40 t=50
Modèle 2-a avec de simples transferts fiscaux 1,3 2,9 4,5 7,0 7,8
Modèle 2-b avec transferts fédéraux 32,5 42,5 48,8 52,9 51,7
Modèle 3 avec euro-obligations et dépenses publiques 30,3 41,9 47,5 55,3 53,6
Calculs par rapport au modèle 1 sans budget fédéral.
Source : Calculs des auteurs.
Graphique 4. Effet sur le PIB du pays S d’une perte de compétitivité due 
à une surévaluation
En %
Modèle 1 : sans budget fédéral, Modèle 2a : avec de simples transferts fiscaux, Modèle 2b : avec des transferts fédé-
raux, Modèle 3 : avec euro-obligations et dépenses publiques.















Désajustements de change, fédéralisme budgétaire et redistribution 91Dans le modèle 3, des euro-obligations permettent de financer 
des investissements européens d’un montant en moyenne annuelle 
de 0,9 % du PIB dans les deux pays de la zone euro. Ce mécanisme 
permet d’obtenir un effet de stabilisation comparable à celui 
observé en cas de transferts fédéraux (modèle 2-b). Pour contrer la 
perte de compétitivité du Sud, de grands projets européens sont mis 
en œuvre. Ce « choc de croissance » pourrait être mutuellement 
avantageux, la relance intervenant dans les deux pays à la fois. Mais 
de tels projets européens sont complexes à mettre en œuvre, ce qui 
peut réduire leur impact macroéconomique.
L’établissement d’un budget fédéral possède également l’avan-
tage de limiter l’augmentation des dettes publiques des pays du 
Sud. Le graphique 5 montre l’évolution de la dette publique dans le 
modèle 1 et dans le modèle 2-b. Dans le scénario de base avant 
politique d’ajustement, la dette publique tend à augmenter. En 
Graphique 5. Évolution de la dette publique nationale en pourcentage du PIB : 
scénario de base (Baseline) et scénario (surévaluation du Sud)



























































Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier et Jamel Saadaoui92t = 50, la dette publique représente près de 80 % du PIB au Sud et 
110 % au Nord. Dans le scénario de surévaluation du Sud entre les 
périodes 10 et 50, la dette publique des pays du Sud augmente 
fortement en raison du ralentissement économique causé par le 
choc et atteint 170 % du PIB en 2050. Mais avec un mécanisme de 
redistribution basé sur un budget fédéral, le PIB est moins affecté et 
la dette publique augmente beaucoup moins et dépasse à peine 
130 % du PIB. Sans budget fédéral, la dette des pays du Sud 
augmente de 90 points de PIB sur une période de 40 ans. Alors que 
son augmentation relative est de 50 points avec un budget fédéral.
4. Conclusion
La zone euro repose sur un modèle fondamentalement déséqui-
libré. Les changements de parité étant impossibles, peu de 
mécanismes d’ajustement permettent de corriger les évolutions 
divergentes qui affectent les différents pays de la zone euro en 
raison de leur grande hétérogénéité. Aucun fédéralisme budgétaire 
n’a été mis en place. Restent les mécanismes d’ajustement par les 
prix relatifs, c'est-à-dire la compression des prix et des salaires et les 
réductions d’effectifs. Ces mécanismes entraînent un freinage de la 
croissance et une montée du chômage. Un diagnostic simple peut 
être porté sur les déséquilibres actuels. Au niveau de la zone euro 
dans son ensemble, la balance courante est proche de l’équilibre et 
les déficits publics sont plus faibles que dans d’autres pays de 
l’OCDE. L’euro, pris globalement, est proche de sa parité d’équi-
libre. Mais l’euro est fortement surévalué pour les pays de l’Europe 
du Sud, dont la France, et, au contraire, fortement sous-évalué pour 
les pays d’Europe du Nord, en particulier pour l’Allemagne. 
L’ampleur de ces désajustements de change intra-européens, ainsi 
que leur caractère structurel, sont confirmés par nos estimations. 
Ces désajustements de change freinent la croissance et creusent 
les déficits publics et courants au Sud tandis que la croissance au 
Nord est soutenue par les exportations, facilitant la réduction des 
déficits publics. Les coûts unitaires sont réduits au Nord tandis 
qu’ils sont alourdis au Sud pour des montants considérables, de 
l’ordre de 5 à 6 % du PIB de chaque zone en moyenne par an en 
faveur du Nord et au détriment du Sud depuis les années 2000. Ces 
variations de coûts ont un impact important sur les niveaux d’acti-
Désajustements de change, fédéralisme budgétaire et redistribution 93vité. Ces déséquilibres pourraient être compensés par un 
mécanisme d’assurance budgétaire tel que celui proposé par la 
Commission européenne pour lutter contre les évolutions asymé-
triques. En moyenne au cours des années 2000, les transferts 
induits par ce mécanisme d’assurance budgétaire sont faibles (de 
l’ordre de 0,8 à 1 % du PIB en faveur des pays de l’Europe du Sud) 
mais les transferts ainsi mobilisés peuvent atteindre à certaines 
périodes 4 à 5 % du PIB des pays affectés par un choc négatif.
Dans une dernière partie, une modélisation « stock-flux cohé-
rente » d’une union monétaire à deux pays a permis d’étudier les 
effets stabilisateurs de différents mécanismes budgétaires de type 
fédéral pour corriger les effets d’une perte de compétitivité induite 
par la surévaluation d’un des pays. Trois résultats ont été obtenus. 
Un budget fédéral (d’une taille réduite à 3 % du PIB) n’a qu’un effet 
stabilisateur des plus modestes. L’introduction de transferts à 
caractère redistributif en fonction du niveau relatif d’activité 
économique du pays permet de réduire plus efficacement la perte 
d’activité engendrée par la surévaluation, tout en restant inscrit 
dans un budget fédéral de taille réduite. Enfin des euro-obligations 
finançant des programmes d’investissement européens exercent 
un effet de stabilisation voisin du précédent. Ce sont des illustra-
tions possibles de mécanismes permettant de faire cohabiter au 
sein d’une union monétaire des pays subissant des désajustements 
de change durables, tout en évitant des chutes d’activité pronon-
cées. Les mécanismes proposés présentent l’inconvénient d’être 
purement redistributifs ou de simplement soutenir la demande 
sans comporter de volet visant à améliorer l’offre compétitive des 
pays affectés par la surévaluation. Question complexe mais bien 
réelle si l’on a en mémoire les cas de l’Italie du Sud ou de l’Alle-
magne de l’Est.
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This paper proposes indicators to assess government debt sustainability in 
the medium and long term. We follow the methodological approach by Bohn 
(2008) and distinguish three channels that contribute to sustainable govern-
ment finances: economic growth, real interest payments and fiscal responses. 
We combine the estimated fiscal response with a stochastic debt simulation to 
create two indicators. The first captures the probability of debt-to-GDP ratios 
rising by more than 20 percentage points during a 10-year period.  A govern-
ment will fail on this indicator if its fiscal response to an increase in debt is not 
sufficient to control the swings in debt caused by shocks to real growth and inte-
rest payments. The second indicator captures the probability of debt levels 
being above 90% of GDP in 10 years. We estimate these indicators using histo-
rical data for nine OECD countries. We find that the probability of debt-to-GDP 
ratios rising by more than 20 percentage points in the next decade clearly iden-
tifies countries that have sustainability concerns: Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Iceland, from those that do not: US, UK, Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. 
Keywords: Fiscal policy, Public debt, Sustainability.
1. This paper is based on Lukkezen and Rojas-Romagosa (2012). We thank Nico van Leeuwen 
for excellent research assistance and participants at the EUROFRAME conference and two 
anonymous referees for their comments. All errors are our own.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 127 (2013)
Jasper Lukkezen and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa1001. Medium/long term debt sustainability assessment
Currently, being able to assess debt sustainability seems very 
relevant to European policy makers and the financial markets 
alike. These assessments are at the center of the debate and 
moreover, they also motivate changes in the direction of short-
term economic policies as well as structural reforms. We contribute 
to this discussion by proposing two indicators for medium/long-
term debt sustainability. 
Fiscal policy is defined as the set of government policies that 
involve taxation, transfer payments and government investment 
and expenditure to promote growth, smooth the business cycle 
and redistribute income. Government debt is the accumulation of 
past fiscal deficits (negative surpluses), plus the interest payments 
on past debt. Hence, fiscal policy co-determines these deficits in 
conjunction with other macroeconomic factors and short-term 
shocks. Changes in the direction of current fiscal policies are 
usually motivated in part by the sustainability of this debt-to-GDP 
ratio as high government debt may lead to externalities. Economic 
actors experiencing these externalities may force the policy maker 
to change its fiscal policy. 
Debt sustainability is formally defined as debt-to-GDP ratios 
that are stationary and mean-reverting (Bohn, 1998). In practical 
terms, debt is sustainable if increases in this ratio are reverted in 
the medium and long term. Thus, debt sustainability reduces the 
risk of default and avoids the negative externalities associated with 
high debt levels. The risk of default depends on expected future 
debt levels. With high expected debt levels the probability of 
ending up in a self-fulfilling vicious circle increases (Padoan et al., 
2012)—i.e. high government debt leads to an increase in risk 
premia, implying a higher discount rate for future government 
surpluses which justifies these higher risk premia. Given higher 
interest rates, current cash flow becomes more important relative 
to future cash flow limiting the sovereign’s options to increase its 
surplus. When the market anticipates these rates will become so 
high that the government is no longer willing to take the actions 
necessary to repay its debt, the country will be excluded from the 
Stochastic debt sustainability indicators 101international capital market altogether: a liquidity crisis, possibly 
followed by a default, emerges.
Defaults not only have a large negative impact on the economy 
of the defaulter2, with integrated financial markets default causes 
contagion across national borders (Arezki et al., 2011).3 Adding to 
that, in a monetary union the common central bank may need to 
deviate from its optimal policy in response to an unsustainable 
debt level in one member state, either to ensure monetary trans-
mission or to prevent deflation. This may lead to suboptimal 
monetary outcomes for the other member states (Cooper et al., 
2010). Both reasons amplify the need for an indicator capturing 
the probability that future debt-to-GDP ratios are on an ever 
increasing path.
Furthermore, high debt levels themselves, and not only their 
anticipation, have empirically well-established detrimental effects 
on the economy: they lower future economic growth (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2010; Kumar and Woo, 2012; Baum et al., 2012), may 
crowd-out private investment (Kumar and Woo, 2012) and 
increase the interest payments necessary to service the debt 
(Bayoumi et al., 1995; Schuknecht et al., 2009). Lower growth and 
higher interest rates also spill-over across borders via real economic 
and financial channels (Lejour et al., 2011 and references therein). 
An indicator should therefore also capture the probability that 
debt will remain high over time. Caution is advised when deriving 
policy implications from this indicator. The debt level at which 
detrimental effects on the economy manifest is country-specific 
and depends on economic arrangements. Several countries have 
recently combined high debt-to-GDP levels with low interest rates. 
Nevertheless on average higher debt levels have yielded lower 
growth and higher interest rates.
2. How to assess debt sustainability?
Examining the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio given the 
current state of the economy and trends in growth, interest rates 
2. See Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007), De Paoli et al. (2009) and Furceri and Zdzienicka 
(2011) for quantification.
3. There can also be negative cross-border wealth effects if the defaulted debt is held by 
foreigners.
Jasper Lukkezen and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa102and fiscal policy is necessary for our two debt sustainability indica-
tors. We answer this question by extending Bohn’s debt 
sustainability approach with a stochastic simulation on future real 
growth and real interest rates.4 Combining both methodologies we 
obtain two sustainability indicators. The first assesses upward vola-
tility by providing the probability of a debt-to-GDP ratio increase 
of 20 percentage points, while the second provides the probability 
of breaching a given level (90% of GDP) after a 10-year period. 
Bohn (1998, 2008) combines the accounting equation for the 
debt-to-GDP ratio with a behavioural equation for fiscal policy. 
The accounting equation describes the evolution of the debt-to-
GDP ratio given shocks to the economy and the response of fiscal 
policy to the current debt-to-GDP ratio. The response of fiscal 
policy to the debt-to-GDP ratio is estimated by the behavioral 
equation and is referred to as the fiscal response. The accounting 
equation allows us to disentangle the channels that contribute to 
the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio (dt = debt/GDP):
5 
There are three main channels that impact debt sustainability: 
real growth (gt+1), real interest rates (rt+1) and the fiscal response (st). 
1. Real growth of GDP (gt+1) increases the denominator of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, and thus, directly reduces the size of debt 
relative to GDP. When real GDP growth is positive and 
sustained over time, the debt-to-GDP ratio is steadily 
reduced over time. Real growth rates are determined by 
several factors. These include demand evolution, firm antici-
pations, financial booms and crises, governmental policies—
such as structural reforms—and external factors—such as 
4. It is possible to assess the stationarity of the debt-to-GDP ratio time series directly using unit 
root or cointegration tests. See Afonso (2005) for a survey of these types of studies. However, 
these test results are both unreliable and not informative (Bohn, 1998). They are unreliable 
because unit root tests have very low power in distinguishing unit root from near unit root 
alternatives and not informative as the test outcomes does not inform via which channels 
stationarity is not achieved. Finally, unit root tests provide a stationary picture and no 
indication on how future debt levels may evolve. For this purpose a simulation exercise is 
needed. 
5. Here d is real debt over real GDP, r the real interest rate and s the primary surplus 
(government revenue minus non-interest government expenditure) over real GDP ratio. See 


















Stochastic debt sustainability indicators 103foreign demand and technological progress—which have a 
medium to long-term effect on real growth rates.
2. The real interest payments equal the real interest rate 
(rt+1) times the level of debt. This is the amount of funds the 
government needs to service its debt. Governments can use 
monetary and financial policy instruments to erode the real 
value of government debt by traducing into negative or low 
real interest rates on government bonds. Reinhart and 
Sbrancia (2011) coin these policies as financial repression. 
However, in a monetary union these instruments can hardly 
be implemented by individual countries.  Only the union as 
a whole can do so. 
3. The fiscal response is contained in the primary surplus 
(st = surplus/GDP). A positive primary surplus, meaning 
government revenue is bigger than non-interest government 
expenditure, reduces outstanding debt. The response of the 
primary surplus to the debt ratio is referred to as the fiscal 
response and must be estimated. 
We estimate a behavioural equation for the government 
st = α + pdt + βZt + εt to obtain the fiscal response to the debt ratio. 
The fiscal response (ρ) tells us if the medium/long term country-
specific government commitment to stabilise debt levels is signifi-
cant. A positive and significant response coefficient (ρ) denotes a 
country that has been committed to reduce or maintain steady 
debt-to-GDP ratios (dt) conditional on short-term economic fluc-
tuations and temporary government expenditures (Zt). It can be 
interpreted as a government that engages in fiscal austerity to 
reduce debt levels even when markets are not specifically 
concerned about those debt levels, nor is there international pres-
sure (e.g. EU institutions) to reduce them. Note that these 
responses are based on estimations from ex-post realizations which 
incorporate the effect of the business cycle. We thus abstract from 
a debate on whether the increase in debt is due to a demand or 
supply shock.  These fiscal reactions turn out to be persistent over 
time. Larger re-election probabilities of fiscally responsible politi-
cians at the national level in advanced economies (Brender and 
Drazen, 2005, 2008) probably contribute to this just as the quality 
of fiscal institutions does (Calmfors, 2010 and references therein). 
Jasper Lukkezen and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa104The average contribution of real growth, real interest payments 
and the fiscal response shows whether and through which chan-
nels the debt-to-GDP ratio has been stationary in the past, meaning 
whether past monetary and financial arrangements and fiscal 
policy implementation is consistent with debt sustainability. In 
our set-up debt is stationary if δ = γ (1 – ρ ) with γ = (1 + r)/(1 + g). 
This condition is usually stated as: if the interest rate on debt minus 
the growth rate of GDP minus the fiscal response coefficient is 
smaller than zero, debt will stabilise. 
This does not imply sustainability, because the debt-to-GDP 
ratio can be stationary on average while high debt-to-GDP ratios, 
which are considered unsustainable, are still probable outcomes 
provided adverse shocks occur. We apply the stochastic debt simu-
lation method proposed by Budina and van Wijnbergen (2008) to 
assess this. They obtain shocks to interest and growth rates6 and 
combine these with the estimated fiscal response. This analysis 
combines the institutional attitude towards fiscal sustainability 
from the fiscal response coefficient, with the historic volatility of 
interest and growth rates from the simulation. The intuition works 
as follows: After an adverse interest or growth shock debt increases. 
A government that has a sustainable fiscal policy will respond to 
this shock by increasing its primary surplus over time to counter 
the increase in debt-to-GDP ratios. The opposite effect is in place 
after a positive interest or growth shock. 
We generate a stochastic distribution of simulated debt paths 
yielding a distribution of probable debt-to-GDP ratios in the 
future. Plotting these debt distributions graphically easily illus-
trates debt sustainability. Moreover, we can employ the stochastic 
distribution of future simulated debt-to-GDP ratios to obtain our 
two sustainability indicators:
1. Our upward volatility indicator denotes the probability that 
the debt-to-GDP ratio increases by more than 20 percentage 
points within the next 10 years. This indicator, denoted as 
X+20,10, takes the current debt level as a base line and 
examines the probability of a significant debt increase—
hence non-sustainability—from this base line. It captures 
6. This method simulates interest and growth rates using a vector autoregression model, see 
equation (8) in Lukkezen and Rojas-Romagosa (2012).
Stochastic debt sustainability indicators 105whether the fiscal response is sufficient to control the debt-
to-GDP ratio given volatility in interest and growth rates. 
2. Our debt level indicator X90,10 denotes the probability that 
simulated future debt-to-GDP ratios exceed a threshold of 
90% after a period of 10 years. This captures the idea that 
above a certain debt-to-GDP ratio negative externalities 
could occur even if debt-to-GDP ratios are stable. We take 
this particular threshold from Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), 
who find that above this debt level real growth decreases. 
The empirical literature is not conclusive, so using debt 
thresholds for policy purposes is debatable.7
Our analysis is based on ex-post outcomes and hence includes 
past monetary, financial and fiscal policies8 implicitly. In the 
short-run primary surplus, real growth and effective interest rates 
are all determined endogenously and possibly have multiple equili-
bria. These equilibria may depend on the debt level (De Grauwe, 
2011; Corsetti et al., 2012). Evaluating this endogenous mecha-
nism is beyond the scope of our analysis.9 However as we know the 
ex post outcome, we know the end result of this endogenous 
mechanism. This assumption allows us to estimate ρ and contrast 
it with interest and growth rates. A precondition for these estima-
tions then is that long time series covering at least 40 years should 
be available. Time series should span several business cycles and 
contain periods of high and low debt to prevent misinterpretation. 
7. Kumar and Woo (2012) and Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) doubt whether a clear 
threshold exists. Furthermore, this particular debt level is only indicative of what—in a wide 
sample of countries and time periods—Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) found to be the threshold 
level where negative externalities began. The actual threshold level, if it exists, is country 
specific and unknown. Alternatively a politically-defined debt threshold, like the 60% limit 
from the Maastricht Treaty could be used. 
8. Our fiscal policy measure takes the business cycle into account and therefore implicitly 
incorporates the effect that too restrictive fiscal policies also negatively affect growth (even more 
in deep recessions and/or when the economy is in a liquidity trap) and have a negative (instead 
of a positive) effect on debt levels.
9. In particular, short term endogenous mechanisms can include regime-switching processes 
and/or changes on the fiscal multiplier that will directly affect short-term outcomes. By using 
historical data in our estimations our data already contains the ex post outcome, which means 
that we are taking the end-result of the endogenous mechanism as given. Hence, we are also 
assuming that in the medium term there are no structural changes in the economy (i.e. no 
regime-switching or significant changes in the fiscal multiplier).
Jasper Lukkezen and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa1063. Estimation and simulation
We have data for nine OECD countries: United States (USA), 
United Kingdom (GBR), Netherlands (NLD), Belgium (BEL), 
Germany (GER), Italy (ITA), Spain (ESP), Portugal (PRT) and 
Iceland (ISL).10 The number of countries is limited due to the 
requirement of long time series spanning at least 40 years. 
Figure 1 presents the debt-to-GDP levels for all the countries in 
our sample.11 For a group of countries—US, UK, the Netherlands 
and Spain—we observe that they begin with high debt levels after 
the Second World War, which sharply decreased afterwards, but 
have  increased in the later period—especially in the last decade. 
Another set of countries: Germany, Italy, Portugal and Iceland 
have experienced steady debt increases, even though these 
countries began the period with relatively low debt levels.
In Figure 2 we show the real growth rates.12 Here we observe 
that most countries have experienced a steady decline in real 
growth in the post-war period. This means that the real growth 
channel to reduce debt levels has become less important over time. 
Accordingly, Figure 3 presents the smoothed series on effective 
nominal interest rates and inflation.13 When inflation is larger, 
real interest rates are often negative and thus, for these periods we 
have financial repression. For most countries (with the exceptions 
of Belgium and Germany) we observe financial repression periods 
between the 1950s and the 1980s. However, after the 1980s real 
interest rates are positive, and thus, the financial repression 
channel was no longer a source of debt reduction. Therefore, after 
the 1980s, with declining real growth rates and positive real inte-
rest payment, positive fiscal responses became the main channel to 
reduce debt levels.
We estimate econometrically a fiscal response function and 
relate the estimated fiscal response coefficient with the average 
interest and growth rates to determine whether debt converges 
towards a steady state. Table 1 shows that for the US, the UK, the 
10. Description of the data and data sources in Lukkezen and Rojas-Romagosa (2012). Due to 
consistency with the pre WWII analysis in this work we use only net data for the US.
11. Note that the vertical scale can be different for each country.
12. The series have been smoothed in Figure 2 and the left-hand (y-axis) scale is the same for 
each country.
13. Effective nominal interest rates are calculated as government interest payments over debt.
Stochastic debt sustainability indicators 107Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Italy the fiscal response to 
increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio has been robust and positive in 
the post-war period. On top of that the US, the Netherlands and 
Italy have a positive non-linear response, indicating that the 
primary surplus responds more strongly to debt at high levels. On 
the other hand, Spain, Portugal and Iceland have non-significant 
fiscal responses in the post-war period (and Spain and Portugal have 
even a negative non-linear response), which creates doubts about 
their capacity to reduce debt by implementing fiscal austerity. 
Of course, if these countries experience beneficial shocks (i.e.
higher than expected growth rates or lower than expected interest 
rates), debt sustainability will be easier to achieve. As soon as a 
country that does not have a significant and strong fiscal response 
record—and has in addition insufficient real growth or cannot use 
financial repression instruments—is exposed to an adverse shock, 
debt will increase and may do so without bound. We capture 
exactly this effect in our simulation of future debt levels in 
Figure 4. The left part of the figure shows the simulation without a 
fiscal response whereas the right part shows the simulation with 
the estimated fiscal response.14 The yellow area contains 90% of 
stochastic debt paths, the red area the next 5%, the black line 
denotes the median, and the 60% and 90% thresholds are 
highlighted by blue horizontal lines.                      




























r 0.020 0.018 0.022 0.044 0.034 0.004 -0.002 -0.044 -0.073
y 0.029 0.023 0.035 0.028 0.025 0.037 0.042 0.039 0.058
gamma 0.991 0.995 0.987 1.016 1.009 0.968 0.958 0.920 0.869
ρ(debt) 0.090*** 0.045*** 0.074*** 0.038*** 0.026* 0.066*** 0.048 0.003 0.014
ρ(debt^2) + * 0 + *** 0 0 + *** –*** –*** 0
ρ 0.090 0.045 0.074 0.038 0.026 0.066 — — —
δ 0.902 0.950 0.914 0.978 0.983 0.904 0.958 0.920 0.869
* = significant at 10% level, 
*** = significant at 1% level
Source : Lukkezen and Rojas-Romagosa (2012).
14. As mentioned before, for Spain, Portugal and Iceland the estimated fiscal response 
coefficient is not significant. However, for illustrative purposes we artificially set their fiscal 




























































































































































































































































ItalyFigure 1. Debt-to-GDP ratios in the post







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IcelandFigure 2. Smoothed real g









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ItalyFigure 3. Nominal interest rates and inflation in th
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Jasper Lukkezen and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa116How do these distributions look like? 
— Steady state: From the accounting equation it follows that 
debt is stationary if δ=γ (1 – ρ) < 1 . In this case the debt 
series has a steady state, which equals:  
. 
— Slow convergence: r, g and ρ are a few percentage points in 
magnitude, thus small compared to 1. This means that 
convergence towards the steady state is slow. As there is 
significant volatility in interest and growth rates, this volati-
lity will be dominant in the debt developments, not the 
convergence towards the steady state. Also this volatility will 
determine the width of the bandwidth around the steady 
state.
— Skewed distribution: As a shock changes the debt-to-GDP 
ratio by a percentage of that ratio, an adverse shock necessi-
tates a larger response than a positive shock. This means that 
the effect of adverse shocks will be visible longer and the 
debt distribution will be skewed. 
The debt distribution plots in Figure 4 show all the characteris-
tics mentioned. Slow convergence towards some steady state, a 
width of the debt distribution which increases with interest and 
growth rate volatility and decreases with the size of the fiscal 
response and a skewness in the debt distribution—the median debt 
path lies below the average debt path. 
The shocks in our simulations depend on the historic volatility 
of interest and growth rates. That means they do not contain unex-
pected exogenous events (e.g. war, natural disasters). In any case, 
the results of our simulation exercise are not informative on debt 
sustainability under such conditions as other concerns will receive 
higher priority than debt sustainability concerns. Nevertheless, 
under a business as usual scenario, it is still very useful to know the 
probability that debt could increase above a certain threshold or by 
a certain number of percentage points. From Figure 4 it becomes 
clear that the probability of being on an unsustainable debt path is 
non-zero for some countries: Italy, Spain, Portugal and Iceland. 
Stochastic debt sustainability indicators 117This means that there is a reasonable chance that these countries 
have unsustainable debt levels. 
Table 2 presents the debt sustainability indicators proposed in 
the last section. Specifically the indicator that the debt level 
increases by 20 percentage points in the next decade (X+20,10) 
distinguishes countries with no or only small debt sustainability 
issues (US, UK, Netherlands, Belgium and Germany) from 
countries with serious debt sustainability issues (Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Iceland). 
4. How to use debt sustainability indicators?
From the Second World War up until the early eighties, the 
fiscal response was not important for debt sustainability, since in 
most developed economies real growth rates were relatively high 
and real interest payments were low (and even negative for some 
countries). This is not the case anymore: with relatively low real 
growth rates and positive real interest payments, strong fiscal 
responses are crucial for debt sustainability. Thus, by estimating 
historical fiscal responses using Bohn’s approach we can test for 
current debt sustainability. 
Our estimated fiscal response (ρ) is an institutional variable that 
measures how over medium and long-time periods, the govern-
Table 2. Summary table showing the debt sustainability indicators in % of GDP
2009 2019, ρ>0 2019, ρ=0
 debt debt 95 % width X90,10 X+20,10 debt 95 % width X90,10 X+20,10
USA 53 50 10 0 0 59 15 0 0 
GBR 68 77 21 1 3 89 26 53 56 
NLD 57 58 21 0 0 58 28 0 1 
BEL 96 90 23 47 0 94 26 69 0 
DEU 71 75 22 1 1 82 26 14 11
ITA 106 118 35 100 20 124 47 100 43
ESP 46 60 78 12 46 67 94 23 58
PRT 76 76 55 16 11 84 66 35 25
ISL 92 69 72 100 5 83 92 36 18 
Jasper Lukkezen and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa118ment of a particular country deals with medium/long term 
changes in debt levels. In particular, it measures how fiscal policy 
reacts to changes in debt levels, once policy is adjusted to take into 
account the country-specific fiscal policy changes to unexpected 
increases in temporary expenditure and to the business cycle. As 
we need to correct for these variables in our estimate of the 
country-specific fiscal response, we need time series that encom-
pass several business cycles. 
Our simulated stochastic debt distributions and the indicators 
capture whether current fiscal policy generate sustainable future 
debt levels. They relate expected fiscal responses to expected 
economic shocks under current monetary and financial arrange-
ments starting from the current state of the economy. Our 
preferred indicator, X+20,10, shows the probability of an increase of 
debt of 20 percentage points in the next decade. A country that 
‘fails’ on this indicator has a non-zero probability of a substantial 
debt increase in the coming decade. The debt level indicator, 
X90,10,  shows the probability of debt exceeding the 90% threshold.
It is important to note that our indicators provide information 
on medium and long-term debt sustainability. They are not 
suitable to analyze short-term debt sustainability. For instance, 
they cannot provide information on whether—for example—Spain 
will be able to roll over its debt in the coming months. On the 
other hand, our sustainability indicators—together with the esti-
mated fiscal response—do provide information on whether it is 
reasonable for a country to join a monetary union. In such a 
union, the use of financial and monetary policies is limited for 
individual countries, making it unlikely for them to achieve debt 
reductions through policies that yield very low or negative real 
interest rates. This leads to an increased dependence on fiscal 
policy to tackle debt sustainability. It is precisely this medium—to 
long term institutional relation between fiscal policy and debt 
sustainability that is captured by our indicators.
For medium to long-term fiscal policy assessments, our indica-
tors have several advantages over the current available indicators. 
The original sustainability norms envisaged at the creation of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) were to follow the Maastricht 
Treaty criteria: ceilings of 3% and 60% on government deficits and 
debt-to-GDP ratios, respectively. They are static and are not able to 
Stochastic debt sustainability indicators 119capture volatility in the economy and the government’s fiscal 
response to that. It is now clear that several countries were able to 
violate these criteria without consequences, while others that met 
the criteria have nonetheless been hit by the crisis. Sustainability 
indicators related to ageing (European Commission, 2009) can take 
volatility into account but have another drawback: they assume no 
fiscal response and project how government debt levels will 
explode unless the government enacts reforms. As such, they are 
valuable in putting this issue on the policy agenda. Whether these 
issues actually get solved, depends on the quality of the political 
process and the strength of fiscal institutions. Finally, cyclically 
adjusted budget balances (CABB) are dependent on projections of 
future growth, which are known to have an upward bias (Larch 
and Salto, 2005). This can distort the identification of actual fiscal 
policy. Furthermore, these estimates are vulnerable to endogeneity 
problems, since it becomes difficult to disentangle the effects of 
expected growth on the CABB from the effects CABB has through 
the fiscal multiplier on growth. 
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DEBT, ASSETS 
AND IMBALANCES IN THE EURO AREA 
AN AGGREGATE VIEW
Christophe Van Nieuwenhuyze1
National Bank of Belgium
The recent developments in the euro area have shown how important it is 
that the various economic sectors pay attention to their financial positions. 
In the literature, the approach to analyse these positions is often partial, focu-
sing on the government sector or just on the gross debt, as in the case of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and Cecchetti et al. (2011). This paper conducts an 
aggregate analysis of the debt positions of the euro area countries, taking 
account not only of the public debt but also of private sector debt and the finan-
cial assets of the various sectors (net debt). On the basis of this analysis, it 
emerges that euro area countries differ extensively in terms of their total net 
debt. In a context of hampered financial integration, the euro area might 
benefit from a reduction of these differences. 
Keywords: Euro, financial crisis, Debt, Imbalances, Balance of payments, Net international investment position, 
Flow-of-funds, Economic governance.
The recent developments in the euro area have shown how 
important it is that the various economic sectors pay attention to 
their financial positions and particularly to the sustainability of 
their debt levels. The attention usually focuses on the government 
sector. Despite the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
1. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the National Bank of Belgium. I am particularly grateful for comments from and helpful 
discussions with Hugues Famerée, Hans Geeroms, Ivo Maes, Marc Maréchal and Vincent 
Périlleux. The paper furthermore benefited from presentations of earlier drafts at the ECB flow-
of-funds workshop in November 2011, a LIME workgroup meeting at the European Commission 
in January 2012 and the 9th EUROFRAME Conference in June 2012.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 127 (2013)
Christophe Van Nieuwenhuyze124Pact provisions, many euro area governments have not succeeded 
in reducing their gross debt to a level that can be considered sustai-
nable, inter alia in the light of the financial crisis and the rising 
costs of population ageing.
In response, the euro area authorities have reformed and 
strengthened economic governance at the European level. Under 
the impetus of the new Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (“Fiscal Compact”) and the “Six Pack”, not only 
public finances will be monitored more closely, but also general 
macroeconomic imbalances within the so-called macroeconomic 
imbalance procedure (MIP), in which debt indicators relating to 
both the public and private sector have an important weight.
In this context, this paper takes an aggregate view at the size of 
debt and compares the euro area countries' total indebtedness, that 
is the total of the public sector's debt and that of the other non-
financial sectors, namely households and non-financial corpora-
tions. Furthermore, aggregate net debt indicators are constructed, 
in which the financial assets held by the various sectors also are 
taken into account.
Such an analysis shows that the euro area can be divided in two 
types of countries, on the one hand “deficit countries”, which 
have a high net debt level, and on the other hand “surplus 
countries”, where the gross debt is largely counterbalanced by the 
domestic sectors' financial assets and, as a result, the debt level is 
less problematic. On the basis of this aggregate net debt, also 
known as the net external assets (or net international investment 
position) with the sign reversed, the paper illustrates the connec-
tion between debt and competitiveness issues. Whereas a partial 
approach to the debt problem, by focusing on government gross 
debt only, is currently giving rise to a series of measures in order to 
reduce the public debt level, this aggregate analysis rather puts the 
euro area shortcomings down to the balance of payments of the 
Member States. 
This view relates to a recent but growing literature citing other 
reasons than just public debt as the cause of the euro area crisis, 
such as Lane and Pels (2011), who point to current account imba-
lances, or Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011), who likewise mention 
the current account differences, but who furthermore draw atten-
Debt, assets and imbalances in the euro area: an aggregate view 125tion to a stagnating flow of funding from the  “northern”  to the 
“southern” EMU countries. Werner (2011) highlights bank lending 
to non-productive projects and Pisani-Ferry (2012) focuses on both 
fiscal and monetary economic policy constraints in the euro area. 
Finally, De Grauwe (2011) points to poor economic governance 
that focuses too much on the consolidation of public finances, and 
calls for more coordination and cooperation between the Member 
States. The latter point is also raised by Geeroms et al. (2011), along 
with a policy proposal for the issuance of debt instruments in the 
EMU backed by all Member States. This paper seeks to contribute 
to this literature by outlining a macroeconomic framework in 
which, taking indebtedness as a starting point, the link between 
debt and balance of payments imbalances is shown. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, the various 
sectors' indebtedness in the euro area countries is compared. 
However, since debt levels vary greatly according to the definition 
used, this part begins with an overview of several debt definitions 
at the macroeconomic level. Section 2 looks at the relevance of 
these debt concepts for macroeconomic performances and/or 
financial stability. In Section 3, the link is established between 
debt and balance of payments problems by using a country's aggre-
gate net debt; this part also divides the euro area into deficit and 
surplus countries. Section 4 focuses on the recent adjustments of 
these positions by using the sectors' financial balances, these being 
the difference between their revenue and expenditure. Within the 
euro area, a number of relationships can be identified for the deve-
lopment of these financial balances, both between the public and 
private sector and between the so-called surplus and deficit 
countries. Based on these findings, policy conclusions are drawn in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1. Sectoral debt positions in the euro area countries 
1.1. Macroeconomic debt concepts
At the macroeconomic level, the national financial accounts are 
the best source for calculating the debt ratio of the various sectors, 
because these accounts present an overview of all financial assets 
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level is very dependent on the debt definition used. Various debt 
indicators can be calculated on the basis of the national financial 
accounts. So, the following concepts can be considered: 
— Non-consolidated versus consolidated debt: on a consoli-
dated basis, the calculation does not include financial transactions 
conducted within the same sector (for example lending between 
non-financial corporations);
— Gross versus net debt: financial assets are deducted from gross 
debt to calculate net debt.
Of course, the debt level also depends on the financial instru-
ments regarded as debts. In line with the definition used by the 
European Commission (2012) in the context of the macroeco-
nomic imbalance procedure (MIP), this paper defines a sector’s 
gross debt as the funding obtained via  “loans”  (AF.4, in accor-
dance with the financial accounts terminology) and via “securities 
other than shares”  (or debt securities) (AF.3)3. 
This definition applies the broadest possible debt concept 
taking account of the current quality of the underlying data. 
Narrower definitions are limited to the more accurately measured 
bank credit (taken from statistics provided by monetary financial 
institutions), but omit a substantial part of the funding of the 
sectors, particularly that of non-financial corporations. Conver-
sely, broader definitions also include trade credit, for example, 
though the estimate is of lesser statistical quality. 
As already stated, this paper analyses a country’s aggregate debt 
position, taking account not only of the public debt but also of the 
debt of the non-financial private sectors, namely households 
(including non-profit institutions serving households) and non-
2. The national financial accounts (also known as the flow-of-funds accounts) form part of the 
national accounts and show the financial flows and corresponding stocks of an economy, 
broken down by institutional sector and financial instrument. Helped by recent improvements 
in their statistical quality and availability, they form a rich data source for analysing the causes 
and developments of the financial crisis in the euro area. They are published jointly by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) (quarterly basis) and the European Commission (annual basis). 
For a description of their use and applications, see Winkler (2010) and ECB (2011). For the 
United States, experience with such data goes back to Copeland (1952).
3. In the case of the government sector this definition also includes funding via “currency and 
deposits (AF.2)” and excludes “financial derivatives (AF.34)”, following the terms of the 
Maastricht Treaty. However, these two categories are often negligible in relation to total debt.
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because including them would lead to double counting; the debt of 
the financial corporations sector (S.12 in the statistical standards), 
which consists largely of financial intermediaries, is ultimately 
held by a domestic or external non-financial sector.
1.1.1. Non-consolidated versus consolidated debt
In contrast to the analysis of the public debt, the analysis of the 
private sector’s debt position is less developed. For example, in the 
case of the private sector there is no accurate reference value such 
as the Maastricht Treaty's 60 per cent of annual GDP for public (or 
more precisely general government sector) debt. There is also much 
less of a consensus on the calculation of the private sector’s debt 
ratio. In the case of the public debt, again in accordance with the 
Maastricht Treaty, the consolidated gross debt concept is used. In 
the case of the non-financial private sector there is less unanimity, 
and different concepts are often used simultaneously, sometimes 
owing to the absence of data. For instance, the “scoreboard” which 
the European Commission (2012) uses for its macroeconomic 
imbalance procedure refers to the non-consolidated gross debt for 
the private sector, partly because the consolidated debt concept is 
at this moment not available for each country.
Nonetheless, it is possible to draw up consolidated figures for 
most EU Member States on the basis of the specifications of the 
financial accounts, which provide information on the counterpart 
of each financial transaction. For that purpose, the financial tran-
sactions conducted within each resident sector are disregarded. 
While non-consolidated data are primarily useful for getting an 
overview of the sectors’ funding structure, consolidated data seem 
more suitable for assessing a sector’s financial soundness. Indeed, 
lending between corporations—particularly between members of 
the same group—is generally more stable than bank lending and 
can be regarded as less risky in that respect. Moreover, it is difficult 
to make an international comparison of the estimated lending 
between non-financial corporations, inter alia because the classifi-
cation of some finance companies (for example multinationals’ 
treasury centres) is not always consistent, so that they are some-
times included in the non-financial corporations sector and 
sometimes not.
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consolidated data relates to a country’s financial structure. For 
most sectors, the difference is generally small; the national 
financial accounts are actually compiled on the assumption that 
no financial transactions take place between households, so that—
for this sector—the non-consolidated data are equal to the 
consolidated data, by definition. The biggest differences are 
usually recorded for non-financial corporations, since, as noted 
above, these may include certain finance companies which are not 
part of the financial sector.
1.1.2. Gross debt versus net debt
Up to now, our focus has been on gross debt, so that no account 
is taken of any holdings in the form of financial or non-financial 
assets, possibly counterbalancing those debts. The focus on gross 
debt is in many respects strange, certainly since policy makers 
concentrate on the sustainability of the debt positions, or in other 
words the associated insolvency risk. Sustainability studies are 
conducted almost exclusively for public debt, but they could 
equally be applied to the debt of the private sector. Although
sustainability is a very popular and widespread concept among 
economists to underpin an economic policy that leads to a future 
economic environment which is stable and sound, there is no 
consensus on exactly how sustainability should be measured. In 
most cases “the law of motion of government debt” is used, 
according to which future changes in the debt ratio can be ascribed 
to movements in the primary balance, interest rate, growth rate 
and inflation4. However, there is a consensus that a projected expo-
nential increase in the debt ratio can be regarded as unsustainable, 
and that many macroeconomic variables, including assets, must be 
taken into account in such a sustainability study. Although the 
assets are not explicitly mentioned in the law of motion of govern-
ment debt, various public debt sustainability studies take them 
implicitly into account, for example by deducting them in advance 
from gross debt5, to arrive in fact at a net debt figure. 
4. For an overview of various sustainability studies concerning public finances, see Balassone 
et al. (2011).
5. Technically they form part of the so-called “stock-flow adjustments” (European 
Commission, 2011).
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should be taken into account could be somewhat overstated, 
because the government’s assets, particularly its financial assets, 
are often small (see also Hartwig Lojsch et al., 2011). As such, the 
difference between gross and net debt may in fact not be very rele-
vant. However, nothing could be further from the truth for the 
private sector, which normally holds more assets than it has debts. 
A risk analysis of the private sector’s financial position based solely 
on gross debt may therefore be very misleading, because the assets 
form a buffer which can—to a varying extent—be used to meet 
repayments. Nevertheless, certain assets, such as owner-occupied 
residences, can be less readily used than other more liquid assets, 
such as savings account balances. This paper will therefore only 
deduct financial assets from total financial liabilities for the 
purpose of calculating net debt, which corresponds to net financial 
liabilities or net financial assets with the sign reversed6.
Our preference for net debt rather than gross debt is also 
supported by the  “financial accelerator mechanism” (Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1989), which can be considered as the workhorse of 
modern macroeconomic models analysing the mutual relationship 
between financial and real developments. This mechanism 
assumes an inverse relationship between the external finance 
premium (the difference between the cost of external and internal 
funds) and the net wealth of the borrower in a context of asymme-
tric information. To the extent that net wealth is procyclical (for 
example owing to rising financial asset prices or profits during a 
boom phase), the extra interest cost will consequently fall (rise) in 
a boom (recession), further stimulating (curbing) economic 
growth. In their seminal study of the impact of sectoral balance 
sheet positions on macroeconomic activity, Bernanke and Gertler 
thus also attribute a crucial role to net debt or net wealth.
6. Within the system of national accounts, a distinction is made between net debt and net 
financial liabilities (i.e. liabilities—financial assets), with the latter also including non-debt 
instruments such as equities. However, for simplicity, this paper treats net debt as being 
identical with net financial liabilities by calculating net debt as the difference between total 
liabilities and total financial assets, including equities in both. The transition from gross to net 
debt in this paper is therefore given by: net debt = gross debt + equity financing - total financial 
assets including equities.
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financial situation if the asset price valuation is high or uncertain. 
Moreover, the capacity of the assets to be used as a basis for finan-
cing debts in times of crisis may be called into question, certainly 
in the event of a liquidity crisis or fire sales (Tirole, 2011). In that 
context, gross debt positions or other leverage indicators may 
become more important as a risk indicator. However, as already 
stated, this paper takes only financial assets into account, which in 
the case of the portfolio of the non-financial private sector are 
often highly liquid (for example savings accounts), even in the 
event of a liquidity crisis. As such, the error incurred by taking all 
financial assets fully into account, as in net debt or net wealth, is 
undoubtedly smaller than the error made when disregarding these 
assets, as in the case of gross debt.
1.2. Comparison between euro area countries
A comparison of the sectoral debt positions of the various euro 
area countries immediately shows that, in order to obtain an 
accurate assessment of the debt positions, it is necessary to be 
aware of the sometimes considerable differences between the 
various debt concepts (Table appendix).
The difference between consolidated and non-consolidated 
gross debt (Figure 1) may be substantial, in particular in the case of 
non-financial corporations. Thus, at the end of 2010 the non-
consolidated gross debt ratio of non-financial corporations in 
Belgium stood at 179.7 per cent of GDP, compared to a consoli-
dated figure of 77.5 per cent. Also in Luxembourg the non-
consolidated debt is much higher than the consolidated debt. 
These differences are mainly attributable to lending between non-
financial corporations, which is substantial in Belgium and 
Luxembourg. That may be due to the presence of corporate trea-
sury centres which conduct financial transactions primarily for 
multinationals; the dividing line between these entities—classified 
as non-financial corporations—and financial corporations is thin. 
Their presence is often motivated by tax reasons, and/or the proxi-
mity of major financial centres. Their lending, which inflates their 
assets and liabilities to the same degree, and is in a second step also 
recorded as a liability of the final borrower, distorts the debt ratio 
of non-financial corporations. 
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rison on the consolidated debt ratio, certainly since the estimation 
of financial transactions between non-financial corporations is 
statistically uncertain and may present some methodological diffe-
rences, as indicated by the fact that lending between non-financial 
corporations in Slovakia and Greece is zero according to the 
national financial accounts.
A comparison of the consolidated gross debt ratio of the non-
financial private sector (households and non-financial corpora-
tions) reveals widely divergent values. Countries such as Slovakia 
and Greece have a relatively low debt ratio (68.8 per cent and 
124.1 per cent of GDP respectively at the end of 2010). The euro 
area average is 144.2 per cent of GDP. Conversely, in Cyprus, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg, the debt ratio 
exceeds 200 per cent of GDP.
There are also differences in the distribution of this private debt 
between firms and households. As in the euro area as a whole, the 
household debt ratio is lower than that of non-financial corporations 
in most countries. In the Netherlands, Germany and Slovakia, 
however, household debts exceed those of non-financial corporations.
Figure 1. Consolidated and non-consolidated gross debt 
of the non-financial private sector
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countries. In the euro area, the average debt ratio at the end of 
2010 was 65.3 per cent of GDP. Households in Slovenia, Slovakia 
and Italy have a relatively low debt ratio, of less than 50 per cent of 
GDP. At the other end of the spectrum are the Netherlands, Cyprus 
and Ireland where the debt ratio exceeds 100 per cent of GDP.
These significant differences can often be linked to institutional 
and fiscal factors. For instance, the high debt ratio of Dutch house-
holds is due partly to a favourable tax regime for first-time home 
buyers, whereby the interest charges on a mortgage loan are tax 
deductible for a maximum period of 30 years. Moreover, the Dutch 
mortgage market, just like that in Ireland, offers the option of home 
equity withdrawal, making it possible to borrow against an increase 
in the value of the home due to rising house prices to serve 
consumption or investment purposes. In addition, in 2010 more 
than half of the outstanding mortgage loans in the Netherlands 
were interest-only loans (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2011), which 
means that the borrower pays only the interest charges during the 
term of the loan and does not repay the principal until the loan 
expires. These conditions result in a higher household debt level, 
which should however be put into perspective. It is important to 
understand that such a tax climate also alters household behaviour 
on the assets side. For instance, it is usual for Dutch households to 
build up assets with a view to redeeming the principal at the end of 
the loan. Consequently, as a corollary to the high debt ratio in the 
Netherlands, the level of household assets is also high7 and should 
thus be taken into account when assessing the sustainability of the 
debt position.
An assessment of the debt position of the private sector as a 
whole on the basis of net rather than gross debt reveals a totally 
different picture: the Netherlands and Luxembourg top the 
ranking of the countries with the smallest debt burden. In their 
case, the private sector’s assets far exceed its debts, so that on a net 
basis there is actually no longer a debt; instead, there are net finan-
cial assets. At the end of 2010 these stood at 154.0 per cent and 
7. Note that a large part of the financial assets of Dutch households consist of pension fund 
reserves (around 60% of their total financial assets at the end of 2010), given the capitalization 
pension system. However, even when those assets are excluded, their financial assets still 
averaged some 120% of GDP.
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Netherlands. Also in Belgium, Italy, Germany, Malta, France and 
Austria the private sector’s assets exceeded its debts. In the other 
euro area countries the assets fall short of the outstanding gross 
debt, so that the private sector in those countries still has debts on 
a net basis, the highest figures being recorded in Ireland and 
Estonia (around 110 per cent of GDP at the end of 2010). For the 
private sector of the euro area as a whole, net financial assets 
amounted to 43.7 per cent of GDP.
Whereas—in the context of the financial crisis and the debt 
crisis—the ranking of the countries on the basis of the private 
sector’s gross debt looked somewhat surprising, with Greece and 
Slovakia among the stronger countries, and the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg among the countries with the highest gross debt, a 
ranking based on net debt provides a better indication of the resi-
lience which the various euro area countries have displayed during 
the crisis.
The same analysis can be applied to the general government 
sector, although as already stated, the role of the assets here is 
generally less important. Also the difference between non-consoli-
dated and consolidated gross debt is generally small for the 
government sector. In most countries, the government sector 
holds only 10 per cent of its own paper. In Belgium and Austria 
this fraction is somewhat higher, probably on account of the 
federal structure of these countries. 
Countries with a high public debt are well known. In the euro 
area, Greece, Italy and Belgium had the highest debt ratio at the 
end of 2010. The euro area’s average government consolidated 
gross debt ratio stood at 85.3 per cent of GDP. Only five of the 
17 Member States (namely Estonia, Luxembourg, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Finland) had a debt ratio below the Maastricht crite-
rion of 60 per cent of GDP. 
As in the case of the private sector, it is also possible to calculate 
a net debt ratio for the government sector. Since public financial 
assets are generally small, a classification of the countries on the 
basis of net government debt produces a similar outcome to a clas-
sification based on gross debt. Once again, Greece, Italy and 
Belgium have the highest government debt ratio. In contrast to the 
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recording net financial assets in a small minority of cases8; this 
applies to Estonia, Luxembourg and Finland. In the case of Estonia 
and Luxembourg, this positive position is primarily attributable to 
their governments’ low gross debt, rather than to the size of their 
assets. Finland is an exception, with government financial assets 
amounting to 113.4 per cent of GDP at the end of 2010. However, 
Finland is a special case, because as a consequence of a national 
decision in 1993, government assets also include the pension 
assets built up with private employment pension institutions 
under the second pillar (OECD, 2010). While this creates a distor-
tion for the net concept between the private and public sector, that 
is no longer the case if one considers the aggregate net position for 
the total economy (public and private sector together). This posi-
tion will be discussed in the next section.
2. Link to economic growth and financial stability 
The increased focus of economic policy on debt positions can 
be primarily attributed to a concern that a high debt level is detri-
mental to macroeconomic performances such as GDP growth. The 
events in the euro area have shown that excessive debt may also 
undermine financial stability, which in turn risks hampering 
economic growth.
Indeed, leading studies recently have confirmed that a high 
debt ratio is associated with lower economic growth. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) demonstrate this negative relationship for public 
debt on the basis of a dataset covering 20 advanced economies 
over the period 1946-2009. Cecchetti et al. (2011) generalize this 
conclusion to the debt ratio of the total economy on the basis of a 
smaller dataset of 18 countries over the period 1980-2006. Both 
studies assume that the relationship is non-linear, and that the 
debt ratio only becomes detrimental for economic growth above a 
specific threshold value. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) conclude that 
a public debt ratio of more than 90 per cent of GDP is associated 
8. These net financial assets may be only temporary in view of the rising costs of population 
ageing. The latter costs can be seen as an implicit government liability which is not at present 
recorded on the government’s balance sheet in the national accounts. If these costs were to be 
included in its liabilities, all governments would probably have net financial liabilities. 
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Cecchetti et al. (2011) confirm this threshold and furthermore put
the threshold for the debt of both households and non-financial
corporations separately, also in the region of 85-90 per cent of
GDP10. However, the results for the private sector, particularly for
households, are found to be less significant. Note that also the
results of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) for the public debt are deba-
table as shown in Nersisyan and Wray (2010).
The importance of these thresholds and the associated conclu-
sions should furthermore be taken with caution in view of the
differences between the various debt concepts illustrated in this
paper. The threshold rules are formulated in very general terms
and may in our view lead to inappropriate policy conclusions.
First, both studies concentrate solely on the gross debt ratio.
Furthermore, in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) certain debt concepts
are used alternatively. For instance, in their study the public debt
ratio of European countries is the consolidated debt ratio, while in
the case of the United States it is the non-consolidated debt ratio.
At the end of 2009 the consolidated debt ratio in the United States
was only 53 per cent of GDP, while the non-consolidated ratio
stood at 84 per cent of GDP; this means that, in reality, the United
States was much further away from the threshold than Reinhart
and Rogoff assumed11. Moreover, our analysis showed that the
debt ratios for both the public and the private sector differ widely
between countries. For some countries, it would thus imply an
unrealistic effort to respect a general defined threshold value12,
whereas in the past those countries have not necessarily produced
9. In practice, GDP growth is roughly 1 per cent lower for the median of the group of
countries with debts in excess of 90 per cent of GDP, compared to the group of countries with
debts of less than 30 per cent of GDP (and 4 per cent for the average of these groups).
10. This study examines the effect on the growth of GDP per capita. A 10 per cent of GDP
higher public debt ratio would cut the growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.1 per cent. The effect
on this growth rate caused by an excessive private debt ratio would amount to roughly half of
that figure.
11.  Note that Reinhart and Rogoff use central government debt, i.e. debt of the federal state,
opposed to general government debt used in this paper, which includes apart from the debt of
the federal state also the debt of the states and the local level.
12.  These threshold values also found their way to economic policy. For example, in its MIP,
the European Commission uses a threshold of 160 per cent of GDP for aggregate non-
consolidated private debt. However, according to the Commission, this threshold should be
seen as a warning signal and not as a target.
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obtained on the basis of these papers’ findings.
To arrive at a more nuanced view, we analyse in this paper the 
link between the debt level and GDP growth for both the non-
consolidated gross debt and net debt ratios13 of the economy as a 
whole14. A scatter plot linking the average real GDP growth over 
the period 2009-11 and the level of first the gross debt ratio and 
second the net financial assets, i.e. net debt with the sign reversed 
(Figure 2), allows the following conclusions to be drawn.
For the euro area, there is no significant relationship between a 
country’s gross debt ratio and its real GDP growth over the most 
recent period (2009-11). For example, the total gross debt ratio of 
the Greek economy is close to the average, whereas its growth 
performance is the weakest in the euro area. On the other hand, 
13.  The results for the consolidated gross debt ratio are not commented on here, but the 
conclusions are broadly the same as those for the non-consolidated gross debt ratio.
14.  Aggregate gross debt at the level of the total economy corresponds to the gross debt of the 
non-financial sectors. Net debt includes the financial sector, but the latter’s contribution to net 
debt is generally close to zero owing to the definition used (liabilities—financial assets) and the 
virtual equality between both sides of the balance sheet of the financial sector in the national 
financial accounts.
Figure 2. Gross debt (i) and net financial assets (ii) versus GDP growth
1. Average annual real GDP growth over the period 2009-11. 
2. As per cent of annual GDP, end 2010. 
3. Difference between total financial assets and financial liabilities of the domestic sectors, as per cent of GDP, end 2010.
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performance during the crisis was far stronger. The gross debt ratio 
is therefore not sufficiently discriminating to separate the weak 
from the strong growth countries over the most recent period in 
the euro area.
The situation is different for net financial assets (or net debt with 
the sign reversed). The link between net financial assets and the recent 
growth performance is remarkably strong and positive. The higher the 
ratio of net financial assets, the higher was economic growth over the 
period 2009-11; the lower the net financial assets ratio, the weaker the 
growth performance was. Again, the conclusion is that net debt is more 
significant for explaining macroeconomic performances than the gross 
debt ratio. The policy conclusions which can be drawn from this rela-
tionship may be at odds with those of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and 
Cecchetti et al. (2011), as argued in the rest of this paper. 
Like these two leading studies, we do not demonstrate any causal 
relationship between the debt ratio and economic growth, but at most 
a correlation. It should be noted that there might be a reverse causa-
lity, in which lower growth leads to a higher debt ratio (via lower 
government revenues or lower GDP). The same argument can be 
applied to net debt. Moreover, our analysis is confined to the most 
recent period. It is not our intention to generalize this relationship, 
since we believe that the broader economic context may influence it15.
The same exercise also illustrates the link between the debt posi-
tions of the countries and financial stability in the euro area. In the 
light of the sovereign debt crisis, we measure the financial instabi-
lity of the countries on the basis of their average interest rate 
spread against Germany on benchmark government bonds with a 
maturity of 10 years over the period 2009-11 (Figure 3). Again, 
there is no clear link with the total gross debt ratio for this variable 
(Reinhart et al. (2012) largely confirm the absence of a clear link 
between, in their case, the level of gross public debt and the level 
of real interest rates), whereas the link with net financial assets is 
highly significant. Consequently, during the sovereign debt crisis, 
15.  The analysis by Cecchetti et al. (2011, see footnote 39) does not produce the same results as 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) regarding the impact on economic growth. They attribute these 
divergent results to a different sample period, which implies that the conclusions are indeed 
sensitive to the chosen time period and are difficult to generalize.
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vulnerable financial position. That finding is all the more 
powerful, given the general focus on the gross debt ratio, which 
also prevails among financial market participants. It shows that 
the financial markets, whether consciously or not, rightly take 
other factors into account to determine the financial soundness of 
a country, such as net financial assets.
3. Debt and balance of payments imbalances
As shown in Section 1 and 2, a country’s net financial assets are 
a much more comprehensive debt indicator than gross general 
government debt, for example, or the gross debt of the private 
sector. The latter two indicators adopt a very partial approach to 
the debt issue, considering only one sector of the economy and 
disregarding the assets possibly offsetting the debts. In contrast, a 
country’s net financial assets combine all sectors and take account 
of their financial assets as well as their debts. The total net finan-
cial assets, which—like the other debt indicators in this paper—are 
taken from the national financial accounts, correspond in concep-
tual terms to the net international investment position, compiled
Figure 3. Gross debt (i) and net financial assets (ii) 
versus 10-year interest rate spread
1. Average monthly 10-year government bond interest rate spread to Germany over the period 2009-11 in per cent. No 
data available for Estonia. 
2. As per cent of annual GDP, end 2010. 
3. Difference between total financial assets and financial liabilities of the domestic sectors, as per cent of GDP, end 2010.
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two are conceptually the same, there may be differences between 
them in practice, owing to different valuation rules for outstan-
ding assets and liabilities.
In addition, net financial assets illustrate the link between debt 
and competitiveness, as they indicate a country’s aggregate net 
debt, namely its net creditor (+) or debtor (-) position relative to 
the rest of the world. Leaving aside valuation effects, an improve-
ment in that position is only possible if the country records a 
surplus on its current account17. This illustrates the connection 
between debt and competitiveness which, at aggregate level, are 
closely interlinked. Indeed, in the end, the only way for a country 
to repay its national debt is to generate current account surpluses, 
which may require an improvement in competitiveness. The 
competitiveness position is therefore one of the elements which 
determines the sustainability of the debt position.
On the basis of net financial assets, the differences between the 
euro area countries are striking (Figure 4). Only a few countries 
have net financial assets (at the end of 2010 this was the case for 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Finland and 
Malta). The other countries have net financial liabilities relative to 
the rest of the world; in Portugal, Greece and Ireland these liabili-
ties exceed their GDP. Ranking the countries according to their net 
financial position clearly reveals the euro area countries perceived 
as risky during the crisis (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and 
Spain). Except for Italy, these countries are at the bottom of 
the ranking.
Another striking point is that the euro area as a whole has a 
fairly balanced external position. At the end of 2010, the net finan-
cial liabilities of the euro area came to only 13.9 per cent of a year’s 
GDP. It can therefore be argued that the euro area as a whole, like 
the countries with net financial assets, is financially sound. These 
figures also put a different perspective on the debt problem of the 
16.  We base the analysis on net financial assets from the national financial accounts, and not 
on the net international investment position, primarily in view of the consistency of net 
financial assets with the calculated gross debt indicators.
17.  To be precise, on the total of the current and capital account. Apart from valuation effects, net 
financial assets correspond to the cumulative balances on the current and capital accounts. In most 
cases, however, the capital account balance is negligible compared to the current account balance.
Christophe Van Nieuwenhuyze140euro area and of certain countries. Rather than a debt problem, the 
euro area’s difficulties can be defined as a deviation between 
balance of payments positions. Some countries have accumulated 
considerable debt positions relative to the rest of the world, notably 
to other euro area members, while other have accumulated assets. 
In the end, the euro area’s difficulties could best be described as 
reflecting the heterogeneity of the Member States in that respect (as 
such, while the situation is sustainable for the euro area as a whole, 
this is not the case at the level of the Member States). 
To analyse the dynamics of these net asset positions and their 
possible correction, it is useful to divide the euro area countries 
into surplus and deficit countries. Since the size of the net financial 
assets is determined partly by volatile valuation effects—which are 
beyond the scope of this paper—we base our criterion for the divi-
sion into deficit and surplus countries also on the average current 
account balance of the Member States over the period 1999-2010 
(Figure 4). If the latter is positive while the country has a negative 
net asset position, the country is nevertheless classified among the 
surplus countries. In the opposite case, if the current account 
balance is negative while the net asset position is positive, the 
country is classified among the deficit countries. On the basis of 
Figure 4. Net financial asset position and current account balance
       As per cent of annual GDP
















































Net financial assets, end 2010 (left -hand scale)
Average current account balance, 1999 -2010 (right- hand scale)
Debt, assets and imbalances in the euro area: an aggregate view 141this criterion, the euro area counts six surplus countries (Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Finland and Austria) 
and eleven deficit countries (Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, Italy, France and Malta)18. The 
classification of Austria and Malta is due to their current account. 
Note that the classification is by no means fixed, and also depends 
on the chosen period. In particular, the current account balance of 
some countries has recorded a trend over the years, which is in 
contrast to their classification. For instance, since 1999 the current 
account balance of Belgium and Finland declined considerably, 
although the balance was still positive at the end of 2010. Conver-
sely, Estonia’s current account has improved notably since 1999 
and even records a positive balance since the end of 2009.
The fact that the classification is by no means fixed is in itself a 
sign that corrections are possible. In view of the relationship 
demonstrated in Section 2 between these net asset positions and 
macroeconomic performances, the deficit countries would benefit 
from eliminating their negative position. That would also lead to a 
more stable euro area, with more balanced external positions. This 
may require some coordination at the European level, whereby the 
surplus countries also might have to undergo some changes in 
their external position. The new macroeconomic imbalance 
procedure offers a useful tool to achieve such adjustement.
4. Adjustment of debt positions via the financial balances  
of the sectors
Changes in the stock of net financial assets take place via the 
aggregate net lending or borrowing of the domestic sectors, also 
known as their net lending to (+) or borrowing from (-) the rest of 
the world. These financial balances result from movements in 
income and expenditure. Leaving aside valuation effects, a positive 
financial balance leads to an improvement in net financial assets, 
and a negative balance leads to a deterioration. The development 
of the financial balances therefore offers a picture of the changes in 
net financial asset positions, for which, as previously argued, a 
18.  A similar breakdown of the euro area countries in two groups in the context of the sectoral 
financial accounts has been carried out by the ECB (2012).
Christophe Van Nieuwenhuyze142reduction of the differences between the euro area countries would 
be desirable. In practice, this means that the deficit countries need 
to increase their net savings. The surplus countries can also help to 
reduce this difference. That might entail some coordination of 
economic policy at European level, since the policy choices of the 
various countries in a currency union have a significant impact on 
one another, as the pattern of financial balances in the euro area 
has shown.
The pattern of the financial balances over the first ten years in 
the euro area implies a number of relations, both between the 
behaviour of the private and government sectors and between the 
deficit and surplus countries. These relations follow in accounting 
terms from the quasi-equilibrium recorded by the euro area as a 
whole relative to the rest of the world. Since the start of EMU, the 
net savings of the euro area have been extremely stable. Since 1999 
the financial balance has fluctuated between -1.5 per cent and 
+1.0 per cent of GDP (Figure 5). The euro area recorded small net 
savings from 2002 until 2007, while in other years there were 
slight net dissavings. The modest financial balances are directly 
linked to the absence of substantial deficits or surpluses on the 
current account of the euro area as a whole. 
Figure 5. Financial balances: sectoral net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) in the euro area*
 As per cent of GDP
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financial balances of the private and government sectors are the 
mirror image of one another, as are the balances of the surplus and 
deficit countries. In the past, increases in private sector savings, 
have partly offset in the euro area increases in government deficits. 
Likewise, improvements of the government balance have been 
associated with a fall in private net savings. However, the connec-
tion between these balances does not indicate any causal direction. 
The opposing movements can be attributed to Ricardian effects, 
according to which the private sector increases its savings when 
public finances weaken, or to an active role for fiscal policy in 
stabilising economic activity (“leaning against the wind’’). In the 
past, this offsetting behaviour has avoided excessively negative 
effects on GDP growth of rising savings in either the private or the 
public sector. At the level of the economy, this compensatory 
behaviour turned out to be feasible since the aggregate net finan-
cial balance did not record any significant deficit.
There exists a similar relationship between the deficit and 
surplus countries (Figure 6). That relationship is best viewed in 
accounting terms from the angle of the external equilibrium 
recorded by the euro area as a whole. To the extent that this 
external balance remains unchanged, for example in the absence 
of an external demand stimulus due to a euro depreciation, this 
means that the scope for net savings in the deficit and surplus 
countries is given. For given net exports of the euro area, rising net 
savings in one group of countries must be associated with decli-
ning net savings in the other group of countries. The economic 
interpretation of this is that competitiveness improvements and 
hence rising net savings in one group of countries trigger a fall in 
net savings in the other group. Or that improvements in net 
exports of one group of countries can only be achieved if the other 
group of countries increases its net imports. If net exports of the 
euro area are unchanged19, improvements in some Member States’ 
financial balance (by increases in net exports) thus necessarily 
19. In a way, EMU and the associated fact that Member States cannot devalue their currency 
has made it more difficult to manipulate net financial assets. A devaluation could lead to a 
sudden rise in net exports and thus in net savings (leaving aside valuation effects). In the 
absence of that option, countries with a problematic net financial position cannot rectify it as 
readily as in the past.
Christophe Van Nieuwenhuyze144imply that other euro area countries will increase their net 
borrowing more strongly (by rising net imports).
Dividing the euro area into deficit and surplus countries 
provides a picture of the link between the financial balances of the 
euro area countries, and thus of their recent saving results. For 
simplicity, the breakdown of the economies is limited to the 
private and government sectors, with no breakdown between 
households and non-financial corporations (Figure 7). 
Over the period from 2009 to mid-2010, the financial crisis led 
to a substantial deterioration in public finances in both country 
groups. The deficit countries in particular recorded a sharp rise in 
budget deficits. By mid-2010, the average came to around 8 per 
cent of GDP in the deficit country group; in the surplus countries, 
the budget balance deteriorated from a pre-crisis balanced budget 
to a deficit of almost 5 per cent of GDP. However, in accordance 
with the historical pattern, these rising deficits were accompanied 
by an increase in private savings. The expansion in private savings 
was most marked in the deficit countries and actually led to a less 
negative aggregate financial balance. By contrast, the aggregate 
Figure 6. Financial balances: net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) of surplus 
and deficit countries1
 As per cent of GDP
1. Four-quarter cumulated sum. 
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remained positive. The reason for the sharp improvement in the 
financial balance of the private sector in deficit countries is mainly 
due to the position of corporations, which in turn may be linked to 
the various measures taken to promote competitiveness, including 
a relatively more favourable development of unit labour costs. Up 
to mid-2010 a rebalancing between the countries seems thus to 
have been initiated, with the deficit countries increasing their 
aggregate net savings and the surplus countries reducing them.
However, the sovereign debt crisis and the ensuing general 
focus on reducing debt positions may have turned the attention 
away from rebalancing needs. Since mid-2010 both surplus and 
deficit countries have cut their government deficit. At the end of 
2011, the average budget deficit had fallen to below the Maastricht 
Treaty’s reference value of 3 per cent of GDP in the surplus 
countries; in the deficit countries, an average budget deficit of 
6 per cent of GDP still looked problematic. However, unlike in the 
past, in the surplus countries, this was not accompanied by a net 
dissaving of the private sector. On the contrary, probably with a 
view to reduce their own debts, the private sector maintained a 
substantial level of savings. The aggregate net savings of the 
surplus countries thus increased further. Again, the deficit 
Figure 7. Financial balances: sectoral net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) 
of surplus and deficit countries1
1. Four-quarter cumulated sum. 
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Christophe Van Nieuwenhuyze146countries presented a mirror image, with higher net borrowings 
from the rest of the world20. The improvement in public finances 
was more than compensated by a considerable fall in private 
savings. Although this could point to a positive Ricardian effect, 
this nevertheless seems rather unlikely in view of the state of 
public finances. It seems more likely that the reduction in net 
savings in these deficit countries is due to the harsh economic 
situation which in some cases even led to a fall in GDP.
5. Policy conclusions:  net financial assets as the yardstick
On the basis of an aggregate analysis of the debt positions of the 
euro area countries, taking account not only of government debt 
but also of private sector debt and the financial assets of the 
various sectors, this paper has shown that the aggregated net debt 
or the net financial asset position is an interesting policy variable, 
particularly for evaluating a country’s financial stability. Corrobo-
rating the empirical and theoretical evidence described in 
Section 2, some additional evidence for that conclusion is 
presented in  this section. 
Although it is common to focus on the sustainability of govern-
ment finances, partly as a result of the convergence criteria 
outlined in the Maastricht Treaty, this paper wants to stress that a 
country’s solvency may also be determined by the financial posi-
tion of the private sector. This aggregate financial position of an 
economy is summarized in a country’s net financial assets, defined 
as the difference between the financial assets and financial liabili-
ties of the domestic sectors. The theoretical and empirical evidence 
described in Section 2 already illustrated that this aggregate posi-
tion is important to determine an economy’s solvency. Note the 
distinction between a country’s solvency and the government’s 
solvency, which is in fact not always made21. The behaviour of the 
private sector may cause major differences between the two. For 
instance, the government often has net debts while in some cases 
20. Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) draw attention not only to these differences, which are 
also reflected in the current account balance, but also to the existence of capital flight from the 
‘southern’ to the ‘northern’ countries. In case of capital flight the underlying imbalances (that is 
those on the current account) tend to become less sustainable since they can no longer be 
financed privately.
Debt, assets and imbalances in the euro area: an aggregate view 147the country has net financial assets. The total net financial assets 
seem to be crucial for assessing a country’s solvency, although they 
might be equally decisive to determine a government’s solvency.
The reason for this is that the domestic private sector is able to 
finance the government in case the economy is characterised by 
net financial assets. The government therefore does not necessarily 
need to depend on the international capital market to finance its 
deficits. It might rely on an extensive tax base which it can use, by 
a tax increase, at least to partly fund its deficits. The room for such 
a strategy is of course limited due to its repercussions on competiti-
veness and—depending where the ideal Laffer-taxation rate is 
situated—also on taxation revenues. Apart from taxation, the 
government can also draw on a voluntary basis on domestic 
savings for debt financing. A funding operation conducted by the 
Belgian government at the end of 2011 demonstrates that such a 
mechanism is not purely theoretical. As well as applying to the 
international capital market, the Belgian government regularly 
calls on private savings via its “State notes” (financial instrument 
specifically for retail savers resident in Belgium). At the end of 
2011, these State notes were issued at a time when financial 
markets were experiencing severe tensions, and were charging the 
Belgian government a very high interest rate. The Belgian govern-
ment offered private investors the possibility to subscribe to 
government paper on the same terms. The issue was a great success 
and the Belgian Treasury raised a total of €8.6 billion via this 
instrument in 2011, enough to cover 20 per cent of its total gross 
borrowing requirement in that year (National Bank of Belgium, 
2012). This illustrates the point that a transfer of private savings to 
the public sector is not purely theoretical. Although this funding 
flow was partly due to the relatively high interest rate offered on 
State notes, it shows that the government of a country with net 
financial assets may be less dependent on the international capital 
market, and thus can tolerate a higher debt. The aggregate net 
21. Since the Maastricht Treaty, a public deficit has often been associated with an external 
imbalance, and consequently a deterioration in net financial assets of a country. This explains 
why government deficits are often the reason why the financial markets impose a risk premium 
on the country or on its ‘currency’, although that risk premium should, in principle, depend on 
a currency’s total supply and demand, namely the net lending (+) / borrowing (-) relative to the 
rest of the world, or in cumulative terms, its net financial assets.
Christophe Van Nieuwenhuyze148financial assets are therefore a key solvency indicator, for both the 
country and the government, as already illustrated in Section 2.
The net financial assets are also relevant in constructing a solu-
tion for the euro area, certainly in view of the balanced position of 
the euro area as a whole. This equilibrium indicates that the euro 
area countries are capable of resolving the Member States’ funding 
problems themselves, provided that capital flows take place 
between Member States. Countries with international (private and 
public) reserves, that is the surplus countries, can use those 
reserves to finance the deficit countries. That puts the European 
Union (2012) initiatives concerning possible recourse to the inter-
national reserves of countries such as China to finance the euro 
area countries in another light. These plans aim to set up a special 
purpose vehicle funded by China and other growth countries, 
which would then grant loans to the euro area Member States. This 
implies a recourse to China’s international reserves, which would 
in principle be the same as resorting to the international reserves 
of the surplus countries in the euro area. 
Finally, the net financial assets can be used as a guide for the 
assessment of euro area exit costs and thus the feasibility of such 
an event. An exit country would immediately have to cope with a 
devaluation. Such devaluation would mean a revaluation of the 
external debt so that, expressed in the devalued currency, it would 
further increase. As shown in Section 2, the net external debt 
already exceeds GDP in a number of Member States, making it 
unlikely for such an exit country to meet its liabilities, and will 
thus be forced into default. Since much of this debt is owed to the 
other euro area countries, this would also imply substantial losses 
for the remaining Member States, making an exit less likely. 
6. Conclusion
This paper presents an aggregate analysis of the debt positions 
of the euro area countries. It takes account not only of government 
debt but also of private sector debt and the financial assets of the 
various sectors. Taking account of financial assets to assess the 
financial position is in line with the approach of Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989) and complements the analyses of gross debt posi-
tions by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and Cecchetti et al. (2011). 
Debt, assets and imbalances in the euro area: an aggregate view 149On the basis of this analysis, it emerges that euro area countries 
differ extensively in terms of their total net (external) financial 
assets. In a context of hampered financial integration, the euro 
area might benefit from a reduction of these differences in external 
financial positions (by rebalancing current accounts). This implies 
that the deficit countries (countries with a negative net financial 
asset position or an aggregate net debt) should increase their net 
savings, preferably by improving their competitiveness. The 
surplus countries (countries with net financial assets) can help to 
reduce this difference by taking account of the need for the deficit 
countries to become more competitive.  
Reducing the differences between external financial positions 
in the EMU seems to be crucial since current account imbalances in 
the Member States of a currency union can only be maintained if 
there is close financial integration. However, the experience of the 
financial crisis has shown that the financing of current account 
deficits in the euro area cannot be taken for granted. In that 
context, the EU’s new macroeconomic imbalance procedure, 
which also monitors the external position of a country, for 
example by means of the net international investment position, is 
warmly welcomed.
This paper’s findings open up various avenues for future 
research. In particular, there is a need for a better understanding of 
the causes of the external imbalances in the euro area, their recent 
development and the appropriate ways of correcting them—for 
example by closer coordination of economic policy between the 
various countries—and the contribution of the new EU economic 
governance in that regard. For assessing the financial position it is 
preferable to take account of assets as well as liabilities. In addition, 
there is a need to know more—within the limits imposed by data 
availability—about the characteristics of those assets and liabilities 
(maturity, liquidity) and how they relate to the various sectors. 
Microeconomic data can be useful here. Finally, the impact of 
valuation effects on the net asset position and the composition of 
the assets could also be examined, in view of their importance 
illustrated in this paper, for example in assessing the costs of a 
country’s potential exit from a monetary union.
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Table. Debt ratios, euro area





















Euro area 99.3 78.9 65.3 -43.7 92.3 85.3 57.6
Belgium 179.7 77.5 53.1 -96.5 109.7 96.2 80.2
Germany 66.5 50.2 61.6 -71.0 87.4 83.2 50.6
Estonia 121.6 93.3 54.5 109.2 7.1 6.7 -36.5
Ireland 222.4 n.a. 118.9 111.1 n.a. 92.5 50.5
Greece 63.4 63.4 60.7 15.6 n.a. 144.9 89.4
Spain 141.6 128.2 85.7 46.1 67.8 61.0 39.8
France 104.7 82.3 55.1 -41.9 93.3 82.3 58.8
Italy 81.4 80.4 45.0 -69.0 124.7 118.4 99.1
Cyprus 159.2 158.9 130.1 n.a. 104.9 61.5 n.a.
Luxembourg 201.6 149.3 52.3 -154.0 20.1 19.1 -49.9
Malta 149.3 102.0 62.7 -58.0 74.4 69.0 51.8
Netherlands 96.3 94.9 127.1 -106.2 71.7 62.9 34.4
Austria 109.0 93.0 56.8 -31.8 84.9 71.8 43.7
Portugal 153.1 128.8 95.5 48.6 104.0 93.3 63.5
Slovenia 97.7 87.3 31.1 36.9 47.0 38.8 0.8
Slovakia 32.9 32.9 35.9 34.6 45.7 41.0 24.7
Finland 114.8 92.1 62.9 65.1 53.0 48.3 -65.1
1. Including the financial sector.
2. For households, the consolidated concept equals the non-consolidated concept since the financial transactions 
between households in the financial accounts are assumed to be zero.
3. Net debt calculated as the difference between total financial liabilities and total financial assets. A negative sign indi-
cates that assets exceed liabilities.
n.a. = data not available.
Sources: European Commission, ECB.
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EXAMPLE FOR EUROPEAN FISCAL POLICY? 1
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Many observers consider the German “debt brake” beyond criticism. In the 
current crisis, many European countries have difficulties refinancing their 
budgets, while the German Treasury’s funding conditions are most favourable. 
The “fiscal compact’s” call for the introduction of German-style “debt brakes” 
in the constitutions of other countries in order to rebuild their credibility on 
financial markets therefore might seem reasonable. However, there are several 
reasons to doubt the underlying (macro-) economic reasoning. Two specific 
problems of the German debt brake are analysed in greater detail: Firstly, the 
German rule is neither simple nor transparent. The calculation of structural 
deficits is a complex matter highly sensitive to specification and therefore open 
to political manipulation. Secondly, the debt brake will ultimately have a pro-
cyclical effect because of the way the commonly used cyclical adjustment 
method works. This will, as a result, destabilise the economy. The German debt 
brake can therefore hardly serve as a good example for other countries. 
Keywords: Germany, Debt brake, Euro zone, Euro crisis, Sovereign debt.
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Achim Truger and Henner Will156When most EU governments pledged at the end of 2011 to 
introduce stricter limits on public debts and deficits, where possible 
incorporating them into the Constitution, this resulted primarily 
from an acute sense of panic in the face of the continuing escala-
tion of the Euro crisis. For the first time, even the bonds of hitherto 
unaffected countries had come under pressure in the financial 
markets. But the fact that European governments resorted to the 
German approach of constitutionally fixed debt brakes certainly 
also has something to do with the allegedly easily demonstrable 
success of the German example. Germany incorporated the debt 
brake into its Constitution back in the summer of 2009, just before 
the onset of the Euro crisis. In 2010, the federal government intro-
duced a sizeable package of cuts for the following years in order to 
steadily reduce the structural deficit in the transition phase to the 
target figure of 0.35% of gross domestic product (GDP) permissible 
from 2016 onwards. The federal budget for 2011 was already drawn 
up to comply with the new transitional regulations. The results 
appear impressive: The federal government claims that it has 
clearly over-fulfilled the requirements, and the entire government 
budget deficit for 2011 was only 0.8% of GDP. Therefore, it might 
seem logical to regard the German debt brake as a tried and tested 
instrument of a successful and solid fiscal policy and declare it a 
shining example to all of Europe. The inclusion in Germany’s 
“Basic Law”, or Constitution, of stringent limits on sovereign debt, 
it is argued, enhances the country’s credibility on the financial 
markets, leading to lower risk premiums and, hence, easier public 
sector financing (see Heinemann et al., 2011). This logic suggests 
that exporting the German debt brake or similar fiscal rules to the 
euro zone countries currently in crisis would be a major contribu-
tion to solving the euro crisis (see also GD 2011, p. 51).
In contrast to the views just sketched, we consider that logic 
and the economic policy currently implemented at the European 
level to be fundamentally flawed and believe that it would jeopar-
dise the survival of the euro for three major reasons. First, it is 
misleadingly reductive in tracing the cause of the euro crisis back 
to unstable fiscal policy in the countries currently experiencing 
difficulties. Second, it almost completely ignores the effect of 
imbalances in foreign trade and the responsibility of the euro zone 
The German “debt brake”: a shining example for European fiscal policy? 157countries that are (still) currently strong in economic terms. Third, 
it remains bizarrely attached to the long-discredited assumption 
that financial markets are rational (for all three points see Horn et 
al., 2010; IMK/OFCE/WIFO, 2011, 2012). We also believe that a 
debt brake is not, in principle, a rational (macro-) economic tool 
for limiting sovereign debt (see e.g. Horn et al. 2008).
In this paper, however, we do not intend to broaden this funda-
mental criticism but, instead, to look in greater depth at two key 
aspects of it: Firstly the problem of intransparency and openness to 
manipulation of the notion of a structural deficit and secondly that 
of an inherent tendency towards pro-cyclical fiscal policies. Assu-
ming that financial markets are even partly rational in economic 
terms, these problems raise serious doubts about the claimed ability 
of the German debt brake to boost confidence and bring stability to 
market expectations. The existing economic literature on fiscal 
rules suggests that certain “quality requirements” go hand in hand 
with sound and adequate rules. A rule should, by these criteria, be 
simple and transparent (see Kopits and Symanski, 1998). The 
assumption is clear: the primary aim of a rule is to protect electo-
rates and financial markets against what may sometimes be self-
serving behaviour on the part of politicians. If, however, neither 
electorates nor markets are able to understand the rule, then that 
rule does not seem particularly useful. As we shall set out in this 
paper, the rule currently being applied by the German government 
is neither simple nor transparent. Calculating structural deficits is a 
highly complex process, and since the German government 
withheld important information, there was a period when not 
even experts were able to replicate the government’s calculations. 
Such calculations are also extremely sensitive to changing specifi-
cations, so outcomes are open to political manipulation. The 
inherently pro-cyclical nature of the German rule, and the conco-
mitant risk of a policy that will exacerbate a crisis, are unlikely to 
secure the long-term confidence of the financial markets.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 begins with a short 
account of the debt brake and some of the principal conceptual 
problems of a debt brake from fiscal policy and macroeconomic 
points of view. Sections 2, 3 and 4 comprise the technical detailed 
analysis and use the authors’ own simulations to demonstrate that 
the methodology used by the government of the Federal Republic 
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adjustment method is very much open to manipulation and will 
produce pro-cyclical outcomes. Section 2 shows the enormous 
scope for interpretation opened up by the method. Section 3 then 
provides an overview of how the German government has actually 
been using the resulting margins to give itself budgetary leeway in 
the transitional period up to 2016. Section 4 illustrates in detail the 
problem of the pro-cyclical susceptibility to revision of the Euro-
pean Commission’s method. A dynamic simulation provides the 
first explicit illustration of the budget balancing method for two 
economic scenarios explicitly linked to the authors’ own tax 
revenue estimates, to demonstrate the impact of the debt brake on 
budget targets during the transitional period up to 2016. It shows 
that the margins that appear currently to exist will be progressively 
eroded by a (not too large) downturn in the economy. Ultimately, 
further discretionary consolidation measures beyond the govern-
ment’s plan to cut spending and raise taxes—its so called Future 
Package—will then be required to meet the targets set out under 
the debt brake. Finally, section 5 draws some economic policy 
conclusions.
1. Introduction to the debt brake and its fundamental 
problems
1.1. The key characteristics of Germany’s debt brake
The debt brake written into Germany’s Constitution in 2009 is 
essentially comprised of three elements. The structural compo-
nent imposes strict limits on structural government deficits—
0.35% of GDP for the federal level (the Bund) and 0.0% for the 
federal states (the Länder). The cyclical component increases or 
decreases these limits in accordance with the country’s economic 
situation. An exception clause, finally, permits the rules to be 
broken in exceptional circumstances. The Bund also has an “adjust-
ment account”, which ensures the debt brake applies not only 
when the country’s budget is drawn up but also when it is imple-
mented. Transitional periods for complying with these limits on 
structural deficits are written into the constitution: 2016 for the 
Bund and 2020 for the Länder. The legislation also provides for 
consolidation aid for five Länder (Berlin, Bremen, Saarland, 
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The debt brake targets, in fact, even go a little further than is neces-
sary to enable Germany to meet its medium-term national budget 
targets: under the preventive arm of the European Stability and 
Growth Pact, Germany is allowed a structural deficit equivalent to 
0.5% of GDP.
1.2. Fundamental problems with the debt brake from a fiscal policy 
and macroeconomic perspective3
We cannot go into the details of Germany’s fiscal policy before 
the introduction of the debt brake. It is sufficient to say that this 
policy has been traditionally pro-cyclical for more than 30 years 
and that between 2000 and the crisis in 2008/2009, its dangerous 
mix of continual tax cuts and the rigid pursuit of a balanced 
budget caused severe damage to growth and employment, substan-
tially widened existing inequalities in the income distribution, and 
weakened the country’s public finances (Hein and Truger, 2005, 
2007; Jacoby and Truger, 2002; Truger, 2004, 2009, 2010). There 
was, therefore, good reason for a change of course. However, the 
change of course represented by the debt brake can be criticised on 
at least five grounds.
Firstly, the capping—now anchored in the German Constitu-
tion – of structural government net borrowing at 0.35% of GDP for 
the Bund and the banning of all structural deficits by the Länder is, 
economically speaking, completely arbitrary. It means that with an 
average annual growth in nominal GDP of 3%, the national debt-
to-GDP ratio will converge to just 11.7% in the long run. We do 
not contest that there are arguments for some ceiling on the debt 
ratio, but—if anything—recent empirical research indicates that 
the critical threshold beyond which a government deficit might 
harm growth is 80% or even 90%.4 We fear that by imposing artifi-
cial limits on what is traditionally the safest form of financial 
investment, the debt brake will instead deprive capital markets of a 
3. For a more thorough and detailed analysis of the shortcomings of the debt brake approach 
in the European context see the contribution by Mathieu and Sterdyniak in this issue. 
4. See for example Caner et al. (2011); Cecchetti et al. (2011); Checherita and Rother (2010); 
Kumar and Woo (2010); Ostry et al. (2010); Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). However, as Nersisyan 
and Wray (2010) have convincingly demonstrated, such studies suffer from serious 
methodological shortcomings and should, therefore, hardly be taken as a guideline for 
economic policy.  
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which forms of investment, and to which countries, the traditio-
nally high excess savings of the German private sector (including 
the assets of private pension schemes) will be diverted in the 
future, but it is likely that this measure will render the financial 
markets considerably less stable in the long term.
Secondly, by using a debt brake, Germany’s fiscal policy is igno-
ring a broadly accepted economic yardstick for the scale of 
national deficits—the “Golden Rule”—and thus turning its back 
on 60 years of theoretical common sense. This Golden Rule, or the 
“pay-as-you-use” principle, is a growth-oriented rule for govern-
ment deficits that permits structural deficits beyond the cycle 
equivalent to net public investment. The idea behind the rule is to 
involve several generations in financing public capital accumula-
tion, since future generations will benefit in terms of greater 
prosperity from the productive investments made now (see 
Musgrave, 1959). It is true that the old rules governing borrowing 
by both the Bund and the Länder in the German constitution were 
imperfect: they were unable to distinguish between gross and net 
investment and, moreover, they failed to include all forms of 
economically relevant investment. However, there was no discus-
sion around a more workable definition or an estimate of 
depreciation—just as there was not with the Maastricht criteria or 
the European Stability and Growth Pact—and the government 
ignored recommendations made by the Council of Economic 
Experts (SVR 2007), a body not exactly known to endorse runaway 
sovereign debt. Moreover, the lamentable trend in net public 
investment both in absolute terms and relative to GDP shows the 
urgency of writing into the country’s constitution a rule to 
promote public investment. Net government investment has 
almost continuously fallen in Germany over the last 30 years—in 
recent years the public capital stock has, in effect, been shrinking 
(Figure 1).
Thirdly, possibly the most serious problem associated with the 
debt brake is that it was introduced at a time when public budgets 
were markedly underfinanced in structural terms, as they have for 
many years come under repeated strain from tax cuts. The long-
term tax reductions adopted in the wake of the global economic 
and financial crisis and Germany’s “Growth Acceleration Act” 
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Teichmann, 2011). Where governments are expected to balance
their budgets in structural terms—or to come very close to doing
so—on a given date without already having closed the revenue
gap, their budget policy faces years of stringent pressure on spen-
ding. In macroeconomic terms, this is an extremely risky course of
action with potentially negative impact on growth and employ-
ment as adjustments are made, particularly against the backdrop of
the precarious economic situation in the euro zone as a whole, and
it will unquestionably go hand in hand with substantial cuts in the
provision of public goods, services and welfare. And if this then
leads (as it almost inevitably will) to the necessary public invest-
ment being scrapped or cut in future years, the much-vaunted
principle of “generational fairness” will be greatly damaged.
Moreover, substantial spending cuts are difficult to justify with the
argument that expenditure policy in the past has been wasteful:
On the contrary, the debt brake affects German public sector
budgets after a period of extremely moderate expenditure growth
(Truger and Teichmann, 2011). The decision to implement the
debt brake and couple it with generous, long-term tax relief was,
therefore, worse than negligent in terms both of economic impact
and of national policy. 
Figure 1. Government net investment in billion EUR and in % of GDP, 
Germany (1980-2011)
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dependent on its precise technical design and on how the under-
lying cyclical adjustment method and the applicable budget 
sensitivities are selected. Although the Bund has already opted for 
the method used by the European Commission as part of its own 
monitoring of member states’ budgets, the decision as to the 
details of implementation is taken by the Ministries for Finance 
and Economics, so the mechanism is anything but transparent and 
is open to manipulation. As far as the Länder are concerned, for 
many of them detailed implementation is still an open question. 
And since, under Article 109 of the constitution, there is conside-
rable scope for local input, Germany could by 2020 have no fewer 
than 17 different debt brakes, one for the Bund and one for each of 
the Länder, all with widely differing designs and effects.
Fifthly, and finally, the debt brake will ultimately have a pro-
cyclical effect because of the way the commonly used cyclical 
adjustment method works and will, as a result, destabilise 
economic development. During times of downturn, too much 
consolidation will be required while, conversely, too little will be 
required during periods of recovery. 
The last two areas of criticism will be explored in greater detail 
in this paper. 
2. Vulnerability to manipulation in theory: the problem  
of determining structural deficits
2.1. Introduction to determining structural deficits
The debt brake is supposed to let public sector budgets breathe 
with the economy; in other words, the automatic stabilisers are 
supposed to operate freely. A calculation therefore needs to be 
made as to which changes in the deficit can be attributed solely to 
cyclical factors and, hence, the automatic stabilisers, and which 
part of the deficit is structural and must, therefore, be capped under 
the debt brake. When a cyclical adjustment method is used, this 
usually determines the notional economic situation (potential or 
trend output). The mismatch between this notional situation and 
the actual situation is known as the “output gap”. Where this is 
positive, the state of the economy dictates that surpluses are 
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The calculation of the scale of the permissible deficit or surplus is 
then based on the product of the output gap and the so called 
“budget sensitivity”. The latter reflects the impact of changes in the 
economic cycle on the government budget and is calculated empi-
rically (see Girouard and André, 2005). The structural deficit is then 
determined after deducting the previously calculated cyclical 
deficit.
Germany’s Ministry of Finance employs the following formula 
in calculating the structural deficit under the debt brake:
The structural deficit dt
STRUK as a percentage of potential 
nominal GDP (Yt
POT) is, therefore, the total deficit (revenue minus 
expenditure: Et(Y)t – At) set against potential nominal GDP minus 
the cyclical deficit, which in turn is the product of the sum of the 
semi-elasticity of revenue (εE) and the semi-elasticity of expendi-
ture (εA) of the automatic stabilisers (budget sensitivity) and of the 




However, there are many possible ways of calculating output 
gap and budget sensitivity, and these produce radically divergent 
results in terms of calculating the structural deficit and, hence, 
determining budgetary policy. Determining potential output has 
already proved both difficult and unreliable (Horn et al., 2007). As 
well as univariate methods, such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter— 
proposed by the German Council of Economic Experts—and the 
modified Hodrick-Prescott filter, which is used in Switzerland 
(Bruchez, 2003), a wide range of diverse multivariate estimation 
methods are also available, such as the one used by the European 
Commission.
2.2. The European Commission’s method for determining potential
Germany’s legislation implementing the debt brake—the 
Article 115 Act—has opted “by means of a statutory instrument 
and without the consent of the Bundesrat, [to] stipulate the details 
of the procedure for determining the cyclical component in 












AYEd −+−−= )()( εε
Achim Truger and Henner Will164the framework of the European Stability and Growth Pact. The 
procedure shall be reviewed and developed further on a regular 
basis taking the current state of knowledge into account.”5
The European Commission estimates potential output by 
means of a Cobb-Douglas-production function. This is derived 
from potential labour input (the product of the working age popu-
lation, the participation rate and per capita hours of work minus 
structural unemployment), capital input (the product of gross 
fixed investment in relation to potential output and potential 
output minus a constant depreciation) and total factor producti-
vity or TFP (in the former method, this was expressed as a Solow 
residual with Hodrick-Prescott filtering, while in the new process, 
it is expressed as Kalman-filtered capacity utilisation) (see D’Auria 





with YPOT as the potential output, LPOT as the labour potential, K as 
capital accumulation, TFP as the total factor productivity, BEA as 
working age population, E as employees, U as the unemployed, 
(E+U)/BEA as the participation rate, NAWRU as the non-accelera-
ting wage rate of unemployment, H/E as per capita hours of work, 
I/YPOT as the gross fixed investment in relation to potential output, 
and δ as the rate of depreciation.
The estimate of potential output is a medium-term projection 
based on short-term forecasts (one to two years). All the elements 
in the formulae used are forecast separately: demographic trends, 
the participation rate, structural unemployment, per capita hours 
of work, the investment ratio, the rate of depreciation (usually a 
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Kalman-filtered capacity utilisation. The model solution is derived 
using statistical software. The estimate is calculated for all EU 
Member States using semi-standardised specifications but with 
different details. The specifications are normally adjusted every 
six months.
2.3. The “current state of knowledge” allows for substantial 
margins of interpretation6
The formulation “in conformity with” used in the Article 115 
Act suggests at first glance that the German government is 
applying the European Commission’s method very precisely. 
Comparison with the “current state of knowledge” shows, that the 
government has in fact left itself a generous margin for interpreta-
tion. However, even if it were to comply with the letter of the 
European Commission method, this would not shed much light 
on what is actually happening: in 2010, the Commission itself 
amended its calculation method twice in twelve months (Table 1). 
First, in its spring forecast, it outlined a modified method (III – new 
TFP, spring), which identifies total factor productivity as less sensi-
tive to cyclical factors than under the old method (I – old TFP, 
spring). However, in its autumn forecast, the European Commis-
sion made a further modification to the new method (IV – new 
TFP, autumn), in which the variables represented by the participa-
tion rate and per capita hours of work were adjusted. Despite this, 
it also reflected the old method in its autumn modifications (II – 
old TFP, autumn). This means that for 2010, a key year in terms of 
determining the adjustment path to the final structural deficit 
target in 2016, there were no fewer than four different EU methods 
for cyclical adjustment. Accordingly, for any given budget sensiti-
vity, four cyclical components and correspondingly four structural 
deficits could be calculated, each with a markedly different impact 
on budget policy.
The impact of these four different methods of calculation 
should not be underestimated. With actual federal net borrowing 
of EUR 44.8 billion, and assuming a budget sensitivity of 0.248, the 
6. The analysis below is based on calculations similar to those already outlined in Horn et al.
(2011).
Achim Truger and Henner Will1662010 structural component ranges from EUR 19 billion to EUR
35 billion, depending on the method and the version applied
(Table 3b, reference scenarios).
The output gap and cyclical component values calculated by the
German government in formulating its 2011 budget do not match
any of these values, even though the assumptions relating to
growth were compatible with those of the European Commission.
Without providing detailed data concerning its assumptions, the
German government announced an output gap for 2011 of -0.6%
of GDP (using the old EU method) and a cyclical component of
EUR -2.5 billion. These figures were, thus, outside the range of esti-
mates produced by the four versions of the European Commission
method, showing that the government did not slavishly apply any
version of the European Commission method(s).
In fact, there is considerably greater scope for further modifica-
tion. The Joint Economic Forecast in autumn 2010 did exactly
that, making explicit reference to the European Commission
method, though unfortunately not applying it transparently (GD,
2010, p.44). Although the Joint Economic Forecast results cannot
be reproduced because some data have been withheld, the changes
that have been published can be interpreted as in line with the
“current state of knowledge”. Thus, we introduce similar modifica-
tions and the estimates calculated for output gap and structural
Table 1. Descriptions of the EU Commission methods 2010
EU Commission Methods
No. Description Changes from I
I Old method, spring version —
II Old method, autumn version
Per-capita-working hours with slightly 
decreasing trend, slight decrease 
in participation
III New method, spring version
Exogenous estimation of total factor 
productivity
IV New method, autumn version
Exogenous estimation of total factor 
productivity; Per-capita-working hours 
with slightly decreasing trend, slight 
decrease in participation (changes from 
II and III combined)
Source : EU Commission.
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brake. Table 2 contains details of the modifications, while Table 3a
reproduces the output gaps and Table 3b the structural deficits.
First, the data for the four reference ranges from Table 1 are listed,
with a distinction made between two different datasets (spring and
autumn). Then each reference is modified in accordance with the
changes in Table 2 and the new calculation—again, differentiated
according to dataset—is presented. This produces a total of eight
modifications, four calculation methods and two datasets (4 x 2
x 8), or 64 different figures for output gap and structural deficit. To
these must be added the eight unmodified reference ranges (4 x 2
= 8), resulting in a total of 72 different structural deficits. Figure 2,
finally, illustrates the distribution of the structural deficits. These
calculations show that, assuming the actual budget balance to be
EUR 44.8 billion in 2010, the structural component of the balance
ranges from EUR -44 billion to EUR -13 billion, with a mean of EUR
-30 billion. Obviously, this is anything but a precise method.    
Table 2. Sensitivity analysis based on variations of joint forecast, autumn 2010 
(”state of scientific knowledge“)
No. Description Further changes from I
V Population growth Annual decrease of 0.4% from 2009 onwards
VI Participation rate Annual increase by +0.4% from 2009 onwards
VIIa Working hours per capita Annual decrease of 0.4% from 2009 onwards
VIIb Working hours per capita Constant 2008 value (1426 hours) from 2011 onwards
VIII “Structural” unemployment Hodrick-Prescott-Filter of unemployment rate
IXa Investment ratio (2009) Constant from 2009 onwards
IXb Investment ratio (2011) Constant from 2011 onwards
X Total factor productivity Annual increase by +0.4% from 2009 onwards
XI Sum of potential increasing effects VI + VIIb + X
XII Sum of potential increasing effects V + VIIa + VIII + IXa
Source : Authors’ calculations of the basis of data from the Joint Economic Forecast Project Group’s autumn 2010 
forecast.
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In % of potential GDP
I - Old TFP 
Spring
II - Old TFP 
Autumn
III -New TFP 
Spring
IV – New TFP 
Autumn
Reference, spring data -2.65 -2.40 -3.86 -3.62
Reference, autumn data -1.47 -1.34 -1.82 -1.69
Modification V spring data -2.65 -2.40 -3.86 -3.62
Modification V autumn data -1.21 -1.08 -1.57 -1.44
Modification VIa spring data -2.65 -2.66 -3.86 -3.87
Modification VIa autumn data -1.47 -1.48 -1.82 -1.83
Modification VIb spring data -2.37 -2.36 -3.59 -3.58
Modification VIb autumn data -1.12 -1.11 -1.48 -1.47
Modification VII spring data -2.52 -2.26 -3.74 -3.48
Modification VII autumn data -1.56 -1.44 -1.92 -1.80
Modification VIII spring data -2.12 -1.87 -3.34 -3.09
Modification VIII autumn data -0.57 -0.44 -0.93 -0.80
Modification IX spring data -2.65 -2.40 -3.86 -3.62
Modification IX autumn data -1.47 -1.34 -1.82 -1.69
Modification X spring data -1.84 -1.83 -3.06 -3.05
Modification X autumn data 0.04 0.04 -0.32 -0.32
Modification XI spring data -3.52 -3.28 -4.74 -4.49
Modification XI autumn data -1.94 -1.81 -2.61 -2.48
Source : EU Commission, authors’ calculations of the basis of data from the Joint Economic Forecast Project Group’s
autumn forecast.
Table 3b. Structural budget balance in 2010
In % of GDP
I – Old TFP 
Spring
II - Old TFP 
Autumn
III – New TFP 
Spring
IV - New TFP 
Autumn
Reference, spring data -27.1 -28.8 -19.1 -20.7
Reference, autumn data -34.8 -35.6 -32.5 -33.4
Modification V spring data -27.1 -28.8 -19.1 -20.7
Modification V autumn data -36.4 -37.2 -34.1 -35.0
Modification VIa spring data -27.1 -27.1 -19.1 -19.1
Modification VIa autumn data -34.8 -34.7 -32.5 -32.5
Modification VIb spring data -29.0 -29.0 -20.9 -21.0
Modification VIb autumn data -37.0 -37.0 -34.7 -34.8
Modification VII spring data -28.0 -29.7 -19.9 -21.7
Modification VII autumn data -34.2 -35.0 -31.9 -32.6
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German government’s use of margins
As the discussion above has demonstrated, there is broad scope
for judgement in the loosely defined framework for how “the”
European Commission method may be interpreted. When contex-
tualised against the impact of individual modifications, this can be
Table 3b (continued). Structural budget balance in 2010
In % of GDP
I – Old TFP 
Spring
II - Old TFP 
Autumn
III – New TFP 
Spring
IV - New TFP 
Autumn
Modification VIII spring data -30.6 -32.2 -22.6 -24.3
Modification VIII autumn data -40.4 -41.3 -38.2 -39.0
Modification IX spring data -27.1 -28.8 -19.1 -20.7
Modification IX autumn data -34.8 -35.6 -32.5 -33.4
Modification X spring data -32.4 -32.5 -24.4 -24.5
Modification X autumn data -44.2 -44.2 -42.0 -42.0
Modification XI spring data -21.4 -23.0 -13.2 -14.9
Modification XI autumn data -31.7 -32.6 -27.4 -28.2
Source : EU Commission, authors’ calculations of the basis of data from the Joint Economic Forecast Project Group’s
autumn forecast.
Figure 2. Histogram of estimated structural budget balances for 2010
 Number of scenarios with structural budget balances in the dimension of -10 to -40 billion euros
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tion by reference to the legislation. For example, the method can 
be selected, or modified at intervals, so as to expand budgetary 
margins at a given time. During the 2011 budget process, this gave 
rise to accusations from various quarters that the German govern-
ment was “playing tricks” with the debt brake. In fact, the 
procedure followed by the government appears to have been enti-
rely correct from a formal legal perspective; what the accusers were 
objecting to was the lack of clarity and scope for manipulation that 
automatically resulted from the method.
From a transparency and credibility perspective, however, the 
government’s failure to clarify the specific cyclical adjustment 
method it was using was highly problematic. The original justifica-
tion for the draft budget and funding plan contained graphic 
representations showing the permissible structural deficits and 
cyclical components calculated for 2011 and subsequent years of 
the transition period on the basis of the 2010 structural deficit as a 
starting point. However, there were no concrete data relating to 
the method used; not even the term “budget sensitivity” featured, 
let alone explanations of how it was determined. The government 
belatedly, and at the urging of some of the MPs on the Budget 
Committee, provided some additional information, yet even 
here—as Section 2 makes clear—the information was decidedly 
thin on detail.
The conversion of the funding to the German Labour Agency 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit), from a loan to a direct, non-repayable 
grant in 2010 was a deliberate manipulation to widen the budge-
tary scope, originally with the aim of implementing as fully as 
possible the tax cuts set out in the coalition agreement. A loan 
would have been deficit-irrelevant under the debt brake, since the 
payment to the agency would have been offset by a corresponding 
asset—the claim on the agency. However, converting that loan 
into a grant increased the actual 2010 deficit and, hence, also 
increased the structural deficit for the year. This structural deficit 
was then used to calculate the permissible deficit for each year in 
the transitional period, during which the deficit must be reduced 
by equal stages of one sixth of the initial value each year until, in 
2016, the deficit has been reduced to the permissible maximum of 
0.35% of GDP (around EUR 10 billion). This adroit increase in the 
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of reductions, also allowing higher permissible structural deficits 
during the transitional period (something referred to by some 
critics as the “ski jump effect”). Meanwhile, the higher 2010 deficit 
then disappeared automatically in 2011 because of the way the 
funding was designed and without any real measures to balance 
the budget being necessary. 
The margins created by this manipulation have now all but 
disappeared for two reasons. First, favourable employment trends 
mean that the Bundesagentur für Arbeit’s funding requirement has 
fallen from more than EUR 16 billion to just EUR 6.9 billion. 
Second, the government has designed its measures to reflect 
budget sensitivities very consistently by setting a higher value of 
0.248 for 2010, which also included that part of the cyclical 
components accounted for by the Bundesagentur für Arbeit, whereas 
for subsequent years, the value was a lower 0.16, which related 
solely to the budget of the Bund. The resulting higher cyclical 
component for 2010 reduced the initial structural deficit by just 
over EUR 4 billion, so the residual higher base value is minimal. 
Moreover, the government reduced that higher base value by using 
the permissible—but unconventional—statistical device of recor-
ding one-off revenue from auctions of mobile telephony licences 
(over EUR 4 billion) as a “structural deficit reduction”. This, at 
least, was not a repeat of the “ski jump effect”, although this does 
not change the fact that the German government originally tried 
to use exactly that device and other accounting tricks to create 
budgetary margins for its planned fiscal policy.
In fact, the “ski jump effect” did then operate in another 
context. In its 2011 budget, the government set its tax revenue 
estimates and the overarching calculation of cyclical components 
and structural deficits against the upturn in the economy—but not 
the corresponding estimates for 2010. In strict legal terms, it was 
not required to, but this is a loophole in the rules, which omit to 
specify how, when, and on the basis of precisely which data the 
initial structural deficit for 2010 is determined. This trick enabled 
the government not just to comply fully with the debt brake in its 
2011 targets but actually to overshoot it by just under EUR 
5 billion.
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government had used the old EU method for its 2011 budget calcu-
lations, since—it claimed—it was unable to move to the new 
method for technical reasons. That is more than improbable, given 
that the new method had been in the public domain since spring 
2010, and once the European Commission had put the details 
online, moving over to the autumn version of it would have taken 
a few hours or one working day at most. Following identification 
of the basic parameters for the 2012 national budget, the govern-
ment then gained further room for manoeuvre by belatedly 
moving its calculation of the output gap to the new EU method, 
resulting in an increase in the estimated negative output gap for 
2011 from 0.6% of GDP to 1.0% of GDP, even though at the same 
time the 2011 GDP growth forecast was itself increased from 1.8% 
to 2.3%. This switch of method meant, paradoxically, that the 
upturn in the economy produced a marked increase in that part of 
the deficit permissible on cyclical grounds.
Overall, then, the past conduct of the German government 
clearly confirms suspicions that using such a technically complex 
method virtually inevitably produces a lack of transparency and 
scope for manipulation. Although the Ministry of Finance (BMF) 
eventually published its data and results following persistent criti-
cism in spring 20117, it still falls well short of achieving the 
transparency demonstrated by the European Commission, which 
publishes the entire scheme for its calculations, including datasets, 
online. As far as exploiting the “ski jump effect” is concerned, the 
government failed to make a retrospective correction, despite 
massive protests by influential institutions including the Council 
of Economic Experts and the Bundesbank (see SVR, 2010; Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 2011), an apparently justifiable decision, given the 
associated negative macroeconomic and public finance effects 
(IMK/OFCE/WIFO, 2011 and 2012), although not exactly a model 
of transparent and credible implementation of fiscal rules.
7. http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_4322/DE/Wirtschaft__und__Verwaltung/
Finanz__und__Wirtschaftspolitik/Wirtschaftspolitik/1103311a7001.html?__nnn=true
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4.1. The underlying problem of all deficit rules: budget deficits are 
endogenous and mostly immune to political control
The debt brake sets a ceiling on structural deficits of 0.35% for 
the Bund and of 0.0% for the Länder. As in the Stability and Growth 
Pact, these ceilings are tied to binding targets for deficits as a 
percentage of economic output. This can be summarised in the 
following simple mathematical formula:
(5)
We shall, for the moment, leave aside the question of whether 
this target deficit is a general one or a structural one—that is, 
whether it has been adjusted for cyclical factors or not. What is 
more important is the functional dependence of revenue (E) on 
economic output (Y), while expenditure (A) is less markedly depen-
dent and, therefore, not portrayed as functionally dependent.
During an economic upturn (when Y increases), there are two 
main effects. First, the denominator of the fraction rises and so the 
deficit falls automatically when revenue and expenditure reach a 
certain level. Second, however, state revenue in particular rises, so 
when expenditure reaches a certain level, the deficit also falls in 
absolute terms as expressed in the numerator. Both effects reduce 
or increase the actual deficit in an upturn and a downturn respecti-
vely. If a government aims to reach its target deficit in each period, 
this means that during an upturn, expenditure may also rise, 
whereas it has to be cut during a downturn. This runs counter to 
the fundamental aim of a fiscal rule, which is to avoid pro-cyclical 
growth in expenditure. Moreover, estimates for both GDP and 
revenue are usually beset with uncertainty, with the result that it is 
very difficult to ensure compliance with the rule even when mana-
ging the current year’s budget. And even when the budget 
calculations are complete, there are still often major revisions of 
the data—such as the GDP figure—which bring further ex-post
uncertainty. If the German debt brake calculations use potential, 
rather than actual, GDP data to determine the target deficit, then 




E (Y ) ADeficit = = target  deficit = const.Y
−
Achim Truger and Henner Will174does not, as the next section explains, do away with it completely 
(for a fuller account see Anderson and Minarik, 2006).
4.2. The issue of the marked susceptibility to revisions of “potential 
output”
The method used by the German government is not only highly 
imprecise and open to manipulation, but its use also tends by 
nature to produce a pro-cyclical fiscal policy that confounds the 
automatic stabilisers. In an upturn, the permissible deficit tends to 
be too large, causing additional overheating in the economy; in a 
downturn, deficit values are too small, placing a further brake on 
economic growth.
The pro-cyclical nature of the method is particularly well illus-
trated by the figures for 2010. There are two different datasets, 
those for the European Commission’s spring and autumn 2010 
forecasts respectively. The data vary markedly between the 
Commission’s spring 2010 forecast and its autumn 2010 forecast, 
when the economic situation and outlook improved substantially: 
for example, the forecast for real GDP in 2010 was revised upwards 
by EUR 60.8 billion, while that for 2011 was also revised upwards, 
by EUR 75.5 billion (index values at constant prices). The modified 
database leads in all four versions of the EU Commission’s method 
to a significant increase of between 2% and 4% in potential output, 
as Table 4 illustrates. Figure 3 shows the effect of the modification 
of the database for the four different versions of the EU Commis-
sions’ method over the whole time horizon from 2008 to 2015.
The method that is adopted has a substantial and quantifiable 
impact on the estimate for nominal GDP and potential output. The 
method that is least affected by cyclical factors is the spring version 
of the new method: in this version, the EUR 46.9 billion increase in 
the GDP forecast in 2010 and the EUR 73.1 billion increase for 
2011 produce changes in the estimated potential of EUR -5 billion 
and EUR 18 billion respectively. The autumn version of the old 
method is, by contrast, the one most affected by cyclical factors: 
EUR 20.5 billion and EUR 49.7 billion respectively—that is, more 
than 50% and more than 70% of the increase in GDP respecti-
vely—are added to potential, meaning that potential itself rises 
markedly because the economy is doing better.
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however, not merely an academic detail but is of direct practical 
relevance for Germany’s budget policy in the context of the debt 
brake: on the basis of the new potential values, and in combination 
with the new GDP values, output gap values must be recalculated 
which, when multiplied by the relevant budget sensitivity figure 
(0.248 in 2010 and 0.16 in 2011), produce a further change in the 
cyclical components. This change ranges from EUR 6.6 billion 
(2010) to EUR 3.7 billion (2011) in the autumn version of the old 
method and from EUR 12.9 billion (2010) to EUR 8.8 billion (2011) 
in the spring version of the new method. Hence, the forecast 
Figure 3.  Effect of a change of data on potential output for the four different 
versions of the EU Commission’s method
Achim Truger and Henner Will176economic upturn produces radically different reductions in the 
permitted cyclical deficit, depending on the version used.
The cyclically determined figure for budget consolidation 
derived in this way does not, however, equate with the actual cycli-
cally determined impact of the higher growth forecast on public 
budgets, which depends directly on the forecast growth in actual 
GDP against constant potential and is, therefore, markedly higher. 
In a period of economic recovery, this results in the cyclically 
determined budget consolidation varying according to the method 
and version used; fiscal policy prevents the automatic stabilisers 
from having their full effect and, for this reason, is too expansive 
in pro-cyclical terms or conversely, in a downturn, produces an 
excessively contractionary pro-cyclical effect.
In the simulations we have carried out, the effect is of a very 
significant magnitude. In the case of the pro-cyclical autumn 
version of the old method, the Bund would have excessive margins 
for 2010 and 2011 of EUR 17 billion, while in the case of the least 
pro-cyclical spring version of the new method, the margins would 
still be just under EUR 7.5 billion. This picture is reversed in the 
case of a downturn: in such a situation, the budget would have too 
Table 4. Pro-cyclical revision and weakening of the automatic stabilisers
A revision of the GDP forecast of € 46.9 bn (2.4% nominal growth) in 2010 and € 73.1 bn (cumulated 3.4% 
nominal growth) in 2011 leads to… 
a change in 
potential GDP 
in bn. € 
a change in 
output gap in 
bn. €
















I Old spring  
forecast version
2010 17.4 29.5 7.3 14.8 7.5
2011 45.1 27.9 4.5 13.9 9.4
II Old autumn 
forecast version1
2010 20.5 26.4 6.6 14.8 8.2
2011 49.7 23.3 3.7 13.8 10.1
III New spring 
forecast version2
2010         -5.0 51.9 12.9        15.0 2.1
2011 18.1        55 8.8 14.1 5.3
IV New autumn 
forecast version3
2010 -1.9 48.8 12.1        15.0 2.9
2011 22.8 50.3          8.0        14.0          6.o
1. Changes in hours p.c. worked, participation rate
2. Changes in TFP
3. Changes in hours p.c. worked, participation rate and TFP
4. Product of percentage-point revision, budget sensitivity and potential GDP with spring data, at constant prices 
Source: EU Commission. authors’ own calculations
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strengthen the downturn, with the automatic stabilisers weakened 
by between 15% and 70%, depending on the version.
4.3. Simulating a future economic downturn8
The issue of the impact of such a debt brake on the future of 
federal budget policy becomes particularly significant in the event 
that Germany undergoes another period of weak economic 
growth, which is currently far from unlikely. To the best of the 
authors’ knowledge, there are no ex-ante simulations of the impact 
such a scenario would have within the framework of a debt brake. 
The only simulations are at the European level and have been 
carried out in conjunction with simulations of the issue of estima-
ting potential output (D’Auria et al., 2010). It is incomprehensible 
that such research has been neglected in Germany when a consti-
tutional rule is being introduced. From an economic perspective, it 
is particularly vital during a period of economic crisis that the 
automatic stabilisers can function appropriately, not least because 
it is otherwise impossible to take discretionary measures without 
invoking the “exception clause”.
The structural deficit for 2011 is markedly below the maximum 
permissible deficit under the government’s deficit reduction 
course, but, as shown before, this can be attributed to two main 
factors. First, the German government has so far benefited from 
favourable economic growth conditions arising from the pro-
cyclical bias in the cyclical adjustment process. Second, the initial 
deficit set out in the deficit reduction plan in spring 2010 was 
determined on the basis of a modest economic outlook and the old 
TFP method, which was very high at 2.2% (the “ski jump effect” as 
explained). Since then, the German government has not needed to 
make use of the credit line that would be permitted and, in fact, 
the resulting margins have widened consistently. Were there to be 
a further economic downturn, however, these positive trends 
could easily be reversed, as the simulation will demonstrate.
The simulation can be divided into various stages. First, the 
macroeconomic framework for a further downturn (IMK risk 
8. The following analysis is based on calculations carried out as part of the IMK’s estimate of 
tax revenues in May 2011: Truger et al. (2011).
Achim Truger and Henner Will178scenario) compared to a reference scenario (IMK baseline scenario)
was established, followed by a fiscal estimate, producing a required
net borrowing value for the country’s medium-term budgetary
planning against a backdrop of otherwise identical expenditure
and revenue conditions. Then the cyclical components according
to the debt brake procedure were calculated dynamically, using the
changing supporting periods, so that the cyclical elements could
be deducted from the total deficit.
Table 5 reproduces the assumptions relating to the risk scenario
for the overall economic parameters by comparison with the basis
scenario. It is assumed that, after a marked decline in economic
performance in 2012, there will be a similarly marked slump begin-
ning in the same year, culminating in a period of stagnation in
2013 and 2014 and further growth in real GDP only from 2015, as
set out in the reference scenario. According to past experience the
central economic parameters were modified: the most responsive
factor is income from profits, while the gross wage bill is a lagging
indicator and declines markedly less. Modified domestic use also
lags and reacts less sharply, although its weakening effect is deter-
mined by the decline in consumer spending. By contrast, it is
assumed that government spending and public investment are not
adjusted—an optimistic assumption, given past experience.
Table 6 reproduces the fiscal revenue estimates generated by
the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF) and the IMK baseline and
risk scenarios. In the interests of simplification, the risk scenario
provides details of only the most important taxes shared by all
Table 5. Basic parameters for tax revenue estimates
Annual growth in %





















Nominal GDP 3.8 3.8 3.2 2.4 3.2 1.3 3.2 1.8 3.2 3.0
Real GDP 2.7 2.7 1.7 1.0 1.5 0 1.5 0.5 1.5 1.5
Gross wage bill 2.8 2.8 3.3 3.0 3.0 2 2.5 1.8 2.5 1.8
Profits and 
Capital income 8.2 8.2 4.8 1.8 5.0 0.8 5.0 2.0 5.0 4.0
Modified 
domestic use 2.7 2.7 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.3 1.9 1.4 1.9 1.7
Source: IMK fiscal estimates (Truger et al., 2011).
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value added tax) and business tax: in the case of purely federal 
taxes (mostly indirect taxes) and local tax (excluding business tax) 
a 0.5 elasticity compared with nominal GDP has been assumed. 
Import duty figures assume a slight fall on the basis of an expected 
fall in imports.
As expected, this produces a significant drop in revenue for the 
Bund by comparison with the baseline scenario. In the first year of 
lower economic growth—2012—the drop in revenue is relatively 
modest, at EUR 3.3 billion, but then, as a result of a severe slump in 
the economy, it rises rapidly to EUR 13.5 billion in 2014 and EUR 
17.0 billion in 2015. By 2015, the cumulative loss of revenue 
compared with the baseline scenario totals EUR 42.6 billion. This 
would dramatically worsen prospects for the Bund.
The basic parameters used by the German government to draw 
up the country’s budget and finance trends to 2015 and the calcu-
lations for debt brake targets produce an annual margin of about 
EUR 10 billion for the period from 2012 to 2014. On the basis of an 
assumed rise in expenditure and as yet inadequately quantified 
budget-balancing measures, the margin in 2015 falls to just under 
EUR 9 billion (Figure 4). It is important to stress that the resulting 
margins have not been “created” by, for example, particular addi-
tional discretionary budget consolidation measures by the 
government but, as already indicated, are the result particularly of 
an upturn in the economy and the legitimate exploitation of the 
scope for manipulation—the “ski jump effect” and the change of 
Table 6. Outcome of tax revenue estimates for the Federal level in EUR billion
Federal total tax revenue
IMK baseline IMK risk Federal ministy 
of Finance
May 2011 estimations
2010 226 226 226
2011 234 234 237
2012 244 241 247
2013 256 247 255
2014 265 252 265
2015 275 258 274
Source: Working Group on Tax Estimates; IMK tax revenue estimates.
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cally differing proposals for fiscal policy. In some cases, there have 
been calls for additional tax cuts, while the opposition SPD in the 
Bundestag, the German Federal Audit Office (Bundesrechnungshof), 
and the Bundesbank have all called for the margins to be scrapped 
by means of a retrospective recalculation of the basic deficit and/or 
for the government to revert to the old EU method. 
A different recommendation would be to use the margins as a 
buffer against the possible threat of a medium-term economic 
downturn—a strategy that the federal government by now seems 
to endorse. The justification for this can be illustrated perfectly by 
using the impact on the federal budget of the assumed risk 
scenario: this needs to take into account not only of the effects on 
the country’s tax revenues of the assumed weakening in economic 
growth outlined above but also of the complex repercussions of 
economic developments on the permissible deficits under the debt 
brake.
In order to include these effects, we adopted the following 
methodology. First, baseline scenario calculations were made for 
potential output, output gap and cyclical components for the years 
2012 to 2015, based as closely as possible on published BMF data.9
Then, using the same method, we made the same calculations for 
the risk scenario. This assumes that when it draws up its budget, 
the German government knows the likely economic trends for the 
year for which it is drawing up a budget and for the following year, 
in accordance with the rules set out in the risk scenario. The result 
is that the economic outlook worsens steadily compared with the 
baseline scenario and the estimates for potential output, the 
output gap and cyclical components are adjusted year by year. For 
the purposes of simplification, we have excluded possible forecas-
ting errors and, hence, necessary posting to the control account.
9. The BMF publishes only time series, which do not enable meaningful conclusions to be 
drawn about the specifications. It is also unclear which values were generated during the 
estimating process and which were exogenous and added subsequently. The series published 
since the spring of 2011 represent progress compared with the BMF’s approach in 2009 and 
2010, when not even data series were published. It is unclear, however, why the BMF persists in 
refusing to publish the data and specifications on which its forecasts are based, as the European 
Commission does, and so make it possible to scrutinise its forecasts rigorously.
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potential output under the baseline and risk scenarios compared 
with the values used by the European Commission. An effort has 
been made under the IMK forecast to adhere as closely as possible 
to the BMF estimates, although they cannot, unfortunately, be 
reproduced entirely. Software for the European Commission 
method may be downloaded from the internet.10
To simulate the budget formulation process, each calculation 
period has been extended by one interval: in 2011, it covers the 
period up to 2012 for budget year 2012 and makes medium-term 
estimates up to 2015, while for budget year 2013, it covers the 
period up to 2013 and makes estimates up to 2016, and so on.
In addition to the discrepancies and extensions of the dataset 
noted in Table 7, we have assumed 5% depreciation in capital accu-
mulation from 2013 and updated growth in the total factor 
productivity figure of 0.8%. The demographic forecasts underlying 
the EU’s approach and the BMF data also throw up marked discre-
pancies. To emulate the BMF data more closely, we have used its 
suggested update figures, even though it is not entirely clear how 
far these take account of growth in the working age population 
resulting from a higher retirement age. NAIRU and the total factor 
productivity estimate were factored in exogenously in order to 
modify the estimate as little as possible.
Table 7. Basic parameters for calculating potential output and changes compared 
with the EU method
Hours per 


















2010 1.5 2.1 2.1 3.7 3.6 3.6 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.3 7.7 7.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4
2011 0.2 0.2 0.2 2.3 2.7 2.7 6.0 8.7 8.7 6.7 7.0 6.7 0.7 1.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.1
2012 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 2.0 1.7 1.0 5.0 4.4 0.4 6.3 6.5 6.3 0.4 0.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.2 -0.2
2013 -0.4 0.0 -1.4 6.6 -0.7 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
2014 -0.2 0.5 2.2 6.9 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
2015 0.4 1.5 1.2 6.8 0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
Source: European Commission. BMF. IMK tax revenue estimates.
10. All specifications and data can be found at http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/ecfin/outgaps/
library. 
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from the BMF figures, with potential output calculated at just 
0.01% below the corresponding BMF figure (EUR 2 billion lower at 
2000 prices). In the risk scenario, however, there is a substantial 
adjustment to potential compared with the European Commis-
sion’s and the BMF’s estimates: for 2015, it is some 2.7% lower 
than the Commission’s and BMF’s potential figures. The main 
reason for this is the slump in investments and lower real growth 
in GDP. 
The question then is how these cyclically determined revisions 
to potential output, output gap and cyclical components affect the 
budget when combined with the cyclically determined drop in tax 
revenue linked to the risk scenario. The answer is illustrated in 
Figure 4. Assuming that the budget balancing measures announced 
in the German government’s “Future Package” are implemented 
and financial transactions are not adjusted, the debt brake would 
give the Federal Republic a margin of EUR 16 billion in 2012, just 
over EUR 14 billion in 2013 and 2014, and just over EUR 9 billion 
in 2015. Under the IMK baseline scenario, this margin would, in 
fact, be even slightly higher.
Figure 4. Structural deficits and the deficit reduction course








2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Finance ministry structural deficits new TFP
IMK baseline scenario new TFP
IMK risk scenario new TFP
Finance ministry deficit redution path
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have greater impact: the pro-cyclical downward revision of poten-
tial does not increase the negative cyclical components 
proportionally to the actual scale of the economic downturn. In 
conjunction with the budget sensitivity figure, which is set too low 
for periods of marked economic upturn or downturn, the fiscal 
policy margin arising from the debt brake declines markedly stage 
by stage. Under the new EU method, the deficit target under the 
debt brake of EUR 10 billion in 2015 would be overshot by EUR 
1.9 billion, while in the case of the much more pro-cyclical former 
EU method, which we have not illustrated in Figure 4, the overs-
hoot would rise to EUR 6.5 billion. In both cases, weaker economic 
growth would reduce the safety margin for the deficit target under 
the debt brake and, ultimately, result in its being exceeded. The 
government would then have to act pro-cyclically by making 
further cuts beyond those already set out in the “Future Package”. 
This is also clearly illustrated in Figure 4: the structural deficits 
assumed in the IMK risk scenario for 2015 (here, the new TFP 
method) exceed the deficit reduction course targets. If there were 
also to be tax cuts—as might be the case from 2013 onwards—then 
the discretionary adjustments and cuts would have to be corres-
pondingly greater. Given the gathering economic gloom, that 
would be a serious mistake. The fact that the most recent tax 
revenue estimate (May 2012) still assumes a modest increase in 
revenue for the medium term is based on the assumption of 
prompt economic recovery in 2013. Were this not to materialise, 
or if the downturn in the following year were to be more marked 
than assumed, then revenue would rapidly drop.
5. Conclusions for European fiscal policy
This paper has considered in concrete terms the effect of the 
German federal government’s detailed debt brake, to show that the 
method chosen for calculating the structural deficit is extremely 
complex and, for that reason alone, highly opaque and open to 
manipulation. The German government has actually exacerbated 
the resulting lack of transparency by failing to provide proper 
information and has used the existing scope for intervention in a 
technically adroit way to broaden its margins in budgetary terms. 
Its satisfaction with this outcome may, however, be short-lived, 
Achim Truger and Henner Will184because on the basis of the pro-cyclical approach stipulated in the 
technical procedure, the margins would rapidly disappear again if 
there were to be a major economic downturn—and this would be a 
certainty if combined with further tax cuts. In the worst case, 
Germany’s fiscal policy would then become even more restrictive 
right in the midst of a Europe-wide economic crisis. It is less than 
clear how a rule of this kind and the German government’s initial 
concrete application of it will seriously boost the confidence of the 
financial markets in Germany’s fiscal policy. 
In fact, taking a closer look at the movement of government 
bond yields over time shows that financial markets do not seem to 
be too impressed by the German debt brake (see Figure 5). Whereas 
there have certainly been growing risk premia for most of the euro 
area countries’ government bond yields as compared to the 
German benchmark since the onset of the crisis, the same is true as 
compared to the government bond yields of countries obviously 
not involved in the euro crisis as for example the U.S., the U.K., 
Japan and Switzerland. The Swiss example in a longer term pers-
pective is especially telling: As far back as in 2003, the Swiss 
introduced a constitutional debt brake at the federal level. From 
2003 to 2010 the Swiss public debt ratio fell by 15 percentage 
points—mainly because of favourable economic trends (just as in 
the recent German case)—from around 55 % to 40 % of GDP, 
whereas over the same period in Germany it rose by 20 percentage 
points from a good 60 % to over 80 % of GDP. However, the diffe-
rence in yields between Swiss and German government bonds 
seems to have remained completely unaffected. Therefore, the 
whole premise of the European fiscal compact as a means to restore 
credibility and to reduce risk premiums on the financial markets 
becomes seriously undermined.
 What else follows from the recent experience with the German 
debt brake as just analysed? First, it must be stressed that the debt 
brake is far from being a well tested economic instrument. On the 
contrary, Germany and its debt brake are currently in the middle 
of a major fiscal policy experiment and the outcome is far from 
certain. The successes noted for the time being are mainly due to 
an unexpectedly strong and lasting economic recovery and the 
technically successful manipulation of figures by the federal 
government, whereas the real test under more severe economic 
The German “debt brake”: a shining example for European fiscal policy? 185conditions lies ahead. Second, the manipulations by the federal 
government to circumvent the debt brake—as beneficial as they 
were from a macroeconomic point of view, because they allowed 
the upturn to gather momentum—morally discredit any emphatic 
calls by the German government for stricter consolidation policies 
elsewhere in Europe. 
Thus on closer analysis the shining example loses all its lustre. It 
was obviously a serious mistake to accept a debt brake so similar to 
the German model so quickly at the European level. Given these 
basic errors, which are hard to reverse, and faced with the difficul-
ties and problems of the German example, European fiscal policy 
should instead go its own way and investigate thoroughly all the 
ways in which it can be reshaped.
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DO WE NEED FISCAL RULES?1
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak
OFCE
The public finances crisis has brought binding fiscal rules proposals back to 
the forefront. The paper analyses their justifications and specifications, either 
in a classical or in a Keynesian framework. In the recent period there is no 
evidence that public deficits were caused by fiscal indiscipline and induced too 
high interest rates; there is no evidence that economically relevant rules can be 
designed. The paper provides an analysis of fiscal rules implemented either at 
country level (like the UK golden rule), or at the EU level (the Stability and 
Growth Pact). The paper shows that fiscal rules did not work before and during 
the crisis. The paper discusses the EU project, the “Fiscal Pact”, which risks to 
paralyse fiscal policies and to prevent economic stabilisation. The priority today 
is not to strengthen public finance discipline but to question economic deve-
lopments which make public deficits necessary to support output. 
Keywords: Fiscal policy, Fiscal rules.
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The 2007-2012 crisis is first of all a banking and financial 
crisis, due to hazardous and unregulated financial innovations, in 
a context of financial liberalisation and globalisation. Markets 
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Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak190were greedy, blind, and volatile. The crisis is also due to the huge 
increase in capital stocks coming from neo-mercantilist econo-
mies, raw material exporting economies, pension funds, or the 
wealthiest in emerging and advanced economies, tracking the 
most profitable financial opportunities. Monetary policies allowed 
private debts to rise, financial and housing bubbles, which 
supported output growth without higher wages or social incomes. 
Last but not least, the world economy became more fragile due to 
the strategies run by mercantilist countries (like China and other 
Asian emerging economies, Germany, and other Northern Europe 
economies) pursuing competitiveness gains and cumulating 
external surpluses (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2011).
But the crisis is not due to the rise in public debts and deficits. 
At the end of 2007, the public deficit for the OECD as a whole 
amounted to 1.3% of GDP only and was therefore below the level 
ensuring debt stability. Net public debt amounted to 39% of GDP 
only. 
The crisis led to a huge rise in government debts and deficits. 
Initially this rise in debts and deficits was due to government 
measures implemented to support banks, later to the automatic 
fall in tax revenues resulting from lower output growth, and finally 
to measures implemented to support output. Starting from mid-
2009, markets pretended to have doubts about public finance 
sustainability. They requested higher risk premia on government 
bonds issued by some euro area countries. Proposals aiming at 
imposing governments either fiscal policy rules or independent 
Councils in charge of assessing or even setting fiscal policies are 
back to the forefront. 
The issue is especially acute in the euro area, where existing 
rules did not work (especially the Stability and Growth Pact, SGP), 
and where Member States (MS) having lost monetary sovereignty 
are under direct financial market pressure, where the Greek crisis 
has  shown the implicit solidarity linking all euro area MS. The ECB 
and some of the countries having agreed to help Southern 
countries wish in counterpart the strengthening of binding rules 
on domestic fiscal policies. 
The objective of monetary policy is rather clear: maintaining 
low and stable inflation, the equilibrium unemployment rate 
Do we need fiscal rules? 191theory ensuring that monetary policy will lead to the highest 
employment level. The issue is more delicate for fiscal policy: 
should it target full employment or the equilibrium of public 
finances, and how to define the latter? What is an optimal fiscal 
policy? Can rules allowing to run an optimal fiscal policy in 
permanence be defined? 
The paper has four parts. Section 1 deals with the justifications 
for fiscal policy rules, either in a classical or in a Keynesian 
framework, trying to make a link between the justifications and 
the proposed rules. Section 2 describes different kinds of rules that 
may be implemented. Section 3 provides an analysis of fiscal rules 
experiences. Section 4 discusses recent EU proposals. Section 5 
concludes. 
1. Fiscal rules, from justifications to specifications
1.1. The classical model
Fiscal rules proponents argue that governments are not benevo-
lent2. Governments do not aim at optimising citizens’ welfare but 
aim at being re-elected. Besides, each generation is selfish and does 
not care about the situation for future generations. Last, financial 
markets need to be reassured on the ability of governments to 
service debt. Each of these goals induces a specific rule. 
According to the Leviathan-State theory or the Public Choice 
theory, each social group seeks to benefit from higher public spen-
ding without considering that this will imply higher taxes. In a 
non-cooperative equilibrium public expenditure are excessive. 
Each government agency aims at increasing the number of civil 
servants and means at their disposal, without accounting for effi-
ciency and productivity. Governments tend to spend too much in 
order to please their voters, without correspondingly increasing 
taxes. They use fiscal policy for electoral purposes and not for stabi-
lisation purposes. They do not make the appropriate budgetary 
efforts in good economic times. The social choice between public 
expenditure and taxes is biased because governments can run defi-
2. See, for instance, Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Drazen (2004), 
Wyplosz (2011). 
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of government debt or deficit. Thus public deficits are always 
excessive and this leads to excessive public debts. 
Public deficits are therefore an autonomous cause of macroeco-
nomic unbalances. According to the “crowding-out” effect theory, 
public deficits generate excessive demand, which induces higher 
interest rates and crowds-out private spending. Public deficits 
reduce savings available for investment. The current deficit level 
leads financial markets to expect large deficits to persist and hence 
further increases in government debts. Markets anticipate high 
future long-term interest rates, which immediately increases inte-
rest rates, and crowds-out private investment (Ducoudré, 2005). 
Public deficits are detrimental to capital accumulation and there-
fore to future growth.
Three objections can be made to this reasoning. The first objec-
tion is theoretical. The described mechanisms will not play if 
households are Ricardian. On the one hand, Ricardian households 
are aware that a deficit is equivalent to taxes: they cannot be fooled 
by the government strategy and they have a preference for govern-
ments who do not spend much. On the other hand, Ricardian 
households increase their savings in order to offset higher public 
deficits; public debt has no specific unfavourable effect: financing 
public expenditure through taxation or higher indebtedness will 
be similarly detrimental to output growth.
The second objection is empirical. Such mechanisms of higher 
interest rates and crowding-out effects have hardly been observed 
in reality. From 2002 to 2005 both short and long-term interest 
rates were historically low despite the rise in government deficits 
in Europe, like in the US and Japan. This has also been the case 
since 2008: large economies have run large government deficits 
and high public debts with low interest rates at the same time. The 
rise in government debts did not have any impact on interest rate 
levels or on inflation expectations. In 2009, long-term interest 
rates stood at 1.4% in Japan, 3.3% in Germany and the US, 3.6% in 
the UK, 3.7% in France, i.e. were similar to expected potential 
output growth (and were even clearly below it for the US). It is 
difficult to assert that such interest rates levels are detrimental to 
investment.
Do we need fiscal rules? 193Last, this theory does not explain why all governments would 
have suddenly become demagogic and increased their deficits in 
2002 or in 2009. In the recent past, the rise in government deficits 
was due to fiscal stabilisation rather than to a spontaneous rise in 
expenditure or a spontaneous decrease in tax revenues. It is not 
obvious that the OECD countries were characterized, in the recent 
period, by fiscal indiscipline (contrary to what Debrun and Kumar,
2007; and Wyplosz, 2011, 2012 pretend). 
This theory omits that governments do not care only about 
median voters but also about leading classes requesting primarily 
lower taxation for companies or for themselves and trying to 
promote public spending cuts strategies. 
In any case, this theory advocates the implementation of a 
“Golden rule of public finances” in order to reduce the govern-
ments’ bias for running excessive deficits: current expenditure 
must be financed through taxation, while investment which will 
benefit future generations may be financed through borrowing.3
It is however difficult to measure investment. How to account 
for education or research expenditure, even more since we have to 
measure net investment? Besides, it is fair to smooth exceptional 
public spending and tax revenues over all generations. Despite 
these limits, the rule, according to the classical theory, should be a 
golden rule and not a balanced budget rule.
This rule can be more precisely defined. Let us assume that a 
country wishes to maintain a public debt level equal to its public 
capital stock. Public debt in real terms varies as: 
, where  stands for the real interest rate 
and Sp is the primary government balance. The public capital stock 
level varies as: . The equality between debt and 
capital stock requires that: . 
Government borrowing should equal net public investment plus 
debt depreciation due to inflation.  
The second argument is intergenerational fairness. A given 
generation should not consume too much at the expense of future 
generations. But such an “excessive consumption” is difficult to 
3. This view was developed at the end of the 19th century by Von Stein (1885), Leroy-Beaulieu 
(1891) and Jèze (1896). It can also be found for instance in Musgrave (1939) or Eisner (1989).
1(1 ) pD D r Sπ−= + − − r π−
1 1K K I Kδ− −= + −
1 1 1( )pS S rD I K Dδ π− − −= − = − − +
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productivity growth, natural resources and environmental 
constraints. It is difficult to compare the well-being of successive 
generations. In this approach, the criterion cannot bear exclusively 
on the public deficit; private savings need also to be taken into 
account. According to the “golden rule of economic growth”, per 
capita consumption is maximised in a permanent regime if the 
interest rate equals GDP growth. As long as the interest rate does 
not exceed GDP growth, there is no evidence that fairness is not 
ensured. Intergenerational fairness may thus require a fiscal 
surplus (if the savings ratio is spontaneously too low) or a deficit (if 
the savings ratio is too high). 
The third argument is public debt sustainability. Financial 
markets should not believe that a country may be a situation where 
sovereign default is the more profitable outcome. Let sp, stand for 
the primary government balance-to-GDP ratio, , the interest rate 
on debt corrected from GDP growth, h, the debt-to-GDP ratio. At a 
given debt ratio, , one should avoid that h exceeds a critical 
value where the primary balance would be unbearable for the 
population. The difficulty is that  depends itself on sustainability 
perceived by markets. Countries like Greece, Italy, or Belgium, 
have been able to run primary surpluses of 5 percentage points of 
GDP. If = 1%, the limit for h is 500%. If  = 5%, the limit comes 
down to 100%. An indebted country is at risk of being trapped in a 
self-fulfilling spiral if financial markets require high interest rates 
to offset an unsustainability risk.
Moreover, it is necessary to make a difference between countries 
with monetary sovereignty, borrowing in their own currency and 
able to ask for central bank financing (Nersisyan and Wray, 2011), 
and non-sovereign countries, borrowing in foreign currency or not 
able to benefit from central bank financing, like euro area countries. 
The latter do not control their interest rate; they may have to 
pay risk premia; they may default. These countries may be trapped 
in a spiral: financial markets’ doubts -> increases in interest rates -> 
unsustainable debt -> financial markets’ doubts. Debt substainabi-
lity is a crucial issue for these countries.
The former may run very low interest rates and are not in 





Do we need fiscal rules? 195funding to the government. Coordination between fiscal and 
monetary policies can maintain full employment after a negative 
demand shock. The risk is that over-expansionary fiscal policies 
lead the central bank to raise interest rates to stabilise inflation, 
which may lead public debt to be unsustainable, or to abandon its 
inflation target (Sargent and Wallace, 1981, Leeper, 1991, Sterdy-
niak and Villa, 1994). This cannot occur with the following rule: 
fiscal policy must maintain a satisfactory employment level, while 
enabling the interest rate not to be higher than the nominal 
growth rate, with stable inflation at a satisfactory level.
1.2. The Keynesian model
From a Keynesian perspective, a certain level of public debt and 
deficit is necessary to ensure that demand equals potential output. 
Public deficits result from the macroeconomic situation and are 
not at the origin of this situation. In times of economic uncer-
tainty or entrepreneurs’ pessimism, private demand may be 
insufficient to maintain full employment. The optimal policy 
consists in cutting the interest rate until the demand level is satis-
factory. The advantage of this policy is that it does not increase 
public debt, it helps capital accumulation and lowers the profit rate 
requested by companies to invest. However, it may lead to exces-
sive private companies’ or households’ debt accumulation. It may 
generate financial or housing bubbles. Conversely interest rates 
cuts may be inefficient in times of strong economic depression, 
when private agents are reluctant to borrow. It may be insufficient, 
especially because there is a floor to nominal and consequently to 
real interest rates: at the end of the 1990’s, the daily interest rate 
was set at 0 in Japan, which led to a base rate of around 3% for 
commercial banks and to a real credit interest rate of 4.5% (accoun-
ting for a price deflation of around 1.5% per year). It may not be 
implementable in the euro area where the common interest rate 
cannot adjust to the different business cycle situations in the 
17 MS. So the sharp rise in public debts must be related to decelera-
ting inflation and growth (which prevents the authorities to cut 
sufficiently the real interest rate adjusted for growth) and to the
introduction of the euro (which does not allow anymore MS to run 
appropriate interest rates and exchange rates).
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak196In order to obtain a satisfactory demand level, the government 
must then accept some public deficit. Let us note y, the output gap, 
d,  private demand, g public demand, r the interest rate, and  h
public debt-to-GDP ratio,
If , the stabilisation fiscal policy is: 
If this policy is implemented and if stabilisation is perfect, then 
there is no link ex post between the deficit and the output gap. g, 
government borrowing, is considered as structural according to the 
OECD or the EC methods, which makes no sense. 
In the long run, g = 0 and .
The long-term public debt level is not arbitrary, but depends on 
private agents’ wishes: debt must equal desired debt at the optimal 
interest rate, i.e. the rate equal to the growth rate. 
This simple model shows that a fiscal rule like:
 should not be recommended, since it 
would not allow for full stabilisation and since the government 
cannot set a debt target regardless of private agents’ saving behav-
iour. The public debt level desired by private agents has probably 
increased during the crisis since households wish to hold less risky
financial assets and companies want to deleverage. In structural 
terms, the ageing of populations implies that safe public assets are
increasingly desired. 
Such a deficit necessary to support activity will not crowd out 
private spending: it will not raise the interest rate, since by defini-
tion the interest rate is as low as possible. It does not raise 
sustainability issues a priori: if the rise in public debt leads agents to 
increase their spending, the government will be able to cut its 
deficit accordingly. The government must be ready to cut its deficit 
when private demand resumes. This may require that some public 
expenditure or some tax cuts are explicitly defined as temporary.
This ideal scheme requires that the government cuts the public 
deficit when the economy comes close to full employment. The 
rule should be: the public deficit must be reduced when demand
tends to become excessive, therefore when inflation tends to acce-
lerate or when the central bank has to raise its interest rate above 
the output growth rate in order to slowdown inflation.
y g d cy r khσ= + + − +
g d rσ= − +
( ) /h d r kσ= − −
( )g g y h hλ μ
°
= − − −
Do we need fiscal rules? 197Box 1.  A Keynesian fiscal policy rule? 
Can a Keynesian fiscal rule be designed? Net public investment (NPI) 
must be financed through borrowing; public deficit should be corrected 
of debt depreciation induced by inflation (at least for a 2% inflation 
target and a 60% debt target); fiscal policy should be countercyclical: a 
1% output gap justifies a 0.75% of GDP public deficit, i.e. slightly more 
than the automatic effect; fiscal policy should be restrictive when 
monetary policy is restrictive (a fiscal surplus is needed when the inte-
rest rate set by the ECB exceeds 4%, the “golden-rule” growth rate, 
according to Phelps). Therefore:
S=-NPI-1.2% + 0.75 output gap + 0.5 (i-4) 
According to this sensible fiscal rule, which ensures that public debt 
does not exceed public capital stock in the long-term, and using the 
OECD output gap, the French public deficit should have amounted in 
2011 to:   
1.2+1.2 +0.75*3.3+1.25 = 6.2% of GDP. The French public deficit 
amounted in fact to 5.2% of GDP.
But this rule does not allow for full stabilisation and does not take 
intro consideration the link between the output gap and fiscal policy.
According to this approach, the rise in public debts is a macroe-
conomic phenomenon with two causes: insufficient private 
demand and too high interest rates. Weak demand may mirror 
households’ desire to own more financial assets combined with 
companies refusing to increase their borrowing. 
Pierre is 50 year-old and worries about his future pension. He 
decides to save 1,000 euros per month so as to have cumulated 
120,000 euros at the age of 60. Hence he generates a demand 
deficit. If interest rates cannot be cut, the government must 
increase its deficit by 12,000 euros per year and the public debt by 
120,000 euros after 10 years. Will this debt be a burden for 
Antoine, Pierre’s son? The answer is no if Pierre donates 120,000 
euros to his son. The answer is also no if Pierre spends this amount 
while Paul, Peter’s cousin and 10 years younger saves money over 
this period. The 120,000 euros are a desired additional debt. In 
such a situation, government should allow public debt to rise. The 
government stabilises the economy through providing the desired 
public debt. Public deficits increase demand directly but also indi-
rectly by raising public debt, owned by households, which tends to 
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generations since it has a counterpart in terms of assets owned by 
households. Public debt is only a way to make the economy more 
liquid. Households’ savings have a counterpart in terms in public 
debt and deficit. One may of course regret that it has no counter-
part in terms of private companies’ investment and debt, but in the 
context we are considering, companies do not wish to borrow.
This scheme may come to a halt if households become Ricar-
dian, if markets request risk premia, or if the government sets a 
public debt target (for simulations, see Ben Amar and Sterdyniak, 
2011). Let us assume that households increase their savings’ ratios 
because they wish to own more public debt as they get older. The 
government thus increases public debt, but households expect 
future tax increases (they are wrong, of course): they increase their 
savings further, which obliges the government to increase its 
deficit further. Another example is: households increase their 
savings ratio; the government has to increase its deficit to stabilise 
output, but markets request risk premia to offset the debt rise. Here 
also, the economy may enter into an infernal spiral: higher interest 
rates requested by markets will lead the government to increase its 
debt to maintain full-employment, which will worry markets, and 
increase debt again. In both cases, private agents’ defiance towards 
public debt is a self-fulfilling prophecy; output cannot be stabilised 
(see Box 2).
Thus public debt can be cut only through higher companies’ or 
households’ borrowing or lower savings (owing to reduced uncer-
tainty about the future). Public debt reduction requests interest 
rates to be kept as low as possible. When government borrowing is 
of a Keynesian type, it makes no sense to advocate a strong cut in 
government borrowing without explaining how the resulting 
demand deficit will be offset.
Hence, there are two views on public debts and deficits, like on 
the need for fiscal rules. Fiscal rules proponents may blame Keyne-
sians for opening a Pandora’s box. How to avoid government’s 
demagogic choices, once debts and deficits are allowed? Fiscal rules 
opponents may reply that the fiscal policy adequacy criterion lies 
on both the employment level, inflation, and interest rates. They 
may request rules consistent with the macroeconomic stabilisation 
objective.
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Let us consider the simplest model.
Public balance is: s = ty-g, where g stands for discretionary policy.
GDP is: y = d + g + c(1-t)y + ny*- ny  where d is a private demand shock.
Let us assume that t =0.5; c=0.5; n=0.25.
The multiplier equals 1 for a specific shock; 1.33 for a EU wide shock. 
The public balance stabilisation constraint increases it to 2 for a specific 
shock, 4 for a EU wide shock. The economy is more unstable under a 
balanced budget constraint. 
 Let us now assume that households are Ricardian or that financial 
markets request risk premia for public deficits. This will translate 
through (-hs) in the equation determining output:  y = d + g + c(1-t)y + 
ny* – ny – hs, where h = 0.5. Then fiscal policy is less efficient. The 
economy is here also more unstable in the event of a negative demand 
shock. It cannot be stabilised if h becomes equal to or higher than 1.
For neo-classical economists, the rise in deficits and public 
debts in recent years shows that rules are needed to avoid this drift.
For Keynesians, this rise was necessary and fiscal rules are harmful
if they prevent fiscal policy to play.
However, the fundamental question is: why are large public 
deficits necessary today at the world level in order to support 
demand? Prior to the crisis, four factors contributed to insufficient 
world demand: 
— Many countries implemented neo-mercantilist strategies 
aiming at building current account surpluses: Asian countries 
Specific shock EU shock 
y s y s
Full stabilisation of y  0 -1  0 -1
Automatic stabiliser -1 -0.5 -1.33 -0.67
s stabilisation -2  0 -4  0
Cost of reducing deficits -2 -1 -4 -1
Specific shock EU shock 
y s y s
Full stabilisation of y  0 -1  0 -2
Automatic stabiliser -1.33 -0.67 -2 -1
s stabilisation -2  0 -1  0
Cost of reducing deficits -0,667 -1 -1 -1
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak200learnt the lesson from the 1997 crisis and wish to be free of finan-
cial markets’ pressure; China’s rapid growth model is based on 
exports; some countries wish to anticipate the implications of their 
ageing populations (Japan, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, 
and Nordic countries). These surpluses add to oil exporting 
countries’ surpluses. 
— Trade globalisation increases the weight of international 
competitiveness. Each country has an incentive to exert downward 
pressure on their wages so as to raise domestic competitiveness. 
Countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Austria have 
succeeded in lowering substantially the wage share in value added 
since 2000. Consequently consumption has decreased as a share of 
GDP in these countries. Accounting for globalisation and for the 
interests of leading classes no country implements the relevant 
strategy: supporting output growth through higher wages and 
social benefits4.
— Anglo-Saxon economies have chosen a growth strategy 
based on wages and incomes stagnation for households as a whole 
and a rise in inequalities. This implies a declining consumption 
trend which was offset by higher households’ borrowing and 
financial and housing bubbles, allowed by real interest rates main-
tained at low levels. When households’ borrowing reaches a 
paroxysm and when bubbles burst, public debt has to support 
demand. 
— The rise in public debt in France and in many countries does 
not result from rising public expenditure, since on the contrary the 
latter have decreased as a share of GDP (by 1.4 percentage point in 
the euro area between 1997 and 2007, 0.8 percentage point in 
France), but from lower tax receipts (by 1.5 percentage point in the 
euro area as in France over the same period) due to the tax counter-
revolution implemented by most governments for 25 years. In the 
name of free movement of people and capital, EU institutions have 
forbidden countries to implement measures needed to protect 
their tax policies. Hence EU governments have used tax competi-
tion. Tax and contributions cuts have been intensified (on 
corporate taxation, higher-income households, wealth, employers’ 
4. Strangely, the European Commission and economists in the industrial economies 
recommend this strategy … but for China. 
Do we need fiscal rules? 201contributions, etc…) with no positive growth impact. These tax 
policies have increased social inequalities and public deficits. 
Simultaneously the tax counter-revolution was a choice of EU 
institutions, liberal governments and leading classes as a way to 
cut tax revenues, and pretend afterwards that in view of the resul-
ting deficit, public expenditure need to be cut. 
2. Fiscal rules: lessons from experience
2.1.  A typology for fiscal rules
A fiscal rule5 may be defined as a fiscal policy constraint which 
imposes limits on variables like deficit, public debt or public 
expenditure, either in absolute terms or depending on some 
economic variables. The introduction of fiscal rules has been 
strongly advocated by the IMF, in order to facilitate domestic fiscal 
policies discipline or surveillance by the IMF (see IMF, 2009). 
There are different types of rules according to several criteria 
(see also EC, 2010): 
— Some rules set permanently what fiscal policy should be: for 
instance, the structural deficit should be nil or equal to net public 
investment. Other rules set a ceiling: public deficit should not 
exceed 3% of GDP; debt should not exceed 60% of GDP. Such rules 
play in an asymmetrical and episodic way. 
In the first case, the difficulty is how to design a rule able to 
account for all situations. Generally, these rules are based on magic 
numbers (like budgetary positions in balance), unrelated with 
macroeconomic equilibrium constraints. The balanced govern-
ment budget rule for instance has no economic justification once 
it is recognised that a certain level of public debt is necessary 
(because public debt is desired by private agents who wish to own 
safe assets), and that besides, it is justified to finance public invest-
ment through borrowing. Let us assume for instance that 
households wish to own public debt at 60% of GDP under a 4% 
interest rate and a 4% nominal growth. The equilibrium govern-
5. This paper addresses national rules only and does not discuss rules imposed on local 
governments.
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which could require an interest rate at below GDP growth. 
In the second case, the rule bites in times of crisis, precisely 
when output needs fiscal policy support, and not in good times, 
when fiscal consolidation would possibly not be detrimental to 
growth. The ceiling is here also generally arbitrary. 
— Rules can apply to government borrowing, structural 
balance, public debt, expenditure or taxes. But government 
borrowing depends on the cyclical situation: a norm on govern-
ment borrowing is necessarily pro-cyclical. The structural balance 
is difficult to measure. The debt criterion is difficult to fulfil as, in 
the short run, a restrictive policy can increase the debt-ratio (see 
Box 3). Should a rigid rule constrain the social choice between 
public and private expenditure? This is not justified from a demo-
cratic point of view. Expenditure rules generate incentives to 
introduce tax expenditure. The rule in terms of tax revenues is 
often counter-productive: it leads governments to increase 
borrowing rather than raise taxes. 
Box 3.  The public debt criterion in the short term
Let us consider an economy in a Keynesian situation. Demand deter-
mines output, according to: . Debt varies as: 
. If g declines by 1, this leads y to fall by 1/1-c(1-t). A 
restrictive fiscal policy will lead the debt-to-GDP ratio to rise if: 
For instance: if c=0.5 and t=0.5, , cutting the deficit by 1 
leads output to fall by 1.33 (from 100 to 98.67), ex post the deficit will 
fall by 0.33. Debt will decrease to 99.67. The debt-to-GDP ratio rises 
from 100% to 101%. In the short run, a restrictive policy cannot cut the 
debt-to-GDP ratio. 
— Rules can have annual, medium-term (debt or deficit targets 
set at a five-year horizon) or long-term (ensuring public finance 
sustainability) horizons. But an annual rule often comes into
conflict with the short-term economic context. A medium-term
rule allows postponing efforts and may lack credibility; it implies 
commitments for the future while ignoring the future short-term 
situation. A long-term rule is not very useful: even if a country
(1 )y g c t y= + −
0h h g ty= + −
0 0/ (1 )(1 )h y c t> − −
0 0 100h y= =
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immediate increase in social contributions is counterproductive
when demand is insufficient.
Some economists recommend fiscal policy to be run at two 
horizons: in the short-run, expansionary fiscal policies would be 
allowed; in the longer-term the implementation of rigid fiscal rules 
or announcements of future pensions or health reforms would 
reassure financial markets (see for instance Schick, 2010). But this 
is probably an illusion: What is the credibility of such policies? 
— Rules may consist in a simple objective set out by the govern-
ment. This case has the advantage of being soft: the government 
may amend its objective or may not fulfil it if needed, possibly 
explaining why.  
Rules may be supervised by an external authority (Committees 
of experts, Parliament, Constitutional court, EU Commission), 
which may be entitled to give advice only or to impose the fulfil-
ment of the rule. But how should this authority be appointed: is 
fiscal policy a technical or a political issue? The supervising autho-
rity may be given the mandate to give advice, to dialogue with the 
government. Going beyond this is hardly consistent with demo-
cratic principles. 
— Rules may be written into Law or into the Constitution. But 
all possible events cannot be written into the law. If the text is too 
vague (for instance: fiscal policy should target a balanced budget) it 
may be ineffective. If the text is too precise (for instance: a 
balanced structural balance), it is unenforceable. 
Wyplosz (2002) proposed establishing a national fiscal policy 
committee of independent experts (how would they be 
appointed?). This Committee would have to regulate fiscal policy, 
i.e. to set the public deficit level, while public spending and 
receipts would remain under the responsibility of national govern-
ments and parliaments. After the ECB’s independence, it would be 
a new step towards leaving economic policy entirely in the hands 
of a technocracy. The Committee’s mandate would be to ensure 
public debt long-run sustainability, while output stabilisation 
would come in second. 
But Wyplosz has difficulty in defining debt sustainability. He 
makes two suggestions: a balanced budget over the economic cycle 
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak204(which implies a public debt at 0% of GDP in the long run), or the 
stabilisation of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the medium run (i.e. cycli-
cally adjusted), but he admits that it is impossible to set  an 
appropriate level for this ratio. 
As concerns monetary policy, the central Bank’s objective is 
rather clear6: ensuring low and stable inflation rates, the equilib-
rium unemployment rate theory ensuring that monetary policy 
will lead to the maximal employment level. The fiscal policy objec-
tive is less obvious: should fiscal policy target full employment or 
public finances in balance, and how to define the latter? Should 
public debt be reimbursed or is public debt necessary for the macr-
oeconomic equilibrium? This is a political choice which belongs to 
voters and not to experts (Murray and Wilkes, 2009). Wyplosz
(2011) recognises that this committee should follow rules, but he 
does not define them: will rules bear only on public finance vari-
ables or will they account for the macroeconomic context? 
Economic developments lead effective budget to differ from 
budget plans. The Committee would therefore have to control in 
permanence government policy measures and oblige the govern-
ment to change taxes. What government would accept this? 
Why would citizens be asked to vote for political parties’ repre-
sentatives if fiscal decisions are made by non elected independent 
experts? Can economic policy choices be made independently of a 
macroeconomic strategy and without democratic debate? 
The crisis has clearly shown that fiscal policy cannot obey rules 
and must be run by determined and brave governments, which 
will never be the case with experts’ committees. Can we imagine 
that a group of experts would have opposed to banks’ financial 
support or to active stabilisation policies in 2008-2009 in the name 
of public finance sustainability? 
Fatas et al. (2003) proposed a Sustainability Council, who would 
assess fiscal policies according to sustainability criteria. Their judg-
ment would be made public, so as inform financial markets and 
the general public. The problem is that sustainability is a vague 
concept, which makes sense as a long-term constraint only. This 
6. Although this objective has become less clear under the financial crisis’ developments. 
Should the Central Bank ensure financial and banking system stability, supervise it, or rescue it?
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policy run in a given year. It would require judgements on the 
output gap level, on optimal debt, on the need for discretionary 
fiscal measures. Why would these experts be more qualified than 
others to have an opinion on so difficult issues? The risk is that 
these experts help markets to have a single opinion and that they 
exert excessive influence. 
Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) consider that a fiscal council 
could fight the deficit bias of governments. They recognise that 
fiscal rules are often too rigid. The fiscal council should induce 
governments to fulfil rules, but would also allow for flexibility and 
for possibly not fulfilling them. However, the fiscal council would 
have a consultative role only.
Others simply suggest setting an independent fiscal policy 
committee in charge of assessing macroeconomic projections’ 
credibility and whether fiscal assessments are realistic. This is 
already the case in many countries. But should there be a single and 
official Committee? Would not this paralyse the democratic 
debate? There is a risk that such a Committee initiates a vicious 
circle: lower expected output growth and hence a higher deficit and 
hence a more restrictive fiscal policy in order to meet the deficit 
target at any cost, at the price of a further fall in output growth. 
— How should the position of the economy in the business 
cycle be accounted for? Should the fiscal rule apply only to the 
structural balance (knowing all measurement difficulties)? Should 
discretionary fiscal policy be forbidden? What should a govern-
ment do after a major depressive shock: give up the fiscal rule in 
order to support growth or try to meet the rule at the risk of
slowing down the recovery?
— The non fulfilment of the rule may lead to no sanction 
(except by the general public), may be subject to fines (in the case 
of international commitments), may be impossible (if the 
surveillance authority is entitled to constrain the government or if 
the rule is automatic). 
The last two cases raise feasibility and democratic issues. In the 
event of a deep depression, a rule may be unenforceable or may 
have disastrous macroeconomic consequences. Why could a group 
of experts oblige an elected government to run a given policy?
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that euro area Member States make commitments to bring their 
structural deficit in balance and thereafter maintain it in balance. 
Any deviation from the path would be corrected through an auto-
matic rise in taxes. But this would prevent any stabilisation fiscal 
policy; this supposes that the structural balance can be available in 
real time, and that the structural balance equilibrium matches 
macroeconomic equilibrium.
Delpla (2010) suggests that the balanced budget rule is written 
into the Constitution. The rule would apply to the structural 
balance. An independent fiscal Committee (IFC) would be settled 
and requested to assess the structural balance. The rule would 
apply from 2018 only. Until then, the structural deficit, estimated 
at 8% of GDP in 2010, would have to be cut by 1 percent of GDP 
per year without accounting for the business cycle situation. 
In a permanent regime, deficits (due to a deviation between 
effective and voted budgets) would be cumulated in a notional 
account and would have to be amortised in seven years. If the 
finance law project (PLF) deviates from this rule, it will be judged 
not in conformity with the Constitution by the Constitutional 
Council. In case of recession (to be defined by the IFC), the rule 
would be put aside for N years, but cumulated deficits would have 
to be offset in the following years. The rule would not be applied in 
case of exceptional circumstances, voted by the Parliament. 
In case of structural reforms (raising output growth or reducing 
implicit debt) the IFC could allow for a certain level of deficit. This 
would open the door to drifts: 2% of deficit for the introduction of 
the “Contrat Première embauche” (Scheme for young employment), 
5% for the abolition of the minimum wage, etc…
Thus, the rule would only apply when net public debt is higher 
than 40% of GDP. In France, it would have been applied only from 
1996 to 1998, and since 2008. 
This proposal lies on strong assumptions, lacking evidence: 
1. The optimal level of net public debt is 40% of GDP.
2. Any level of deficit may be run, private demand or interest 
rates will adjust. 
3. Discretionary deficits should be forbidden. 
4. Structural government balances may be assessed in real time. 
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with high flexibility. This is how rules worked until recently.  
2.2. National rules
Many countries have introduced in their constitution rules 
with no real impact, either because these rules are vague and not 
really binding, or because they are abandoned when they become 
binding. 
There is no fiscal rule in the US. There is a public debt ceiling, 
which can be raised when needed, which may be the opportunity 
to make medium-term fiscal commitments. Since 1974, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has played a significant role in 
producing reports on the medium-term fiscal outlook and on fiscal 
policy costs. The situation is similar in the Netherlands, where the 
Centraal Planbureau (CPB) plays an important expertise role, in 
Sweden (with a Fiscal Policy Council), in Belgium (High Council of 
Finance) and in Denmark (Economic Council).
In Germany under the Stability National Pact, the central and 
local governments are not allowed to run deficits exceeding the 
amount of their investments. They should target a budgetary posi-
tion in balance. 
 In Spain, the Fiscal Stability Law from 2004 states that “all levels 
of government should aim at budgetary positions in balance”. 
In the UK, the New Labour government introduced in 1998 a 
“Code for fiscal stability”, embedding two rules. The golden rule 
for public finances states that the government shall be allowed to 
borrow only to invest over an economic cycle. The sustainable 
investment rule states that net public debt should remain at a 
stable and prudent level, set at 40% of GDP. 
The golden rule has an economic justification since it ensures in 
theory that public expenditure are financed by the generations 
which benefit from it. It is appropriate from a cyclical view point: 
in times of recession, government borrowing can increase both 
under the automatic deficit and under discretionary measures, as 
long as this higher borrowing is offset in good economic times. It 
allows governments to borrow to invest, which is particularly 
necessary for countries lagging behind in terms of public invest-
ment. The rule prevents governments from reducing their deficits 
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this rule opens a Pandora’s box on public investment definition: 
should the rule stick to the national accounts’ concept or should 
all expenditure preparing for the future be included, like education 
and research expenditure? The rule implies a risk of excessive 
public investment in bad economic times. 
The golden rule is probably one of the best fiscal rules. However 
it has three drawbacks: it is difficult to implement because it 
assumes that there is a “regular” economic cycle. What should be 
done if the economic cycle turns out to be irregular? The govern-
ment has an incentive to change business cycle dating in order to 
have rooms for manoeuvre. 
The UK golden rule is slightly too strict, since we have seen that 
the appropriate rule is that government borrowing equals net 
public investment augmented by debt depreciation.
Should we recommend the implementation of a golden rule
correctly designed as structural government borrowing excluding 
net public investment and debt depreciation? Balassone and 
Franco (2002) reject this rule in the name of measurement difficul-
ties. The rule requires in fact statisticians to assess the cyclical part 
of government borrowing (therefore the output gap and its impact 
on public finances), public investment and public capital stock 
depreciation, in other words four debatable measures. But is not it 
better to use a fair rule, estimated with some lack of precision than 
to follow a wrong rule, estimated with precision?
A more fundamental criticism is that this rule defines fiscal 
policy neutrality, cyclical neutrality (only automatic stabilisers are 
allowed to work) and structural neutrality (public savings equals 
public investment). But a government may choose not to be 
neutral. It may wish to run an expansionary fiscal policy (in times 
of deep recession) or a restrictive policy (in times of high inflation). 
It may wish to implement structural measures if it judges that 
savings are too high ex ante (which would require a too low interest 
rate) or too low (for instance in the light of demographic develop-
ments). The rule confuses a neutrality criterion with an economic 
policy norm. Nothing guarantees that the fiscal policy needed to 
reach a satisfying output level in a country which does not control 
its interest rate matches the golden rule. 
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rule ensures on its own that net public debt stands below public 
capital stock. 
No mechanism forces the UK government to fulfil the Code; the 
government simply needs to explain why he did not fulfil it and 
how he will fulfil it. The rule allowed the government to increase 
substantially public investment spending starting from 2002, 
which was necessary both for structural (public infrastructure was 
insufficient) and cyclical (to counterbalance the fall in private 
demand after the burst of the internet bubble) reasons. 
In November 2008, in view of public finance deterioration, the 
UK government abandoned the Code for fiscal stability, 
announcing that it would restore public finances once the economy 
would recover. Government borrowing rose rapidly, together with 
net public debt (which reached 60.5% GDP in March 2011). This 
shows clearly that fiscal rules cannot be set as rules “for all seasons”.
Formally, France is already committed to a fiscal rule. Since July 
2008, the Article 34 of the Constitution states that: “The public 
finance multiannual guidelines are defined by programming laws. 
They are part of the target of public finances in balance”. This 
article has had very little influence on fiscal policy implementation 
since then. In times of crisis, multiannual guidelines rapidly lose 
any influence (Table 1). This was the case in 2002 and 2009. 
Table 1. Public balance targets according to the French stability programmes 
In % of GDP
98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
J 99 -2.9 -2.3 -1.2
J 00 -2.1 -1.7 -0.5
J 01 -1.0 -0.6 -0.4 0.2
J 02 -1.4 -1.3 -0.5 0.0
J 03 -2.8 -2.6 -2.1 -1.6 -1.0
J 04 -4.0 -3.5 -2.9 -2.2 -1.5
J 05 -2.9 -2.2 -1.6 -0.9
J 06 -3.0 -2.9 -2.6 -1.9 -1.0
J 07 -2.7 -2.5 -1.8 -0.9 0.0
J 08 -2.4 -2.3 -1.7 -1.2 -0.6 0.0
J 09 -2.9 -3.9 -2.7 -1.9 -1.1
J 10 -7.9 -8.2 -6.0 -4.6 -3.0
J 11 -7.0 -5.7 -4.6 -3.0
Obs. -2.6 -1.8 -1.5 -1.6 -3.2 -4.1 -3.6 -3.0 -2.3 -2.7 -3.3 -7.5 -7.0 -5.2
Source: Stability programmes, Updates (1999-2011).
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the golden rule allows in the medium term a deficit of around 2.5% 
of GDP.
2.3. The Stability and Growth Pact 
Euro area countries are committed to the SGP. This is a unique 
example of a fiscal rule enshrined in an international Treaty, 
which raises a delicate issue: can a Treaty resulting from a political 
compromise, necessarily with simple specifications, contain 
binding economic constraints which may come in contradiction 
with economic principles, and with the needs of relevant fiscal 
policy?
The Pact was based on the assumption that MS domestic fiscal 
policies could have negative impacts on partner countries. But 
only the risk of an over-expansionary policy was taken into consid-
eration, and not the risk of too restrictive policies. The Pact was 
marginally revised in 2005, but its basic principles remained 
unchanged. MS should not run higher than 3% of GDP public defi-
cits and higher than 60% of GDP public debts. MS must produce 
Stability programmes showing 4-year projections for public 
finances, bringing medium-term budgetary positions in balance (a 
1% of GDP deficit is allowed for MS with high growth and low
public debt). Budgetary efforts must reach at least 0.5% of GDP per 
year (measured in terms of primary structural balance, as estimated 
by the Commission). If debt exceeds 60% of GDP, debt should be 
brought down to this value at a satisfactory pace. Once the objec-
tive of the structural balance in equilibrium is reached then it must 
be maintained. Only automatic stabilisers are allowed to play, the 
structural balance being estimated by the Commission’s method.
The European Commission initiates an Excessive Deficit Procedure
(EDP) when a country breaches the 3% of GDP limit for deficits
(unless this excess is temporary) and sets a deadline for the country
to bring its deficit below 3% of GDP. MS not fulfilling their
commitments under an EDP may be subject to fines, but this has 
never been implemented.
The SGP drawbacks have often been analysed (see, for instance 
Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2003, 2006): 
Do we need fiscal rules? 2111. The 3% limit makes no sense in times of economic depres-
sion. A country hit by a specific recession may need a higher 
than 3% of GDP deficit to counterbalance a large fall in 
domestic private demand. A priori this will have no negative 
impact on euro area inflation. Such a deficit will have a posi-
tive impact on partner countries since it will prevent spill-
over effects of a fall in demand. In 2002, Germany was 
running a 3.5% of GDP public deficit but inflation was 
growing by 1.4% only and there was a 1.9% of GDP current 
account surplus: one cannot see how the German deficit 
could then have had a negative impact on his partners. 
2. The Pact is blind for two reasons. It bites only at the trough 
of the cycle. But restrictive measures should be taken only 
when the economy at the peak of the cycle. The Pact cannot 
bite for too virtuous countries (who induce other countries 
to be “sinner” countries).
3. The Pact does not take account for issues such as external 
imbalances, competitiveness, private indebtedness, financial 
or housing bubbles.
4. The Pact should allow sanctions for countries running exces-
sive public deficits, inducing inflationary pressures and
excessive deficits, which require the ECB to raise interest 
rates. In fact, countries under an EDP are often countries 
with low growth and low inflation, and which need public 
deficits to support their growth. Conversely, a country like
Spain could enjoy strong and inflationary growth without 
any public deficit but with a large current account deficit. 
5. The rationale for a medium-term budget in balance has no 
economic justification. It is tighter than the golden rule or 
debt stability. In a situation of weak private demand and inte-
rest rates already at a floor, a government budget in balance is 
inconsistent with a satisfactory demand level. A deficit kept 
in permanence at 0% of GDP would lead nominal public debt 
to be stable in level and declining as a percentage of GDP. 
Public debt would reach 0% of GDP at some point. But savers, 
in particular pension funds, need to own long-term, liquid 
and safe assets, in other words public assets.
6. In good economic times, the SGP induces cuts in structural 
government borrowing, but cannot exert pressure on 
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the concept of a good economic situation is problematic: MS 
refused to accept the structural unemployment rate floor as 
calculated by the Commission. In times of depression, the 
rule becomes totally unenforceable. Besides, the distinction 
between a structural and cyclical balance is questionable: 
where should stimulus measures be placed? What about the 
large revenue falls due to the overreaction of corporate and 
income taxation? There is no justification for prohibiting
discretionary fiscal policies. 
7. Since the single interest rate cannot fit all domestic specific 
situations, each MS should be allowed to run fiscal policy in 
order to reach a satisfactory output level (corresponding to 
the natural rate of unemployment). Let us summarise the
EMU functioning by: yi = di + gi –σ r, where yi is the output 
gap, di : private demand and gi : public spending (assumed to 
be equal to the public deficit), r is the common interest rate. 
Then we should have: gi = – di + σ r. On the contrary,
imposing  gi = 0  leads to an unsatisfactory output level. 
8. The SGP implementation relies crucially on the potential 
output growth estimate. This is problematic in times of 
crisis. According to the Commission method, potential 
output deviates relatively little from observed output, so the 
deficit is estimated to be mostly structural.
As Table 2 shows, the 2009 crisis led the Commission to revise
substantially its estimates of potential output before the crisis. For 
2007, the structural deficit increased by 1.2 percentage points at 
the euro area level. The reduction in the deficit between 2006 and 
2007 was revised downwards from 0.5 to 0.1 percentage point In 
2011, was the effort needed to bring the  structural deficit back to 0 
amounting to 3% or 0% of GDP?
The SGP implementation led to strong tensions within the area 
(Tables 3 and 4). In 1999-2000, the largest countries refused to run 
restrictive policies, despite strong growth, because they did not 
want to undermine growth while domestic unemployment was 
still high. Thus, in the 2003-2004 economic downturn, deficits rose 
above the 3% of GDP limit and governments refused to undertake 
restrictive policies which would have deepened the recession. This 
led to an open crisis between the Commission and the Council in
Do we need fiscal rules? 213November 2003. From 2004 to 2007, fiscal positions improved
thanks to the recovery and to consolidation policies undertaken in 
Portugal, Germany and Italy. In mid-2008, no country was under 
an EDP. However, six countries ran public debts exceeding 60% of 
GDP: countries cannot meet a priori fiscal rules. There are still 
economists however (see for instance, Calmfors 2012) who blame 
countries for not having strictly conformed with the rules of the 
Pact, as if these rules have any economic justification. 
Table 2. Revision of the European Commission's structural balance estimates, 
2005-2011
In % of GDP
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP growth, % 1.8 3.2 2.8 0.3 -4.2 1.9 1.5
Public balance -2.5 -1.3 -0.7 -2.1 -6.4 -6.2 -4.1
Potential growth* 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.4 0.9 0.8 1.1
                            ** 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9
Output gap* 0.0 1.4 2.5 1.4 -3.7 -2.6 -2.2
                   ** -0.9 -0.2 0.2 -1.2 -7.3 -7.3 -7.7
Structural balance* -2.5 -2.0 -1.9 -2.8 -4.6 -5.0 -3.2
                              ** -2.0 -1.2 -0.7 -1.4 -2.6 -2.5 -0.1
* Autumn 2011 estimate; ** Spring 2008 estimate.
Source: European Commission (2008, 2011).
Table 3. Excessive deficit procedures
Source: European Commission.
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Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak214Over 1998-2007 the euro area government balance was however 
in surplus according to the OECD estimates (Table 5). From 1997 
to 2007 the improvement in the structural euro area balance is due 
to decreasing interest payments and public expenditure (Table 6). 
Conversely it was limited due to lower tax revenues. The imple-
mentation of a tax harmonisation strategy in Europe would have 
prevented tax competition.
In 2007, debt was sustainable in all euro area countries (except 
in Greece and France, see Table 7). The gap was negative for the 
UK, the US, and even more for Japan. From a purely fiscal perspec-
tive, the assessment of the Pact is therefore mitigated. The Pact was 
probably binding, but less strongly that it intended. 
Fiscal policy rules were not helpful during the crisis. The crisis 
destroyed the reliability of structural balance estimates (see 
Table 2); it appeared that governments were not controlling their 
deficit levels, due to the over-reaction of revenues (corporate taxa-
tion, income taxation, inheritance and transfers tax). Governments 
implemented discretionary policies; the Commission had to accept 
the latter and even pretend to co-ordinate them, forgetting its 
discourses on their inefficiency. The objective of structural budget 
in balance was entirely put aside. Government deficits rose, both in 
their structural and cyclical components: the Stability Pact had to 
be put aside.     
Table 4. MS not fulfilling the rules
Public deficit/Public debt in % of GDP
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
PRT 4.3 3.1 3.4 5.9/63 4.1/64 3.2/68 3.6/72 10.1/83 9.2/93 5.9/108
FRA  3.2 4.1/63 3.6/65 3.0/66 /64 /64 3.3/68 7.5/78 7.0/82 5.6/85
DEU 3.6/60 4.0/64 3.8/66 3.3/68  /68 /65   /66 3.0/73 3.3/83 /84
NLD   3.2    5.5/61 5.3/63 3.7/66
GRC 4.4/104 4.8/102  5.7/97 7.4/99 5.3/103 6.0/106 6.7/105 9.8/111 15.6/127
10.4/
143 7.5/153
ITA 3.1/109 3.0/106 3.6/104 4.4/104 3.3/106 /106 /104 /106 5.3/116 4.5/119 3.9/121
ESP        4.2 11.1 9.2/60 5.9/68
IRL        7.3 14.3/66 32.4/96 10.1/114
BEL  /107 /103  /98  /94  /92 /88 /84   /90 6.0/96 4.2/97 3.6/97
AUT  /67 /66 /66 /65 /64 /62 /61   /64 4.2/70 4.6/72 3.7/74
Source : European Commission (2011).
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1998 2.7 -2.3 4.1 -0.2/-1.3 2.1/3.2
1999 2.8 -1.5 3.6 0.1/-0.8 2.3/3.2
2000 3.9 -1.1 3.5 0.8/0.0 0.7/1.5
2001 2.0 -2.0 3.3 0.6 /0.0 0.9/1.5
2002 0.9 -2.7 3.1 -0.1/-0.5 0.4/0.8
2003 0.7 -3.1 3.0 -0.6/-1.2 -0.1/0.5
2004 2.0 -2.9 2.8 -0.4/-1.2 0.3/1.1
2005 1.8 -2.5 2.7 -0.3/-1.3 0.4/1.4
2006 3.3 -1.4 2.6 0.6/-0.6 0.9/2.1
2007 3.0 -0.7 2.6 1.3/-0.1 0.9/2.3
2008 0.3 -2.1 2.6 0.6 /-1.0 -0.1/1.5
2009 -4.2 -6.4 2.5 -2.0/-4.1 -2.3/-0.2
2010 1.8 -6.3 2.5 -1.5/-4.2 -1.7/1.0
2011 1.6 -4.0 2.6 -1.3/-4.3 -0.3/2.7
2012 0.2 -2.9 2.8 -1.8/-5.2 1.3/4.7
*OECD estimate / OFCE estimate.
Source : OECD, Economic Outlook, May 2012.
Table 6. Public finances from 1997 to 2007 (cyclically adjusted)






Euro area -1.5 -1.6 -1.4 +1.5
Germany -2.5 -0.5 -3.7 +1.7
France -1.6 -0.6 -0.8 -0.2
Italy -1.0 -3.9 +2.2 -0.7
Spain +2.2 -3.1 +0.3 +5.1
Netherlands 0.0 -2.6 +0.8 +1.7
Belgium -0.5 -3.4 +2.3 +1.7
Greece +1.0 -3.1 +6.5 +2.4
Austria -4.6 -1.2 -5.0 +1.5
Portugal +3.8 -1.0 3.5 +1.2
Finland -2.4 -2.4 -6.4 +6.4
Source : OECD, Economic Outlook, May 2012.
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak216Public finances deteriorate in times of crisis when fiscal rules 
can no more play and are necessarily “forgotten”. Should fiscal 
rules be implemented, although they would not have allowed the 
policies run in 2008-2010? Is there a need for temporary fiscal rules 
to bring the economy out of the crisis? But how would such 
temporary rules make a trade-off between growth and public 
finances objectives? Between doing everything to bring deficits 
below 3% of GDP and debts below 60% of GDP and doing 
everything to support growth?
The strong deterioration of public finances during the crisis is 
not due to over-expansionary policies before the crisis (except for 
Greece). It results from the depth of the recession (which raises the 
issue of economic instability induced by financial globalisation), 
by banks’ recapitalisation in some countries (Ireland, which raises 
the issue of the regulation and supervision of the banking system), 
by the length of the crisis (which raises the issue of crisis exit strate-
gies), by the bad functioning of the euro area which leads financial 
Table 7. Public finances in 2007

















Germany 0.2 2.6 42.9  1.6  1.9 +10
France -2.7 0.2 34.0  0.2 -0.3 -8
Italy -1.7 3.0 89.6  0.9  2.2 -18
Spain  1.9 3.0 18,7 -3.2  3.6 -35
Netherlands  0.2 1.8 28.0  0.3  1.7 -20
Belgium -0.2 3.5 73.4 -0.2  3.6 -28
Austria -0.7 1.3 30.7 -0.3  1.4 -6
Greece -6.7 -3.0 80.4 -2.9  -0.7 +4
Portugal -2.3 0.6 44.1  0.6  0.3 +17
Finland  5.2 4.6 -71.1 -0.3  4.4 -67
Ireland 0.2 0.9 -0.3 -3.4  0.8 -42
Euro area -0.6 2.0 43.3 0.1 2.0 -10
United Kingdom -2.7 -0.7 28.8 -0.3 -0.6 -2
USA -2.8 -0.8 47.2 -1.1 -0.3 -6
Japan -2.5 -1.9 80.4  0.7 -2.6 +45
Source : OECD, Economic Outlook, November 2011.
Do we need fiscal rules? 217markets to bet against Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain, where the 
situation of public finances is not worse than in the US. 
The requested budgetary effort depends strongly on the esti-
mate of the cyclical component of government borrowing; in 2011 
it was nil at the euro area level according to us (since the primary 
structural balance was already in surplus), and amounted to 3% of 
GDP according to the European Commission (which aims at brin-
ging structural deficits in balance).
As a fiscal rule, the SGP Pact therefore has a negative assess-
ment. It was not met prior the crisis. It generated useless tensions. 
It did not allow to design an economic strategy before and during 
the crisis. It does not allow to define a crisis exit strategy.
3. Fiscal rules proposals
Although the rise in deficits and debts since the beginning of 
the financial crisis was not due to a drift in public finances, many 
economists and international institutions advocate exit strategies 
based on implementing fiscal rules in order to bring budgetary 
positions in balance. This raises two issues: how to define this new 
equilibrium? How to ensure that fiscal rules are consistent with 
macroeconomic equilibrium requirements? 
Even if the crisis has shown the need for active fiscal policies, 
some countries blame inappropriate fiscal policies for current diffi-
culties. Therefore, they wish more binding fiscal policy constraints. 
Should EU governments deprive themselves of weapons which 
were helpful during the crisis? 
In the euro area, Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland 
demand more binding rules as a counterpart of the increased fiscal 
solidarity needed in face of speculation against public debts. The 
objective is also to re-assure financial markets who have understood 
that public debts in the euro area have become risky assets. But any 
rule raises credibility issues. Too rigid rules implemented simulta-
neously in Europe will reduce GDP growth which will have vicious 
effects: falling output growth generates lower tax receipts, and raises 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, public finance targets will not be reached; 
rising unemployment and political and social tensions will increase 
the fears that the country defaults and even leaves the euro area. 
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3.1.1. Germany: The debt brake 
Germany introduced a “debt brake” in its Constitution, which 
forbids higher than 0.35% of GDP structural deficits from 2016. 
The cyclical deficit is estimated according to the fragile Commis-
sion’s method. According to that estimate, Germany would have 
run excessive structural deficits (i.e. above 0.35% of GDP) each year 
since 1974 (except in 1985 and 1989). But can we consider that a 
country with higher than 6.5% of GDP current account surpluses 
in 2005-2007 and a 1.5% inflation rate was running excessive 
public deficits? In fact, the debt brake is not more rigid than the 
SGP rules. But Germany did not fulfil the SGP.
Deviations from the rule may be allowed in case of “natural 
disaster or exceptional economic circumstances”. They should be 
passed in a Parliament vote, with a 2/3 majority. 
The law introduces a “notional adjustment account”, where 
deficits over the 0.35% ceiling (due to cyclical developments or a 
bad implementation of the budget) are recorded. These deficits will 
have to be cut either thanks to good economic times or to discre-
tionary policies. The amount of this account cannot exceed 1.5% 
of GDP. 
This rule is satisfactory neither in the short nor in the long 
term. In the short-term the definition of “exceptional situations” 
will be crucial. If growth decelerates, the fiscal policy constraint 
will depend strongly on the potential output estimate. In 2010, the 
German government deficit amounted to 4.3% of GDP. The struc-
tural deficit amounted to 3.5% of GDP according to the 
Commission or the OECD, to 1.3 % of GDP according to us. 
In the long-term, if German potential output is assumed to 
grow by 3% per year in nominal terms, running a 0.35% of GDP 
deficit would bring the public debt down to 12% of GDP. Is this 
realistic? 
With Germany having imposed on itself such a rule, the other 
EU countries are under market pressure to be as virtuous as 
Germany. 
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In 2010, the UK introduced an independent Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR), in charge of producing macroeconomic and 
fiscal forecasts and of assessing the government patrimonial 
accounts. In 2011, the government set the objective of bringing 
the structural current government borrowing in balance in five 
years, i.e. to apply the golden rule with the problems we 
mentioned earlier. The OBR has to assess if the fiscal policy imple-
mented will reach this objective (with a higher than 50% 
probability). What will the government do if active fiscal policy is 
needed in 2016? Fortunately, it will not be constrained by the 2011 
programme. Hence, the medium-term commitment is not so 
binding. 
3.1.3. A French-type rule? 
In March 2010, a Commission was appointed with the mandate 
of recommending a rule for public finances in balance (see 
Camdessus, 2010). From the beginning, the Commission chose to 
exclude wise rules like the true golden rule or the stabilisation of 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, and suggested instead a rule of a structural 
budget in balance, which forbids discretionary measures and 
imposes a too strong constraint in the medium term. There was 
however no macroeconomist among the members of the Commis-
sion, and stabilisation issues were forgotten. The Commission 
suggested that each new government commits themselves by law 
on a programme of structural deficit cuts and on a date at which 
the structural balance will be reached.  
The French government had proposed a complicated constitu-
tional law project. Each government had to commit themselves in 
a multiannual public finance law7, which should cover at least 3 
years and include, year by year, a public spending ceiling and an 
amount of new measures in terms of revenues (independently of 
the conjuncture). Higher than planned spending would be allowed 
only if associated with a similar rise in receipts. The government 
would have to commit initially on a fixed intangible scenario 
including each year structural deficits (public expenditure less 
receipts corrected from the conjuncture) cuts. The government 
7. With a content to be specified in an Organic law.
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reached. The Constitutional Council would be entitled to amend a 
finance law if the latter was not in conformity with this multian-
nual public finance law, i.e. if it involved a lower than planned 
fiscal effort.
The experience of the SGP had however shown that it is useless 
to ask governments to announce a public finance trajectory inde-
pendently of the cyclical context. In November 2007, the French 
government announced that the structural deficit would be cut 
down to 0.6% of GDP in 2011. In January 2010, the structural 
deficit target for 2011 had moved to 4% of GDP. Obviously, this 
rise in deficit was needed accounting for the crisis. But what would 
have happened if the budget had been constrained by a multian-
nual law passed in 2008? Does the French government consider it 
was wrong to support the economy in 2009, and that it should 
have been constrained to remain inactive? 
Some economists (like Boone and Pisani-Ferry, 2011) were 
requesting France to make more budgetary efforts: they requested 
that the multiannual law passed at the beginning of the Parlia-
ment, sets “the fiscal policy main parameters over a five-year 
period”, as if a rigid economic policy could be run without accoun-
ting for cyclical or structural developments. They requested the 
“correction of past deviations”: in 2013 or 2014, excessive deficits 
from 2009 or 2010 should be corrected without accounting for the 
effective cyclical circumstances over these years. An “independent 
public finance council” should be settled, and would be in charge 
of evaluating implemented fiscal policy. But who would appoint 
these experts? What would be the judgement criteria of these 
experts? 
This project was approved by a vote in the French National 
Assembly and the Senate, but not with a sufficiently large majority. 
It was therefore not adopted. 
However, the French government had from then clearly 
committed to follow the deficit public reduction path enshrined in 
the budget law (6% of GDP in 2011, 4.6% in 2012 and 3% in 2013), 
independently of cyclical developments. Hence, the announce-
ment of GDP growth 1 percentage point lower than anticipated for 
2012 induces austerity measures which dampen GDP growth 
Do we need fiscal rules? 221further. As shown in Box 2, each time French GDP growth is 1 
percentage point lower than anticipated, the government must 
implement measures amounting to 1 percentage point of GDP if it 
wishes to meet the a priori set target, which reduces ex post GDP 
growth by 2%.
3.2. The EU proposals
The European Commission’s legislative proposals on the SGP 
strengthening and the “Euro Plus Pact” aim at constraining all euro 
area MS to introduce binding fiscal rules in their constitution. The 
EU authorities did not learn the lessons from the disastrous euro 
area management before the crisis. This management was focusing 
on rigid public finance rules and not on a precise coordination of 
macroeconomic strategies, which increased disparities in Europe in 
a weak growth context (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2011). 
The debt crisis strengthened the weight of proponents of auto-
matic and without economic rationale fiscal rules. These 
proponents can now rely on financial markets’ threat, on the need 
to reassure financial markets, on the weight of Germany, which 
wishes increased EU solidarity to be paid by strengthened SGP 
rules. The Greek crisis is way to hide the financial crisis under the 
carpet. 
The proponents of strict rules point to the threat of financial 
markets and rating agencies. If a country does not include such 
rules in their constitution they will lose their precious AAA. Finan-
cial markets would lend at reasonable rates only to countries 
committing not to have to borrow. On the one hand, countries 
cumulating huge foreign currency reserves (like China, and oil 
producing countries), pension funds, and insurance companies 
wish to own huge public assets amounts. On the other hand, they 
refuse to lend to countries which need to borrow, at least without 
high risk premia. They refuse to accept that their accumulation of 
liquid assets has a counterpart in terms of debt. Such contradictory 
demands can only paralyse the world economy. 
On 29 September 2010, the Commission proposed a set of six 
legislative proposals aiming at “strengthening economic 
governance”:
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medium term objective of budgetary positions in balance, 
and the constraint for countries running a structural deficit 
to cut it by at least 0.5% of GDP per year. No lesson is drawn 
from past experience. 
— Countries will face sanctions if public spending increases 
more rapidly than prudent GDP growth (unless this is offset 
by a rise in taxation or if the country runs a fiscal surplus). 
This will prevent economic stabilisation through increased 
public spending. In times of economic depression, do we 
really need prudence? What would happen if by prudence 
households stop consuming or companies stop investing? 
— Countries will face sanctions if they do not cut their struc-
tural deficit by at least 0.5 percentage point per year.
— Countries running a higher than 60% of GDP debt ratio will 
be under an excessive deficit procedure if the debt ratio does 
not fall by 1/20th per year of the gap between the effective 
debt and the 60% reference value. But it is almost impossible 
to prevent the debt ratio to rise in times of economic 
slowdowns. This new rule is pro-cyclical: it strengthens the 
constraint on deficits in slow growth periods. A country with 
a 90% debt-to GDP ratio and a 2% annual inflation rate, will 
have to keep a public deficit at below or 2% of GDP if 
domestic GDP grows by 2%; the deficit will need to be below 
or at 1% if GDP grows by 1% only. 
— Guilty countries (countries with too rapid rises in public 
spending, countries not cutting their structural deficit, or 
not complying with an EDP) will have to make a deposit of 
between 0.2% and 0.5% of GDP, which will possibly be 
converted into a fine if the requested measures are not 
implemented. 
— MS will have to introduce EU rules in their domestic fiscal 
frameworks (the 3% and 60% limits, the medium-term target 
of budgetary positions in balance) and to implement a 
surveillance of the fulfilment of these rules by an “indepen-
dent budgetary institution”.
— A qualified majority will now be needed for the Council to 
oppose measures and sanctions recommended by the 
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of sanctions. 
The Commission’s proposal undermines MS autonomy; forces 
them to fulfil strictly rules without economic rationale, and 
reduces their ability to stabilise their economies. It will increase 
further tensions between the Commission and the MS. Expert 
Committees are given the mandate of monitoring fiscal policy, 
although the crisis has clearly shown that strong and determined 
policy responses are needed. 
The proposal was passed by the European Parliament while 
media remained silent and hence citizens entirely indifferent. The 
Parliament worsened the text: the Commission will be able sanc-
tion automatically a country not fulfilling the forecast path for 
deficits. 
According to the Euro plus pact adopted in March 2011, each 
MS must introduce in their fiscal framework or their Constitution a 
fiscal rule similar to the SGP, the Commission being in charge of 
verifying this similarity. 
In October 2011, the ECOFIN council specified that MS under 
an EDP, i.e. currently almost all euro area countries, will have to 
meet their budgetary targets independently of economic circums-
tances, in other words to implement pro-cyclical fiscal policies.
On 9 December 2011, the European Council proposed a “fiscal 
pact”, which merely repeats the already adopted framework. It 
became the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
(TSCG) and was signed on 2 March 2012. This text only recalls the 
six directives. Each country is requested to include in its Constitu-
tion a rule limiting the structural public deficit to 0.5% of GDP. It 
will have to converge rapidly towards this objective, according to a 
schedule given by the Commission. An automatic correction 
mechanism will have to be implemented in case of a deviation 
from this path. The EU Court of Justice will verify that the rule 
complies with the European rules. Countries will have to cut their 
deficit, according to a schedule proposed by the Commission. 
Countries under an EDP have to submit their budgets and struc-
tural reform programmes to the Commission and the Council, 
which will make recommendations and monitor budget imple-
mentation. A qualified majority of euro area governments will be 
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countries breaching the 3% ceiling or not complying with instruc-
tions given by the Commission. MS will have to introduce 
independent fiscal committees in charge of verifying that the 
balanced budget rule is met and the adjustment path.
This project is dangerous from an economic point of view 
because it imposes an arbitrary public deficit rule; it imposes quasi-
automatic fiscal policies; it prohibits any discretionary policy to 
support activity. But discretionary policies are needed to stabilise 
the economy. Let us assume that the tax-to-GDP ratio is 50% and 
propensity to consume is 1. Then the multiplier equals 2. If private 
spending falls by 10 ex ante, this will lead output to fall by 20 in the 
absence of any fiscal policy response, and the public deficit will rise 
by 10. Fiscal expansion raising public expenditure by 10 will lead 
to the same rise in deficit but will prevent output from falling. 
Such a policy would be forbidden according to the law proposal. 
The proposal is based on an implicit and wrong theory: automatic 
stabilisers should be allowed to work, but discretionary stabilisa-
tion fiscal policies should be forbidden. At the end of 2008, the 
IMF, the G20 and the European Commission requested countries 
to implement such discretionary policies. Should these policies 
have been abandoned two years later? 
MS will lose fiscal autonomy. Implementing this Pact would be 
a serious setback for democracy in Europe.
In fact, the aim is to impose strong commitments to MS in order 
to convince Germany and the other Northern countries to accept 
more financial solidarity in Europe, to persuade the ECB to inter-
vene more strongly by buying public debts, and more importantly 
to announce its intention to do it as long as necessary. But so far 
Germany and the ECB are not convinced that they should follow 
this strategy.
Last, some economists and even ministers in Germany or the 
Netherlands requested that a country not fulfilling the SGP may be 
condemned by the European Court of Justice. Fiscal policy would 
be submitted to the judiciary power. Jean-Claude Trichet, the then 
ECB President, and Wolfgang Schaüble, the German minister for 
finance, proposed that a Commissioner be responsible for euro 
area MS public finances, be allowed to supervise MS budgets, and 
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rules, inconsistent with macroeconomic governance needs are 
implemented. This is the ambiguity of current European construc-
tion: better economic policies coordination is needed, but a strictly 
numerical control of public deficits levels is neither economic 
policy coordination, nor an optimal rule.
3.2.1. A French-type rule? Bis 
In October 2012, the French government has had the Parliament 
enact an “Organic law relating to the planning and governance of 
public finances” (loi organique relative à la programmation et à la 
gouvernance des finances publiques, LPFP), which translates into 
French law the European Fiscal pact (the TSCG). In fact, the govern-
ment chose to take account ad minima of the Treaty, since the new 
fiscal procedure is not included in the constitution. 
Article 1 of the Organic Law stipulates that: “In accordance with 
the objective of running government accounts in balance as set out 
in Article 34 of the Constitution, the LPFP sets the medium-term 
targets of the government administrations referred to in Article 3 
of the TSCG.” But how can a Programming law “set a target” when 
the target derives from Article 3 of the Treaty, which clearly states 
that the target should be a structural deficit of below 0.5% of GDP 
and that an adjustment path to ensure a rapid convergence 
towards equilibrium will be proposed by the European Commis-
sion? The ambiguity of this article reflects an attempt to reconcile 
the irreconcilable: the sovereignty of Parliament in budgetary 
matters with France’s commitment to follow the recommenda-
tions of the Commission.
The programming law will cover 4 to 5 years, but will be voted 
again by the Parliament each year  and so the constraint will 
possibly be amended with the vote of a new programming law, as 
this has been the case in France since the SGP was introduced. 
Thus the programming law as such does not introduce additional 
constraints to those already required by European treaties. 
The organic law establishes a High Council of Public Finances, 
which will give advice on the macroeconomic forecasts underlying 
the finance law project, on the Stability programme which France 
has to submit to EU authorities, on the LPFP. The High Council 
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trajectory announced in the LPFP. He will give his opinion on the 
existence of “exceptional circumstances”. 
The High Council will be chaired by the President of the Cour 
des comptes (Court of audit) and will consist of 4 members of the 
Cour des comptes and four members appointed due to their exper-
tise in public finances by the Presidents of the French National 
Assembly, the Senate and two Finance Commissions. The Cour des 
comptes will have a prevailing role, which is problematic. The Cour 
des comptes’ judicial officers are not a priori macroeconomic 
experts, and because of their job position are often more 
concerned with public finances in balance than with output 
growth and employment. The latest Cour des Comptes’ Reports have 
for instance underestimated the size of the output gap, they 
support the thesis according to which the fiscal multiplier is close 
to 0 and that public expenditure cuts are more relevant than 
increases in taxes. We would like to be sure that the Cour des 
Comptes’ judicial officers will express their own views in full inde-
pendence, and that the High Council’s Reports will reflect a 
diversity of opinions; which is not currently the case in the Cour 
des Comptes’ Reports.
More fundamentally, one may wonder whether there will be 
some flexibility in the High Council’ assessments. Will the High 
Council be entitled to conclude that the adjustment path is too 
restrictive, and that the medium-term target is not realistic? What 
strategy will be advocated by the High Council in the event of an 
economic slowdown: an expansionary policy to support growth or 
an austerity policy to restore public finances?
Finally, a question needs to be raised: what will be the legiti-
macy of this High Council? Fiscal policy choices must be subject to 
democratic procedures. Economic policy assessment is part of a 
scientific, democratic debate. Should it be entrusted to a High 
Council, composed mainly of judicial experts, rather than econo-
mists on the one hand and representatives of the nation on the 
other hand?
The High Council will only give advice, which neither the 
government nor the Parliament are obliged to follow, but the risk 
is great that these recommendations influence financial markets 
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not to fulfill them strictly.
To ensure that countries do indeed follow the adjustment path, 
the Treaty requires countries to provide an automatic correction 
mechanism if deviations are observed with respect to this path. In 
the spirit of the negotiators from Northern European countries and 
from the Commission, this mechanism should stipulate that in the 
event of 1% of GDP deviation in year N, the Constitution ensures 
that, automatically, some taxes (e.g. VAT) are raised by 0.5 percen-
tage point of GDP and some expenditures (e.g. social benefits) are 
cut by 0.5 percentage point of GDP. As a matter of fact, Chapter 3 
of France’s Organic Law provides that the High Council reports 
such a deviation, that the government explains the reasons for this 
deviation and then takes them into account when elaborating the 
next finance law. Parliament’s rights are respected, but fortunately 
the automaticity of the correcting mechanism is not guaranteed. 
In the spirit of its founders, the fiscal treaty should put an end 
to the possibility of autonomous domestic fiscal policies. Fiscal 
policies should become automatic. Fiscal policy should aim at 
budgets in balance, just as monetary policy must be to prevent 
inflation; growth and employment shall be sought through free 
market structural reforms. The Organic Law seems to be an ambi-
guous compromise. France is ratifying the Treaty, but implements 
it only reluctantly. It’s a safe bet that, as with the Stability Pact, 
there will be great tensions in the euro area between those who 
demand the strict enforcement of the Treaty and those who do not 
want to sacrifice growth to it.
3.3. Fiscal rules and markets
In 2011, most euro area economies ran close to primary struc-
tural balances, in other words their debt ratio would be stable if 
they could borrow at interest rates equal to output growth 
(Table 8). This is not the case for Japan, the US, and the UK. 
Besides, euro area countries suffer from a much higher interest rate 
than countries outside the euro area, although they have smaller 
imbalances. There is a specific cost for euro area countries.
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financial markets constraints. Since 1945, no industrial country 
defaulted on its public debt. Public debt was a safe asset, since 
governments were borrowing in their own currency and could 
always ask for central bank financing. Industrial countries bene-
fited from “monetary sovereignty”. This is always the case today 
for Japan (where 10-year government bonds interest rates are at 
1%, despite a government debt of 205% of GDP), the US (where 10-
year government bonds interest rates are at 2%, despite a govern-
ment debt of 100% of GDP) and the UK (where interest rates are 
also at 2% with a debt of 85% of GDP). It is a nonsense that rating 
agencies rate governments having monetary sovereignty, as if the 
latter could possibly default. Countries with monetary sovereignty 
should abandon their AAA: by nature, their debt is safe since it is 
guaranteed by the monetary power of their central bank.
Euro area countries have lost their “monetary sovereignty”: 
according the EU Treaty, the ECB is not allowed to finance govern-
ments; there is no solidarity between MS. Financial markets 
























FIN -0.6 -0.9 49 1.9 17.5 -0.7 2.5
DEU 5.7 -1.0 81 2.2 17.5 1.0 1.9
AUT 1.9 -2.6 72 1.9 16.1 0.1 3.1
NLD 9.2 -4.6 65 0.4 15.4 -2.4 2.4
BEL -0.8 -3.9 98 1.2 12.5 -0.6 4.4
FRA -2.1 -5.2 86 1.2 10.7 -1.6 3.2
US -3.1 -9.7 103 2.1 9.6 -5.7 2.0
UK -1.9 -8.4 83 0.6 9.6 -4.2 2.3
SPN -3.5 -8.5 69 -0.5 8.6 -3.7 5.7
JPN 2.6 -9.5 206 0.7 8.2 -7.4 1.0
IRL 0.1 -13.0 108 0.7 7.5 -2.0 8.7
ITA -3.1 -3.8 120 -0.6 7.5 1.4 6.6
PRT -6.4 -4.2 108 -2.4 6.4 -1.5 12.2
GRC -9.8 -9.2 165 -6.1 2.9 1.1 19.0
* This grade is the average of each country's rank according to four criteria: current account, public deficit, public 
debt and output growth.  
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, May 2012. Authors' calculations.
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started on the more fragile euro area countries: Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland, and then by a domino effect, Italy, Spain, and even 
Belgium. In December 2011, Belgium had to pay an interest rate at 
4.3%, Spain at 5.3% and Italy at 6.6% against 3.1% for France and 
1.85% for Germany. Greece, Ireland and Portugal are brought back 
to a situation of developing economies in the past: their debts have 
become risky assets, facing substantial risk premia; they have to 
obey the caudine forks of the IMF. 
Thus, fiscal policy may be entirely paralysed.  In a country with 
monetary sovereignty, in times of recession the central bank may 
cut its interest rate down to the lowest level and be committed to 
keep it durably low; the government increases its deficit, but the 
low level of interest rates avoids public debt to increase under a 
“snowball effect”; this leads the exchange rate to fall, which 
supports output. The debt guarantees by the central bank implies 
that there is no default risk, hence no reason for being obliged to 
reassure markets in permanence. The central bank will keep inte-
rest rates low in times of depression and this will ensure fiscal 
policy effectiveness. Fiscal policy does not have to care about 
markets. This is still the strategy of the US. 
In the euro area the risk is that a country may be unable to 
increase its deficit under the fear that government debt will be 
downgraded by rating agencies and that interest rates increase 
strongly. Countries have therefore no choice but to engage in 
beauty contests, in order to appear as virtuous as Germany in the 
markets’ eyes. Their fiscal policy becomes ineffective and hence 
their cyclical position cannot be stabilised. Public debt becomes a 
permanent risk factor, since governments are at the mercy of 
markets’ animal spirits. Any economic policy would have to be 
assessed accounting for markets’ opinion. But markets do not have 
any particular macroeconomic expertise. They demand austerity 
measures in depressed times and afterwards complain about insuf-
ficient output growth. This is how they proceed nowadays for the 
euro area in general, for Italy and Greece in particular. They favour 
free-market reforms, such as reducing social protection or the 
number of teachers. The default risk must be inexistent for 
countries to remain able to stabilise their economy. 
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getting reformed in order to guarantee MS government debts; MS 
would find their “monetary sovereignty” again. EU public debts 
should become safe assets again, with low interest rates but fully 
guaranteed (by EU solidarity and fundamentally by the ECB). This 
is the only way to maintain domestic fiscal autonomy, which is 
necessary due to disparities in Europe and to the loss of the mone-
tary instrument and of the exchange rate .
The euro area framework was not appropriately designed 
initially, especially as concerns the trade off between “fiscal policy 
autonomy/single currency/monetary sovereignty”. The joint 
guarantee creates a moral hazard problem, since each country may 
increase its debt with no limit, but the absence of guarantee leaves 
the door open to financial markets always ready to bet against 
some countries. The guarantee cannot be restricted to countries 
fulfilling the automatic fiscal rules of the SGP or the fiscal pact, 
which lack economic rationale. It cannot be restricted to countries 
committed to follow a pre-defined trajectory for public deficits, 
without accounting for the cyclical situation (as propose Doluca et 
al., 2013). Such a commitment would oblige countries to imple-
ment simultaneously restrictive policies in times of economic 
slowdown, multiplying by almost 4 the size of the shock ex ante
(see Box 2). 
Contrary to what several economists propose (and among them 
even de Grauwe, 2012), this guarantee cannot be limited to 60% of 
GDP. The 60% of GDP figure is arbitrary, and does not fit with the 
needs of macroeconomic equilibrium. The non-guaranteed debt 
would be considered as highly risky and markets would require 
high interest rates. Since almost all euro area countries run govern-
ment debts of more than 60% of GDP, they would have to borrow 
at high interest rates. The interest rate spread between the two types 
of debt would allow financial markets to speculate in permanence. 
Euro area countries would not have to reassure markets 
anymore. They could implement differentiated but coordinated 
strategies, setting themselves a main target of bringing their 
economy to a satisfactory employment level, consistent with 
moderate inflation. 
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Due to the crisis, there is probably a need for a more transparent 
fiscal policy management: governments should set out clearly their 
output growth target, temporary expansionary measures should be 
clearly announced as such, the structural balance should not 
include temporary expansionary measures; the public deficit target 
should be explicit, but this target can only be the true golden rule 
and should be assessed accounting for the macroeconomic context. 
But fiscal rules proponents forget that fiscal policy cannot be 
managed on its own, under arbitrary criteria. Fiscal policy should 
set itself the objective of maintaining (or reaching) a satisfactory 
employment level albeit allowing inflation and interest rates to 
remain at satisfactory levels. Government deficit and debt should 
be derived from this objective. 
The emergency today is not to strengthen public finance disci-
pline by cutting deficits blindly but to question economic 
developments (financial globalisation, the wish of many countries 
to build surpluses, the change in incomes distribution), which 
make these deficits necessary to support output (Mathieu and Ster-
dyniak, 2011). 
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In response to the severe disruption of the financial system, the agenda 
defined by the Group of Twenty (G20), in 2008, has led to a new regulatory 
framework. These ongoing reforms outline a new organization, which could be 
called the Global and Integrated Prudential Model. Such a model is based on global 
rules defined by international standard setters and on the integration between 
the different parts of the prudential organization. In this context, a new pruden-
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Henceforth, international coordination is underway, but questions remain. 
What could be the effects of the new rules on banking capital requirements, 
and, consequently, on the funding of the economy, not to mention the very 
structure of the financial system? 
As for the EU, which very swiftly carried out an important recasting of its 
legal frame, the continent will henceforth have to face three challenges: first, 
the risk of regulatory competition from large countries, chiefly the USA; second, 
the need to improve the law-making and the complex supervisory system; and 
third, the building of the Banking Union aimed at overcoming the current euro 
area crisis. 
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The first global financial crisis which began in 2007 brought 
severe discredit on all the Authorities, both national and global, 
responsible for foreseeing, controlling and managing financial 
changes. In response to the severe disruption of the system, the 
agenda defined by the Group of Twenty (G20) has led to reforms 
aimed at providing a new regulatory framework in order to 
improve financial stability (G20, 2008 and 2009).Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 127 (2013)
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be called the Global and Integrated Prudential Model. Such a model is 
based on the one hand on global rules defined by international 
standard setters and, on the other, on the integration between the 
different parts of the prudential organization, mostly between 
macro and micro-prudential levels. 
This paper will take into account, first, the lessons to be learned 
from the crisis; and, second, the new prudential framework in 
progress at the global level; an assessment of the new framework, 
which lays stress on the new banking standards (Basel III), is 
provided. Then, it will examine how, in this context, a new 
prudential organization is being set up in Europe. Last, this paper 
will offer an assessment of the strengths and the weaknesses of this 
EU framework. We shall see that the implementation of such a 
reform faces obstacles both inside the EU (with harmonization 
problems) and outside it (with the worldwide regulatory competi-
tion between areas, mostly from the United States). In such a 
context, the current European project towards an integrated 
Banking Union is to be seen as an attempt to get over such 
obstacles and over the current euro area crisis. 
1. Post-crisis lessons and reforms: The emergent Global  
and Integrated Prudential Model
1.1. What lessons are to be learned from the crisis? 
Numerous recent debates have been aimed at throwing light on 
the causes of the recent crisis and on the consequences of its mana-
gement. Thus a sort of consensus has emerged, which can be 
summarized around four chief points. 
a. Central banking inflation-targeted policies have been called 
into question
For three decades Central Banks have adopted the so-called 
inflation-targeted policies aimed at stabilizing inflation at a low 
level. Such policies were based on the belief that retail price stabi-
lity would ensure the financial system’s stability (Borio, 2011). On 
the contrary, experience has shown that in a liberalized financial 
system, retail price stability may well go hand in hand with strong 
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were often the consequence of excess in credit growth, resulting 
from generous liquidity provision at low rates by central banks 
(Aglietta, 2011; Blanchard et al., 2010; Eichengreen et al., 2011; 
Goodhart, 2010b). 
These monetarist-inspired policies were not in line with libera-
lized economies. Indeed, given the increased function of asset 
markets, which are fluctuating by nature, liberalized economies 
have become intrinsically unstable. Thus, throughout the so-called 
period of Great Moderation, monetary stability went together with 
financial crises. Such a diagnosis has led nowadays to a new 
approach to Central Bank monetary policy in order to take into 
account financial stability. 
Regarding this new goal, we are bound to wonder what kind of 
instrument could be used to attain it. Indeed interest rate setting 
by central banks, which is nowadays almost the single anti-infla-
tion tool, would not be efficient to counteract excessive credit 
growth (Goodhart, 2010b). Moreover, according to the Tinbergen 
rule, it seems difficult to try to achieve two different objectives 
with the same tool. A risk of conflict between the two goals would 
appear in such a case. For these reasons, a consensus now exists to 
achieve the financial stability goal through specific instruments. 
The response brought by global standard setters, namely the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS), has consisted in creating a new tool 
(capital buffers) with a macro-prudential goal in the new banking 
framework (the so-called Basel III standard; see 1.2-a, hereafter). 
This new tool is considered to have a countercyclical effect to miti-
gate excessive credit raises and their consequences, namely 
inflation in asset prices. 
b. The new features of systemic risk in a global economy
A prolific literature has recently addressed the question of 
systemic risk (EU Commission, 2009; ECB, 2009; Galati et Moes-
sner, 2011; IMF, 2009). Systemic risk can be briefly described as 
“the risk of widespread disruptions to the provision of financial 
services that have serious consequences for economy at large” 
(FSB, 2011b). The very existence of Systemically Important Finan-
cial Institutions (SIFIs) can be seen as a chief cause of such a risk. 
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basis of a single criterion, namely their size, measured according to 
the total amount of their balance-sheet. The 2007-2009 financial 
crisis revealed that two other factors could increase systemic risk. 
These factors consist, on the one hand, of liquidity problems of 
banks, which are related with situations of excessive indebtedness 
(the latter being measured by the leverage ratio); and, on the other 
hand, of off-balance-sheet relations between banks, especially 
through credit insurance mechanisms, such as Credit default swaps 
(CDSs) (FSB, 2011b; BCBS, 2011b).
It was observed during the crisis that liquidity problems and off-
balance-sheet relations were acting as dangerous channels leading 
to quick and wide propagation of financial shocks. The unres-
trained development of complex securitization was based on 
products such as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCPs), which appear as mere 
financial innovation concentrates. Thus, through the securitiza-
tion process we could observe that the worldwide financial system, 
chiefly European banks, ensured the financing of the north-
American residential real estate bubble. 
Among SIFIs, the FSB has isolated a sub-category called global-
SIFIs (G-SIFIs). These institutions are such that “their distress or 
failure would cause significant dislocation in the global financial 
system and adverse economic consequences across a range of 
countries” (FSB, 2011d). In order to identify Global Systemically 
Important Banks (G-SIBs), a study has been carried-out by the 
BCBS in cooperation with the FSB. This work led to detecting a set 
of 29 banking groups defined as G-SIBs. A combination of criteria 
was defined for such a selection, including, in addition to the size, 
new significant features such as interconnectedness, global cross 
jurisdictional activity, complexity and the lack of readily available 
substitutes (FSB, 2011b). 
c. The “Too Big to Fail” principle led to considerable changes 
in the Lender of Last Resort function
The notion of Lender of Last Resort (LLR) appeared two centu-
ries ago in economic literature, but this concept has never received 
a clear-cut definition (Ugolini, 2011). However, it can be agreed 
that, in its classical meaning, the LLR function is that of the 
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Thornton-Bagehot’s well-established rules, to a distressed bank 
facing a liquidity problem but which is not insolvent (Thornton, 
1802; Bagehot, 1873; Humphrey, 1989). This kind of operation is 
aimed at avoiding a banking failure which could be contagious and 
therefore create damage to the financial system as a whole. 
Nevertheless, for 25 years, in each of the OECD banking crises 
following the liberalization process, Authorities have rescued 
insolvent institutions. Such policies were adopted according to the 
well-known principle Too Big To Fail (TBTF). Indeed, it was agreed 
that, given their size, big financial entities could bring about, 
should they meet a failure, a severe disruption or even a collapse of 
the banking system. 
As a consequence, the classical Thornton-Bagehot model was 
replaced by a new prudential scheme about thirty years ago. We 
call it the Hierarchical Prudential Model (HPM). It is based on two 
chief features: on the one hand, the constructive ambiguity principle
(when the Central Bank adopts a discretionary, or ambiguous, atti-
tude towards distressed banking situations); and, on the other 
hand, safety nets (comprising both supervision, which includes 
prudential rules and surveillance, and solidarity and guarantee schemes
(Humphrey, 1992; Gardener, 1992; Perrut, 2010).
During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the TBTF principle was 
set up as an intangible rule by G7 decision-makers, in October 
2008, when they solemnly declared their commitment to avoid 
any failure of systemically important institutions (G7, 2008). 
As a result of such developments, three major changes can be 
observed in the LLR function. First, a doctrinal change occurred, for 
the major principles of the prudential doctrine were clearly put 
aside (both the “Let insolvent institutions fail”, of the classical 
model, or the “constructive ambiguity” principle in the HPM). 
Second, a diversification among authorities acting as LLR could be 
observed. Indeed, task-sharing took place between States, which 
chiefly guaranteed recapitalization operations, and Central banks, 
which provided banks with liquidity. Third, the toolkit used to 
conduct anti-crises operations was widened to new instruments. As 
for the States, operations expanded henceforth from capital furni-
ture to guarantees, including bad banks (or defeasance structures); 
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term liquidity provisions and sovereign debt purchases (4); 
moreover major Central Banks signed unlimited currency swap 
agreements with each other (ECB, 2011b; EU Commission, 2009), 
which outline a kind of International LLR function. 
d. Consequences of the crisis management: moral hazard 
problem and collective costs
A huge moral hazard problem and considerable collective costs 
can be observed, as consequences of the decision-making to deal 
with the recent crisis. 
The solemn declaration of the G7 leaders mentioned above led 
to important actions to rescue insolvent institutions and therefore 
to big amounts of capital furniture in order to fill the equity gap in 
distressed institutions. The very nature of such operations led to 
the commitment of States rather than of Central Banks. 
Such bail-out operations brought two major consequences. 
First, a situation of considerably increased moral hazard appears as 
a direct consequence of the crisis management. Indeed, all 
systemic institutions could from now on consider themselves as 
protected against a failure given their size, whatever their misbeha-
viours. Such an improper situation creates a stimulus for new 
excessive risk-taking policies. 
Considerable collective costs are to be seen as a second effect of 
the anti-crisis policy. According to the EU Commission, approved 
State aid in the EU in favour of the financial sector amount to 
€ 4.100 billion, of which about € 2.000 billion were actually 
employed in 2008 and 2009. IMF sources state that EU bank losses 
reached a global amount of € 1.000 billion and 8% of EU GDP 
between 2007 and 2010 (EU Commission, 2011b). Thus, the emer-
gency crisis management led to huge collective costs in order to 
refloat the financial sector. Therefore, the set-up of management 
and resolution regimes for financial institutions is to be seen as a 
priority among the ongoing reforms in order to preserve the 
economy, to avoid moral hazard and to protect taxpayers. 
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framework for resolution regimes
An ongoing set of reforms is orchestrated by the G20 and the 
FSB. Two main components of this agenda consist of a new set of 
banking standards, the so-called Basel III framework, which is to be 
seen as the chief tool aimed at preventing a new financial crisis, 
and a set of guidelines for resolution regimes for financial 
institutions. 
In conjunction with these global responses, each country or 
area has initiated a recasting of its legislative framework for finan-
cial activities. Thus, within the set of recommendations from the 
FSB regarding macro-prudential supervision, systemic risk observa-
tories have been set-up in the USA, the UK, China, as well as in the 
EU as a whole (FSB, 2011d); (see hereafter, 2.1).
Reforms can also be observed concerning micro-prudential 
supervision, in Europe and in the USA where, within the 2010 
Dodd-Frank reform, the organization, which is currently 
somewhat bureaucratic is to be redefined, especially regarding the 
supervisory task-sharing between authorities. 
a. The new Basel III standard on capital, leverage and 
liquidity
According to capital ratio standards, banks are required to keep 
an amount of capital as a percentage of their exposures, risk-
weighted with several methods. The Basel III framework, still in 
progress, will be implemented by banks between 2013 and 2019. 
The existing micro-prudential tool (the capital ratio) will be drama-
tically strengthened. A macro-prudential overlay will be added 
through capital buffers and new tools, entirely different from 
capital ratio, namely liquidity ratios (BCBS, 2010; 2011a, b). 
Regarding the micro-prudential level, the strengthening of the 
prior capital ratio, namely Basel II framework (recently changed 
into Basel 2.5) comprises: 
— A rise in minimum capital requirements with better quality; 
— A wider risk coverage; 
— A new tool called leverage ratio, non-risk based and including 
off-balance-sheet exposures; such an instrument aims to 
restrict bank indebtedness; it establishes a strict limit for 
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level of core capital multiplied by 33. 
In order to counteract both moral hazard and systemic risk, the 
macro-prudential overlay, which is entirely new, comprises, in 
respect of capital requirements: 
— A countercyclical buffer in order to limit excessive credit 
growth; this tool will be monitored (between 0% and 2,5% of 
the exposures) by the supervisors; 
— An additional capital buffer for Systemically Important Banks 
(SIBs), varying from 1% to 2.5% of the exposures; such an 
additional loss absorbency capacity for these banks is aimed 
at reducing systemic risk and, should a failure occur, limiting 
its effects on collective costs. 
Moreover, two liquidity ratios (a short-term one and a long-term 
structural ratio) will be created with a worldwide harmonization. 
Such tools are aimed at avoiding new liquidity crises like the 
chronic ones we have been faced with since 2007. 
b. The setting-up of a framework for financial crises manage-
ment and resolution
During the recent crisis, Authorities ascertained the lack of a 
resolution process for individual failures. Such a lack compelled 
administrations to undertake emergency actions, which led to a 
moral hazard problem and to losses for the taxpayers. 
A resolution regime for financial institutions is aimed at avoi-
ding the triggering of a systemic crisis when a bank failure occurs, 
at protecting the taxpayer and at following the proper hierarchy 
between the creditors. 
The FSB recently published a set of principles in order to guide 
the national resolution regimes which are to be established. FSB 
guidelines call for jurisdictions to adopt several measures (FSB, 
2011a): 
— Designation of a resolution authority to resolve insolvent 
institutions;
— Definition of specific principles for cross-border groups; 
— Frames for recovery and resolution plans concerning SIFIs. 
Several countries have already planned measures regarding 
these issues. 
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in 2010 entitled “A European framework for crisis management in 
the financial sector”, and made legislative proposals, June 2012 
(EU Commission, 2010c; 2012b). 
1.3. Towards a Global and Integrated Prudential Model
The boost given by the 2008 G20 agenda and the take-over by 
the coordination of international institutions outline a new orga-
nization to ensure a sounder financial system. We would qualify 
such an architecture as the Global and Integrated Prudential 
Model. Indeed, such a framework is founded on two main features. 
On the one hand, the authorities’ determination to respond to 
financial globalization has led to a global regulation, which should 
be adopted in all countries. On the other hand, the acknowledg-
ment of systemic risk and moral hazard calls for an integrated 
prudential policy. This forthcoming organization thus appears as a 
third generation prudential model, following the 19th century 
Thornton-Bagehot classical model and the post-WW2 Hierarchical 
Prudential Model, as mentioned before (see 1.1-c). 
A new framework defined at the global level. The 2008 G20 
programme (Washington Summit) for a global reform of the finan-
cial system is based on several principles: promoting sound 
regulation and financial market integrity; reinforcing international 
cooperation; reforming international financial institutions (G20, 
2008). 
This action-based programme was entrusted to the FSB whose 
task is to ensure, together with the IMF, the coordination of regula-
tors and standard setters. The latter comprise:
— sector-oriented regulators (banking: Bank for International Sett-
lements, BIS, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
BCBS; insurance: International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors, IAIS; security markets: International Association 
of Securities Commission, IOSCO);
— standard setters with broader focus (International Accounting 
Standard Board, IASB, and US Financial Accounting Standard 
Board, FASB, regarding accounting standards) and interna-
tional organizations (World Bank and OECD). 
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will expressed from now on by some regulators (Basel Committee, 
IASB) to expand their standard setting status to that of supervisor 
of the complete and harmonized implementation of their stan-
dards. Such a policy is aimed at avoiding, on the one hand, 
situations of unfair competition between the countries and, on the 
other hand, the loss of credibility in standards, should their enfor-
cement be disordered. Thus, the Basel Committee expressed its will 
to ensure the follow-up of the implementation of its framework, as 
it appears clearly in a recent comparative report on the implemen-
tation timetable among countries or jurisdictions for Basel 
standards (BCBS, 2011c); (see 1.4, hereafter). 
An integrated prudential organization. Integration is indeed a new 
feature of the new prudential organization. This appears, first, in 
the setting-up of coordination between micro and macro-prudential 
supervision. Integration between these two levels is required by the 
new banking standards, which will entrust Central Banks (whose 
function is, inter alia, to look after money and credit) with the task 
of implementing macro-prudential measures such as the level of 
countercyclical buffers. A closer cooperation between Central 
Banks and supervisors will be necessary in this regard in order to 
make the transmission of such decisions to individual banks effec-
tive. EU supervisory reform will give us an example of such 
integration (see hereafter, 2.1-a).
Second, prudential policy is henceforth to be seen as a complete 
cycle, including several steps linked together:
— preventive action. This level is based upon precocious risk 
detection, which is the task of systemic risk observatories, 
and strengthened prudential rules (mostly within Basel III 
reform); monetary policy probably should also contribute to 
deal with excessive raises in asset prices; 
— crisis management. Crisis, when they occur are to be faced by 
several players, namely, Central Banks and States (whenever 
a LLR function is required), and micro-supervisors to manage 
individual distressed situations; 
— crisis resolution. Resolution frameworks are aimed at dealing 
with the failure of institutions in order to avoid systemic 
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the hierarchy of the rights between creditors. 
1.4. The new Basel III banking framework and the global reform: 
what are the consequences?
a. General remarks about the global reform
 If we understand correctly the logic and direction of this new 
prudential model, we have to wonder about the consequences and 
dangers facing present developments. Moreover, would a legal 
separation between activities be an interesting regulatory solution?
Risk of a regulatory gap between financial sectors. The new ongoing 
regulatory framework will comprise different components, among 
which the new banking rules and the forthcoming rules on the so-
called “shadow banking system” (SBS). Regarding this, we can say 
that the wider the gap in the regulatory structure (between banks 
and the SBS), the stronger the incentive will be for actors to 
develop less regulated sectors. Ben Bernanke has observed that 
such a gap was a cause of the recent crisis (Bernanke, 2012). 
Indeed, the different parts of the regulatory system cannot be 
dissociated from each other. Otherwise, the very causes of the 
recent crisis would only be reinforced by the new banking stan-
dards. Indeed, Basel III higher standards are to be seen as a strong 
incentive for giving a fresh impetus to the “originate to distribute” 
model, especially through securitization and new developments of 
the shadow banking system. G20 leaders are conscious of such a 
situation. During the Seoul G20 meeting, in 2010, the FSB was 
asked to elaborate rules in order to control the shadow banking 
system (FSB, 2011d). 
Risk of disparities and time lags between jurisdictions for imple-
menting the reform. To be sure, the global reform will not follow the 
same pace, depending on countries or jurisdictions, for two 
reasons. First, the desire to complete the G20’s programme is prob-
ably not shared with equal intensity by all countries. From this 
point of view, the slowness in the finalisation of the Dodd-Frank 
reform may lead to a situation in which national regulations will 
be competing, thereby slowing down or even impeding any global 
reform. For instance, a gap between USA and EU jurisdictions 
about the implementation process of the new banking rules can be 
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vise the implementation of its rules, the Basel Committee recently 
published, as mentioned before (see 1.3), a follow-up report on the 
implementation of its standards throughout the world. As for Basel 
2.5 framework (published in 2009), the report shows that the EU 
set its deadline at the end of 2011 for the enforcement in all 
Member States. According to available information, all EU coun-
tries could comply with this timetable, whereas in the USA, 
proposals for regulations were still under discussion and still not 
yet published in October 2011 (BCBS, 2011c). 
Second, the implementation of the reforms cannot possibly 
avoid some discrepancies among firms or countries, which will 
lead to disparities in competition. The process of implementation 
for Basel II (or 2.5), for instance, shows that a perfectly coordinated 
and homogenous approach between firms and countries is practi-
cally impossible. 
Indeed, the first pillar of Basel II framework comprises three risk 
categories: counterparty credit risk, market risk and operational 
risk. For each category, a choice is to be made by the actors, under 
the control of the supervisor, among several options. As to credit 
risk, three options are available, the standardized approach, the 
Foundation internal-rating-based approach (FIRB) and the 
Advanced internal-rating-based approach (AIRB). Options must be 
made for each of the seven portfolios included in the Counterparty 
credit risk. Thus, even in the same country, under the same super-
vision, the implementation of Basel rules would not be exactly the 
same. In the Basel III framework, countercyclical buffers and liqui-
dity ratio will make the process even more complex. Furthermore, 
banks will be put under a closer oversight from national supervi-
sors whose discretionary powers would be extended (e.g. for 
defining the level of countercyclical buffers). 
Capital ratio versus regulatory separation between activities. Within 
the Basel capital ratio, aimed at taking into account all specific risks 
of banks, the latter remain free to define their capital allocation 
between activities according to their strengths and strategies. 
As for legal separation between banking activities no less than three 
projects for reforms are currently being discussed. First, the UK 
Vickers reform which chiefly consists in establishing a “ring fence” 
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aimed at establishing limits to proprietary trading; and third, the 
EU Liikanen report proposals mostly aimed at controlling proprie-
tary trading and particularly “risky activities” (HLEG, 2012). 
Basically, mandatory separation between activities is based on 
two doubtful, not to say erroneous ideas. First, there is the idea 
that investment banks would carry more systemic risks than retail 
banks. Therefore it would be necessary to protect retail banking 
(especially deposits) with a legal separation such as that required 
by the old USA 1933 Glass-Steagall Act. Nevertheless, during the 
recent crisis, we have seen that all banking businesses can lead to 
systemic risks. 
Second, legal separation would protect against contagious 
effects between activities. However, if refinancing links were to 
remain between businesses, legal separation would be absolutely 
ineffective against systemic shocks. As it was recently ascertained, 
liquidity appeared to be a dangerous channel leading to the propa-
gation of financial shocks. 
Would a stricter definition of legal separation prevent such 
propagation? In this a case, a “Chinese wall” would forbid finan-
cial links between different activities (e.g, between retail and 
investment banking). The consequence would be the drying-up of 
interbank markets. Such a situation would lead to a dramatic lowe-
ring of bank lending to the economy. 
However, should a few highly speculative and risky activities, like 
proprietary trading, be separated? A mandatory separation as well 
as a separation in financing could indeed avoid contagious effects. 
But such a legal separation should be accompanied by a huge 
capital surcharge, which would be the only effective tool in order 
to ensure a downsizing of this activity. 
b. Direct consequences of the new banking standards 
(Basel III) on the bank balance-sheets
It is far too soon to have a precise idea about the effects of the 
new banking standards. Indeed, on the one hand, discussions are 
still going on about the very definition of some rules (especially 
concerning the short term liquidity ratio, LCR, as mentioned 
below). On the other hand, two monitoring exercises have been 
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Banking Authority). We can only observe that such studies were 
led under restrictive assumptions. The Basel Committee (BCBS) led 
a monitoring exercise (using bank accounts as of 30 June 2011) on 
212 banks, including 103 Group 1 banks (defined as being interna-
tional and having a tier 1 capital in excess of € 3 billion), and 109 
Group 2 banks (BCBS, 2012). This exercise assumes full implemen-
tation of the final Basel III package and takes into account systemic 
surcharge. But countercyclical buffers and firm strategies, aimed at 
bringing a response to the new rules, are not considered. The EBA 
monitoring exercise (EBA, 2012) comprises 158 banks, including 
48 Group 1 banks, and follows the same criteria and methodolog-
ical background as that of the BCBS. Despite these limits a few 
trends can be identified concerning the effects of the new banking 
rules. 
■ Capital ratios: sharp increase in capital requirements and higher 
banking capital needs. 
Far higher capital requirements. Such an increase in the capital 
requirements appears both in the new definition of the Risk-
Weighted-Assets (RWA) and in the capital rates required in propor-
tion of these total exposures. 
According to the BCBS monitoring exercise, Group 1 Risk-
Weighted-Assets would increase by 19.4% (almost one-fifth) under 
Basel III rules, in comparison to current RWA (Basel 2.5). 
Under the new framework, Tier 1 requirements (comprising 
mostly equity) for non systemic banks would rise from 4% of the 
RWA (Basel II rules) to a level ranging from 8.5% to 11% (the latter 
including the maximum 2.5% countercyclical capital buffers) 
according to Basel III standards (see Appendix A). For these non 
systemic banks, total requirements would rise from 8% (Basel II) to a 
level ranging from 10.5% (including 7% in equity shares) to 13% 
(including maximum capital buffers). 
For systemic banks (subject to a systemic surcharge ranging 
from 1% to 2.5% of the RWA), Tier 1 ratio would reach a level 
ranging from 11 % to 13,5 % (with a full systemic surcharge and 
full countercyclical capital buffers). The total requirements would 
reach a level ranging from 13% (including 9.5% in equity shares) 
and 15.5% (including 12% in equity). 
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system) and capital ratios (as percentages of the RWA), Group 1 
capital ratio Tier 1 would fall from 11.5% (current rules) to 7.5% 
(Basel III rules), i.e. a decline by 4.1 percentage points and over 
one-third (see Appendix B). Total capital ratio, for Group 1 sample, 
would fall from 14.2% to 8.6% (i.e. a decline by 5.6 percentage 
points and 41%). 
Higher capital needs. In terms of capital shortfall, the full effect of 
Basel III rules (including systemic surcharge) would lead to the 
following results, according to BCBS exercise (using data as of 
30 June 2011). For Group 1 (see Appendix B and C): 
— to meet the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) target (7%), the 
capital shortfall would amount to € 485.6 billion; 
— then (assuming banks already hold 7% CET1 capital), to 
meet the Tier 1 capital target ratio (8.5%), Group 1 banks 
would need an additional € 221.4 billion; 
— last, (assuming banks already hold 7% CET1 and 8.5% Tier 1 
capital), to meet the total capital target ratio (10.5%), Group 
1 banks would need an additional € 223.2 billion. 
These estimates, which amount to a total figure of € 930.2 
billion, do not include any countercyclical buffer. 
Liquidity standards: towards a drastic reducing of banking transfor-
mation. As mentioned before (see 1.2-a), two liquidity ratios, still 
under discussion, are created in the Basel III framework. The first 
one, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), is a short term ratio, 
aimed at ensuring that banks can withstand a 30-day stressed 
funding scenario. It is expected to be implemented by 2015. The 
second one, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), is a long term 
structural ratio, designed to address liquidity mismatches. The 
NSFR should be implemented by 2018. 
According to the BCBS monitoring exercise, the shortfall of 
liquid assets to comply with the LCR (on the basis of the June 2011 
accounts) would amount to € 1.760 billion for the whole sample 
(Group 1 et 2, i.e. 212 banks). This shortfall represents approxima-
tely 3% of the € 58.500 billion total assets of the aggregate sample. 
As for the NSFR, the shortfall would amount to € 2.780 billion. 
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below the 100 % NSFR requirement. 
According to the press statement issued by the BCBS oversight 
body, namely the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, 
January 2012, the liquidity approach will not change, except for a 
few key points related with the LCR, currently under investigation. 
Nevertheless, discussions which began two years ago are still 
going on. According to the European Commissioner M. Barnier, 
reserves (from Governors from the Bank of England and from the 
ECB) and even demands for revision (from the USA and Japan) are 
to be mentioned. Moreover, a Green book issued by the European 
Commission is expected on these topics, September 2012 (Barnier, 
2012).
Regarding liquidity ratios, especially the long term one (NSFR), 
we observe that such a measure would strongly reduce banking 
transformation which is part of the function of commercial 
banking in order to finance the economy. Thus, the current Basel 
III project should be strongly mitigated in order to avoid, especially 
in the EU, a sharp lowering of bank lending to the economy. 
c. What will be the consequences for using banks to fund the 
economy? 
Bank strategies. Already, significant changes can be observed in 
bank strategies in order to deal with the new banking rules. Such 
measures range from: asset sales (according to BIS estimates, such 
asset sales from EU banks could amount to a level ranging from 
€ 500 billion to € 3.000 billion over the next years); stopping non 
core businesses; reducing dramatically global exposures. For 
instance, according to its annual report, a major investment bank, 
UBS Group, has already decided to downsize its exposures sharply. 
The chief part of its risk-weighted assets, concerning investment 
banking, would be reduced by one third, namely a CH 130 billion 
decrease, between September 2011 (RWA: CH 400 billion) and the 
end of 2016 (RWA: 270 billion). Moreover, observers have pointed 
out that UK banks have begun a process aimed at reducing their 
assets (BIS, 2012a). 
Bank asset-liability management. Furthermore, together with the 
increase of capital ratios, the implementation of the long term 
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whole banking asset-liability management, both on the asset side 
(with an increased need for short term assets and for high quality 
securities), and on the liability side (with diversification of 
resources and more stable funding). 
Risks for the financing of the economy. Thus two risks appear as 
possible consequences of the new banking framework. On the one 
hand, numerous questions are to be asked about the conditions of 
funding the economy by banks. A slowdown or a decrease in bank 
lending is to be feared. As a consequence, discrimination between 
companies, both in the volume and the cost of operations could 
appear, especially to the detriment of SME’s which are the chief 
source of job creation. These rules could also lead to an increase in 
the cost of lending. 
On the other hand, there could be a possible crowding out effect 
against the industrial sector for the collation of fresh capital and 
medium-term resources on the financial markets, which, apart 
from the States, will be solicited on a large scale by the banks to 
meet Basel III ratios over the next decade. 
d. Towards a reshaping of the whole financial sector 
The new Basel III standard probably results from the intent of 
BCBS regulators, namely major Central bank representatives, to 
reshape the whole financial sector. 
Such a new organization would consist, on the one hand, in a 
downsizing of banks and of the banking system, whose function in 
the funding of firms would be reduced; on the other hand, in an 
increase of firm funding by financial markets and long-term inves-
tors (namely pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds 
and private equity funds). 
We may observe that the effects of such an evolution would 
converge with some alternative reforms discussed at the begin-
nings of the Basel III elaboration. Such alternatives comprised size 
limits for banks or limits related to with banking diversification. 
Regarding this, the forthcoming redefinition of banking peri-
meters under Basel III, according to the criteria of specialization or 
capital requirements, is not far from some features of the UK 
Vickers ongoing reform. 
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with a new impetus given to the “originate to distribute” model, 
which appeared to be among the chief factors of the recent crisis. 
Indeed, capital surcharges and liquidity ratios will represent a 
strong incentive to boost the shadow banking system, through the 
securitization process. Global regulators, especially the FSB, have 
from now on to address a new challenge. Will they be able to 
define and ensure a consistent implementation of the whole G20 
programme? Indeed, regarding the shadow banking system, its 
regulatory control is urgent in order to avoid the increased regula-
tory pressure on banks from leading to a new impulse to less 
regulated financial sectors. 
2.  The EU prudential framework: assessment, perspectives
The second part of this paper will examine, first, the EU pruden-
tial framework in progress, along with the global reform; second, it 
will discuss a few points concerning this reform; third, it will 
address a current issue, the so-called Banking Union for the Euro 
Area. 
2.1. Recent changes in the EU prudential framework
Let us recall first that several EU institutional bodies were 
involved, during fall 2008, in dealing with the direct consequences 
of the crisis: 
— decisions taken by intergovernmental meetings (European 
Council, Ecofin, Eurogroup), in coordination with interna-
tional meetings (mostly G7 and G20) ; 
— legislative or regulatory actions from the institutional commu-
nity “triangle” (European parliament, Ecofin, Commission) ; 
— Eurosystem actions, mostly aimed at providing banks with 
liquidity.  
Then, the EU undertook a recasting of both its supervisory and 
its legislative frame for financial activities. This reform should be 
completed by the end of 2012 (EU Commission, 2010a; Perrut, 
2012b).
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The revision of EU supervisory institutions was adopted in 
October 2010, and consists of: 
— The creation of a macro-prudential oversight body;
— The set-up of three sector-oriented authorities, taking over 
from the so-called Lamfalussy supervisory Committees. 
Both levels (macro and micro-prudential) are expected to 
cooperate through cross-representations and a Joint Committee. 
Entrusted with the macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial 
system, the European Systemic Risk Board’s main objective is to 
prevent and mitigate systemic risks. In this regard the ESRB must 
collect the information needed for its action, identify systemic risk, 
issue warnings and recommend measures when threats have been 
detected (EU, 2010). The president of the ESRB is the ECB presi-
dent. Its Steering Committee comprises 14 members, including 7 
ECB members and the 3 presidents of micro-prudential authorities. 
The General Board includes in addition the governors of the 27 
national central banks. The ECB provides a secretariat and thereby 
“analytical, statistical, logistical and administrative support to the 
ESRB”. Last, the ESRB does not have a legal personality. 
The micro-prudential supervisory level, called the European system 
of financial supervisors (EFSF), which includes the ESRB, works as a 
decentralized network. While national supervisors carry-out their 
day-to-day operations, and supervisory colleges ensure the 
surveillance of cross-border groups, the 3 new European sector-
oriented Authorities (taking over the prior 3 Committees) are 
entrusted with the tasks of coordinating the implementation of 
European supervisory standards and ensuring a strong cooperation 
between national supervisors. Established since the beginning of 
2011, these new bodies (European Banking Authority, EBA; Euro-
pean Securities and Markets Authority, ESMA; European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority, EIOPA) comprise chiefly the 
27 representatives of the national public bodies entrusted with 
supervisory functions. 
In contrast with the ESRB, these authorities have legal persona-
lities. They are independent from political powers but are 
nevertheless expected to report to them. Moreover, these new 
bodies have binding powers on financial institutions. However, as 
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according to complex proceedings.
Their mandate, which is extremely wide, can be summarized 
around two quite distinct axes: 
— Elaborating a single set of rules and principles, that is to say a 
common supervisory culture; 
— Solving conflicts regarding individual cross-border institu-
tions (controlled by supervisory colleges). 
b. The recasting of the legislative framework
 According to a well-known “spill-over effect”, the launching of 
the euro, in 1999, gave a fresh boost for completing the single 
market of financial services with two programmes. First the Finan-
cial Services Action Plan (1999-2004) which produced 39 legal 
measures, and, second, the Financial Services Policy (2005-2010); 
(EU Commission, 2005). 
From 2008 on, the crisis required emergency responses, which 
were followed-up by the will to reform the legislative framework 
for financial activities. This programme was to be completed before 
the end of 2011, in order to ensure a transposition in all EU 
member states in 2012. This plan is founded on three principles 
(EU Commission, 2010a; 2011a). 
Enhanced transparency. This part includes: a regulation concer-
ning credit rating agencies (CRAs), adopted in 2009; a legislative 
proposal on derivative markets (already published) and the impro-
vement of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), 
whose proposal is under discussion by the legal system. 
Enhanced resilience and stability of the financial sector. This section 
comprises chiefly two points. First, as yet unpublished legislative 
proposals, in order to set up a complete set of tools for the preven-
tion and resolution of failing banks. Second, proposals for the 
revision of the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD IV), published 
in July 2011 (a directive and a regulation), in order to take into 
account the Basel III framework.
Protection of the consumer. Regarding this issue, measures have 
been taken on short selling and credit default swaps; moreover, the 
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and insurance policy holders) has been completed or is in progress. 
2.2. An assessment of the EU ongoing reforms
Let us examine, first, several issues raised by legal changes in the 
EU, second, questions related to supervision. 
a. Legislative process: some improvement, but weaknesses and 
questions remain
 In the close aftermath of the strong impulse given to the single 
market of financial services, in 1999, the European Council and 
Ecofin ordered a study on the regulation of European security 
markets. Published in 2001, Lamfalussy’s report sets out a devasta-
ting criticism of the legal European system. Indeed, the paper 
regrets deeply the lack of basic common rules and doubts whether 
the existing legislative system would be able to produce such a 
corpus. It reads as follows: “the current regulatory system is not 
working”. Moreover, the criticism turns into a flame-thrower to 
attack such a system, arguing that it is feeble and slow while tech-
nology changes at a fast pace. As a consequence, new EU laws are 
already out-of-date when implemented. Last but not least, the 
diagnosis underlines the lack of any control from the EU to ensure 
an effective and consistent implementation of rules in all the 
Member States (Committee of Wise Men, 2001). The core proposal 
of the report consists in associating regulatory and supervisory 
committees in the legislative process. Such recommendations led 
to the setting up (between 2002 and 2004) of sector-oriented 
committees (for security markets, banking and insurance). 
These committees bring together national supervisory and regu-
latory bodies. They are aimed at improving the rules and, on the 
authority of legislative institutions, defining implementation 
measures. 
The goal of improving the quality of legislative work has been 
reasserted in the Financial Services Policy programme (2005-2010) 
with a formula: “better lawmaking”. Several means such as: the law 
recasting technique (making laws more simple, legible and up-to-
date), impact assessments (cost-benefits studies), open consulta-
tions and controls for the effective application of community 
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2005). 
Recently, in 2010, a Smart Regulation principle was presented in 
a communication of the E.C. According to this paper, the whole 
regulatory “policy cycle” must be taken into account, “from the 
design of a piece of legislation to implementation, enforcement, 
evaluation and revision” (EU Commission, 2010b). 
After such attempts, we have to question the quality and the 
effectiveness of EU rules. As to the improvements, we can observe 
that the intensive legal work carried-out by the EU in the field of 
financial services since 1999 is aimed at providing the Union with 
a modern set of rules, consistent and constantly updated. In addi-
tion, legislative responses to address the crisis have been fast and 
effective, with the ambition of taking over immediate measures to 
ensure a whole framework for financial security. The recasting 
technique offers clearer and more legible rules. Follow-ups are 
frequently conducted. Before the proposals, synthetic green papers 
presenting clear questions are provided for wide consultation by all 
the players (see for instance: EU Commission, 2012a). 
Nevertheless, weaknesses and questions remain. During the 
“Lamfalussy process review”, in 2007, remarks were made about 
the lack of sufficient delegation of power from the legal system to 
the committees, while it was the very purpose of the “comitology” 
reform (ECB, 2007). However, we can observe that henceforth the 
chief directives frequently go together with delegation for imple-
mentation measures. 
The 2004 Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), 
implemented at the end of 2007, raises a number of questions. 
Indeed, the MiFID is to be seen as the hard core of the financial 
market regulation, whose infrastructures are subject to extremely 
fast technological change. Reports from market observers state that 
numerous advanced technologies are used by players, namely 
investment banks, in order to circumvent the rules, thus create 
glaring disparities between investors (Vauplane, 2011). What are 
the reasons for such unfair practices? Do they proceed from 
unclear, imprecise rules or from the lack of a proper supervision? 
Last, is there effective control of national implementation of EU 
regulation, in order to ensure a consistent set of rules throughout 
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should be seriously documented. 
b. The supervisory reform : a complex organization, numerous 
tasks, limited binding powers
Like several large countries (USA, UK, China, inter alia), the EU 
as a whole has created a macro-prudential oversight body, the ESRB. 
This body, which has no binding powers or legal personality, 
depends entirely on the EBC for its technical and administrative 
support. 
According to reports published before it was set up, this body 
was expected to derive its influence from its reputation (High Level 
Group, 2009). However, given the dependency of the ERSB on the 
ECB and the ECBS (within the Steering Committee and the General 
Council, respectively), we consider that such a body will be mostly 
a place for exchange and consultation, especially between the ECB 
and the ECBS, on the one hand, and micro-prudential authorities, 
on the other hand. 
In contrast to the ESRB, the new micro-prudential authorities, 
already have a history because they took over prior supervisory 
committees that were set up almost ten years ago in the aftermath 
of Lamfalussy’s report. Several attempts have been made to 
strengthen these bodies, in order to allow them to cope with the 
enlargement of their mandate. They have been entrusted with 
powers a little more binding (such as the so-called approach 
“comply or explain”, which compels an institution to justify itself 
if it does not comply with a prescription). 
Before being upgraded into Authorities, it was considered that 
these sector-oriented committees were mainly acting as “informal 
mediators” (CEPS, 2009). Moreover, the increase in the number of 
bodies and committees (4 Lamfalussy’s committees and 3 Authori-
ties, henceforward), which create risks of overlapping, is to be 
mentioned (for instance, between European Banking Authority 
and ECB’s Banking Surveillance Committee). 
The recent upgrading of the supervisory committees into 
Authorities provides these bodies with extended capacities, owing 
to their legal personality and binding powers. However, two limits 
are to be noted. On the one hand, the decision-making process will 
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hand, binding procedures that could be undertaken against a 
financial institution or a national authority (the latter being repre-
sented within the new EU Authorities) are complex and, obviously, 
somewhat tricky. 
The specialization of these bodies according to each financial 
sector (banking, insurance, security markets) has been discussed. 
Indeed, one might wonder if choosing a single supervisor for all 
financial businesses would not have been a better solution. 
However, such a specialization can be seen as preferable, given the 
specific features of each business, namely concerning rules, 
national organization and even the very nature of risks (by 
contrast with insurance, banks have to address systemic risk). 
In order to cope with the supervision of cross-border banking 
groups, especially when crises occur, the EBA is supported by two 
tools, as mentioned, supervisory colleges and memoranda of 
understanding. Supervisory Colleges (there are about 120 SC in the 
whole EU) bring together, for each cross-border banking group, the 
authority of the home country (where the registered office of the 
group is established), which is the lead supervisor, and authorities of 
all the host countries (where subsidiaries or branches are situated). 
According to field testimonies, hostile situations can be observed 
in those colleges, between host and home supervisors. Moreover, 
several reports have pointed out the lack of effectiveness of super-
visory colleges to deal with crises of cross-border banking group 
such as Dexia or Fortis (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2009). 
European memoranda of understanding (either multilateral or 
bilateral) are signed between authorities of banking supervision, 
central banks and finance ministries in order to offer guidelines for 
financial crises situations. It appears that such agreements were 
not helpful during the recent crisis (EU Commission, 2010d).
In addition, new Authorities are entrusted with the task of 
improving the legislative process, owing to their field experience, 
especially regarding the definition of implementation measures 
foreseen in the directives. They are also expected to promote a 
common supervisory culture and practice in order to ensure a 
consistent implementation of EU rules. A common basis of this 
kind for supervision is needed to avoid regulatory competition. 
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a. The vicious circle of debt and the lack of integrated anti-
crisis mechanisms 
The so-called euro area crisis erupted in spring 2010, with Greek 
public debt problems. Since then, contagious effects towards other 
countries (Ireland, Portugal, Spain) have been observed. Two and 
half years later, the crisis is still not under control. A consensus is 
now emerging about the causes of such a lasting crisis. Indeed, 
public finance unbalances and acute banking problems are now 
creating a vicious circle (BIS, 2012; IMF, 2012; Merler and Pisani, 
2011, 2012). Such a situation results from the strong links existing 
between banks and States, for two reasons. 
On the one hand, the euro area lacks an integrated framework 
for addressing individual banking crises. In such a situation, each 
member state remains responsible for rescuing its own national 
banking sector. Given the size of the banking sector, rescue opera-
tions, when they occur, have important consequences on public 
budgets. Thus, the need for bank recapitalization leads to public 
unbalances. 
On the other hand, European banks hold portfolios comprising 
a high proportion of sovereign bonds as a percentage of their total 
assets. Indeed, public bonds held by European banks amount to 
41.5% of the risk-weighted assets (RWA, according to Basel 
Committee methodology) in Germany, December 2010, and to 
20% and more in France, Italy and Greece (Merler and Pisani, 
2012). The breakdown of these public bond portfolios shows a 
strong concentration upon domestic public debt. As a matter of 
fact, domestic public bonds amount to more than 70% of the total 
public bond portfolios held by German banks, September 2011. 
The percentage rises to more than 80% in Spain, Ireland, Italy and 
Portugal. Since then, whenever doubts are raised about the 
solvency of member states, fears lead immediately to impairments 
of bank public bond portfolios and to bank downgrading by rating 
agencies. 
Moreover, we have to recall that the euro area lacked a public 
finance solidarity mechanism, at least until 2010. Such a lack 
created a factor of uncertainty for market operators. Indeed, it was 
to be feared that a national public finance crisis would lead to the 
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early as 2009, through the sharp rise in the spreads between public 
bond interest rates among euro area countries. 
b. A global response to the crisis of the EMU
During the European Council (EC), June 2012, EC President 
Van Rompuy presented a report entitled “Towards a genuine 
EMU”, following discussions with the Eurogroup, the ECB and the 
EU Commission, and comprising proposals (European council, 
2012a). 
These proposals consist of a building block approach to make 
the EMU stronger over the next decade. The latter comprises four 
blocks: an integrated financial framework (the so-called “Banking 
Union); an integrated budgetary framework; an integrated 
economic policy framework (to promote sustainable growth); 
ensuring democratic legitimacy and accountability (such a goal 
would be reached through: a better involvement of the European 
parliament, EP, in EU procedures; and a better cooperation 
between national parliaments and EP). 
Conclusions of the EC meeting invite the President of the EC to 
develop, in close collaboration with the same institutions, a 
specific and time-bound road map for the achievement of a 
genuine Economic and Monetary Union before the end of 2012. 
The Euro area statement, June 2012, and the Commission propo-
sals under Article 127 (on the prudential tasks the ECB can be 
entrusted with), September 2012, are to be taken in account for 
that purpose. 
c. What kind of “Banking Union”? 
Among the four block approach of the European Council (EC) 
report, the integrated financial framework still has to be precisely 
defined before the end of 2012, according to recent Commission 
proposals, September 12, EC Interim Report, October 12, and 
meetings. The financial block, or the so-called Banking Union, can 
be examined through four items (EU Commission, 2012c). 
Integrated supervision. This level would be entrusted to the EBC, 
according to Article 127(6) of the Treaty (TFUE). This article fore-
sees that specific tasks may be conferred upon the ECB by the 
Global and european financial reforms 263European Council, concerning policies relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions. The scope of institutions 
concerned by such a function will surely raise tense debates in the 
next months. This scope would surely comprise, among the 6.000 
existing banks, systemic banks, international banks and banks 
receiving public support. It could also comprise all the other Euro-
pean banks, according to the last proposals from the EU 
Commission, September 12. 
A part of the supervisory tasks, such as the protection of the 
consumer, would remain decentralized at the level of national 
supervisors. According to the recent EU Commission proposals, 
the organization of the ECB should be redefined in order to ensure 
that monetary policy, under the control of the Council of Gover-
nors, and prudential policy, entrusted to a Supervisory board, are 
strictly separated.  
A European deposit insurance scheme. This mechanism would be 
integrated at the euro area level. It would include banks overseen 
by the European supervision. 
A European resolution scheme. Such a scheme would be funded by 
contributions of banks and would also be integrated at the euro 
area level for banks concerned by the integrated supervision. Both 
the deposit insurance scheme and the resolution scheme could be 
set up under the control of a common resolution authority. 
The European stability mechanism (ESM) as a backstop. In order to 
give sufficient credibility to these two mechanisms (deposit insu-
rance and resolution schemes), the ESM could act as a fiscal 
backstop. (European Council, 2012–1). The ESM could also inter-
vene on public debt markets and in order to recapitalize banks. 
Regarding this, the Euro area statement, 29 June, only gives general 
principles, which should be formalized in a memorandum of 
understanding. 
Thus, EC proposals for the euro area are based upon two inter-
connecting ideas. On the one hand, it is necessary to break the 
vicious circle between banks and states. The direct recapitalizing by 
the EMS would be the proper response to such a situation. On the 
other hand, such a solution requires that a preliminary step would 
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deposit insurance and resolution schemes. 
d. Discussion 
Global remarks about European Council proposals “Towards 
a genuine EMU”. The EC fourfold building block approach can be 
seen as a medium term political package aimed at strengthening 
the EMU.This programme announces a step forward in order to 
address two of the chief weaknesses of the EMU when it was 
launched—namely, the lack of budget coordination and the lack of 
centralized banking supervision. However this plan has two 
shortcomings. 
First, the target of the so-called “Democratic legitimacy and 
accountability” block appears to be very limited. Certainly, the 
intention to include the European Parliament and national Parlia-
ments “at the level at which the decisions are taken” is to be 
welcomed. However, it is to be deeply regretted that this block does 
not offer the slightest idea of any other institutional reform. As a 
matter of fact, the European institutional framework, whether at 
the global or euro area level, has become extremely complex. Such 
a situation cannot but hamper the effectiveness of the European 
process and its understanding by citizens. Clarity should be seen as 
a necessary component of democracy and accountability. 
Second, it should be noted that the project for a Banking Union 
does not take into account the question of reforming banking 
structures. Such a reform could contribute, together with the new 
banking standards and the resolution plans, to making the system 
sounder. Indeed, this topic is analyzed in the recent Liikanen 
report, October 2012, mandated by the EU Commission, February 
2012 (HLEG, 2012). However, proposals made in the document 
about banking structures are somewhat timorous and indefinite, 
even concerning the core measure on trading activities. 
Remarks about the Banking Union. As mentioned above, these 
proposals will remain under discussion until the end of 2012. 
Nevertheless, a few questions can be raised and remarks made 
regarding the project of a banking union. As a preliminary remark, 
we are bound to observe that such a project is, de facto, an 
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supervision (2010) and deposit insurance. 
What should be the scope covered by the banking union? This ques-
tion is one of paramount importance given the fact that, as we saw 
before, the different blocks of the project of the Banking Union 
would be applied to the same coverage of institutions. 
According to the Commission recent proposals, all the euro area 
banks should be subject to the integrated supervision from the 
ECB. Such coverage would be enforced according to three steps: 
first, it would concern all banks receiving public support (1 January 
2013); second, the most significant systemically important banks 
(1 July 2013); third, all the banks from the euro area (1 January 
2014). To argue about such a wide coverage, the Commission 
points out that last bank failures were observed in non-systemic 
banks. Nonetheless, these failures have created “significant nega-
tive impacts on the financial stability of Member States” (EU 
Commission, 2012c). 
Yet German leaders expressed a clear opposition to such an 
extension of the ECB supervisory tasks. In their view, the ECB is 
not provided with sufficient means in order to ensure such control. 
They also consider that a proportion of about 90% of the banking 
assets in the euro area is held by about 200 banks. 
Another concentration indicator can be found for the whole EU 
in ECB data as of December 2011. The latter show that 37 banks 
(out of 4.713) hold total assets amounting to € 26.780 billion (out 
of € 44.820 billion), which represent 60% of the total banking 
assets. 
We may consider that the supervisory reform should only 
concern about 100 banks comprising banks with public support, 
systemic banks and cross-border banks. 
Centralized supervision would offer one important advantage 
which would be to ensure an harmonized implementation of 
banking rules, especially of the new Basel III framework (which is 
transposed in EU by the CRD IV directive and the CRR regulation). 
Indeed, the current approach would leave some important powers 
to national supervisors (like the decisions about the enforcement 
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regulatory competition through the euro area. 
What form of task-sharing will exist between the ECB and the 
current supervisory system? The current supervisory system 
comprises national supervisors and the new supervisory architec-
ture, examined above (see 2.1). The latter consists of a macro 
prudential level, chiefly entrusted to the ECB, and a micro-pruden-
tial level entrusted to the 3 sector-oriented authorities bringing 
together national supervisors. These two levels work together 
through the European System of Financial Supervisors. 
Questions must be raised about the relations between the EBA 
and the ECB to achieve the new prudential tasks entrusted to the 
ECB. According to the Commission proposals, voting arrange-
ments within the EBA should be adapted, in order to avoid giving 
an automatic majority to euro area representatives. 
As for the task-sharing, in our opinion, the ECB should manage 
only prudential supervision over a small number of banks, i.e. all 
the banks belonging to the 3 categories mentioned above. The 
remaining supervisory tasks (protection of the consumer, control 
of the enforcement of the EU rules…) should be ensured by the 
existing authorities (national supervisors and European Banking 
Authority).
We are bound to observe that this new forthcoming reform, 
with its different levels (supervision, deposit and resolution 
schemes, ESM) is likely to make the current system even more 
complex. This forthcoming multi-level supervisory process should 
be simplified and clarified in order to become: technically clear 
and understandable by citizens; efficient and not excessive (centra-
lized supervision of all banks is not relevant); and able to take 
quick decisions. 
3. Conclusion
Aimed at addressing the first global financial crisis with a global 
regulatory reform, the G20 agenda outlines a new prudential archi-
tecture, which is global and integrated. Such a goal is ambitious. 
Henceforth, international coordination is operative and functio-
ning, but questions remain. Is there the same strong will in all 
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programme? What could be the perverse effects of the new rules? 
Regarding the new banking rules on capital and liquidity, it is to 
be feared that such a reform would lead to a decrease in the 
funding of the economy, especially of SMEs which create jobs. 
These new rules will probably give a strong impulse towards the 
reduction of banking functions in the financial sector and an 
increased role for other actors. What is at stake is the entire resha-
ping of the financial sector. Will the global regulators be able to 
define a consistent framework in order to control all financial 
actors and to ensure its complete implementation? Such is the 
chief post-crisis challenge in order to avoid, on the one hand, regu-
latory circumventing through the shadow banking system, which 
would only repeat recent misconduct, and, on the other, regula-
tory competition between the chief areas. 
As for the EU, which very swiftly carried out an important recas-
ting of its legal frame, the continent will henceforth have to face 
three challenges. The first is outside the EU and results from the 
risk of regulatory competition from large countries, chiefly the 
USA. The second is inside the EU and is the result of the complex 
organization of the legal and supervisory system. We are bound to 
wonder if the challenge of creating a set of harmonized rules and 
practices in all the countries can be met without improving such 
an institutional framework. 
The third challenge is related to the redefinition of the 
Economic and Monetary Union around four blocks. A chief 
element of the latter covers all of the sensitive issues in the debate 
over Banking Union, the precise shape of which still has to be 
defined. Leaders should soon be able to move on to a new stage in 
the integration of anti-crisis measures. 
Yet important features remain unclear and still under discus-
sion. The definition of a new, clear and efficient frame will be a 
decisive test of the ability of EU decision-makers to overcome the 
current political and financial crises. These are technical issues, but 
what is at stake is a central political question: will the EU leaders 
ensure the “sustainability” of the European process? 
Two tasks lie ahead, the redefinition of world standards and the 
European financial reform. These post-crisis programmes are 
Dominique Perrut268aimed at bringing the liberalized financial system into line with 
social and economic needs. It seems that EU citizens have a 
compelling duty to watch developments in these two areas very 
carefully. 
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Table. Capital requirements, as a percentage of risk-weighted assets 








Common equity 4.5 2.5 0–2.5 1–2.5 7–12 2 
Tier 14 6 8.5-13.5 4 
Total (Tier1 + Tier 2) 8 10.5-15.5 8 
1. Buffer that restricts distributions if the capital ratio falls below 7%. 
2. SIFIs will be placed in buckets according to their systemic importance, whereas non-SIFIs will receive a zero sur-
charge. An empty bucket will be added on top of the highest populated bucket to provide incentives for banks to 
avoid becoming more systemically important. If the empty bucket becomes populated in the future, a new empty 
bucket will be added with a higher additional loss absorbency level applied. 
3. A SIFI operating at the peak of the financial cycle could be required to hold up to 12% of common equity against 
risk-weighted assets under Basel III. Under the Basel II definition of common equity, the ratio of common equity to 
risk-weighted assets would be roughly 15% for the same bank. 
4. Common equity plus additional Tier 1 capital. 
Source: BIS, 82nd Annual Report 2011/2012, 2012. Table VI.B
Table. Aggregate capital ratios and capital shortfalls
Fully implemented 
requirement, in percent 
Actual capital
 ratios, in percent 










CET1 4.5 7.0 10.2 7.1 38.8 485.6 
Tier 1 6.0  8.5   11.5 7.4 66.6 221.4
Total 8.0 10.5 14.2 8.6 119.3 223.2 
Group2
CET1 4.5 7.0 10.1 8.3 8.6 32.4
Tier 1 6.0  8.5 10.9 8.6 7.3 16.6
Total 8.0 10.5 14.3 10.6 5.5 11.6
The shortfall is calculated as the sum across individual bank where a shortfall is observed. The calculation includes all 
changes to risk-weighted assets (eg definition of capital, counterparty credit risk, trading book and securitisation in 
the banking book). The Tier 1 and total capital shortfalls are incremental assuming the higher tier capital require-
ments are fully met. See below for details.
*The shortfalls including the capital conservation buffer also include the capital surcharges for 28 initial G-SIBs as 
applicable.
Source: BCBS, 2012, Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 30 June 2011.
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Figure. Estimated overall capital shortfalls, participating Group 1 
and Group 2 banks
    In € billions






















 Group 2 minimumGroup 2 minimum
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FINANCIAL CRISIS, ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 
AND A RETURN TO GROWTH IN THE EU1
John FitzGerald
The Economic and Social Research Institute
This paper considers how a range of economies are adjusting to the external 
imbalances that they faced at the beginning of the current crisis. It also consi-
ders how the real economy may adjust when recovery eventually takes hold. 
Finally it considers how the adjustments under way will contribute to a return 
to long-term growth.
Keywords: Joint analysis of fiscal and monetary policy, Stabilisation, Current account adjustment.
While the EU economy is suffering from its worst economic 
crisis since its foundation, it remains probable that a resolution 
will eventually be found which will allow a return to growth. As of 
today it is not clear what the nature of that resolution will be or 
how long it will take before an economic recovery will be clearly 
established.  It is also not clear what permanent damage has been 
done to the EU economy as a result of this crisis. While it is absolu-
tely certain that the current crisis will leave a permanent scar on 
the EU economy, resulting in the level of output per head in the 
future being substantially lower than it would have been absent 
the crisis, it still seems likely that there will be an eventual return 
to growth. 
1. This paper was presented at the 9th EUROFRAME conference in Kiel in June 2012. This 
research was part funded by DG ECFin. The paper has benefitted from comments received at 
that conference and comments from Iulia Siedschlag, Thomas Conefrey, Ide Kearney and Adele 
Bergin and an anonymous referee. The author is solely responsible for the views expressed in 
this paper. Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 127 (2013)
John FitzGerald278This paper considers the experience from a range of EU 
countries that have undergone a radical adjustment in the current 
crisis. It examines the speed of adjustment and the impact of that 
adjustment on their domestic economies. In particular, it looks at 
the experience of a group of countries that entered the crisis with 
large and unsustainable deficits on their current accounts. In the 
case of many of these countries, the imbalances in the current 
accounts were accompanied by investment bubbles, which burst 
when the crisis began. In the case of the remainder of these 
countries there was no investment bubble and the external imba-
lances were associated with a high level of domestic consumption 
relative to exports.  A further factor that has affected the adjust-
ment process has been whether or not the banking system was 
largely domestically owned or foreign owned.
The different circumstances of these countries have affected the 
nature of the adjustment that they have undergone. Where an 
investment bubble burst, the increase in unemployment was espe-
cially rapid and severe. Also the adjustment in the current account 
has been large. By contrast, in the countries where there was no 
investment bubble the rise in unemployment has been slower, 
though nonetheless severe, and the adjustment in the external 
imbalances has been less dramatic. 
Section 1 of this paper considers the past experience of EU 
economies which had major external imbalances. This past expe-
rience holds some lessons for the current situation, but there are 
also significant differences. Section 2 then considers the nature of 
the adjustment process occurring in a range of EU economies 
today and its implications for future growth. Section 3 of the paper 
discusses what lessons can be learned from the past experience of 
growth and convergence in the EU for growth in the eventual reco-
very phase. 
1. Previous periods of economic adjustment
Crises in the current account of countries are not new; they 
have occurred in many EU countries (and most non-EU countries) 
at some stage over the last 60 years. The beginnings of the current 
crisis were also characterised by large current account deficits in all 
the countries that have subsequently faced major difficulties. It is 
Financial crisis, economic adjustment and a return to growth in the EU 279useful to examine some of the cases from the past where there were 
large current account deficits and how these countries subse-
quently adjusted. 
In Table 1 a number of examples of major imbalances that have 
occurred in the past are illustrated. In the case of each country the 
table shows the current account deficits at their peak and also the 
subsequent change in the current account balance as the problem 
was addressed. It also shows the period over which that adjustment 
took place. 
The two biggest previous crises considered in Table 1 are those 
of Portugal and Ireland in the 1980s. The adjustment in the current 
account can occur through either or both of a rise in exports or a 
fall in imports. The classic and most desirable method of adjust-
ment is for a country to improve its competitiveness, very often 
through an exchange rate change, and then to increase output and 
exports. Such an adjustment is likely to have the least damaging 
effects as it should, eventually, lead to a higher level of output. This 
is likely to show up as an increase in the share of exports in GDP.
The alternative mechanism is for domestic demand to fall suffi-
ciently far to cut the volume of imports (reflected as a fall in the 
share of imports in GDP). In the case of adjustment through a fall 
in domestic demand, output is generally reduced. The mechanism 
whereby the fall in domestic demand takes place may vary. In 
some cases a collapse in domestic investment can bring this about 
without direct government intervention. However, it very often 
Table1. Previous large adjustments
Balance of payments Exports Imports GDP Effective 
as % of GDP exchange rate 
Country Years Initial Change Change Change % % 
Austria 1980-85 -4.5 3.4 3.4 0.1 7.4 5.3 
Finland 1989-93 -5.0 3.5 8.4 2.0 -9.5 -24.8 
UK 1989-94 -4.9 3.9 2.8 -0.4 6.1 -8.8 
Belgium 1980-85 -3.9 4.3 13.4 9.3 4.8 -15.1 
Denmark 1986-90 -5.5 5.9 4.1 -1.8 2.3 8.2 
Portugal 1982-86 -14.5 13.0 6.6 -7.5 4.9 -44.5 
Ireland 1981-87 -13.3 13.1 9.3 -9.2 15.2 -0.3 
Source: EU DGEcFin AMECO database, spring 2012. 
John FitzGerald280takes a significant period of contractionary fiscal policy to reduce 
domestic demand through reducing consumption and, hence, 
imports, to restore external balance.
In Table 1 we consider for each country the period over which a 
major change in the balance of payments took place. The Table 
shows the relevant period over which the adjustment took place, 
the change (improvement) in the current account (as a percentage 
of GDP) and the change in exports and imports, also as a percen-
tage of GDP. 
As shown in Table 1, only in the Irish and the Portuguese cases 
did a large reduction in imports contribute to the adjustment in 
the current account. Even in those two cases the increase in the 
export share was close to the reduction in the import share. In all 
the other cases, because the adjustment took place through the 
allocation of more resources to producing exports, the export share 
of GDP showed a significant rise.
Compared to today, in most cases the external environment 
facing the countries undertaking the adjustment was more favou-
rable, sometimes much more favourable. For example, the latter 
part of the Irish adjustment in the late 1980s occurred against the 
background of rapid growth in a major trade partner, the UK. This 
was a significant factor explaining why, in all cases other than 
Finland in the 1990s, the favourable adjustment in the current 
account was also accompanied by moderate growth in the 
economy making the adjustment. The Finnish problems in the 
early 1990s were aggravated by the economic collapse in a major 
trading partner, the Soviet Union, and the Finnish crisis also 
involved a financial collapse. None of the other cases involved a 
major financial collapse.
While a real depreciation of their exchange rate occurred in the 
case of most of these countries, it was only of a substantial magni-
tude in the cases of Finland, Belgium and Portugal. Thus exchange 
rate flexibility, while facilitating an adjustment in the balance of 
payments, was not an essential condition for such a change. In the 
case of the Irish adjustment in the 1980s the fall in the effective 
exchange rate was quite moderate. However, to achieve this result 
there was a substantial change in the nominal exchange rate in 
1986, offsetting other adverse exchange rate movements.
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is the timing of the adjustment in the balance of payments and in 
government borrowing. Figure 1 shows the paths of adjustment in 
the case of the Irish adjustment of the 1980s and the Finnish 
adjustment of the 1990s. In both cases the balance of payments 
and the government accounts showed adjustments of fairly similar 
magnitudes. However, in the case of the current account in both 
countries, the adjustment began much earlier than the adjustment 
in the government deficit. This reflects the fact that the impact 
effect of fiscal tightening is to reduce domestic demand and hence 
imports, but also to reduce growth and hence tax revenue. It is 
only when the necessary adjustment in the government structural 
deficit had been accomplished, and the fiscal stance relaxed, that 
the benefits were reflected in higher growth and a rapid reduction 
in government borrowing. (A similar pattern was observed in the 
UK adjustment of the early 1990s). 
The experience of Finland and Ireland in the 1980s and the 
1990s was that adjustment took the best part of a decade. The 
improvement in the current account preceded the improvement in 
the government balance. When accompanied by world growth, as 
was the case for Ireland, the adjustment was less painful. In the 
Figure 1. Adjustment in the government and the external accounts, 
Finland (1989-2000) and Ireland (1981-1992)
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John FitzGerald282case of Finland the fact that there was also a financial crisis aggra-
vated the initial loss in output. 
2. The current crisis—beginning the adjustment
After the start of the EMU the issue of the current account 
balance of individual member states fell from policy-makers’ over-
sight. While both Ireland and Spain largely complied with the 
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) before the 
crisis, they saw a critical deterioration in their public finances when 
the recession hit. The SGP was no guarantee that all was well in 
those economies. What most clearly signalled the growing internal 
problems in those economies was the growth of their balance of 
payments deficits over the course of the last decade. Blanchard, as 
early as 2001, identified this as a problem for Spain and, writing in 
2007, he showed that, even with rational and well-informed 
markets (no bubbles), governments of individual member states in 
EMU should care about balance of payments deficits (Blanchard, 
2001 and 2007). With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that 
property bubbles were growing in both Spain and Ireland, bubbles 
which markets (and governments) did not anticipate (European 
Forecasting Network, 2006). The possibility of such bubbles occur-
ring through irrational or unexplainable action by individual 
economic agents further strengthens Blanchard’s arguments. 
While membership of EMU made it easier to finance such 
current account deficits, non-membership did not prevent the 
growth of very large deficits in other member state such as Estonia, 
Latvia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. The era of cheap capital 
knew no international boundaries. Where these deficits were 
funded by direct foreign investment, the countries were less vulne-
rable to sudden reversals (von Hagen and Siedschlag, 2010). 
However, where the capital inflow occurred through the banking 
system, or through portfolio investment, there was greater vulnera-
bility to sudden shocks. Table 2 shows the current account balance 
at the beginning of this crisis for countries with large deficits.
In the run up to the current crisis, in the period 2005-7, relati-
vely little public attention was devoted to this sign of growing 
imbalances. Governments (and international institutions such as 
the IMF and the EU Commission) relied on the fact that the foreign 
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payments deficits were private sector liabilities. This apparent lack 
of concern was strengthened by the absence of exchange risk in the 
case of Spain and Ireland. There was an illusion that such private 
sector liabilities could never become the responsibility of domestic 
governments. However, when the crisis hit, where these liabilities 
belonged to a domestically owned banking system, it proved 
impossible for the domestic government to avoid responsibility for 
these debts. Ireland was the most notable example where the 
private sector liabilities turned into public sector liabilities. Other 
countries that have seen this occur on a smaller scale include 
Spain, the UK, and even in a surplus country, Germany. Today we 
are seeing a belated replay of the Irish crisis in the case of Spain, 
with serious concerns about the stability of the banking system 
and its implications for the sovereign.
For some countries with very large balance of payments deficits, 
such as Estonia and Hungary, the liabilities were the responsibility 
of foreign owned banks. As a result, these countries did not have to 
take responsibility for these private sector liabilities when the crisis 
hit, as ultimate responsibility lay with the foreign owners of the 
banks. As a result, the recovery in these two countries has been 
Table 2. The current crisis—economic adjustment and the balance of payments
Current Account Exports Imports
GDP Consump-tion Country Years Initial Change Change Change
as % of GDP %  change over period 
Ireland 2007-11 -5.5 5.6 25.4 12.9 -9.5 -11.8
Hungary 2008-11 -6.9  7.9 10.6 3.7 -4.0 -8.3
Spain 2007-11 -10.0 6.1 3.2 -2.9 -2.3 -4.3
Portugal 2008-11 -12.6 6.0 3.0 -3.2 -3.1 -4.2
Romania 2007-11 -13.6 9.5 9.0 0.3 1.1 -1.1
Lithuania 2007-11 -15.0 13.4 23.9 12.2 -5.9 -13.3
Estonia 2007-10 -15.7 19.5 12.3 -3.8 -15.5 -22.2
Greece 2008-11 -17.9 6.6 -0.1 -7.1 -13.1 -11.6
Latvia 2007-11 -22.4 21.2 16.8 0.5 -16.4 -23.6
Bulgaria 2007-11 -25.2 27.0 7.0 -13.3 2.5 -4.8
Source: EU DGEcFin AMECO database, spring 2012.
John FitzGerald284much more rapid than in Ireland or Spain. Whether or not a 
country “owned” banks has been an important aspect of how the 
adjustment, subsequent to the crisis, has played out.
Whether or not the counterpart to the balance of payments 
deficits across the EU was a rise in government indebtedness or in 
private sector indebtedness, the deficits signalled dangers ahead. 
As the deficits continued to rise, as a consequence of very rapid 
domestic growth, especially in the building sector, this was unsus-
tainable. With the advent of the crisis, even where the current 
account deficits were not the counterpart to large government 
borrowing, they still needed to be tackled as they were no longer 
fundable in a risk-averse world.
Table 2 shows similar data to Table 1 for the early years of the 
current crisis for those economies with large current account defi-
cits, which might be difficult to finance. In the Table they are 
ranked in order of the size of the current account imbalances at the 
beginning of the crisis (from smallest to largest deficits). The years 
when the adjustment in the current account began (either 2007 or 
2008) are shown in the second column. The current account imba-
lance at the beginning of the crisis and the subsequent 
improvement is shown in columns 3 and 4 for each country. 
The largest deficits were experienced in 2007 or 2008 in a range 
of non-members of the Euro zone—Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania and Romania. However, many of the countries with very 
large current account imbalances have seen them greatly reduced 
or eliminated by the end of 2011. This was the case for the Baltics, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Spain. 
Portugal and Greece still had deficits of over 5 percentage points of 
GDP at the end of 2011.
In the case of most of these countries, a substantial part of the 
improvement has been achieved by increasing exports as a share of 
GDP. However, in the case of Ireland, this rise in the export share 
was achieved through resilient exports showing some growth 
against the background of a very large drop in the value of GDP. 
For six of the countries featured in Table 2 the cumulative fall in 
the volume of GDP was very substantial—between -5% and -17%. 
The cumulative falls in personal consumption was even larger for 
these countries—between 8% and 24%. The fall in consumption in 
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decline in domestic consumption played an important role in real-
locating resources to the current account.
Table 3 shows the cumulative fall in GDP along with the invest-
ment share of GDP at the beginning of the crisis and the change in 
this share since 2007/2008. It also shows the rise in unemployment 
over the adjustment period. 
For the EU 15 the investment to GDP ratio averaged around 
20 per cent over the period 1991-2010 and for the EU 27 it 
averaged around 19 per cent. By this measure, many of the econo-
mies with large current account deficits at the beginning of the 
crisis also had very high levels of investment—over 25 per cent of 
GDP.  In many of them this was due to a bubble in the construc-
tion / real estate sector. A key mechanism to bring about the very 
rapid and large adjustment in the Baltic republics was, first and 
foremost, a collapse in domestic investment demand. This collapse 
in the investment bubbles was accompanied by a collapse in 
consumption. In turn, this fall in domestic demand created major 
fiscal problems, which were rapidly addressed with fiscal tighte-
ning. The combined effect was a drastic fall in output. The 
problems were less acute in Bulgaria as there had been a boom in 
Table 3. The current crisis—economic adjustment, investment and unemployment
Growth Investment share Unemploy-
ment rateGDP Initial Change
Country Years % as % of GDP Change
Ireland 2007-11 -9.5 25.5 -15.4 9.8
Hungary 2008-11 -4.0 21.7 -4.9 3.1
Spain 2007-11 -2.3 30.7 -9.0 13.4
Portugal 2008-11 -3.1 22.5 -4.4 4.4
Romania 2007-11 1.1 30.2 -5.6 1.0
Lithuania 2007-11 -5.9 28.1 -10.5 11.1
Estonia 2007-10 -15.5 35.5 -16.7 12.2
Greece 2008-11 -13.1 22.1 -8.2 10.0
Latvia 2007-11 -16.4 34.1 -11.7 10.1
Bulgaria 2007-11 2.5 28.7 -7.8 4.3
Source: EU DGEcFin AMECO database, spring 2012.
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boom saw a parallel reduction in imports of capital goods, having 
limited impact on domestic output in the short run.
In the case of Portugal and Greece the deficits in 2008 were very 
large. While some adjustment had taken place by 2011, there was 
still a long way to go. In both cases the bulk of the adjustment that 
did take place was through a reduction in the import share of GDP. 
In both cases the export share of GDP is quite low, so that a very 
large percentage increase in exports would be required to close the 
deficit. Such a huge reallocation of resources could take some 
considerable time, leaving a cut in imports, through domestic 
deflationary action, the main mechanism for adjustment.
In the case of Ireland the bulk of the adjustment in the balance 
of payments had been completed by 2010. This partly reflected the 
fact that the initial deficit was smaller than in the case of the other 
countries. In the Irish case the main mechanism appears from the 
table to be a rise in the export share of GDP. This proved possible 
because exports already constituted a very large share of GDP, so 
that the percentage increase in volume needed to make the adjust-
ment was relatively low and, hence, achievable in a relatively short 
time scale. However, the dramatic reduction in the value of GDP 
here masks a major reduction in import demand as a result of the 
large fall in domestic demand.
Generally, where a current account adjustment takes place 
through a cut in imports this must, in turn, be driven by a fall in 
domestic demand and, hence, a fall in GDP. This is a painful 
process. If the adjustment can be achieved through higher exports 
it is much more likely to be accompanied by growth in GDP.
Table 3 gives more details of how the adjustment process is 
playing out within the EU deficit countries. It shows the invest-
ment share at the beginning of the crisis for each country. This 
suggests a sharp divide between the countries where the imba-
lances reflected an exceptionally large investment share of GDP, 
and related property market bubble, and countries where invest-
ment was not abnormal—Greece and Portugal. In the former camp 
were Ireland, Spain, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria and 
Latvia. With the exception of Bulgaria, the investment share in 
these countries has fallen dramatically over the period 2007-10. 
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is that the investment share of GDP falls precipitously. It is gene-
rally much faster than for an adjustment that is brought about by 
fiscal policy, because of the inevitable political constraints asso-
ciated with dramatic changes in fiscal stance.
This collapse in the investment share has generally not been 
due to direct fiscal action, but rather to a collapse in a building/
property bubble. This has, in turn, had very adverse consequences 
for the public finances. 
A second consequence of an adjustment through a bursting 
property market bubble is that the output of the building sector 
falls dramatically. Because this sector generally has low producti-
vity and is, as a result, quite employment intensive, a collapse in 
output results in a big increase in unemployment. In six of the 
economies experiencing an adjustment through this mechanism (a 
collapse in investment) the rise in the unemployment rate 
exceeded 9 percentage points over the period 2007-2010. The rise 
in three other economies (Bulgaria, Portugal and Hungary) was 
much lower.
A third consequence of an adjustment through a bursting 
property market bubble is that it can lead to a financial collapse. 
This is what happened in Ireland in the period 2008-10 (and in 
Finland in the early 1990s). Today Spain seems to be facing the 
same, rather delayed, consequences for its financial sector of the 
bursting property market bubble. Where there is a financial 
collapse, as in Ireland, this greatly magnifies the costs of adjust-
ment. In the case of Ireland the support for the banking system has 
directly added forty percentage points to the debt GDP ratio, with 
all that that entails in the burden of future debt interest payments 
(FitzGerald and Kearney, 2011). 
This contrasts with the case of Estonia. Because the banking 
sector in Estonia was foreign owned, the financial costs of the 
collapse in investment demand did not directly affect the local 
economy. This has made it possible for the economy to move on 
rapidly from the collapse in investment, unlike Ireland. While one 
Latvian owned bank had difficulties, the bulk of the costs incurred 
in the financial sector in that country accrued to shareholders in 
John FitzGerald288foreign banks operating in that country, speeding the process of 
economic recovery.
In the case of the other countries (Portugal, Greece and 
Hungary) with more normal investment shares yet large deficits, 
the adjustment process (towards balance on the current account) is 
more complex.2 Instead of a collapse in investment demand trigge-
ring the adjustment, direct fiscal action is the only way to bring it 
about. This must involve a generalised reduction in consumption 
as well as in investment. Instead of the costs of the adjustment 
being concentrated on the unemployed, who previously worked in 
the building and related sectors, as in Ireland, Spain and Estonia, 
the costs of adjustment are likely to be shared much more broadly 
by the population as a whole.3 Adjusting through cutting public 
expenditure or raising taxes also tends to take longer than the 
forced adjustment through a bubble bursting.
Those countries that had exceptionally high levels of invest-
ment have seen a collapse in investment demand triggering a big 
fall in imports and a rapid adjustment in the balance of payments. 
There are a number of mechanisms whereby the collapse in buil-
ding and construction has translated into a fall in imports: these 
include the effects on employment, and hence on incomes, as well 
as the effect of the fall in perceived housing wealth and the rise in 
household indebtedness on consumption. For the countries that 
have experienced such a shock, the necessary adjustment in the 
balance of payments has been accomplished or is on the way to 
being accomplished. What are left are the legacy effects of the 
collapse on the public finances (and, in the case of Ireland, on the 
financial system). In the other countries the adjustment has some 
considerable way to go. The fact that the action to bring about 
adjustment in the current account has been concentrated on the 
deficit countries, the effects have been more painful than would 
have been the case if demand had risen in surplus countries. 
2. Obviously it is not necessary to restore the current account to exact balance to ensure 
sustainability. However, in the case of these countries there is clearly a significant further 
distance to travel.
3. In the case of Ireland, Spain and Estonia, the population as a whole are also suffering a 
major loss of real income as a result of the second round effects of the crisis—the catastrophic 
effect on the public finances of the property market bust.
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considered here for 2011 and the change since the beginning of the 
crisis. This shows that while there has been a very substantial 
improvement in the current account imbalances there has been 
much less change in the public finances over the period. In the 
case of Latvia and Lithuania the Table masks very dramatic 
changes since 2007. Their government deficits ballooned as a result 
of the building bust but then, through dramatic fiscal action, the 
public finances have been brought back much closer to balance.
For countries such as Ireland, Spain and Portugal, considerable 
fiscal tightening has taken place but progress appears to be slow. 
This arises first because the adjustment, unlike those in the past 
considered in Table 1, is taking place against the backdrop of a very 
unfavourable economic environment in the euro area. Secondly, as 
discussed earlier in the case of past adjustments in Finland and 
Ireland, the current account generally improves before progress 
appears in the public finances. That is because the tough fiscal 
action, while reducing the structural deficit, has a substantial nega-
tive impact effect on growth.  It is only towards the end of the 
Table 4. Government borrowing, investment and GDP
Government 
borrowing Investment Current a/c GDP
Country Years Change End Change Change
as % of GDP %
Ireland* 2007-11 -13.1 -13.0 -15.4 5.6
Hungary 2008-11 7.9 4.2 -4.9 7.9
Spain 2007-11 -10.4 -8.5 -9.0 6.1
Portugal 2008-11 -0.5 -4.2 -4.4 6.0
Romania 2007-11 -2.3 -5.2 -5.6 9.5
Lithuania 2007-11 -4.5 -5.5 -10.5 13.4
Estonia 2007-10 -1.4 1.0 -16.7 19.5
Greece 2008-11 0.8 -9.2 -8.2 6.6
Latvia 2007-11 -3.1 -0.4 -11.7 21.2
Bulgaria 2007-11 -3.3 -2.1 -7.8 27.0
* The figure for Ireland includes the cost of bank recapitalisation. If this is excluded the deficit for 2011 is now estima-
ted at 9.2 % of GDP.
Source: EU DGEcFin AMECO database, spring 2012.
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vement in the cyclical element of the deficit.
Table 5 shows exports as a share of GDP in each country at the 
beginning of the crisis4. In countries where the share of exports in 
GDP was 40% or more at the beginning of the crisis the adjustment 
in the current account has been more rapid. This reflects the fact 
that a given percentage increase in exports will have a bigger 
current account impact where exports are already large. This is a 
problem which Portugal and Greece face as they have a low export 
share of GDP. Unless there is a large rise in exports, the only other 
way to reduce the deficit is through a large reduction in imports, 
driven by a corresponding fall in domestic demand. 
This examination of past current account crises, and of the 
progress to date in the current crisis, suggests a number of 
conclusions.
Firstly, don’t own your own banks or, if you do, exceptionally 
tight regulation and suitably targeted fiscal policies are essential to 
ensure no financial collapse. Estonia and Latvia, while suffering 
4. The countries are ranked as they are in the other tables: the first country in the table had 
the lowest current account deficit in 2007 and the last country had the highest 2007 deficit.
Table 5. Exports as a share of GDP at the beginning of the crisis
Exports Change in current account
Country Years as % of GDP
Ireland 2007 80.2 5.6
Hungary 2008 81.7 7.9
Spain 2007 26.9 6.1
Portugal 2008 32.4 6.0
Romania 2007 29.3 9.5
Lithuania 2007 53.8 13.4
Estonia 2007 67.1 19.5
Greece 2008 24.1 6.6
Latvia 2007 42.5 21.2
Bulgaria 2007 59.5 27.0
Source: EU DGEcFin AMECO database, spring 2012.
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the costs of the burst bubble are carried by foreign banks and their 
shareholders. By contrast, Ireland and Spain are carrying all the 
financial costs of burst housing bubbles and this burden will greatly 
slow any recovery. Until the costs of the financial collapse have 
been fully dealt with it is difficult for the real economy to recover. 
The size of the export sector matters. Where an export sector in 
an economy is large it is much easier to grow exports through 
improving competitiveness. Where the export sector is small a 
bigger share of any adjustment must be achieved by cutting 
imports by means of a fall in domestic demand (and living stan-
dards). This is a more painful process.
The pattern of recent adjustment does not suggest that 
membership of EMU was a good predictor of whether a country 
would suffer severely in the current crisis. Current account imba-
lances occurred whether or not countries were EMU members. The 
nature of the adjustment that has taken place so far does not 
suggest that exchange rate changes have been important in the 
adjustment process for most countries who were not EMU 
members. Only in the case of Hungary and Romania has there 
been a substantial fall in the effective exchange rate over the 
course of the adjustment period.
In countries where a property market or investment bubble has 
burst, the adjustment in the current account has taken place more 
rapidly. The initial incidence of this adjustment has been felt parti-
cularly by the large numbers who have lost their jobs in the 
building sector as a result of the bursting bubble. Where the 
current account imbalances have to be eliminated through redu-
cing consumption there is no “automatic stabiliser” to ensure that 
adjustment happens rapidly. Instead the adjustment must be a 
consequence of fiscal action reducing consumption. This is inevi-
tably a slower process than bursting a bubble. Also, because it 
requires domestic policy action to impose cuts in consumption 
across the whole population (not just those affected by a building 
bust), it is likely to face much more popular opposition.
Finally, experience in previous crises in EU countries suggests 
that major adjustments to restore domestic balance can take many 
years. It also suggests that the adjustment in the current account 
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number of years. However, the current crisis is different from 
previous crises as the adjustment process in the countries with 
major imbalances is taking place against the backdrop of contrac-
tionary fiscal policies in the rest of the EU. EUROFRAME (2012) 
estimates that the effect of the tightening fiscal policy stance in the 
EU this year will be to knock between 0.8% and 1.4% off the 
growth rate. In addition, the failure to deal effectively with the 
banking crisis, not just in Spain and Ireland, but throughout the 
EU has seen the destruction of the single EU financial market. 
Barrell et al. (2011) suggest that this move to national banking 
systems, if not reversed, will have a very negative additional effect 
on the EU growth rate.
3. Returning to growth
Returning the EU economy to balanced growth requires a 
number of tasks: restoring order to the public finances, enhancing 
competitiveness in those economies with chronic current account 
deficits (as well as changes in the economies with large current 
account surpluses to increase demand), developing a resilient 
banking system and reducing the exposure of EU economies to 
financial shock and, finally, labour market changes to match 
supply and demand for unskilled labour in the longer term.
3.1. Restoring order to the public finances
A key priority for policy is to return the public finances in a 
range of EU members to a sustainable path. This is a sine qua non
for future growth in these economies and it will require a 
prolonged period of fiscal tightening in countries such as Ireland, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal. For other countries, such as Italy, the 
necessary adjustment is much more limited.  All of this would be 
much easier if there were a return to sustained growth in the EU 
economy. A significant part of the fiscal crisis is due to the fact that 
the EU economy is operating well below capacity. When actual 
output in the EU economy grows to match its potential, all econo-
mies will see a significant improvement in their public finances. 
Without a return to growth in the EU economy as a whole, the 
current crisis in the more troubled EU member economies will 
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ments in the current account (and in the public finances) were 
made with less pain where they occurred against the backdrop of 
growth in trading partners.
In some economies the problem with the current account imba-
lance has already been addressed but there is a distance to go 
before balance is restored to the public finances (Ireland). In 
addressing the public finance crisis, the balance of payments in a 
country such as Ireland is likely to move into substantial surplus. 
In other economies, such as Portugal, the adjustment needed in 
the public finances, while still large, is less than it is for Ireland. 
However, there is still some distance to go before the current 
account of the balance of payments is restored to a sustainable 
path. All of these problems will be eased for economies, and even-
tually put behind them, by a return to growth. This Section of the 
paper addresses some of the lessons to be learned from the past 
experience of convergence.
3.2. Restoring competitiveness
A second task will be to improve the competitiveness of the EU 
economy, to enhance future growth. This will involve changes to 
enhance cost competitiveness across the EU as a whole, and 
changes in competitiveness in individual economies, which serve 
to reduce the major domestic imbalances. This must involve a rela-
tive improvement in the competitiveness of deficit countries 
relative to surplus countries. This will be achieved by a more rapid 
increase in costs in surplus countries than in deficit countries.
As discussed above, the current crisis has so far seen adjustment 
in many of the economies with large balance of payments deficits 
occurring through a reduction in imports brought about by a 
collapse in domestic demand. While such a contraction in output 
can, if sufficiently large, restore balance it comes at the cost of a 
considerable loss of output. An alternative strategy is to reduce 
domestic costs relative to competitors so that exports grow more 
rapidly. Such an approach is the only one which will protect 
growth and ensure that the other imbalance—in the labour 
market—is ironed out within a reasonable space of time.
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titiveness can only be secured by reducing domestic costs. This 
tends to be a time consuming process. In addition, even with a 
restoration of competitiveness it takes time for the productive 
capacity of the economy to be rebuilt through investment. Thus 
even with a rapid adjustment a recovery in exports will take some 
considerable time. With the huge pressures for early adjustment in 
those economies that are heavily indebted, this leaves little alter-
native than to adjust through cutting domestic demand as an 
instrument for cutting imports.
In addition, with relatively inflexible labour markets in some 
economies, the necessary adjustment in domestic costs is taking 
some considerable time. At one end of the spectrum are the Baltic 
states, where domestic competitiveness has been improved quite 
rapidly. At the other are Spain and Portugal where the response of 
domestic costs to the crisis has proved sluggish. In the case of 
Germany and the Netherlands, the tighter labour markets are 
resulting in an above average increase in wages, which facilitates 
adjustment across the EU. However, this process is also quite slow 
in these latter economies.
3.3. Developing a resilient and competitive banking system
The Cecchini report, which provided the blueprint for the 
Single Market, quantified major economic benefits from a more 
integrated EU financial system. While progress over the 15 years 
since the Single Market began has been slow, it was, nonetheless, 
real. The effect of the current financial crisis has been to fragment 
the EU banking system. Whereas before the crisis there had been a 
gradual move towards a more integrated EU banking system, this 
has now been dramatically reversed. With each country 
responsible for the solvency of its own banks there has been a rapid 
return towards a system of national banks. A major consequence of 
this is a fall off in competition. The decision to recapitalise the EU 
banks over a nine month period aggravated this tendency in early 
2012. There are big potential gains for shareholders in reducing 
capital requirements through deleveraging rather than raising new 
capital, and this process could pose major problems for some of the 
New Member States who do not have domestically owned banks. 
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vant governments responsible for any shortfall.
Barrell et al. (2011) show that a purely national banking system 
in the EU would see a substantially lower level of output than one 
where there is a system of EU-wide banks. This would arise because, 
instead of risks being shared over a large and diversified banking 
system, each national banking system would reflect the risks of the 
local economy (and any related lack of liquidity).5 By contrast, the 
US has continued to move away from the Glass-Stiagall era, where 
out-of-state banking was not allowed. An important impetus for 
this was the reduction in risk consequent on more regionally diver-
sified banks. It also has resulted in significant efficiency gains. 
Even with the recent financial upheavals in the US there is no 
suggestion that the trend towards an integrated US banking system 
should be reversed.
The development of a less competitive national banking system 
in the EU may not affect large multinational companies, which 
raise funds directly from financial markets and have access to 
many different banks across the range of countries in which they 
operate. However, in the absence of geographically diversified 
international banks, that can provide comparable terms for similar 
borrowers across the different EU markets, the problems with 
national banking systems are likely to have a negative impact on 
the cost of funds for smaller companies and the household sector. 
In turn this will negatively impact growth. 
Reversing this process will be important for the growth of the 
EU in future years. Any return to a more integrated EU banking 
system is only likely to proceed if there are major changes in how 
the banking system is regulated. As currently proposed, an EU wide 
banking system will need an EU-wide regulatory system rather 
than the current system with individual national regulation and 
responsibility.
5. Geographical diversification may not always be successful, if poorly managed. However, the 
recent Spanish experience suggests that the more geographically diversified large Spanish banks 
have proved more robust in the face of the current crisis than have the smaller banks, whose 
business was confined to the Spanish economy. 
John FitzGerald2963.4. Labour market reform and investment in human capital
The experience of convergence in living standards in the EU 
over the last quarter of a century has highlighted the significance 
of investment in human capital. Darvas and Pisani-Ferry (2011) 
make the point that the EU2020 agenda is still relevant. “Educa-
tion, research and the increase in participation and employment 
rates are perfectly sensible objectives in the current context…”. As 
shown in Figure 2, because of the fact that the educational attain-
ment of the population in many member states has only improved 
gradually over the last twenty five years, there is still considerable 
benefit to be reaped in the coming decade (in terms of increased 
potential output); as less well educated workers retire and are 
replaced by more productive better educated workers there will be 
further growth in productivity and in the productive labour force 
across a range of countries.  
In the case of some of the countries in southern Europe, even 
today their education systems are failing to produce adequate 
numbers of high school and third level graduates. This is particu-
larly the case for Portugal. If it raised the throughput of skilled 
persons through their education system towards the EU average, 
this would see substantial benefits accruing well into the next 
Figure 2. Investment in human capital. Ratio of human capital index 









DEU USA FIN SWE DNK GBR NLD SVK HUN CZE ITA FRA ESP POL GRC IRL PRT
Financial crisis, economic adjustment and a return to growth in the EU 297decade. However, the benefits of any such policy would take some
considerable time to mature.
The effect of the current recession has been to dramatically
increase the unemployment rate in the EU. However, the increase
in unemployment has not been evenly distributed, with relatively
good performances in the German and the UK labour markets,
contrasting with dramatic increases in unemployment in those
countries that have seen a collapse in their building and construc-
tion sectors. However, the distribution of the increase in
unemployment within the EU is not only uneven, but the share of
the unemployed who have limited education also varies across
countries. Because the average education of workers in the buil-
ding and construction sector is quite low, those economies that
have seen a collapse in that sector have also seen a disproportio-
nate rise in the unemployed with limited education.  
Figure 3 shows the educational attainment of the unemployed
across the EU member states. The share with lower secondary
education is exceptionally high in Portugal and Spain. In the case
of Portugal it reflects the relatively low average educational attain-
ment of the labour force as a whole. However, in Spain it also
Figure 3. Share of unemployed by level of education, 2010
In %
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John FitzGerald298reflects the very serious loss of employment in building and 
construction6. What is perhaps surprising is that the share of less 
well educated workers in the numbers unemployed is relatively 
low in Ireland, Estonia and Latvia, which all saw a dramatic fall in 
the investment share of GDP. In the case of Ireland this may reflect 
differential emigration by non-Irish former building workers who 
have lost their jobs.
Whatever the causes of the rise in unemployment, the evidence 
suggests that those who are unemployed with limited education 
will find it most difficult to get back to work, even in a recovering 
economy (Kelly, McGuinness and O’Connell, 2011). Because of the 
concentration of such unemployed workers in a number of 
member states, this may make the task of returning their econo-
mies to full employment in the recovery phase more difficult.  
Figure 4 shows the trend in employment and labour supply in 
the EU over the last 15 years for those with only lower secondary 
education. The trend in both supply and demand has been steadily 
6. Spain may also be affected by substantial immigration of workers for the building and 
construction sector in the boom years. 
Figure 4. Labour force and employment in the EU
EU 15, lower secondary education














Financial crisis, economic adjustment and a return to growth in the EU 299downwards. However, the recession has seen demand fall even 
more rapidly than supply. A continuation of this pattern of falling 
demand in an economic recovery would mean that demand for 
this category of labour is unlikely to catch up with supply to 
address the problem of unemployment. By contrast, Figure 5 
shows the steady upward trend in the supply and demand for 
skilled labour. Even in the economic downturn demand for this 
category of labour continued to rise.
Much will depend on the elasticity of substitution between 
skilled and unskilled labour in individual economies. If it is very 
low as it is in Ireland (Bergin and Kearney, 2007), then it will be 
more difficult to see employment for unskilled workers increasing. 
With a Leontief production technology, where skilled and 
unskilled workers are employed in fixed proportions, it would 
require substantial growth in total employment to ensure that 
substantial numbers of unskilled workers got jobs. Under these 
circumstances, reducing wage rates for unskilled workers relative to 
skilled workers would make little difference to demand. With 
unskilled workers constituting a small share of total employment 
unskilled wage rates would have to fall dramatically relative to 
Figure 5. Labour force and employment in the EU,
EU 15, tertiary education














John FitzGerald300skilled wage rates in order to improve the competitiveness of the 
economy sufficiently to employ all the unemployed unskilled 
workers (along with even more skilled workers). However, the 
higher the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled 
labour, the easier the economy will adjust to employing unem-
ployed unskilled workers. 
An alternative strategy is to reduce the supply of unskilled 
workers. In the long run, in an economy such as Portugal, this 
would be best achieved by reducing the output from the school 
system of young people with only lower secondary education and 
increasing the share completing tertiary education. While it would 
take a generation to achieve its full impact on the economy, there 
is no real alternative. A less effective strategy is likely to be retrai-
ning unemployed workers with limited education, especially 
where they constitute a large share of the unemployed. 
Nonetheless, it would be likely to produce a faster pay back than 
just waiting for a generation of new young graduates. 
4. Conclusions
A sine qua non for sustainability and recovery in the most trou-
bled EU economies is a return to sustained growth in the EU as a 
whole. It is obvious that the trigger for a return to growth is not 
available in the more troubled economies. As a result, it is only 
when the countries within the EU, which do not face major 
domestic imbalances, return to growth that a generalised recovery 
will ensue. Those economies, which are currently experiencing 
large current account surpluses, are best placed to lead the reco-
very. The study by EUROFRAME, 2012, showed the strong negative 
effect on growth in 2012 arising from the current stance of EU 
fiscal policy. Until the overall fiscal stance of the EU, and espe-
cially of the euro area, at least ceases to be deflationary, it is hard to 
see an economic recovery occurring. With continuing retrench-
ment in the more troubled economies, this rebalancing of the EU 
fiscal stance must depend on appropriate policy action in the rest 
of the EU, especially in the countries with substantial current 
account surpluses.
However, tackling serious domestic imbalances in the more 
troubled economies cannot await a return to growth. But this task 
Financial crisis, economic adjustment and a return to growth in the EU 301will only be completed when growth in the EU is assured and it 
would also be greatly facilitated by increased flexibility in domestic 
costs so that adjustment could take place through increased 
exports rather than reduced imports. The counterpart to such an 
improvement in competitiveness should be an increase in 
domestic demand in the surplus economies.
The experience of the last twenty years shows that convergence 
has actually happened, even if in a rather uneven form. Past invest-
ment in human capital holds out the prospect for further 
dividends in the coming decade. This is true for most of the trou-
bled economies. However, realising this potential will depend on 
tackling a range of obstacles. Further investment in human capital 
is desirable in some economies, especially in southern Europe.
The crisis has left a serious legacy of unemployed workers. In 
some of the most troubled economies a substantial proportion of 
the unemployed have limited education and this will pose a barrier 
to re-employment even in an economic recovery. Making the 
labour market work better is going to prove a challenge in those 
countries where unemployment is especially high. 
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HOW TO RESTORE SUSTAINABILITY 
OF THE EURO?1
Kari E.O. Alho
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We specify an open-economy version of a two-region New Keynesian model 
for EMU and demonstrate that the result on the unsustainability of the euro 
with ever-mounting inflation differentials by Wickens (2007) does not hold in 
general. Strong fiscal consolidation and far-reaching successful structural 
reforms are needed to reach sustainability in terms of competitiveness and 
reduced public debt over the medium run. However, the current deflationary 
adjustment involves a major polarisation within the euro area. Debt relief 
within the union and internal devaluation in the debtor country may essenti-
ally alleviate the adjustment burden and shift it from the problem countries to 
the strong countries. An internal revaluation in the strong countries can 
markedly help the situation in the weak countries in the short run if the interest 
rate remains unchanged. 
Keywords:  EMU, Euro, Sustainability, Fiscal policy, Competitiveness.
The financial and economic crisis which started in 2008 has 
delivered a major blow to the global economic system. As is typical 
in a deep recession, the crisis has also caused tensions between 
countries operating in a fixed exchange rate system, like the EMU, 
with diverging economic developments and imbalances within it. 
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Kari E.O. Alho304Already before the crisis, Wickens (2007) observed that the euro 
had not been stable in the sense that the price levels, i.e., the real 
exchange rates of the participating countries of the euro area had 
been on diverging paths during the first decade of the euro. The 
high inflation countries at the outset did not experience lower 
inflation hence, but quite on the contrary, they diverged in terms 
of price levels and competitiveness. He then made the claim that 
this will be the case in the future as well. Sustainability can only be 
reached if there are fiscal transfers from the high-inflation 
countries to the low-inflation countries, which would be unlikely 
to happen. This unsustainability holds irrespective of the fact that 
the ECB has a perfect success in its task and capacity to contain 
inflation in the euro area as an aggregate in the sequel as well. 
In this paper, we first intend to tackle this same question using 
a stylized new-Keynesian macro model (NKM) for two member 
countries of the euro area, with a slightly more elaborated specifi-
cation than that used by Wickens (2007). However, our 
conclusions are far more comforting than his. We argue that his 
core result does not hold in general. The model has a determinate 
solution both for the euro area as a whole and its member 
countries. Also, if there is an inherited divergence in price levels, 
linked to a loss of competitiveness in a member country, the 
internal adjustment within EMU is sufficient to eliminate this 
imbalance, even without a policy reaction by the ECB. 
It has already been shown earlier in the literature of the NKM 
models that the model for a single infinitesimally small member 
country of a closed monetary union is stable, see Galí and Mona-
celli (2005).2 The intuition behind this notion is the fact that the 
output in the monetary union is pinned down by the relative price 
level within the union which acts as a substitute for the Taylor rule 
in a single open economy under flexible exchange rates. Below we 
come to the same conclusion in our formulation of the relative 
price level in an open economy EMU.
Wickens (2007) only considered stability with respect to price 
levels, while we subsequently enlarge the analysis to consider 
stability in terms of both price levels and fiscal policy and public 
2. Note that this section is missing from their article publication of the same paper in Galí and 
Monacelli (2008).
How to restore sustainability of the euro? 305debt. The model is reformulated by giving up the assumption of 
homogeneous financial markets in the euro area and replacing it 
with segmented markets with diverging sovereign risk premia in 
interest rates. 
We can discern two meanings of the term sustainability. First, 
we have the case where the NKM model has or does not have a 
determinate, bounded unique solution. Secondly, we should 
consider, whether it makes sense for a weak country to remain as a 
member of the euro area, so that from a policy point of view this is 
beneficial for both the weak and strong euro area countries. The 
exchange rate has both a dimension of macroeconomic stability 
and microeconomic efficiency (see e.g. Alho, 2011 on the latter). 
The current crisis, manifesting in the financial markets, is basically 
due to macroeconomic imbalances in terms of idiosyncratic devia-
tions in competitiveness, output and public deficit. Therefore, we 
have to base the consideration of the sustainability of the euro on 
whether the emerged imbalances in the euro area in terms of 
competitiveness and debt ratios will be eliminated within a reaso-
nable time span of, say, the next five to ten years, and what this 
requires in terms of economic policies. 
One core feature in the current crisis management is the magni-
tude of the burden sharing, so that the problem countries get some 
assistance from the strong countries in their adjustment process. 
This has also created a conflict within the currency union as some 
actors and the public in the strong countries hold that that there 
has already been enough transfer of funds to the problem 
countries, while the problem countries urge for more help. Here we 
come to illustrate this situation with respect to some policies, but, 
needless to say, without a definitive result on how far this goal 
should be accomplished in the present crisis, as is also done in the 
report by the council of the Institute for New Economic Thinking 
(2012). We contain ourselves to analyse how the various policies 
work and are shaped in this respect. 
We analyse the sustainability of the euro from the following 
policy angles to alleviate the current divergences:
(i)   Fiscal austerity in the problem country with a high debt and 
a large public sector deficit, and loss of competitiveness.
Kari E.O. Alho306(ii)  EU bailout programmes extending subsidised credit to the 
problem country.
(iii) Debt restructuring and debt relief in the problem country.
(iv) Structural reforms, i.e., cutting mark ups in the economy of 
the problem country. 
(v)  Internal (fiscal) devaluation, i.e. lowering the export prices 
of the problem country through cost cuts and raising the 
home market price of the imported goods by VAT type of 
changes.    
(vi) Inflationary policies (revaluation) like cost rises in the 
strong EMU country which reduces the existing gap in 
competitiveness between the EMU countries.
As a final scenario we could think about a full breakdown of the 
EMU. This case has not, however, been evaluated in the paper.
We study the mutual interrelationship between the ECB and 
national fiscal policies. However, our approach differs markedly 
from the recent literature on monetary unions where optimal 
monetary and fiscal policies are studied, see e.g. Galí and Mona-
celli (2008), Ferrero (2008) and Orjasniemi (2010), where optimal 
fiscal policies could be linked to respond to idiosyncratic shocks. 
Instead we try to capture a situation, like the current one, where a 
policy error has been made and imbalances within the euro area 
have emerged, and policies are basically pursued to stabilise future 
public debt and competitiveness developments with simple budge-
tary rules. Numerically, we illustrate a case like that currently in 
some EU member states where a rapid pace is required in the elimi-
nation of the public deficit, assisted by an EU rescue package. If 
there is no or only a weak fiscal consolidation, this may entail an 
unsustainable situation for the euro area in the sense that the 
imbalances would not be eliminated, or that the mounting public 
indebtedness would not be prevented within a reasonable horizon. 
However, in the future, a rise in the interest rate set by the ECB 
could cast a doubt on managing the interest burden of accumula-
ting public debt and the success of fiscal consolidation. We also 
illustrate that the adjustment, although successful, to the current 
divergence in competitiveness and public debt will lead to a major 
polarisation within EMU in the sense that the problem countries 
lose and the rest can gain, although the latter fairly little, in terms 
How to restore sustainability of the euro? 307of output during the medium-run adjustment period. And as a 
next item, we infer that far-reaching successful structural reforms 
are needed to quickly balance the public debt ratio in the problem 
EMU country. Then we turn to consider policies where the adjust-
ment burden is shifted to the creditor EMU country so that we first 
analyse debt restructuring and a possible debt relief, and as a last 
item internal devaluation, called fiscal devaluation (revaluation) in 
the problem (strong) country. The general conclusion is that these 
policies work in quite an effective manner in boosting the 
economy of the weak EMU country and stabilise the divergences in 
adjustment within the Monetary Union. However, the effects of a 
reverse cost push in the strong EMU country crucially depend on 
the reaction of monetary policy. We assume that the ECB first 
commits to a fixed low interest rate and then gradually returns to 
obey a Taylor rule. Under such a policy, a revaluation in the strong 
country lowers the expected real interest rate and changes the gap 
in competitiveness and thus has an expansionary effect, especially 
on the weak country in the short run. However, over time, the 
effect turns negative for the strong country and neutral also for the 
weak country. On the other hand, if the ECB reacts immediately to 
a rise in the inflation rate, the effects are recessionary on both 
countries and thereby on the whole union.
In general, we find that existing idiosyncratic losses and gains 
in competitiveness bear a major overhang for the Monetary Union. 
Much more vigorous policies are needed under such conditions in 
comparison to those under no initial divergence in competiti-
veness. We also conclude that the measures aiming at balancing 
the indebtedness process can only be observed over time, which 
leads to uncertainty as to policy effectiveness in the short run. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we 
build the two-region model for the EMU, and in Section 2 consider 
theoretically stability of the euro area NKM model. In Section 3 we 
calibrate the model numerically. In Section 4 we widen the 
analysis to fiscal policy and public debt, with subsections on the 
fiscal austerity, debt restructuring and bailout packages, structural 
reforms and fiscal devaluation (revaluation) in the problem 
(strong) country. Section 5 concludes.
Kari E.O. Alho3081. The model
We specify the following stylized New Keynesian macro model 
for the euro area, consisting of two countries, following Wickens 
(2007), but deviating from it in some key respects. The IS curve, 
based on aggregate demand, is in period t the following, for both 
member countries, i,j = 1,2, i j,
 (1)
where q is the output gap in log, r the common interest rate set by 
the ECB, π is the inflation rate, Et is the expectation operator on 
information in period t, θ is the equilibrium real rate of interest 
given by the time preference, p is the price level in log, p* the 
global price level outside the euro area, s is the log of the effective 
exchange rate of the euro, units of foreign currency per unit of 
euro, z and ε the demand impulses stemming from the domestic 
fiscal policy and the world markets, respectively. In general, a 
superscript star denotes a global variable. All parameters in (1) are 
positive. The first two terms on the right-hand side refer to contri-
butions by consumption behaviour and investment to aggregate 
demand, and the next three terms refer to net exports. So, we 
depict the influence of the expected real rate of interest, the 
expected output gap in the next period, the influence of the 
competitiveness of the country concerned, both within the euro 
area and in relation to the rest of the world, and the external 
demand both within the euro area and the world economy outside 
it. In the Appendix we present a more exact derivation of the IS 
curve, especially the case how it is specified in connection with 
fiscal policies in Section 4.
The supply curve, the inflation rate, measured through a CPI, is 
determined by the following relationship, depicting also a Calvo 
pricing mechanism for domestically produced goods,
(2)
where the subscript 0 denotes an initial value of a variable deter-
mined outside the model. The justification of this specification for 
the supply curve is that the domestic price level is made of goods 
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How to restore sustainability of the euro? 309supplied by the domestic producers, and by imports from the euro 
area partner and from the global markets (the three first terms on 
the right-hand side of (2)). In addition, we depict the influence of 
the output gap on inflation in a standard manner. The supply (uit) 
shocks in (2) are serially uncorrelated, but observed in the begin-
ning of the period, before the policy by the ECB is decided.3
We deviate from Wickens (2007) who took the external value of 
the euro as fixed and derive its determination as an endogenous 
item through the portfolio balance. The demand (superscript D) 
for the euro assets denoted by B (government bonds), the stock BS 
of which is momentarily given, is determined by investors in the 
euro area and those in the rest of the world, so that in equilibrium 
we have,
 (3)
Here we assume that the euro area bonds are perfect substitutes 
for each other so that within the euro area financial markets are 
homogeneous, but see, however, below in Section 4. Each demand 
component k is determined by the given wealth and positively 
by the expected yield differential between the euro area and the 
rest of the world, 
(4)
A similar equation holds for the demand for the external assets, 
which can be skipped through the portfolio balance identity. For 
simplicity, we assume that the investors in the market have a fixed 
de/revaluation expectation of the future exchange rate of the euro 
so that Est+1–st is given by the initial gap in the inflation rates, i.e., 
it is equal to , where Ω is the inflation target by the ECB. 
From (3) and (4) we can derive the reaction that a rise in the euro 
area interest rate leads to an inflow of capital from abroad and to a 
revaluation of the external value of the euro, and thereby to disin-
flation within the euro area through this link as well, see (2), 
3. We have somewhat incorrectly specified that the price variable in the competitiveness term 
in (1) is the gap in the total price levels, not that in the domestically produced goods. This 
deviation can, however, be corrected when specifying the parameters of the equation. 
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In the standard manner, we assume that the two EMU countries 
in the model are initially symmetric and of equal size. This means 
that all the reaction parameters in the above country model are 
identical for countries i and j. 
The ECB takes the aggregate euro area indicators, denoted by a 
bar, as a basis for its policy. These are in the symmetric case, 
. (6)
The model for the aggregate euro area is then given by the 
following behavioural equations, 
(7)
(8)
From the supply curve (8) we find that when the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) holds, i.e., the expected inflation rate is equal to 
the global inflation measured in euro then the expected euro area 
output gap is zero given that there are no supply shocks in the euro 
area. Similarly, we find that if this holds in each member country 
as well, then the expected value of the output gap is zero, 
Eqi,t =Eqj,t = 0, and output is at the natural level in each country. 
From (8) we infer, using the above result concerning expected 
change in the exchange rate that, in equilibrium,
. (9)
We should still make a note on the nature of our model with 
respect to the interpretation of the price levels. Our approach is a 
macroeconomic one, not one describing growth and convergence. 
Therefore, when we speak of price levels we should not identify 
them to the existing price level differentials in a PPP sense within 
Europe so that the price levels are lower in Southern Europe in 
comparison to the Northern Europe due to lower real income and 
productivity levels in the former. But we should rather identify 
them as price levels in relation to productivity levels, and interpret 
them in terms of competitiveness differentials. 
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How to restore sustainability of the euro? 3112. Sustainability of the euro: the basic result on determinacy
We could start, as Wickens (2007) did, from a discretionary 
formulation of the monetary policy by the ECB. However, this 
effort is not in effect needed, and in order to be able to argue about 
the conclusion of Wickens, we first state the basic outcome of the 
policy-making. It is well known that the central bank fully offsets 
the effects of aggregate demand shocks (if the interest rate is not 
free to move due to the zero lower bound). This means that in the 
absence of the supply shocks the expected (for the next period) 
and the current period output gap is zero. As mentioned above, 
this holds in the steady state long-run equilibrium.
We could then insert, similarly as Wickens (2007) did, the ECB 
policy into the IS curves (1) for both countries i and j and subtract 
the IS curves for i and j from each other. Using the identity 
Eπi,t+1 =Epi,t+1 – pi,t , the following dynamic equation can be readily 
derived for differentials of logs of price levels,
. (10)
This is a determinate difference equation with a unique 
bounded solution based on the future path of the fiscal and 
demand shock differentials, in contrast to that stated by Wickens 
(2007), as the coefficient of the forward-looking variable is smaller 
than unity, see King and Watson (1998) and Sargent (1989, 216), 
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Galí (2010) for a general treat-
ment of the NKM model. This requires that the fiscal impulses and 
the demand shocks do not diverge from each other more rapidly 
than with the exponential order of (β + 2λ + φ) / β. Meeting this, if 
there is an initial idiosyncratic shock to the price levels, they 
converge over time. This takes place in conjunction with the fact 
that the euro area as a whole stays well in a stable way within the 
goals adopted by the ECB, see below. The terms involving competi-
tiveness are essential as to this outcome.
However, this is not how Wickens (2007) treats this equation 
(10) and Minford and Srinisavan (2010) consider the NKM model 
in a similar way to him. Both start from a shock to the initial price 
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Kari E.O. Alho312level or the price differential in (10) and then trace the future path 
of the price differential. Both then use Eq. (10) or the like in the 
NKM model in effect as a backward-looking equation to trace the 
future path. Wickens (2007) argues that the ECB can do nothing to 
prevent this divergence in price level deviations to mount over 
time. But we argue that this interpretation of the NKM model is 
not correct. 
Galí and Monacelli (2005) argue that within a closed monetary 
union consisting of infinitesimally small member countries, a 
member country’s terms of trade within the union has a unique 
stationary solution, by deriving a forward and backward looking 
difference equation for the terms of trade. From this result they 
then derive the equilibrium levels of domestic prices and output. 
But, we can add to this that this relative stability is reached within 
a monetary union for all kinds of monetary policy rules by the 
ECB. Let us next follow their line of argumentation, which starts 
from the inflation equation. We can first derive the following 
equation in our case for the price differential within the monetary 
union,
, (11)
where Δ is the difference between countries i and j. Let us then take 
the goods market equilibrium, see the Appendix, analogously as 
Galí and Monacelli did. Now we can approximately state the 
following equation for the output difference, as a function of the 
differential in competitiveness and in the fiscal impulse,
, (12)
where ζ is the share of the fiscal impact in output, assumed to be 
0.2, and δ is the elasticity of substitution between the goods 
produced in the home and foreign country, assumed to be two in 
the calculations below. Inserting this into (11) we can derive the 
following second-order difference equation
, (13)
where v is a combination of the difference in the fiscal impulses 
and the supply shocks. The roots of the difference equation (13) 
are hard to handle analytically. However, a numerical evaluation 
 2 1 1 1(1 )( ) ( )t t t t t t tp p E p p q uξ ξ α− ++ Δ − Δ = Δ − Δ + Δ + Δ
 (1 )t t tq z pζ ζ δΔ = Δ − − Δ
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How to restore sustainability of the euro? 313of the grid (with α being 0.3), where 0 < ξ1 + ξ2 < 1, ξ1 > ξ2 , gives 
the result that one of the roots μ1 is quite tightly centered on the 
value of 0.6-0.7, i.e. less than unity in absolute value, while the 
other root is clearly higher than unity. We can now derive the 
following solution to this difference equation, analogously as in 
Galí and Monacelli (2005, 16) and Sargent (1987, 395),
(14)
This is a unique stationary solution for the equation (13), 
converging to price parity similarly as above. 
Turn then to the monetary policy rule. Below we shall analyse 
rules of the Taylor type of the following kind,
(15)
Let us next turn to consider the determinateness of the aggre-
gate euro area, the model of which was presented above in 
Equations. (7) and (8). In the prototype case of a closed economy 
the NKM model as such, i.e. without the monetary policy reaction, 
is not determinate, see Galí (2010). The model can be made as 
determinate if ω2 > 1, see e.g. Woodford (2003) and Galí (2010). 
However, in our specification of the open economy model for the 
euro area we come to the conclusion that it is stable under a wider 
range of policy rules, under the set of parameters adopted below in 
Section 4. 
We have now come to the conclusion that both the models for 
the aggregate euro area and the difference between the EMU 
countries are stable. We can then infer that the individual EMU 
countries have a determinate solution as a linear combination, 
being either a sum or a difference of these two models, too, given 
that the shock processes do not diverge too fast from each other. 
Given the equilibrium path for the terms of trade within the 
monetary union, we can then trace back out the equilibrium prices 
and output. 
Galí and Monacelli (2005) (and in their other papers, too) 
derive the result that the open economy NKM model is isomorphic 
with the closed economy model. This specification leads, however, 
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Kari E.O. Alho314and competitiveness and differences in this sense stick to the 
initial gap in them. It seems that the key role of competitiveness 
vanishes in an equilibrium case from the IS curve. Therefore, we 
have wanted to specify the model so that it applies in a disequili-
brium situation as we have now a case where competitiveness is a 
key factor in determining the output. 
3. Numerical analysis of sustainability within the euro area 
after an idiosyncratic shock in inflation and competitiveness
We illustrate the above two-region EMU model with simula-
tions using a numerical specification. We choose the following 
fairly standard or plausible values for the parameters (see the 
Appendix): the inflation target  Ω  is 2% p.a., the same holds for 
the global inflation rate π*, λ = 0.2, β = 0.3, γ = 0.3, α = 0.3, δ = 0.1, 
θ = 0.02, ψ = 6,φ = 0.2, ξ1 = 0.5, ξ2 = 0.3 and ξ3 = 0.2. The elasticity 
of substitution between imported goods and home goods is taken 
to be fairly small, two, which leads to the value of the φ parameter, 
see on this also the Appendix. The openness of the euro area to 
global trade is taken to be 10%. The reaction parameter ψ in Equa-
tion (5) is based on the evidence between the relation of the euro-
dollar rate and the respective interest differential, depicted in 
Commission (2008, 10). The long-run equilibrium of the model is 
that the interest rate set by the ECB is 4% p.a., and inflation is on 
its target of 2% p.a. in both countries. The standard Taylor rule in 
(15) has the parameters ω1 = 0.5, ω2 = 1.5, but see on this Section 4. 
In this section, we carry out the simulations of the model, speci-
fied for a quarterly time unit4, over the period from 2010, second 
quarter, to 2040 under the assumption that initial shocks to level 
(stock) variables take place in 2010Q1. This temporal specification 
does not mean that we aim in this section to trace the current 
situation in the euro area, but rather want to demonstrate how the 
equilibrium can be restored after an initial shock. So, i.a., we 
assume in this section that initially output is on its trend in both 
countries and that the interest rate is on its equilibrium value, i.e., 
4% p.a. In this Section we omit the fiscal impulses. We impose 
4. This means adjusting the annual interest and inflation rates to match the quarterly 
dimension of the model. 
How to restore sustainability of the euro? 315terminal conditions to the model so that the forward-looking 
variables reach in the long run constant levels. 
Assume that, similarly as in reality, referred to in the Introduc-
tion, country 1 has run into an imbalance in its initial price level 
and in competitiveness of the magnitude of 10 per cent (in logs) in 
the initial situation (in 2010 Quarter 1). Similarly, this is reflected 
in that the country 2 has reached a competitiveness gain of the 
same magnitude. The outcome for the price level differential and 
the output gaps is now the following, see Figure 1.
Adjustment within the euro area eliminates the initial gap in 
competitiveness. We see that adjustment brings in a substantial 
polarisation within EMU in terms of output reaction. In the EMU 
country which has lost its competitiveness, the loss in output in 
the deflationary process is very severe, while the country with a 
gain with respect to competitiveness benefits from this. The speed 
and magnitude of these reactions are astounding which casts 
doubt on the relevance of the model from an empirical point of 
view. This feature is basically dependent on the expected output 
term in the IS curve. If that term does not appear the size of adjust-
ment is much smaller, but at the same time much more sluggish 
back towards equilibrium.
Figure 1. The price differential and the output gaps (QGAP) after an asymmetric 












Kari E.O. Alho316In this case there is no reaction by the ECB if the initial output 
gaps are zero, if the initial interest rate is on its equilibrium level 
(4%) and if the global inflation rate is the same as the target 
adopted by the ECB. This is then the case of a perfect idiosyncratic 
shock within EMU. However, even without a policy reaction the 
euro area reaches stability, although this can involve a very marked 
polarisation within the EMU.
The general conclusion is that this kind of idiosyncratic dispari-
ties will be eliminated over the long run within EMU, rather than 
that they are persistent. 
4. Sustainability with respect to public deficit and debt
Recently, another angle as to the stability of the euro has 
emerged, namely the robustness of the Monetary Union with 
respect to a diverging situation in public borrowing and debt. 
Currently, the EMU has had to face the debt crisis of Greece and 
other so-called PIIGS countries with a large public sector deficit, 
many of them over 10% of GDP, and a high debt exceeding 100% 
of GDP, with a marked trade imbalance. 
In the initial stage of the EMU more than a decade ago, concern 
was often raised that the financial markets do not deliver enough 
sanctions with respect to those countries pursuing lax policy in 
their public finances. The interest rate differentials were quite 
small irrespective of the diverging public indebtedness in the 
member countries. The present global economic crisis has changed 
all this. The interest premiums between good and bad borrowers 
have widened markedly and now the tune has changed from tran-
quillity to an alarmed consideration of a Euro area country even 
running into some kind of insolvency, reinforced by excessive 
market reactions in the interest rates. 
The fiscal sustainability has been considered in a NKM model, 
i.a., by Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) in an optimising framework 
with several instruments of fiscal policy identified in it, see also 
Galí and Monacelli (2008), Ferrero (2008) and Orjasniemi (2010). 
Here our approach deviates from these optimal policy analyses in a 
fundamental way. We assume that an imbalance has emerged as 
currently, and the goal of policy-making is to overcome it, notably 
in public sector indebtedness and competitiveness. 
How to restore sustainability of the euro? 317We limit ourselves to consider sustainability with respect to an 
emerged fiscal imbalance in one EMU country so that we identify 
the effect of fiscal policy as a demand impulse in the IS curve in Eq. 
(1) and through a sovereign risk factor.5 We consider how the 
public deficit should be reduced and its link to the stability of the 
euro. We have analysed the sustainability of the euro from the 
policy points mentioned in the Introduction. By sustainability we 
now mean that the public sector indebtedness can be kept under 
control, ultimately measured by whether the no-Ponzi game 
assumption will or will not be met as to public sector indebtedness. 
4.1. Modifications to the model
The debt dynamics are,
, (16)
where D is the real public debt (in book value), is the average 
interest rate on public debt, zi is now primary deficit in country i in 
relation to GDP, and Q is the level of GDP. The actual level of 
output evolves as follows,
, (17)
where QPOT is the potential output growing at the rate of the trend 
growth of the labour-augmenting productivity process, see below 
Section 4.3. 
Let us now take as a starting point the current debt crisis in 
EMU, started in 2010 by the situation in Greece, and the policies 
adopted to overcome the instability caused by it to the euro. We 
assume that the fiscal policy rule consists of the components of 
automatic stabilisers and discretion, where the latter now means a 
stipulated gradual cut in the initial primary deficit along the 
announced path in one of the member countries, the problem 
country i = 1. Thus we have, 
(18)
5. See, however, below where we allow for an effect on inflation by the fiscal austerity leading 
to hikes in taxation.
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Kari E.O. Alho318where the first component captures the automatic stabilizers and 
the second the structural budget deficit in the problem EMU 
country 1. In the other strong EMU country 2, only the automatic 
stabilizers are at play. Above in the previous section we have 
assumed that the external value of the euro only reacts to the inte-
rest rate set by the ECB and the financial markets in the euro area 
are homogeneous. This is clearly not consistent with the facts of 
the 2010-2012 euro debt crisis. We assume now that the financial 
markets in the euro area are segmented so that the bonds of 
countries 1 and 2 are no longer perfect substitutes for each other as 
they were above in (3). So, their risk premia deviate according to 
the extent of the respective government borrowing, see below. The 
interest rate on the government debt of the problem country rises 
as the fears of insolvency of the country spread in the market. 
Second, this also leads to an outflow of capital from the euro area. 
We should note that the first impact, in itself, leads according to 
our specification above in (5) to a stronger euro. In order to reach 
the possibility of a weakening euro, the latter negative impact 
should be stronger than the first impact. Let us therefore revise the 
determination of the external value of the euro to take place 
through the following open interest parity arbitrage condition, 
incorporating a combined risk premium,
(19)
where r* is the foreign interest rate and the rates ri and rj now refer 
to the short-run market rates. This equation can be derived from a 
portfolio balance model between domestic and foreign assets, 
where the parameter m1 reflects the attitude toward risk aversion 
and the risk (variance) of the exchange rate, and GDP marks the 
size of the portfolio. Now, given the exchange rate expectations, 
the higher the debt ratio is in the euro area, the more the euro 
depreciates. Let us assume simply that Est+1 =  st–1 + Ω – π*, similarly 
as above. 
A notable feature of the debt crisis is the markedly widened 
interest rate differentials in the euro area between the good and 
bad borrowers. We can introduce the following specification for 
this risk premium, 
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Here the second term captures the interest differential vis-à-vis 
the interest rate set by the ECB and the last term captures the 
expected capital loss related to government bonds of country 1. 
The parameter 1 – κ depicts the expected amount of the debt to be 
paid by the borrower country in the case of its debt default, and μ, 
multiplied with the convex function f of the debt ratio, captures 
the probability of the default by the country 1. 
One outcome of the crisis in 2010-2012 has been that funds 
have been channelled to other euro area countries so that the inte-
rest rates in Germany and elsewhere with a limited budget deficit, 
like Finland, have been pushed downward. We take this effect 
simply into account so that for the country 2, modifying Laubach 
(2009),
(21)
Here  is the EMU reference value for the public debt ratio, 
i.e., 60 per cent. We insert ri and rj into the IS curve in Equation (1) 
instead of r.
The euro rescue package reached in May 2010 consists of loans 
extended to Greece by the other euro area countries at rates lower 
than the current market interest rates, and similarly for Ireland in 
November 2010, Portugal in May 2011 and Spain in July 2012. This 
transfer has the effect that the domestic fiscal impulse in the 
country 2 is smaller than without this measure by the amount of 
the interest subsidy extended to the problem country. An equiva-
lent effect, mutatis mutandis, applies to the country 1. This 
transfer effect will be taken into account in Section 4.3.
Based on this reasoning we specify in Equation (20) that 
f(dt) = 0.5dt + 0.5d2t  – d12 , where d is the debt ratio in country 1 
being 100% initially and d12 is the size of the debt of country 1 
which country 2 is ready to finance or guarantee. This implies that 
in the initial stage the probability of default is zero if the euro 
partner is ready to finance the total debt outstanding. However, 
over time this probability may become positive, if the country 
concerned will run into a higher level of debt as will be the case in 
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situation as well. It is true that this formulation for the f-function is 
ad hoc, but in any case the future evolution of the interest spreads 
in the euro area is quite uncertain at the moment. Let us further 
tentatively assume that κ = 0.5, μ = 0.01, and initially d12 = 0.5. The 
last item comes to play a role in Section 4.3. 
Let us finally introduce the capital stock and the labour market 
explicitly in the model. In the spirit of the Keynesian analysis in an 
open economy, the labour market in effect operates as a residual of 
the model here in the following sense. Let us first specify the 
output gap in a log-linear manner as a function of the constant 
returns to scale production function,
(22)
where k is the capital stock, a is labour-augmenting technical 
change and l is the labour input, all as log deviations from the 
equilibrium. In effect, we use this equation to derive the labour 
input, once the output and the capital stock have been deter-
mined. The capital stock is defined on the basis of the investment 
function in the Appendix, and the country-wise interest rates,
. (23)
The capital stock evolves as,
, (24)
where ϑ is the share of investment in equilibrium in relation to the 
capital stock. The demand for labour now determines the wage rate 
from the marginal productivity condition, 
, (25)
where (1 – σ)-1 is the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour and mu is the mark up-term in the pricing decisions of the 
firms. In the numerical solutions, we use a fairly typical value of 
0.7 for the elasticity of substitution and 0.2 for the mark-up factor.
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fiscal austerity
We now turn to the simulations. With the previous specifica-
tions, we will try to trace a situation like the current one in the 
euro area, at least more than we did in Section 3. 
The above specification is not able to describe the current situa-
tion in the euro area so that the interest rates would correspond to 
those realised currently in the financial market in the European 
debt crisis. However, to avoid being too far from the reality, we 
assume below that the short-run interest rate r1 of the problem 
country 1 is 2.5 percentage points above the short-term rate set by 
the ECB throughout, added by the premium described in the 
previous section in Equation (20). We further assume that a 
country has to finance its debts with loans with the maturity of ten 
years, and that the starting values for the average interest rates on 
debt in Equation (16) are 3% for country 1 and 2% for country 2. 
The future evolution of the interest rate is quite crucial for the 
sustainability of the fiscal austerity in country 1, see below.
To further increase realism, we assume that both countries have 
initially (in 2010) a negative output gap of 4 per cent and face an 
autocorrelated adverse aggregate demand shock ε from world 
markets which vanishes by 10% per quarter, and that there is in 
addition a recessionary shock in late 2011 and early 2012 of one 
percentage point mimicking the current cycle. The size of the 
initial shock is calibrated in such a way that the aggregate demand 
initially equalizes output with the stipulated gap. To depict the 
current situation, we also define that initially country 1 has lost its 
competitiveness by 10 per cent vis-à-vis the average in the euro 
area and the rest of the world, while country 2 has reached a gain 
of the same magnitude. We simulate the model basically over the 
period starting in 2010Q2. Some policies will take place later on in 
the manner described below.
We now specify the rule in (18) to be the following for country 1,
. (26)
We call a fiscal consolidation according to the rule (26) a strong
one, and the case where in Equation (18) h2 = 0.1 and h3 = 0, a weak
one. The magnitude of the automatic stabilizer in (26) is standard, 
 1, 1,0.5 0.09(1 0.6) 0.01
t
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Kari E.O. Alho322but the fiscal consolidation is arbitrarily fixed, although it is harsh 
enough to bring in a rapid reduction in the public deficit and, in 
the end, a ceiling for the public debt—although a very high one— 
see Figure 3 below. By fixing the h2 parameter to this value, we 
assume that the high debt country cuts its public deficit in relation 
to GDP initially by more than 3 percentage points per year in its 
austerity programme, which is broadly consistent with the present 
desired situation in the PIIGS countries. It is true that in (26) we 
explicitly miss the link between the debt ratio and the degree of 
fiscal consolidation, raised to an important position by Schabert 
and van Wijnbergen (2011). In country 2 only automatic stabilisers 
are in operation. We assume that the potential output grows by 2% 
p.a. in both countries, but see on this Section 4.4. The initial debt 
ratios are taken to be 100% for country 1 and 50% for country 2. 
The IS curve is now modified as in Equation (37) in the Appendix. 
The strong scenario (26) defines the baseline. 
During the crisis the standard monetary policy rules have not 
been at play. This is partly dictated by the zero lower boundary of 
the nominal interest rate. The interest rate policy by the ECB is 
assumed to be a combination of two rules so that it is first fixed to a 
rule of keeping the rate at 1% up to the end of 2014 and thereafter 
it gradually returns in two years to the modified Taylor rule, see 
Figure 2 (see Equation (38) in the Appendix for details). It is true
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How to restore sustainability of the euro? 323that this fairly rigid set up omits the link between the monetary 
policy and fiscal consolidation in the euro area in the initial stage. 
If we assume that the ECB obeys a Taylor rule throughout, some, 
but not all, of the results below will change.
From Figure 3 we see that fiscal austerity can have a perverse 
effect in the short and medium run as to the debt ratio, although 
the size of this difference is not very big. So, there is a temporary, 
but not permanent, self-defeating fiscal austerity. Even though the 
public deficit is cut markedly, the debt ratio in country 1 rises 
temporarily more rapidly in the case of a strong adjustment than 
in a weak case as output is squeezed in the short run. In any case 
the debt ratio rises to a very high level in the problem country 1.
Above in Section 2, we initially identified sustainability of the 
euro in terms of a determinate solution for the euro area and the 
member countries. From a policy point of view this may be quite 
far from the reality. Let us therefore examine in the sense of 
Bergman (2001), whether the evolution of the future public debt 
meets the no-Ponzi—game assumption. According to this analysis, 
we estimate a regression of the following kind, 
Dt = e0 + e1Dt–4 + vt . (27)
If the parameter e1 is higher than unity plus the discount rate, 
indicating explosive debt dynamics, then the no-Ponzi game 
condition is not satisfied. In our simulations estimation of this 
equation for the period 2011-2031 produces the outcome that 
under a strong fiscal policy the parameter e1 gets the value 0.966 
(with t-value 70) and under a weak consolidation it gets the value 
1.048 (with t-value 368). This implies that the weak consolidation 
policies are likely to lead to a situation of being near insolvent in 
terms of debt dynamics.
If the problem country 1 could finance throughout its public 
debt with a fixed interest rate, say 4% p.a., the public debt in it 
would be on a sustainable path under a strong fiscal consolidation 
(e1 would then be clearly less than unity), see the Table. In this 
sense we see that the interest rate policy by the ECB, the fiscal 
policy and the sustainability of the euro are closely linked 
together. A likely future rise in the interest rate set by the ECB 
towards the equilibrium value can jeopardise the sustainability of 
Kari E.O. Alho324the euro through its spillover effect on the interest burden of the 
public debt in the problem EMU country. 
The country 1 reaches under a strong fiscal austerity in 2016 the 
limit of 0.5% of GDP in terms structural budget balance stipulated 
by the Fiscal Compact of spring 2012.
We see that the diverse impacts of various cases will be felt over 
the long run, but over the medium run the outlook is quite inde-
pendent of the interest rate assumptions, similarly as predicted in 
the Greece country report by the OECD (2011). Over the long run, 
the interest burden and the fiscal consolidation will make their 
effects felt clearly on the sustainability criterion in Equation (27). 
The problem in actual policy making lies in the fact that it is very 
difficult to commit to this kind of policy restraint in a credible way 
from the point of view of the financial market agents, which reco-
gnise various uncertainties and have normally a much shorter time 
horizon in their decisions.
Fixing the interest rate by the ECB to 1% throughout the simu-
lation period would drive down quite soon the debt ratio under a 
strong fiscal austerity, but this would take place at the cost of 
jeopardising the inflation control, which would rise over time to 
6% p.a.    
Figure 3. The public deficit and debt in a high debt, low competitiveness EMU 
country (1) under an adverse demand and supply shock and varying degree of 
fiscal austerity, in relation to GDP (deficit on the left scale, debt on the right) 
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How to restore sustainability of the euro? 325It is anyway interesting and important to see from Figure 4 that 
the adjustment in the strong EMU country 2 involves an overshoo-
ting so that output gap changes sign before converging to the 
equilibrium where output is equal to the potential GDP. It can be 
argued that the NKM model shows a fairly vigorous pattern of 
adjustment back to parity which is not very likely to happen in 
reality. Therefore, we should interpret the results as only illustra-
tive rather than predictions of future developments. We see that 
the adjustment implies roughly a 10 percentage point reduction in 
the nominal wages in the problem country 1, see Figure 5. It is also 
interesting to note that the wage adjustment in the strong country 
back to equilibrium is sluggish during the first few years.
Let us then return to compare the situation under a strong fiscal 
adjustment assumed so far compared to the weak case, see Figure 6. 
Table. Alternative simulations on the link between the interest rate and the fiscal 
policy in the problem country 1 (under strong fiscal consolidation)







plus, i.e. –z1) 
in 2015, % 
of GDP




Value of e1 in 
Eq. (27) over 
the period 
2010-2031
as in Equation (20) -2.2 -0.2 140 181 1.030
4% p.a. throughout -2.1 -0.1 138 115 0.740
Figure 4. The output gaps in the two EMU countries under a strong fiscal 
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Kari E.O. Alho326We infer that the strong country 2 gains in terms of output after a 
couple of years from a harsh adjustment to the euro debt crisis. 
However, the difference for country 2 is quite small so that we can 
state that the adjustment burden is fully borne by the problem 
country alone. On the other hand, the country 1 causing the debt 
crisis loses sharply and increasingly during the first two years, but 
then the situation is reversed and it turns towards neutrality and a 
small gain. Thus, there is a marked polarization within EMU as a 
result of the debt crisis. 
By varying the policy rule in Equation (18) so that the parameter 
h2 is raised, we can infer that the pain linked to a strong adjustment 
is higher, but the more rapidly the reduction in the budget deficit 
takes place in country 1, the more rapidly it will start to gain from 
its austere policies. Of course, the measure used here omits many 
aspects, economic and political, linked to a successful elimination 
of emerged imbalances within EMU. Altogether, we could argue 
that a successful consolidation and price adjustment are a condi-
tion for a country to be able to permanently reap the microeco-
nomic gains delivered by the participation into the single currency.
We can also depict a difference with respect to the external 
value of the euro and the average inflation rate. It seems to be the 
case that over the long run a weak fiscal adjustment to some extent 
Figure 5. The evolution of the nominal wage rates under a strong fiscal 
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How to restore sustainability of the euro? 327jeopardizes the inflation control in the euro area. Thus the average 
inflation rate would be on a gradually accelerating trend up to 
2015, and weak consolidation can markedly slow down the price 
level adjustment after initial idiosyncratic disparities to competiti-
veness. We illustrate this in Figure 7 below.    
Figure 6. The difference in the output gaps (output less potential) between 
the cases of weak and strong fiscal austerity* 
* In this comparison in the weak consolidation case the parameters are as follows in Eq. (18) h1 = –0.5, h2 = 0.1, h3 
= 0. The strong consolidation is that stipulated in Eq. (26). The curves denote the difference q(weak)–q(strong).
Figure 7. The price level differential (p1–p2, in logs) under a strong and weak fiscal 
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Kari E.O. Alho328The interest rate policy by the ECB is not sufficient alone to 
hold public sector indebtedness under control. There is thus a 
limited interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in EMU, as 
the latter is necessarily needed to manage the current situation of 
the debt crisis. Of course, the interest rate policy also plays a role, 
but it is limited in the sense that it cannot alone stabilise output 
under a demand shock due to the lower boundary for nominal 
interest rates. In this sense our result reinforces the conventional 
wisdom, analysed by Kirsanova, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2009), that 
monetary policy can be targeted to output stabilisation and fiscal 
policy to contain public sector finances. But our results sharpen 
this outcome in the sense that the fiscal policy adjustment is neces-
sarily needed to assist the ECB in its task of reaching a sustainable 
non-explosive outcome for the euro area. 
In the package of new EU legislation, launched in autumn 2010, 
and recently approved as the so-called six pack, aiming to enhance 
the sustainability of the euro area, a new concept by the EU 
Commission was launched. In addition to the fundamental 
concept of Excessive Deficit Procedure of the Stability and Growth 
Pact a new one, namely Excessive Imbalance Procedure, was intro-
duced. It tackles other types of imbalances in the overall economic 
developments than just the budget deficit and public debt. The 
Euro Plus agreement agreed in March 2011 calls for additional 
adjustment to restore imbalances in competitiveness. The above 
model shows that fiscal stabilisation can markedly speed up the 
convergence in price levels (competitiveness), and is in broad 
terms a sufficient condition for this, see Figure 7. However, the 
path back to parity may be quite sluggish. The smaller the para-
meter h2 is in Equation (18), the slower the price levels converge 
back to parity. This would suggest that the role of other policies to 
maintain overall stability could also be of importance. 
4.3. Sustainability through debt relief?
One central issue in the crisis of Greece has been a possible debt 
default which has been tried to be avoided through organised debt 
relief by combining fiscal austerity and debt restructuring with 
lower than market interest rates. Let us next consider this possibi-
lity. Imagine that in the first quarter of 2011 a debt default takes 
place so that a half of the debt of the country 1 will be wiped out 
How to restore sustainability of the euro? 329and the consequent capital loss will be borne by the country 2. 
Assume further that in Equation (20) in the interest differential the 
term d12 is one half, because the country 2 is ready to finance a part 
of the debt burden through debt restructuring. The interest rate on 
new debt in country 1 will be lower due to this mechanism. In 
order to capture this situation, we have to modify also the IS curve 
so that the capital gain related to a lower debt burden will give rise 
to a higher level of spending so that a part of the gain, say 10%, 
will be consumed in country 1 in a year. The government finances 
also change due to this transfer as the country 2 is assumed to 
finance the part of the debt depicted by d12 of the country 1 at the 
lower rate r2. Similar effects, mutatis mutandis, concern country 2.
We see from Figure 8 that, as specified, the burden is shared by 
the two countries symmetrically. However, the effect of this effect 
is quite limited, around 1% of GDP, and vanishes gradually. This 
policy leads to a slowing down of the reduction in the existing gap 
in competitiveness.
4.4. Sustainability through structural reforms?
The above results are quite gloomy in the sense that the high 
debt country runs into ever mounting debts in this decade even 
though the evolution of the debt may not be as such inconsistent 
with the no-Ponzi game criteria. Let us therefore still find out 
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Kari E.O. Alho330under which kind of structural reforms to be adopted by the high-
debt country it could stabilize and turn its debt ratio into decline. 
We derive from a CES production function in (22) and the 
dependence of the potential output on the capital stock K, 
ρ = ρ(QPOT,K) where ρ is elasticity, and from the optimal invest-
ment equation, the following expression,
, (28)
where mu is the mark up factor in the goods market and (1 – σ)–1 is 
the elasticity of substitution and d is the rate of depreciation. We 
now have the expression for a change in the potential output
. (29)
The mark up factor has two kinds of effects. First, as in (28), it 
has an effect on the potential output. Secondly, it has an opposite 
effect on the inflation rate in (2). We now see that the problem 
country 1 needs to carry out reforms to such a magnitude that their 
impact outweighs their recessionary impact through the rise in the 
real financing costs.
Assume in a schematic way that the potential output of the 
problem country 1 concerned grows permanently by 2 percentage 
points p.a. more than earlier, which is a very big amount, and 
assume further that it initially cuts the annual inflation rate by 
0.25 percentage points and thereby has an effect on the equili-
brium price level. Let us further assume that the fiscal policy rule in 
Equation (18) is fixed to the strong value. The outcome is the 
following, see Figure 9. If there were no initial loss of competiti-
veness in country 1, an acceleration of the potential growth rate by 
0.5 percentage points p.a. would be enough to reach a similar level-
ling off and slight reduction in the debt ratio. This again shows the 
large impact of the inherited loss of competitiveness as to the 
sustainability of the euro.
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d r dπσ
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How to restore sustainability of the euro? 3314.5. Stability through internal devaluation and revaluation?
The key challenge facing the euro area, on the basis of what has 
been found out in the previous sections, is divergence in competi-
tiveness. Therefore, it would be interesting to find out what could 
be achieved by measures influencing directly the competitive posi-
tion of an EMU country in trouble. Accordingly, the term of fiscal 
devaluation has been launched, which means that domestic costs 
of exporters are cut through lowering the payroll tax of the 
employers, financing this through raising the tax on import prices 
by a hike in the VAT rate. Although our model is quite concise and 
deficient in this respect, we can try to mimic something of this 
kind of policies by inserting (a) a negative shock to the price level 
P1 of country 1 in the markets of both countries, as a kind of an 
export subsidy, (b) a corresponding rise in the price level of 
country 2 in the market of country 1, and (c) a corresponding shift 
in the competitiveness term of country 1 vis-à-vis the third 
countries. 
As an illustration, we assume that the export and import 
competing enhancement in competitiveness of country 1 is 5% 
from 2012Q1 onward. As foreign trade is typically a quarter of 
GDP, and consumption a half, this means that the consumer price 
level rises by around 2.5%-points, and the overall gain to the 
Figure 9. The debt ratio in country 1 under structural reforms, in combination 
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and the rest of the world.
We assume in the baseline a strong fiscal consolidation in the 
meaning defined above in Section 4.2. The result for the output 
gap is now the following, see Figure 10. The impact is quite vigo-
rous so that a 7.5% internal devaluation leads already quite in the 
short term to a 4%-points gain in output in country 1.
It has a major negative effect on the country 2, and is to some 
extent a beggar thy neighbour policy, although the euro area as a 
whole gains in terms of output, see Figure 10. As this policy boosts 
output in country 1, and does not initially have an impact on the 
budget deficit, it also has a major positive effect on the debt ratio. 
The strong growth is also a result of a rapid convergence back to 
equilibrium incorporated in the model.
The core of the current EU policies is to prevent divergences in 
competitiveness from emerging and eliminating rapidly those 
emerged in this respect. It has been sometimes recently argued that 
the surplus countries, like Germany, should pursue inflationary 
policies driving down its competitiveness and thereby creating 
boost to the problem deficit countries in EMU. One justification 
for this effect is that the euro area is quite closed vis-à-vis the rest of 
the world and thereby it could be quite an effective policy to 
neutralise, or at least reduce, the existing gaps in competitiveness. 
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How to restore sustainability of the euro? 333Let there be a temporary shock of 2.5%-points to the annual infla-
tion rate in country 2 (in 2012Q1).
An internal cost push shock in country 2 is a successful alterna-
tive from the point of view of country 1 which gains in terms of 
output, and the disparity within the euro area would diminish, see 
Figure 11. 
The outcome of this policy crucially depends on the reaction of 
the monetary policy. If the interest rate does not react in the begin-
ning, but only in lagged manner as assumed here, the expected real 
rate of interest goes down and initially both countries will gain. 
After that there is a loss for the revaluing country. Both countries 
turn in the end to neutrality. A revaluation in the strong country 
also decreases the needed reaction of deflationary adjustment in 
wages and prices in the weak country, as is plausible, see Figure 12. 
Figure 11. The effect of a cost push (internal revaluation) in the strong EMU 
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We have analysed the case of EMU adjustment to an imbalance 
in inflationary shocks and competitiveness. We argue that internal 
adjustment within the euro area is able to restore over time sustai-
nability of the EMU also with respect to idiosyncratic shocks. We 
reject the unsustainability result by Wickens (2007, 2010) and 
show that it does not hold within EMU in general. True, we did not 
address the issue of whether the EMU as such is conducive to such 
imbalances to emerge. So, we consider the reaction to a period of 
mounting imbalances, like in 1999-2007, rather than the reasons 
behind it. Thus, we do not ask the causes of the crisis, but try to 
find a remedy for it. We also find that, even though the EMU 
would stay sustainable, the adjustment patterns with respect to the 
emerged imbalances entail a major polarisation within the Mone-
tary Union which is likely to lead to political tensions. 
Above, we have basically taken two approaches to the issue of 
sustainability: a technical one concerning the existence of a deter-
minate solution for the euro area model and a policy point of view 
playing a bigger role in reality. As to the fiscal consolidation, we 
inferred that it takes a lot of time and the debt ratio in the problem 
country may rise to a very high level.6 This may make it implau-
sible that the debtor country could reassure the financial markets 
Figure 12. Wage developments in the weak country 1 under an internal revaluation 
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How to restore sustainability of the euro? 335of its solvency. This would call for a more stringent fiscal adjust-
ment rule in the country concerned. The problem with the 
adjustment is that a strict fiscal policy leads to a cut in output, 
which leads to a higher debt ratio. This would call for an enlarge-
ment of the NKM model to describe the behaviour of the private 
sector under fiscal consolidation in the sense that a lower scenario 
of the public debt developments can have a boosting effect on 
private consumer behaviour through an expected reduction in 
taxation. On the other hand, we could expect that the public debt 
ratios rise also permanently because in private sector portfolios 
private assets are substituted for those of the public sector in the 
crisis. We leave these issues for future consideration. 
The mounting debt ratios in the problem countries cast a doubt 
on whether the EMU can successfully manage its current crisis. In 
the spring of 2012 fears and speculation emerged that Greece 
would have to leave the euro area. What this would imply for the 
monetary policy and stability of the banking sector falls outside 
the realm of the present paper. 
We inferred that far-reaching and successful structural reforms 
are sufficient to restore the sustainability of the euro in terms of 
containing the public sector indebtedness, as it seems that in the 
case of rising future interest rates by the ECB austerity in the public 
finances may not be sufficient to achieve this alone. Fiscal devalua-
tion is quite an effective tool in stabilising the EMU and in 
reducing the otherwise marked disparities in adjustment to the 
debt crisis within the Monetary Union.
It is difficult to definitely argue how much and how rapid a 
macroeconomic adjustment is in reality needed in order to restore 
euro and overcome the present crisis. We have illustrated some of 
the ways to reach a better balance in the euro area. It is, however, 
true that many aspects like the stability in the financial markets are 
not at all well captured in macroeconomic modelling like the NKM 
model. The relevance of our approach stems from the fact that a 
better balance in the real and nominal overall economy is also 
conducive to a better balance in the financial markets. However, 
the financial markets react to macroeconomic developments with 
6. We did not here assume any asset privatisation in the problem country assumed in OECD 
(2011).
Kari E.O. Alho336a lead and do not properly discount future developments. There-
fore, it is difficult to assure the markets in the short term of future 
stringent adjustment as these policies typically take quite some 
time to be successfully put into effect. 
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Kari E.O. Alho338Appendix. Derivation of the IS curve and specification 
of the interest rate rule
We start from the goods market equilibrium, written in terms of 
log deviations from the steady state
(30)
where q is the output gap, c is consumption expenditure, i invest-
ment, x exports and m imports (measured in terms of the domestic 
price level), z the fiscal impulse and the wi’s are the equilibrium 
shares of respective variables in relation to output. From an inter-
temporal optimisation we derive the consumption expenditure
(31)
where v is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and θ depicts 
the time preference. Based on the cost minimisation by firms we 
can write the following investment equation
. (32)
The export equation is based on the import demand function of 
the importer country, so that typically for the country k,
, (33)
where comp is the competitiveness of the country k, i.e. the real 
exchange rate and δ is the relevant elasticity of substitution. We 
divide exports and imports to those of the EMU country with the 
EMU partner and rest of the world, with shares of wk,EMU and 
wk,REST, k = X,M, summing to unity. 
Let us next insert first (31), (32) and (33) into (30) and write it, 
in a standard manner, for the next period t+1 and take expecta-
tions on both sides, and subtract this equation from Equation (30). 
Let us approximate that investment is in the long run roughly a 
constant share of the capital stock being in a constant relation to 
aggregate output, so that the expected investment term on the 
right-hand side can be written to be the same as the expected 
output gap. These steps give first the following equation, (we omit 
 ,it C it I it X it M it it itq w c w i w x w m z ε= + + − + +
, , 1 , , 1
1
( ),i t t i t i t t i tc E c r E π θν+ +
= − − −
 , , , , 1( )i t i t i t t i ti q r Eτ π += − −
 * andkt t kt kt kt ktx q comp m q compδ δ= + = −
How to restore sustainability of the euro? 339here the separation of the exports and imports into those within 
and outside of EMU), 
(34)
Let us next assume that competitiveness obeys the following 
type of return to normality adjustment, based on price and wage 
setting reacting to the existing gap in competitiveness and 
expected output. If competitiveness is bad, there is less room for 
price and wage rises, and competitiveness returns to normality. 
Similarly, if the current output gap is positive, the wage rises are 
more moderate. So, competitiveness adjusts as follows, 
, (35)
where the parameters are positive and the superscript E denotes the 
equilibrium. Let us further assume that the expected change in the 
fiscal impulse depends negatively on the existing impulse,
, (36)
where χ is positive. This implies that there is a solvency rule opera-
ting in public finances. Similarly, we assume that the change in the 
expected foreign output gap obeys a return back to parity. 
We further want to allow for that typically we cannot realisti-
cally specify that production would be a jump variable. So, a part 
of the agents are backward looking and liquidity constrained, 
while a part of them are forward looking in the manner described 
above, see Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004). There are also costs in 
adjusting production to meet the demand. This enlargement 
means that we introduce into the model the lagged output gap and 
divide the impact of the expected output to this term and the 
lagged output gap. Then, altogether, we can get the following IS 
curve, being a mixture of forward and backward looking curves 
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Kari E.O. Alho340This is the basis of our specification of the modified IS curve in 
the section 4 from the basic one in Equation (1) above. Calibration 
takes place so that the short run fiscal multiplier of z is around 0.7. 
The lag structure is specified so that the fiscal impulse vanishes in 
around three years. These conditions stipulate the parameter χ to 
be 0.5 and γ1 = 0.3 and γ2 = 0.6.
We assume that the EMU is a small open region in the sense 
that it does not have an impact on the global economy, so that the 
global output gap q* obeys the developments influenced by a 
demand shock mentioned above in Section 4.2.
Let us still specify the interest rate rule by the ECB assumed in 
the paper in Section 4. We specify for the target interest rate rT and 
the actual rate r the following,
(38)
where r0 is 1% and the function raux is zero up to the year 2015, 
and then rises in two years to unity and stays there. The parameters 
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THE EUROPEAN REDEMPTION PACT
AN ILLUSTRATIVE GUIDE1
Hasan Doluca, Malte Hübner, Dominik Rumpf and Benjamin Weigert
German Council of Economic Experts, Wiesbaden, Germany
The European Redemption Pact (ERP), a proposal of the German Council of 
Economic Experts, describes an exit strategy from the debt crisis which 
currently plagues the euro area. The pact includes a binding commitment of all 
participating countries to bring public debt ratios below the reference value of 
60% within the next 20 to 25 years. To ensure that this objective can be reached 
with realistic primary balances, participating countries can transfer their exces-
sive debt exceeding the 60% threshold at a certain date, into a redemption fund 
for which participating member countries are jointly and severally liable. In 
this technical paper, we describe in detail one possible way of implementing 
the ERP and the primary balances each country would need to achieve under 
the proposal. 
Keywords:  European Redemption Pact, European debt crisis.
In their for now latest attempt to solve the European debt 
crisis, policy makers at the EU summit in January 2012 decided to 
introduce a fiscal compact aimed at initiating a reduction in exces-
sive sovereign debt. While this decision laid the foundations for 
solving the debt crisis, one cannot rule out that individual member 
countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) get into refinan-
cing difficulties until financial markets have been convinced that 
the agreed consolidation process is being upheld. The high degree 
of uncertainty on financial markets is reflected in the still high risk 
1. An updated and extended version of this paper has been published as: Doluca H., Hübner 
M., Rumpf D., B. Weigert, 2012. “The European Redemption Pact: Implementation and 
Macroeconomic Effects.” Intereconomics 47(4): 230–239.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 127 (2013)
Hasan Doluca, Malte Hübner, Dominik Rumpf and Benjamin Weigert342premiums on sovereign debt. At these interest rates, the consolida-
tion path agreed upon in the fiscal compact requires member 
countries with high debt ratios to run primary surpluses at levels 
which only very few countries were so far able to sustain over a 
prolonged period of time. 
Given the herd instinct and high degree of uncertainty still 
prevailing in financial markets, there is still the danger that an 
abrupt loss in market confidence can swiftly turn into a “self-fulfil-
ling prophecy” among investors. The massive surge in interest 
rates thus triggered then actually calls into question whether the 
public debt of a country is actually sustainable. Therefore, we 
cannot exclude that financing terms for some EMU member 
countries deteriorate further, even when the respective member 
countries have undertaken credible and essentially appropriate 
reforms. In the extreme case, such a country may no longer be able 
to refinance outstanding bonds in the international financial 
market, and a liquidity crisis could then turn into a solvency crisis. 
To regain the trust of the markets, the consolidation targets of 
the fiscal compact have to be backed by realistic paths for primary 
balances. At the same time, to give EMU member countries time to 
reach required primary balances, one has to ensure that sudden 
outbursts of a liquidity crisis can be adequately dealt with. 
However, these measures must neither rely on the European 
Central Bank to buy up government bonds nor imply unlimited 
joint financing through Eurobonds. In addition, a successful 
mechanism for addressing potential liquidity crisis should func-
tion pre-emptively and not only after a crisis occurs such as the 
EFSF/ESM. The European Redemption Pact (ERP), a proposal of the 
German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE), describes an exit 
strategy from the debt crisis which fulfils these requirements.
1. European Redemption Pact—The proposal
The proposal, which is described in detail in the Council’s 
annual report of the year 2011 demands that member countries 
engage in an irrevocable consolidation of their public finances in 
return for support in time of a liquidity crisis2. The key idea of the 
2. The respective chapter of the annual economic report 2011/12 and additional information 
on the ERP can be downloaded from www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de. 
The European Redemption Pact: An illustrative guide 343proposal is to separate the public debt of participating member 
countries into a part that is compatible with the debt threshold of 
60% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stipulated in the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) and the excessive debt above this thres-
hold. Under the proposal, the EMU member countries’ debt 
exceeding the 60% ceiling on a certain date will be transferred into 
the European Redemption Fund (ERF) for which the EMU members 
are jointly and severally liable. In return, the participating 
countries would enter into payment obligations towards the ERF 
that are calculated such that each country would repay its trans-
ferred debts within 20 to 25 years. Through the joint and several 
guarantees for the fund, highly indebted member countries pay a 
lower interest rate on their transferred debt. This reduction in refi-
nancing costs reduces primary balances required for reducing debt 
ratios below the 60% threshold.  
The possibility to take advantage of lower financing costs for 
the transferred debt is associated with strict conditions. In parti-
cular, these conditions comprise earmarking the revenue of a 
designated tax for fulfilling the payment obligations, depositing 
collaterals and an obligation to commit to consolidation and struc-
tural reforms. After transferring excessive debt into the ERF, the 
remaining national debt must thereafter not again exceed a level of 
60% of GDP. To this end, debt brakes would be introduced in all 
participating countries based on the German and Swiss models. In 
particular, after a transition period, these debt brakes must 
constrain the structural deficit below the level of 0.5% of GDP set 
out in the SGP. 
Participation in the pact is open to all euro area countries. 
However, one has to distinguish between those states that are 
currently running a structural adjustment programme and the 
other member countries of the EMU. Countries that are currently 
running a structural adjustment programme can join the redemp-
tion pact immediately, but their debts can only be transferred to 
the redemption fund after the successful conclusion of the respec-
tive adjustment programme. Concerning the other member 
countries, at the very least, those countries should take part whose 
debt ratios exceed the level of 60% of GDP. At present, these would 
be Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, the 
Netherlands, and Spain. 
Hasan Doluca, Malte Hübner, Dominik Rumpf and Benjamin Weigert344The central parameters of the ERP are consistent with the deficit 
and debt rules of the intensified Stability and Growth Pact and the 
fiscal compact. In particular, the commitment to redeeming the 
debt in the ERF within 20 to 25 years corresponds to the stipula-
tions calling for annual debt reduction by 1/20th of debt exceeding 
the target level of 60% of GDP. Moreover, the commitment to 
implement national debt brakes, the key element of the fiscal 
compact, already fulfils a central precondition for the implementa-
tion of the ERP. 
To make the proposal operational countries enter in payment-
obligations against the fund in return for being allowed to transfer 
part of their debt. Two questions are important: (i) how can debt be 
transferred into the fund? and (ii) how must the payment-obliga-
tions be designed to ensure timely redemption? 
Transferring debt into the redemption fund is organized by 
allowing participating member countries to refinance themselves 
through the redemption fund until the amount of debt refinanced 
through the ERF reaches the current difference between the debt 
accumulated to date and the hypothetical debt that would just 
equal 60% of GDP, i.e. the SGP debt threshold (Figure 1). The exact 
Figure 1. Debt ratios in the euro area (2011)*
*In relation to Gross Domestic Product at current prices. BEL-Belgium, DEU-Germany, EST-Estonia, EUZ-Euro Zone, 
FIN-Finland, FRA-France, GRC-Greece, IRL-Ireland, ITA-Italy, LUX-Luxembourg, MLT-Malta, NLD-Netherlands, AUT-
Austria, PRT-Portugal, SVK-Slovakia, SVN-Slovenia, ESP-Spain, CYP-Cyprus.
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The European Redemption Pact: An illustrative guide 345length of this transitional phase depends on the sequence of 
immediate refinancing needs. During this so-called roll-in phase, 
the participating countries fulfil consolidation and reform agree-
ments which are comparable to the structural adjustment 
programmes of the EFSF. While each country will henceforth have 
to service its own debt financed via the new fund until it is comple-
tely redeemed and the new fund expires, participants will be 
jointly liable for the debt, thus ascertaining affordable refinancing 
cost for all participants.
Payment-obligations through which the transferred debt is 
redeemed are expressed as a constant fraction of GDP. The scale of 
annual payment-obligations relates to the volume of transferred 
debt. It is set at a level that ensures that each country redeems its 
debt in the ERF within a period of 20 to 25 years. Accordingly, 
countries transferring more debt have to bear higher annual 
payment-obligations. As the ERF can only gain the trust of finan-
cial markets if the joint and several guarantee is upheld until the 
transferred debt is completely redeemed, payment obligations 
have to be constructed in a way that all participating countries 
complete the redemption of their debt inside the ERF at approxi-
mately the same time.  
By agreeing to redeem their debt in the redemption fund within 
25 years and to keep the remaining debt below the 60%-threshold, 
participating countries implicitly commit to certain upper limits 
for their primary balances and debt quotas. The exact development 
of these figures depends on several assumptions on GDP growth 
and country specific refinancing costs. In addition, required 
primary balances are determined by the sequencing of refinancing 
needs that each country is allowed to cover through the redemp-
tion fund during the roll-in phase. In general, there are several 
options to implement the ERP, which differ mainly in the exact 
sequencing of refinancing via the funds. In the following, we study 
the development of primary balances for one possible implementa-
tion of the ERP.
2. Implementing the ERP—Illustrative examples  
and calculations
In this section we describe in detail one possible way of imple-
menting the ERP together with the set of assumptions. Thereby, 
Hasan Doluca, Malte Hübner, Dominik Rumpf and Benjamin Weigert346answers are given to technical questions that arise when imple-
menting the ERP like, e.g., how the debt of each country will be 
transferred into the ERF and how payment obligations for each 
country are calculated.
2.1. Designing the roll-in phase
The total amount that each country is allowed to refinance via 
the ERF depends on the amount of debt that exceeds the threshold 
of 60% debt of GDP as set out by the Maastricht-Treaty at a certain 
date (To simplify the subsequent analysis, we use 1 January 2012 as 
the starting date of the ERF). Countries that are currently showing 
high deficit figures might be admitted to transfer a slightly higher 
amount. Without this deficit surcharge, which was not part of the 
original proposal of the GCEE, they would either face unrealisti-
cally high consolidation needs during the first years or end up with 
a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding the 60%-ceiling after the roll-in 
phase. In the following, we design the deficit surcharge in a way 
that prevents high deficit countries from having to improve their 
fiscal balance by more than two percentage points in 2012. Under 
these assumptions, the total volume to be refinanced by the ERF 
adds up to 2 327 billion euro (Table 1). Together with the deficit 
surcharges which prevent the eventual size of the ERF would stand 
at 2 378 billion euro. Of this amount, Italy would account for 963 
billion euro or 40% of the debt in the ERF, followed by Germany 
with 558 billion euro or 23% and France with 533 billion euro or 
22% (Table 1).
In our calculations, the transfer of national debt to the ERF will 
be stretched over three to four years—the roll-in phase. Depending 
on whether short term treasury notes are included or not, a longer 
roll-in phase can be constructed for most countries. In most cases a 
country’s refinancing needs during the first three years exceed by 
far the amount to be transferred to the ERF. Given the large 
amount of short term debt, the total amount to be transferred is 
allocated such that 50% is used in the first, 30% in the second and 
20% in the third year. However, any other allocation rule, e.g. 
33.33% in each year, can be implemented without altering the 
basic results. Under this scenario, Italy would be allowed to roll-in 
debt of about 963 billion euro which covers nearly 100% of the 
refinancing needs over the four years 2012 to 2015 (Table 1) and 
The European Redemption Pact: An illustrative guide 347no specific allocation rule would be necessary. In contrast, 
Germany with a much lower debt-to-GDP ratio and consequently 
less debt exceeding the 60% threshold would cover only a fraction 
of its refinancing needs by using the ERF. The same holds true for 
the Netherlands that covers only (10.9%) of its total refinancing 
needs via ERF. 
Table 1. Financing of general governments via ERF1 within 
the roll-in phase2
Euro billion
2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
Germany Financial demand   399.0   342.0   192.0   197.0   1.130.0
  thereof via ERF    279.2    167.5    111.7    0.0    558.4
  Ratio (%)    70.0    49.0    58.2    0.0    49.4
France Financial demand   381.0   202.0   155.0   162.0   900.0
  thereof via ERF    266.4    159.8    106.5    0.0    532.7
  Ratio (%)    69.9    79.1    68.7    0.0    59.2
Italy Financial demand   422.0   211.0   171.0   169.0   973.0
  thereof via ERF    422.0    211.0    171.0    159.3    963.3
  Ratio (%)    100.0    100.0    100.0    94.2    99.0
Spain Financial demand   205.0   107.0   86.0   58.0   456.0
  thereof via ERF    60.7    36.4    24.3    0.0    121.5
  Ratio (%)    29.6    34.1    28.3    0.0    26.6
Netherlands Financial demand   88.0   53.0   46.0   49.5   236.5
  thereof via ERF    12.9    7.8    5.2    0.0    25.8
  Ratio (%)    14.7    14.6    11.2    0.0    10.9
Belgium Financial demand   72.0   40.5   35.0   34.0   181.5
  thereof via ERF    68.9    40.5    28.4    0.0    137.7
  Ratio (%)    95.7    100.0    81.1    0.0    75.9
Austria Financial demand   22.5   20.0   29.5   18.0   90.0
  thereof via ERF    18.3    11.0    7.3    0.0    36.7
  Ratio (%)    81.5    55.0    24.9    0.0    40.7
Cyprus Financial demand   2.2   3.9   1.4   2.5   10.0
  thereof via ERF    0.7    0.4    0.3    0.0    1.3
  Ratio (%)    30.0    10.2    18.9    0.0    13.2
Malta Financial demand – – – –    0.0
  thereof via ERF    0.3    0.2    0.1    0.0    0.6
  Ratio (%) – – – – n/a
Total3 Financial demand   1591.7   979.4   715.9   690.0   3977.0
  thereof via ERF   1129.4   634.6   454.8   159.3      2378.0 a)
  Ratio (%)    71.0    64.8    63.5    23.1    59.8
1. European Redemption Fund. 2. Own calculation, basic data from Thomson Financial Datastream as of 30 January 
2012. 3) Without Malta.– a) The financing amount via ERF for some countries is slightly increased to avoid unrealistic 
high improvements of primary balances in 2012, while achieving debt to GDP ratio to decline below 60% of GDP at 
the end of the roll-in phase. For this reason the amount lies above the total overhang of debt exceeding the level of 
60% of GDP at the end of 2011 by about 50 billion euro.
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The scale of annual payment-obligations depends on the 
volume of transferred debt. Countries transferring more debt have 
to bear higher annual payment-obligations. A country’s annual 
payments to the fund are a constant fraction of GDP—the “annual 
payment key.” They have to comprise the pro-rated interest 
payments by the redemption fund on its transferred debt and a 
redemption payment. Given a certain annual payment key, the 
time until a country has redeemed is debt in the fund depends on 
the assumed growth rate and the refinancing costs of the ERF. 
Given our assumptions on future real GDP growth, it turns out 
that all debt in the Redemption Fund is redeemed after a period of 
20 to 25 years if the annual payment keys are calculated according 
the following two-step rule: First, total payments in the first year 
equal one percent of the amount of debt to be transferred plus the 
ERF’s pro-rated annual interest payments. In a second step, the 
sum of these two components is then set in relation to the 
country’s 2011 GDP. This ratio is the annual payment key, which 
is kept constant from then on. More precisely, a country’s annual 
payment key is obtained from the following formula:
This formula illustrates that with economic growth, a country’s 
payment-obligations rise in absolute terms over the course of time.
Annual payments to the fund start in the first year even though 
not all debt has been transferred to the fund. During the roll-in 
phase, the annual payments are therefore corrected to reflect not 
yet transferred amounts of debt (Table 2). 
 annual payment key  (interest rate ERF  1 percentage point)
amount to be transferred to the ERF 
GDP of 2011
= + ×
The European Redemption Pact: An illustrative guide 349Table 2. Illustrative calculation of annual payment obligations
Assumptions
GDP 2011 ................................................. € 1 000.00 billion
GDP 2012 .................................................  € 1 030.00 billion
Public debt 2011 ......................................  € 900.00 billion
Ratio of public debt to GDP (2011) ......... 90%
Interest rate of ERF-bonds1 ...................... 4%
Debt to be transferred and annual payment key
Total volume of debt to be transferred to the 
ERF1 ..........................................................  € 300 billion [Public debt] – 60% * [GDP2011]
Debt transfer to the ERF in year   
2012..........................................................  € 150 billion  
2013..........................................................  90 billion  
2014..........................................................  60 billion  
Annual payment key ................................ 1.5% [Interest rate of the ERF] + [1% 
"redemption charge"] * [total debt 






Debt not yet transferred to the ERF1) ......  € 150.00 billion  (= 90 billion + 60 billion)
a2012 = Hypothetical payment allocation if the 
total amount to be financed by the ERF 




a2012 * [Debt not yet transferred]/




– Correction for debt not yet transferred to 
the ERF .....................................................
 
€ 7.50 billion 
= Payment-obligations in 2012 ................  € 7.50 billion 
Account balance at the end of 2012
Liability against ERF at the beginning of 2012 € 0.00 billion 
 
[Interest rate of the ERF] *€ 150 bn
 
+ Debt transfer to the ERF in 2012...........  € 150.00 billion 
+ Financing costs ......................................  € 6.00 billion 
– Payment-obligations in 2012.................  € 7.50 billion 
= Liability against ERF at the end of 2012 € 148.50 billion 
2013
Payment-obligations for 2013
Debt not yet transferred to the ERF1 .......  € 60.00 billion  
a2013 = Hypothetical payment allocation  
if the total amount to be financed by the ERF 
would have been already transferred to the 
ERF in 2013 ...............................................
 
["annual payment key"] *[GDP2012]
a2013 * [Debt not yet transferred]/
[Total debt to be transferred]
 
 
€ 15.45 billion 




= Payment-obligations in 2013 ................  € 12.36 billion 
Account balance at the end of 2013
Liability against ERF at the beginning  
of 2013 .....................................................  € 148.50 billion 
 
 
[Interest rate of the ERF] *€ 238.5 bn
 
 
+ Debt transfer to the ERF in 2013...........  € 90.00 billion 
+ Financing costs ......................................  € 9.54 billion 
– Payment-obligations in 2013.................  €12.36 billion 
= Liability against ERF at the end of 2013  € 235.68 billion 
1. European Redemption Fund.
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To discuss in detail how each country’s fiscal position will be 
affected by participating in the ERP as well as the resulting evolu-
tion of their stock of public-debt it is helpful to use a simple 
theoretical framework of public debt dynamics. A country’s gross 
public debt ratio to GDP ratio (d ≡ Debt/GDP) evolves over time 
according to the following stylized dynamic equation:
(1)
with it denoting the average nominal interest rate to be paid on the 
amount of public debt at year t, gt denoting the year t growth rate 
of nominal GDP and pt denoting the primary fiscal balance relative 
to GDP. The primary fiscal balance is the balance before interest 
payments are deducted and is essentially comparable to a 
company’s earnings before interest position (EBIT) on the Profit 
and Loss Statement. By using this stylized model, we abstract from 
any one time effects that directly affect the stock of gross public 
debt like receipts from privatization or additional liabilities 
assumed by bank bailout packages. These are not in all cases consi-
dered in the official deficit figure.
As can be seen from Equation (1), a consolidation path can be 
expressed as target values for the debt ratio or as targets for the 
primary balance. In the former case, primary balances required to 
meet the desired reduction in debt ratios become a function of 
assumed interest- and growth rates. In the latter case, commitment 
to a certain path for primary balances ties down debt ratios which 
also depend on the assumption on interest- and growth rates. 
Participation in the ERP defines a target debt ratio of 60% to be 
reached after no more than 25 years. In addition, the level of 
annual payments to the ERF affects the consolidation path for the 
next 25 years. With the path of debt ratios fixed, we thus see that 
the primary balances as required by the ERP become a function of 
assumed growth-, and interest rates.
As can be seen directly from equation (1) certain assumptions 
about key parameters are necessary to calculate the evolution of 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio, namely, the average nominal interest 
rate that will prevail in the future and prospective nominal GDP 
growth rates. Additionally, after joining the ERP a part of a 
( )t 1 t t t t td -d   i g d p+ = − −
The European Redemption Pact: An illustrative guide 351country’s public debt is refinanced via the ERP while the remainder 
is still refinanced on the market. Therefore we need to distinguish 
between two different nominal interest rates, interest rates that 
will be paid by the ERP and interest rates that will be paid by the 
sovereign on financial markets. The crucial interest rate for total 
debt dynamics is the weighted average of both interest rates. 
2.4. Assumptions: Interest rates
With regard to interest rates we consider two different scena-
rios. The first scenario covers the current situation with highly 
stratified interest rates for various member countries of the euro 
area and assumes sustained high interest rates for most of the 
member countries (scenario “without ERP”). In the case of Italy 
interest rates of 7% were already reached and even surpassed 
during the past months and there is the risk that high interest rates 
will prevail in the future. 
The second scenario describes the interest rates likely to prevail 
after the introduction of the ERP (scenario “ERP”). Of course, for 
this scenario, it is essential to come up with a plausible assumption 
on the refinancing costs for the ERF. The main challenge in this 
respect is to assess how the financial market will receive the new 
bond class created by the ERF. 
Bond yields depend, alongside other factors, in particular on 
the following two key parameters: (1) probability of default and (2) 
the bond’s liquidity. When trying to project the interest rates on 
bonds to be issued by the ERF one can thus draw on the yields of 
existing bonds which are also guaranteed by European countries. 
Bonds issued by the European Investment Bank (EIB) or the Euro-
pean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) are therefore a natural 
reference point for potential yields on ERF bonds. For ten-year 
bonds, these two institutions currently pay interest rates of around 
3.0% and 3.3% respectively (as of 23 January 2012). For the two 
reference bonds (EIB, EFSF) the default probability can be consi-
dered to be comparable to that of the bonds to be issued by the 
ERF. With respect to the EFSF, it bears remarking that only partial 
liability is involved, and thus there is a somewhat higher default 
probability than under joint and several liability.
Hasan Doluca, Malte Hübner, Dominik Rumpf and Benjamin Weigert352Market liquidity for ERF bonds would presumably be higher 
than that for the two reference bonds. The impact of a more liquid 
market on the yield can best be estimated by comparing the yields 
between the bonds issued by the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(KfW) and the far more liquid Bunds. A ten-year paper issued by 
KfW is currently traded at about 0.5 percentage points higher than 
the Bunds despite the identical default probability. The liquidity 
advantage for the ERF bonds will probably be on a similar order.
Based on these considerations, financing costs of the ERF can be 
expected to fall within a range of around 2.5% to 3%. However, 
higher yields also seem possible given present market uncertainty. 
In the light of the currently exceptionally low-interest rate envi-
ronment for risk less assets, yields above those on bonds issued by 
EFSF, i.e. around 3.3%, seem improbable, however. To reflect a 
future normalisation of the interest rate, we assume ERF’s financing 
costs of 4%—compared to an EFSF interest rate of 3.3% today. 
Furthermore in the scenario “ERP” interest rates on nationally 
issued debt are assumed to be significantly higher, but still lower 
than in the scenario “without ERP” (Table 3). Exceptions are those 
countries in the euro area that currently benefit from lower interest 
rates due to safe haven effects, i.e. Germany and the Netherlands. 
For these countries, interest rates on nationally issued debt would 
normalize with the introduction of the ERF. Accordingly, for these 
countries we assume higher interest rates in the “ERP”—scenario 
than in the scenario “without ERP”.
2.5. Assumptions: Nominal GDP growth 
GDP in the year 2012 is assumed to grow according to the 
growth forecast of the European Commission as published in the 
AMECO database for each country in November 2011. From the 
year 2013 on, we assume a growth rate of nominal GDP of 3%, 
which is derived from a growth rate of real GDP of 1 – 1.5% and an 
average inflation rate of 1.5 – 2% being in line with the inflation 
target of the ECB. As growth prospects are less favourable for the 
year 2012, GDP growth is lower for that year compared to the long 
term growth rate of nominal GDP assumed for any year beyond 
2012. 
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Based on these assumptions, we are now able to calculate 
primary balances, debt ratios and the evolution of the size of the 
ERF over time. 
3.1. Primary balances
During the roll-in phase primary balances improve step-wise up 
to the level that is necessary to fulfil the requirements of the 
national debt brakes which ensure a structural deficit below 0.5% 
of GDP and national debt (i.e debt not transferred to ERF) not 
exceeding 60% of GDP. For each scenario, Table 4 shows the 
maximum primary surplus that has to be reached between 2012 
and 2035. Taking Italy as an example, we see that it needs to run a 
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1. European Redemption Pact. 
2. European Redemption Fund.
Source: EU (November 2011), own calculations.
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of the debt brakes, even when it can benefit from reduced interest 
rates achieved by the implementation of the ERP (Table 4, column 
“Primary balances required to meet budget rules with ERP”). From 
a historical perspective, this constitutes already the upper bound of 
primary balances that can be sustained over a longer time horizon. 
Only a small number of countries were able to sustain primary 
balances well beyond 4% of GDP for a decade (Figure 2). However, 
most of these countries faced more favourable macroeconomic 
conditions during their fiscal consolidation than what we expe-
rience in the euro area today.
To achieve the same debt reduction path without the imple-
mentation of the ERP, Italy would have to achieve a maximum 
primary surplus of 6.8% (Table 4, column “Primary balance 
required too meet budget rules without ERP”). This is well above 
the maximum primary balances observed historically. At the inte-
rest rates prevailing in the “without-ERP”-scenario, Italy already 
needs a primary surplus of 4.8% only to stabilize the debt-to-GDP 
ratio (Table 4, column “Primary balance required to stabilize 
current debt ratio without ERP”). This means that in case interest 
rates prevail at a level of 7% over the coming years, any successful 
consolidation would probably be just enough to compensate for 
the resulting higher interest payments, without being able to 
Figure 2. Primary balances of selected countries*
* In relation to nominal GDP. Highest average primary balance over a ten-year period. Years in brackets are the last 
year of the respective period.
Source: IMF.
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The European Redemption Pact: An illustrative guide 355reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. These illustrative calculations show 
that bringing down risk-premiums on sovereign debt is necessary 
precondition for a successful reduction of debt-to-GDP ratios in 
the euro area.
3.2. Evolution of the ERF volume over time
With the beginning of the roll-in phase, participating countries 
start serving and redeeming their debt inside the ERF. As a conse-
quence, even though the size of the ERF grows during the roll-in 
phase, its maximum size of 2 281 billion euro is slightly smaller 
than the total sum of all amounts refinanced by the ERF which add 
up to 2 378 billion Euros. With the end of the roll-in phase the 
fund begins to shrink in size. As each country’s annual payment to 
the ERF is defined as a fixed percentage of nominal GDP the actual 
annual amount paid to the fund grows at the same rate as GDP. In 
addition, the share of interest payments in annual payment obliga-
tions declines relative to the share of payments devoted to 
redeeming debt.  While initially, annual payments to the fund are 
mainly used to service interest payments, redemption is getting 
Table 4. Consolidation requirements and ERP1, 2
Primary balance 
in 2011
Primary balance required … Improvement of 
actual primary balance 
required to meet 
budget rules…





actual structural with ERP without ERP without ERP with ERP without ERP
Percent of GDP Percent of GDP Percentage points
Germany    1.1    1.6 1.8 0.0 0.9 0.7
France -3.2 -1.2 2.4 3.0 1.2 5.6 6.2
Italy    0.9    4.1 4.2 6.8 4.7 3.2 5.8
Spain -4.5 -1.7 2.5 4.0 2.7 6.9 8.5
Netherlands -2.4    0.1 1.5 1.4 0.0 3.9 3.8
Belgium -0.3 -0.7 2.9 4.2 2.4 3.3 4.5
Austria -0.8    0.1 2.2 2.4 1.1 3.0 3.2
Cyprus -4.3 -1.3 2.3 3.8 2.5 6.6 8.1
Malta    0.2 -0.2 2.7 3.3 2.0 2.5 3.1
1. European Redemption Pact. 2. Own calculations, November 2011. 3. Maximum primary balance which is neces-
sary to ensure deficit does not exceed 0.5% of GDP and national debt does not exceed 60% of GDP if ERP would be 
implemented. Without ERP: Maximum primary balance needed to reach same evolution of debt ratio.
Source: EU (November 2011).
Hasan Doluca, Malte Hübner, Dominik Rumpf and Benjamin Weigert356more and more important towards the end of the retention period. 
The speed at which the volume of the ERF shrinks in time therefore 
accelerates over time. In 2035 each country makes its final 
payment to the fund and the ERF ceases to exist (Figure 3). 
3.3. Detailed results by country
After having described all the elements of the ERF and the 
specific timing of events, we can illustrate the impact of imple-
menting the ERP for each participating country in detail. Italy may 
serve as an illustrative example (Figure 9): The top left panel 
summarises a country’s key macroeconomic data together with 
information about total public debt, annual payments to the ERF 
and crucial parameters used in the various scenarios. Given that 
Italy had a debt-to-GDP ratio of 120.5% at the end of the year 
2011, it receives a credit line of 963 billion euro from the ERF. 
During the roll-in phase this credit line is used to refinance nearly 
all maturing national debt via the ERF. Successively, all debt in the 
ERF is redeemed until 2035 (Figure 9, top right panel). To achieve 
the envisaged debt reduction, the primary balance needs to be 
improved from 0.9% in 2011 to a maximum of 4.2% in 2015 
(Figure 9, middle left panel). In comparison, without the ERP and 
sustained high interest rates, the primary balance to achieve the 
Figure 3. Debt in European Redemption Fund by country*












The European Redemption Pact: An illustrative guide 357same level of debt reduction has to be improved from 0.9% in 2011
to a maximum of 6.8% in 2015. 
To illustrate the influence of interest rates on required consoli-
dation efforts, we have so far taken interest rates and a sequence of
debt-to-GDP-ratios as given and calculated the primary balances
associated with these consolidation paths. As equation (1) shows,
we can also make a different thought-experiment and hold primary
balances constant and ask to what extent debt-ratios can be
reduced under different interest-rate scenarios. If we apply diffe-
rent interest rate scenarios to the primary balances obtained under
the scenario “ERP”, we get a range of debt levels (Figure 9, middle
right panel). Assuming that Italy would achieve exactly the same
primary balances as previously calculated for the scenario “ERP”
(Figure 9, middle left panel), without the favourable interest rate
environment obtained by implementing the ERP, the debt-to-GDP
ratio would increase above 130% in the year 2035. On the
contrary, when achieving a reduction of interest rates to the levels
assumed in the “ERP”-scenario, Italy’s debt would, by construction,
be reduced to 60% until 2035 with the same primary balances. 
The reason for the significant difference in debt levels achieved
are the interest payments resulting from the low refinancing costs
of the ERF and the expected normalisation of interest rates of
nationally issued debt. Even if the latter won’t play out, i.e. interest
rates for nationally issued debt prevail at high levels, Italy’s debt-
to-GDP level would decrease enormously. Finally, the bottom table
gives detailed information about Italy’s envisaged account balance
evolution within the ERF and the debt evolution composed by
debt issued nationally and through the ERF.
For most of the countries the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2035, the
final year of the ERP, is well below 60%. This is due the underlying
binding budget rules which call for a structural deficit of at most
0.5% of GDP and for a debt ratio—excluding debt transferred to
ERF—not exceeding the target value of 60%. For all countries
except Italy the former rule is binding which implies national debt
ratios to fall below 60%. Only in periods of high redemptions in
the ERF the latter rule can require deficits lower than 0.5% of GDP
or even surpluses. Under the assumed growth rates, this is the case
only for Italy, which therefore ends up with a debt ratio of exactly
60% in 2035. 
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between countries for two reasons: interest rates for nationally 
issued debt range from 3.5% to 5% and the initial debt level varies 
from around 60% to 120%. As indicated by our stylized model of 
debt dynamic, an interest rate range of 3.5% to 5% at a debt-to-
GDP ratio of 60% will necessarily result in a primary balance 
spread of up to 1 percentage point. A country like Malta or Cyprus 
will therefore face a tighter fiscal policy over the 25 year horizon 
than the Netherlands even though the latter have a higher initial 
debt level. 
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have illustrated one possible implementation 
of the European Redemption Pact proposed by the German 
Council of Economic Experts. Based on a set of assumptions about 
future growth rates and interest rates of bonds issued by sovereigns 
and under joint and several liability, we were able to illustrate 
primary balances required in each of the euro area member 
countries to reduce public debt below the 60% threshold 
enshrined in the SGP within the next 20-25 years. Our calculations 
show that required primary balances become sustainable if interest 
rates on public debt can be reduced by allowing member countries 
of the euro area (that are not yet taking part in an adjustment 
program) to transfer their excessive debt beyond the 60% thres-
hold into a redemption fund that is able to issue bonds under joint 
and several liability.
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2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Development of debt 2
ERF account
remaining national debt within ERF
scenario "without ERP"scenario "ERP"
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2025 2030 2034 2035
Debt within ERF (Euro billion)
account balance (beginning of year) 0 18,1 28,8 35,6 35,1 34,4 33,6 25,4 15,5 4,2 0,9
+ refinancing via ERF 18,3 11,0 7,3 – – – – – – – –
= account balance (beginning of year,
transferred to ERF) 18,3 29,1 36,1 35,6 35,1 34,4 33,6 25,4 15,5 4,2 0,9
+ interest rates 0,7 1,2 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,3 1,0 0,6 0,2 0,0
– annual payment 0,9 1,5 1,9 2,0 2,1 2,1 2,2 2,7 3,1 3,5 0,9
= account balance (end of year) 18,1 28,8 35,6 35,1 34,4 33,6 32,8 23,7 13,0 0,9 0
Compsotion of debt (% of GDP)
total (year end) 72,8 72,3 71,2 69,7 68,1 66,7 65,2 56,2 50,9 47,1 46,2
thereof:
national 66,9 63,3 60,4 59,3 58,3 57,3 56,4 51,0 48,4 47,0 46,2
within ERF 5,9 9,0 10,8 10,3 9,9 9,4 8,9 5,2 2,5 0,2 0
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1) Own calculations; basic data for 2011: EU.– 2) As a ratio of nominal Gross Domestic Product.– 3) Within in the roll-in phase there are lower annual
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2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Development of debt2
ERF account
remaining national debt within ERF
scenario "without ERP"scenario "ERP"
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2025 2030 2034 2035
Debt within ERF (Euro billion)
account balance (beginning of year) 0 68,2 107,4 133,9 131,7 129,2 126,4 95,5 58,1 16,0 3,4
+ refinancing via ERF 68,9 40,5 28,4 – – – – – – – –
= account balance (beginning of year,
transferred to ERF) 68,9 108,7 135,8 133,9 131,7 129,2 126,4 95,5 58,1 16,0 3,4
+ interest rates 2,8 4,3 5,4 5,4 5,3 5,2 5,1 3,8 2,3 0,6 0,1
– annual payment 3,4 5,6 7,3 7,5 7,8 8,0 8,2 10,1 11,7 13,2 3,6
= account balance (end of year) 68,2 107,4 133,9 131,7 129,2 126,4 123,2 89,2 48,7 3,4 0
Compsotion of debt (% of GDP)
total (year end) 97,0 95,6 93,8 91,6 89,4 87,3 85,3 72,5 64,9 59,6 58,4
thereof:
national 79,2 68,3 60,7 60,0 59,3 58,7 58,2 56,6 57,4 59,1 58,4
within ERF 17,9 27,3 33,1 31,6 30,1 28,6 27,0 15,9 7,5 0,5 0
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1) Own calculations; basic data for 2011: EU.– 2) As a ratio of nominal Gross Domestic Product.– 3) Within in the roll-in phase there are lower annual
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2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Development of debt2
ERF account
remaining national debt within ERF
scenario "without ERP"scenario "ERP"
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2025 2030 2034 2035
Debt within ERF (Euro billion)
account balance (beginning of year) 0 0,7 1,0 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,2 0,9 0,6 0,2 0,0
––––––––3,04,07,0FREaivgnicnanifer+
= account balance (beginning of year,
transferred to ERF) 0,7 1,1 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,2 0,9 0,6 0,2 0,0
+ interest rates 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
– annual payment 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0
= account balance (end of year) 0,7 1,0 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,2 1,2 0,9 0,5 0,0 0
Compsotion of debt (% of GDP)
total (year end) 69,0 68,7 67,8 66,3 64,9 63,5 62,1 53,7 48,7 45,2 44,4
thereof:
national 65,4 63,2 61,2 60,0 58,9 57,8 56,7 50,5 47,2 45,1 44,4
within ERF 3,6 5,5 6,6 6,3 6,0 5,7 5,4 3,2 1,5 0,1 0
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1) Own calculations; basic data for 2011: EU.– 2) As a ratio of nominal Gross Domestic Product.– 3) Within in the roll-in phase there are lower annual

















2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Primary balance required
to meet consolidation targets 2
Development of debt scenarios2
(primary balance as in scenario "ERP")
scenario "without ERP"scenario "ERP"
"ERP" implementation
with high interest rates
for national debt
Macroeconomic key data and assumptions
GDP (2011)
Euro billion
Gross public debt (2011)
Euro billion
% of GDP
Debt to be transferred to ERF
Euro billion
% of GDP

























2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Development of debt2
ERF account
remaining national debt within ERF
scenario "without ERP"scenario "ERP"
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2025 2030 2034 2035
Debt within ERF (Euro billion)
account balance (beginning of year) 0 263,7 418,7 518,3 510,2 500,9 490,3 374,1 232,9 73,2 25,6
+ refinancing via ERF 266,4 159,8 106,5 – – – – – – – –
= account balance (beginning of year,
transferred to ERF) 266,4 423,5 525,3 518,3 510,2 500,9 490,3 374,1 232,9 73,2 25,6
+ interest rates 10,7 16,9 21,0 20,7 20,4 20,0 19,6 15,0 9,3 2,9 1,0
– annual payment 13,3 21,7 28,0 28,8 29,7 30,6 31,5 38,7 44,9 50,6 26,6
= account balance (end of year) 263,7 418,7 518,3 510,2 500,9 490,3 478,5 350,4 197,3 25,6 0
Compsotion of debt (% of GDP)
total (year end) 87,5 86,5 85,0 83,0 81,1 79,2 77,4 66,2 59,4 54,7 53,6
thereof:
national 74,5 66,5 60,9 60,0 59,2 58,4 57,7 54,4 53,7 54,1 53,6
within ERF 13,0 20,0 24,1 23,0 21,9 20,9 19,8 11,8 5,7 0,7 0
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1) Own calculations; basic data for 2011: EU.– 2) As a ratio of nominal Gross Domestic Product.– 3) Within in the roll-in phase there are lower annual
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2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Development of debt2
ERF account
remaining national debt within ERF
scenario "without ERP"scenario "ERP"
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2025 2030 2034 2035
Debt within ERF (Euro billion)
account balance (beginning of year) 0 276,4 438,8 543,1 534,6 524,8 513,7 391,3 242,7 74,8 24,7
+ refinancing via ERF 279,2 167,5 111,7 – – – – – – – –
= account balance (beginning of year,
transferred to ERF) 279,2 443,9 550,5 543,1 534,6 524,8 513,7 391,3 242,7 74,8 24,7
+ interest rates 11,2 17,8 22,0 21,7 21,4 21,0 20,5 15,7 9,7 3,0 1,0
– annual payment 14,0 22,8 29,4 30,3 31,2 32,1 33,1 40,7 47,2 53,1 25,7
= account balance (end of year) 276,4 438,8 543,1 534,6 524,8 513,7 501,1 366,3 205,2 24,7 0
Compsotion of debt (% of GDP)
total (year end) 81,1 79,7 78,1 76,3 74,6 72,9 71,3 61,2 55,1 50,9 49,9
thereof:
national 70,6 63,4 58,6 57,7 56,8 56,0 55,3 51,7 50,5 50,4 49,9
within ERF 10,5 16,2 19,5 18,6 17,8 16,9 16,0 9,5 4,6 0,5 0
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1) Own calculations; basic data for 2011: EU.– 2) As a ratio of nominal Gross Domestic Product.– 3) Within in the roll-in phase there are lower annual
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2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Development of debt 2
ERF account
remaining national debt within ERF
scenario "without ERP"scenario "ERP"
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2025 2030 2034 2035
Debt within ERF (Euro billion)
account balance (beginning of year) 0 417,8 621,7 782,2 927,0 910,4 891,6 683,4 429,7 142,8 57,1
+ refinancing via ERF 422,0 211,0 171,0 159,3 – – – – – – –
= account balance (beginning of year,
transferred to ERF) 422,0 628,8 792,7 941,4 927,0 910,4 891,6 683,4 429,7 142,8 57,1
+ interest rates 16,9 25,2 31,7 37,7 37,1 36,4 35,7 27,3 17,2 5,7 2,3
– annual payment 21,1 32,3 42,2 52,1 53,7 55,3 56,9 70,0 81,2 91,3 59,4
= account balance (end of year) 417,8 621,7 782,2 927,0 910,4 891,6 870,3 640,7 365,7 57,1 0
Compsotion of debt (% of GDP)
total (year end) 120,0 117,8 115,3 112,5 109,7 107,0 104,4 87,0 73,3 61,8 60,0
thereof:
national 94,2 80,5 69,7 60,0 59,7 59,4 59,3 60,0 60,0 60,0 60,0
within ERF 25,8 37,3 45,6 52,5 50,0 47,6 45,1 27,0 13,3 1,8 0








2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
1) Own calculations; basic data for 2011: EU.– 2) As a ratio of nominal Gross Domestic Product.– 3) Within in the roll-in phase there are lower annual
payments because not all debt designated has already been transferred.
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2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Development of debt 2
ERF account
remaining national debt within ERF
scenario "without ERP"scenario "ERP"
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2025 2030 2034 2035
Debt within ERF (Euro billion)
account balance (beginning of year) 0 0,3 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,0
––––––––1,02,03,0FREaivgnicnanifer+
= account balance (beginning of year,
transferred to ERF) 0,3 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,0
+ interest rates 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
– annual payment 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0
= account balance (end of year) 0,3 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,4 0,2 0,0 0
Compsotion of debt (% of GDP)
total (year end) 70,6 70,2 69,2 67,7 66,2 64,8 63,4 54,8 49,6 46,0 45,1
thereof:
national 66,0 63,1 60,7 59,6 58,5 57,5 56,5 50,7 47,7 45,9 45,1
within ERF 4,6 7,0 8,5 8,1 7,7 7,3 6,9 4,0 1,8 0 0
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1) Own calculations; basic data for 2011: EU.– 2) As a ratio of nominal Gross Domestic Product.– 3) Within in the roll-in phase there are lower annual
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2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Development of debt 2
ERF account
remaining national debt within ERF
scenario "without ERP"scenario "ERP"
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2025 2030 2034 2035
Debt within ERF (Euro billion)
account balance (beginning of year) 0 12,8 20,3 25,1 24,7 24,3 23,7 18,0 11,1 3,3 1,0
+ refinancing via ERF 12,9 7,8 5,2 – – – – – – – –
= account balance (beginning of year,
transferred to ERF) 12,9 20,5 25,5 25,1 24,7 24,3 23,7 18,0 11,1 3,3 1,0
+ interest rates 0,5 0,8 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 0,9 0,7 0,4 0,1 0,0
– annual payment 0,6 1,1 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,5 1,5 1,9 2,2 2,5 1,0
= account balance (end of year) 12,8 20,3 25,1 24,7 24,3 23,7 23,2 16,9 9,4 1,0 0
Compsotion of debt (% of GDP)
total (year end) 66,1 65,8 65,0 63,6 62,3 61,0 59,7 51,7 47,0 43,7 42,9
thereof:
national 64,0 62,7 61,2 60,0 58,8 57,7 56,6 49,9 46,1 43,6 42,9
within ERF 2,1 3,2 3,8 3,6 3,5 3,3 3,1 1,8 0,9 0,1 0
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1) Own calculations; basic data for 2011: EU.– 2) As a ratio of nominal Gross Domestic Product.– 3) Within in the roll-in phase there are lower annual
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2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Development of debt2
ERF account
remaining national debt within ERF
scenario "without ERP"scenario "ERP"
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2025 2030 2034 2035
Debt within ERF (Euro billion)
account balance (beginning of year) 0 60,1 95,5 118,2 116,4 114,3 111,9 85,6 53,5 17,3 6,5
+ refinancing via ERF 60,7 36,4 24,3 – – – – – – – –
= account balance (beginning of year,
transferred to ERF) 60,7 96,6 119,8 118,2 116,4 114,3 111,9 85,6 53,5 17,3 6,5
+ interest rates 2,4 3,9 4,8 4,7 4,7 4,6 4,5 3,4 2,1 0,7 0,3
– annual payment 3,0 4,9 6,4 6,6 6,8 7,0 7,2 8,8 10,2 11,5 6,7
= account balance (end of year) 60,1 95,5 118,2 116,4 114,3 111,9 109,2 80,2 45,4 6,5 0
Compsotion of debt (% of GDP)
total (year end) 72,8 72,3 71,3 69,7 68,2 66,7 65,3 56,3 50,9 47,1 46,3
thereof:
national 67,3 63,9 61,1 60,0 58,9 57,9 56,9 51,3 48,5 46,8 46,3
within ERF 5,5 8,5 10,2 9,7 9,3 8,8 8,4 5,0 2,4 0,3 0

GOOD AND BAD EQUILIBRIA
WHAT CAN FISCAL (AND OTHER) POLICIES DO?
Pier Carlo Padoan, Urban Sila and Paul van den Noord1
OECD, Economics Department, Paris
Fiscal consolidation will go too far if it pushes the economy towards a “bad 
equilibrium” with high and growing fiscal deficits and debt, high risk premia on 
sovereign debt, slumping economic activity and plummeting confidence. In 
this paper we examine the possible conditions under which fiscal consolidation 
would backfire in this sense. For this purpose we develop a stylised stock-flow 
model of public debt and growth, which we subsequently calibrate empirically 
on a sample of OECD countries. We find that, if the sovereign risk premium is 
initially high, fiscal consolidation will help a country to escape from a “bad 
equilibrium”, not push it toward it, even if the direct negative demand impact 
of fiscal consolidation is large. In that case the stabilising impact of structural 
reform and financial backstops will also be larger than under normal market 
conditions.
Keywords: Fiscal policy, Sovereign debt, Multiple equilibria.
Fiscal consolidation is ongoing in many countries, including 
in several euro area member states. There are increasing calls to ease 
the pace of consolidation on the grounds that fiscal “austerity” in 
bad times, rather than strengthening debt sustainability by lowe-
ring risk premia, could be self-defeating as its negative impact on 
growth (both actual and potential) would more than offset credibi-
lity benefits. It could be argued that such a dilemma as to whether 
and in which circumstances markets prefer discipline or stimulus 
1. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the OECD and its members. The authors are indebted to participants at the 
EUROFRAME conference and an anonymous referee for valuable comments. Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 127 (2013)
Pier Carlo Padoan, Urban Sila and Paul van den Noord370should be resolved empirically. However this dilemma cannot be 
addressed effectively without expanding the discussion and 
looking more carefully at growth in a high debt environment, such 
as the one that many advanced countries face today (and will face 
for some time to come). In such an environment the role of debt in 
depressing growth (and affecting risk assessment) must be taken 
into consideration, as well as the role that structural policy can play 
in boosting growth and contributing to debt sustainability.  
Obviously, fiscal consolidation carries a negative direct demand 
effect in the short run. However, there may be offsets, and how 
strong the net effect on growth will be, and perhaps even its sign, is 
uncertain. There is a vast though not entirely conclusive literature 
on the subject, prompted by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) who 
argued that fiscal consolidations can be expansionary, based on a 
number of case studies. According to Perotti (1999) the odds of an 
expansionary effect of fiscal consolidation increase with the extent 
of the initial fiscal predicament, possibly because the private sector 
realises that the situation is unsustainable. In a similar vein, Rein-
hart and Rogoff (2010) argue that when government debt rises 
above 90% of GDP, median growth falls by 1 percentage point. 
Consequently, cutting debt below that threshold would boost 
economic growth, at least in the medium to long run. Conversely, 
there is evidence to suggest that fiscal consolidation may have a 
possibly large negative impact on economic activity in the short 
run if the interest rate has hit the zero bound and hence monetary 
easing cannot be used as an offset (see e.g. Delong and Summers, 
2012 and IMF, 2012). 
Given the uncertainty of the size—if not the sign—of its impact, 
how should we identify the “right amount” of fiscal consolidation? 
One possible way is the following. Fiscal consolidation will go too 
far if, in a world where multiple equilibria are possible, it will push 
the economy  into a “bad equilibrium” after it has been hit by an 
adverse shock. A bad equilibrium is characterized by the simulta-
neous occurrence, and adverse feedbacks between, high and 
growing fiscal deficits and debt, high risk premia on sovereign 
debt, slumping economic activity and plummeting confidence. 
Conversely, fiscal consolidation is an appropriate policy if it helps 
to break such a downward spiral, possibly in combination with 
Good and bad equilibria: What can fiscal (and other) policies do? 371financial firewalls to prevent contagion and structural reforms to 
boost growth or expectations thereof. 
To analyse these relationships in a systematic way we develop a 
stylised stock-flow model of public debt and growth, which we 
subsequently calibrate empirically on a sample of OECD countries. 
A main finding is that fiscal consolidation generally helps 
countries to escape from a “bad equilibrium”, as do structural 
reforms and financial backstops.  This appears to be true even if the 
initial adverse growth impact of fiscal consolidation is comparati-
vely large, assuming a country suffers from a high risk premium in 
bond markets. Moreover, in that case the stabilising impact of 
structural reform and financial backstops is also larger than under 
“normal” market conditions. 
1. “Good” and “bad” equilibria
As a necessary first step we need to identify what a “bad equili-
brium” is and what distinguishes it from a “good equilibrium”. We 
define these concepts with the help of a stylized economic stock-
flow model.2 The model has three equations. The first equation 
describes a negative relationship between public debt and 
economic growth (Y = output, D = real government debt and an 
over-dot indicates the change in the variable)3. It is augmented 
with the impact on growth of financial conditions proxied by the 
real interest rate r, and the fiscal policy stance proxied by the 
primary deficit as a share of GDP p , with the associated semi-elasti-
cities represented by the parameters f and g, respectively:
(1)
This equation is depicted in Figure 1 as the downward-sloping 
straight line RR. RR stands for Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) who 
were the first to posit this relationship and to have tested it empiri-
cally. This negative relationship can be explained inter alia by 
adverse expectations with regard to future taxation associated with 
high public debt. It may also capture the effect of sovereign stress 
2. It is inspired by a model developed by Duesenberry (1958) to analyze the Great Depression.
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Pier Carlo Padoan, Urban Sila and Paul van den Noord372spilling over to banks which hold substantial amounts of sovereign 
debt on their balance sheets, in turn weighing negatively on the 
cost of financing for the private sector and on confidence and 
hence on growth. However, as we will argue below, this negative 
relationship between debt and growth exists only beyond a certain 
threshold. At lower levels of the ratio of debt to GDP the rela-
tionship may actually be flat or even positive. Finally, growth is 
positively affected by the exogenous impact of structural reforms, 
as documented in several issues of the OECD’s series Going for 
Growth (see e.g. OECD, 2012), captured by parameter a.  
According to equation (1) a higher interest rate depresses 
growth and a larger fiscal deficit supports growth.4 These are just 
Figure 1. Good and bad equilibria
Note: The horizontal axis measures the public debt to GDP ratio and the vertical axis the growth rates of public debt 
and output. RR is the relationship between growth and debt and BC the government’s budget constraint. If the debt 
ratio is located right from the bad equilibrium B, it derails while output contracts at an accelerating pace. Left of B
the debt ratio converges towards the good equilibrium G.
4. We include the level rather than the change of the primary public deficit in this growth 
equation. This is consistent with the “Robertsonian saving” hypothesis embedded in 
Duesenberry’s (1958) model. This hypothesis postulates that the next period’s output is 
determined by the preceding period’s income less net saving (Sn), so Yt+1 = k(Y – Sn), where k is a 
constant. This implies that
.
Y/Y = –kSn/Y – (1 – k), so it is the level of net saving as a share of 
output that determines the next period’s output growth rate. Net saving can be broken down 
into public net saving as a share of output, i.e. the fiscal position, and private net saving as a 
share of output, which in turn may be assumed to be a function of the public debt ratio and 






Good and bad equilibria: What can fiscal (and other) policies do? 373the first-order effects of the interest rate and fiscal policy on 
growth. There are second order effects that run through the 
government’s budget constraint, which is the second equation of 
the model and in fact an identity. It relates the primary deficit as a 
per cent of GDP p to the real interest rate r and real public debt D:
(2a)
Dividing the two sides of the equation by D yields:
(2b)
This is the hyperbolic relationship between real growth of debt 
and the debt ratio depicted as BC (as in budget constraint) in 
Figure 1.5 As the debt ratio increases, the real growth of debt 
approaches asymptotically the real interest rate.  The intersections 
of the two curves correspond to, respectively, the “good” equili-
brium (G) and the “bad” equilibrium (B). If the debt ratio is located 
in the interval between the intersections G and B (indicated by 
D0 / Y0), output growth will exceed the growth of debt, and hence 
the debt ratio is falling until the good equilibrium G is attained: 
the good equilibrium is stable. However, if the debt ratio is located 
right of the intersection point B (e.g. if the debt ratio equals D1/Y1), 
the growth of debt exceeds output growth. So the equilibrium B is 
unstable. Beyond B debt keeps growing while output growth keeps 
falling, hence the debt ratio is on an explosive path.
What is not shown in Figure 1 (for the sake of simplicity) is that 
if the debt ratio is on an explosive path the real interest rate is 
bound to increase: the BC schedule shifts outward, thus adding 
momentum to the debt explosion. To capture this effect we need 
to include an interest rate equation, which is the third equation of 
our stylised model. Specifically, we assume that the interest rate 
responds to the growth in the debt ratio and an (exogenous) factor 
h. So:
(3)
5. For the sake of simplicity we omit in this specification the impact of other factors on 
changes in the stock of debt, such as revaluations, the purchase of sale of financial assets by the 
government, or default. 
Pier Carlo Padoan, Urban Sila and Paul van den Noord374The rationale for including the growth rate of the debt ratio as 
an explanatory variable is that we see this as a possible gauge of 
unsustainable public finances. Specifically, we expect an accelera-
ting debt ratio to raise the probability of default (for real or as 
perceived by the markets), i.e. the faster the increase in the debt 
ratio, the higher the risk premium. The parameter h captures the 
impact of swings in market sentiment and contagion effects (in as 
much as these are unrelated to local debt dynamics) as well as 
financial backstops to offset such sentiment and contagion effects. 
As we shall see these factors seem to play an important role in the 
recent euro area dynamics. A reason why this occurs in the euro 
area (and not elsewhere) is that concerns about the sustainability 
of monetary union give rise to a euro “exit” or “break-up” risk 
premium in countries in fiscal distress. 
In sum, our model gauges three potentially explosive feedback 
mechanisms: (i) between the debt ratio and growth (a high debt 
ratio depresses growth which boosts the debt ratio, etc.); (ii) 
between the debt ratio and the interest rate (a high interest rate 
pushes up debt which gives a higher interest rate, etc); and (iii) 
between growth and the interest rate (a higher interest rate 
depresses growth which pushes up the debt ratio and hence the 
interest rate, etc.). This is illustrated in Figure 2. The point to retain 
is that these feedbacks will be explosive if the initial debt ratio is 
“right of B” or converge (to the “good equilibrium” G) if it is 
located “left of B”. 









Good and bad equilibria: What can fiscal (and other) policies do? 375It is possible to derive formal expressions for the “good” and 
“bad” equilibrium debt positions G and B, but before we do so we 
need to address two (important) technical complications. The first 
complication is that the RR schedule may be “kinked”, in the sense 
that only beyond a certain debt threshold there will be a significant 
adverse impact of debt on growth, as depicted in Figure 3. This is a 
standard finding in the empirical literature following Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s seminal paper, with the debt threshold generally found to 
be close to 90% of GDP.6  Indeed this is what we find in our own 
empirical work (see below).This does not change the basic features 
of the model, other than that the value of the parameter b in equa-
tion (1) is conditional on the level of the debt ratio.
The second complication is that the hyperbolic relationship 
between debt growth and the debt ratio depicted in Figures 1 and 3 
is only valid in this form if the primary balance is in deficit. If it is 
in surplus p takes a negative value and the shape of the BC sche-
dule changes as depicted in Figure 4. The bad equilibrium preserves 
its basic features, that is right from the intersection B the debt ratio 
6. See Cecchetti et al. (2011) and Checherita and Rother (2010). Some authors find two 
thresholds, with debt below the lower threshold favourable to growth and debt beyond the 
higher threshold harmful to growth; see Kumar and Woo (2010) and Elmeskov and Sutherland 
(2012) who report thresholds of 30 and 90% and 45 and 66%, respectively.





Pier Carlo Padoan, Urban Sila and Paul van den Noord376explodes, but the nature of the good equilibrium is somewhat 
different. Left of the intersection B the economy is still stable as 
output grows faster than debt. However, the good equilibrium G is 
now located in the second quadrant, i.e. corresponds to a positive 
asset position of the government. In the interval between the 
vertical axes and the good equilibrium G, assets grow faster than 
output and hence the asset-to-GDP ratio increases. It will do so 
until the good equilibrium G is reached.
Ignoring these complications for now, the steady-state debt 
ratio (when debt and output grow at the same rate) can be derived 
by equating the BC and RR equations (1) and (2b) and equating the 
growth rates of debt and output in the interest equation (3), which 
yields:
 (4)
This has two solutions: 
(5a)
(5b)
Figure 4. Debt threshold and primary surplus
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Good and bad equilibria: What can fiscal (and other) policies do? 377Equations (5a) and (5b) are the solutions for the good equili-
brium G and the bad equilibrium B, respectively. It is interesting to 
note that the parameter c, the semi-elasticity of the real bond yield 
with respect to the growth in the debt ratio, drops out of the equa-
tion, which is simply a consequence of the economy assumed to be 
in a steady state and hence the debt ratio being constant. This 
implies that the adverse feedback loop from debt via the bond yield 
on growth does not operate via a change in the bad equilibrium 
itself but rather by influencing the pace of decline or improvement 
once the economy finds itself in the bad equilibrium.7 That said, 
exogenous increases in the bond yield (an increase in h) will lower 
the bad equilibrium debt ratio (see below).
Importantly, the solutions (5a) and (5b) provide an indication 
as to where the economy will be heading if the actual debt to GDP 
ratio is located either left or right of the bad equilibrium B. As can 
be inferred from Figure 1, the higher is the bad equilibrium debt 
ratio, the smaller are the odds that the economy after being hit by 
an adverse shock to its debt ratio shifting it from D0 / Y0 to D1 / Y1
(for example due to a banking crisis) will be trapped in a tailspin of 
falling activity and rising interest rates. And the lower is the good 
equilibrium debt ratio, the longer will be the spell of accelerating 
growth if the debt ratio is hit by a favourable shock (e.g. a bail-out 
or orderly default). So, an increase in the bad equilibrium debt 
ratio (and a fall in the good equilibrium debt ratio) should be inter-
preted as contributing to more favourable growth and debt 
dynamics in the short and medium run.   
For the solutions (5a) and (5b) to be feasible it is necessary that 
the term under the root sign is positive. At the limit it could be zero 
in which case only one solution exists, which has a “bad” right side 
(debt ratio and growth derail of the equilibrium) and a “good” left 
side (debt ratio and growth stabilise left of the equilibrium). 
Whether or not these solutions are feasible is an empirical ques-
tion, which we will address below. But before we address that issue 
we will first examine how policy can help a country who is trapped 
in the bad equilibrium to recover.
7. If it is assumed that the interest rate depends on the level (as opposed to the growth rate) of 
the debt ratio, the equivalent of the parameter c would of course enter the solutions for the 
good and bad equilibria. However, our empirical work (see below) suggests that it is the growth 
rate of the debt ratio rather than its level that affects the yield spread.
Pier Carlo Padoan, Urban Sila and Paul van den Noord3782. Policies to escape from the “bad equilibrium”
Within the logic of this model there are three policy levers avai-
lable for countries to escape from the bad equilibrium: structural 
reform (affecting a), financial backstops to reduce the bond yield 
(affecting h), and fiscal policy (p). These policies should not be seen 
as alternatives, but rather as complements. This is the case because 
they can be mutually reinforcing, as will be demonstrated below. 
More fundamentally, though, this is also the case because we 
assume the economy’s growth and fiscal fundamentals to be struc-
turally weak. This weakness may have been masked for some time 
by risk under-pricing in financial markets and excessive leveraging 
in the private sector, but has become apparent as the economy is 
hit by a financial and sovereign debt crisis. Hence, this reversal of 
fortunes needs to be addressed by all three policy levers so as to 
deliver durable results.   
2.1. Structural reform and financial backstops 
As depicted in Figure 5, structural reform shifts the RR schedule 
outward. As a result, a country whose debt ratio D1/Y1 was on an 
explosive path initially, will find itself left from the (now shifted) 
bad equilibrium B’ and see its debt ratio fall and growth resume 
towards the good equilibrium G’.
But obviously it takes time for structural reform to exert this 
virtuous effect on growth and debt, while time is severely lacking 
when a country is trapped in a bad equilibrium. Moreover, for 
structural reform to produce this virtuous effect confidence must 
be restored. Think for example of product market liberalisation 
that opens up new investment opportunities. Without confidence 
and the availability of affordable funding these opportunities for 
investment may be not taken up and so higher growth would not 
materialize. Without a financial backstop the interest rate could 
continue to grow, driven by adverse debt dynamics and or by 
systemic effects (more below). In other words the role of a financial 
backstop is to provide a “confidence bridge” to buy time, i.e. to 
allow for structural reforms to bear their fruits. 
Financial backstops can help countries to escape from the bad 
equilibrium also through another channel: via the government 
budget constraint. This is depicted in Figure 6, illustrating how a 
Good and bad equilibria: What can fiscal (and other) policies do? 379fall in the interest rate shifts the BC schedule downward and thus 
again pushes the bad equilibrium to the right, triggering a conver-
gence towards the (now shifted) good equilibrium G’. So, financial 
backstops are a double-edged sword: they boost growth directly as 
well as indirectly by containing the debt-interest snowball. 
Obviously this presupposes that the backstops are not “abused” by 
the government to give up on either structural reform or fiscal 
consolidation (to which we turn next). Moral hazard must be 
contained; otherwise the confidence bridge breaks down.
These findings can be easily formalised by computing the rele-
vant policy multipliers from equation (5b):
(6)
(7)
   
Figure 5. The impact of structural reform and financial backstops through 
the output channel



























Pier Carlo Padoan, Urban Sila and Paul van den Noord380These equations confirm the graphical analysis: structural 
reform and financial backstops help countries to escape from the 
bad equilibrium (as it “shifts to the right”). Importantly, these 
multipliers also confirm that these policies are mutually reinfor-
cing: a rightward shift in the “bad equilibrium” triggered by 
structural reform raises the multiplier of financial backstops and 
vice versa. 
2.2. Fiscal consolidation
In our stylised model fiscal consolidation works through two 
channels (output and the government budget constraint). This is 
similar to financial backstops, which work through the same chan-
nels, except that the effects of fiscal consolidation are in opposite 
directions, with the net effect ambiguous. Fiscal consolidation is 
represented by a sustained cut in the primary deficit p, which shifts 
the BC schedule down as depicted in Figure 7. However, as shown 
in Figure 8 it also implies a negative demand shock, shifting the RR
schedule down. The former is potentially stabilising (the bad equi-
librium shifts to the right) whereas the latter is potentially 
destabilising (the bad equilibrium shifts to the left). Where the bad 










Good and bad equilibria: What can fiscal (and other) policies do? 381equilibrium ends up is an empirical question: our theory cannot 
provide a prediction. 
It is again possible to derive the relevant multiplier to measure 
the impact of changes in the primary deficit p on the bad equili-
brium, which reads:
(8)
Whether an increase in the primary deficit gives a lower bad 
equilibrium debt ratio (with the economy becoming more 
unstable) or the reverse is indeed ambiguous and depends on the 
initial level of the bad equilibrium debt and on the “Keynesian” 
fiscal demand multiplier g. When both are large, such that:
fiscal expansion (an increase of p) will have a favourable impact on 
the bad equilibrium i.e. it will shift it to the right. This is a situation 
where the country has fiscal space available to effectively boost the 
economy out of the bad equilibrium through fiscal expansion. But 
if either of the two is small (the Keynesian fiscal impact on growth is 
small and the initial bad equilibrium debt level is small), such that:
fiscal expansion will exacerbate the bad equilibrium trap. Fiscal 
consolidation is than the appropriate policy, possibly in combina-
tion with structural reform and financial backstops (since these 
increase the multiplier (8) and hence the effectiveness of fiscal 
consolidation).     
To sum up, the effect of fiscal policy on the growth path of the 
economy is ambiguous and strongly depends on the initial condi-
tions. It is therefore of crucial importance to empirically calibrate 
the model so as to able to assess the need for and effectiveness of 
fiscal consolidation when countries are trapped by the bad equili-
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In a recent OECD working paper (Padoan et al. 2012) we report 
estimation results for the growth and interest rate equations (1) 
and (3), respectively, which we will use as the basis for our empi-
rical calibration. The estimations are based on a sample of 28 
Figure 7. The impact of fiscal consolidation through the government 
budget channel

















Good and bad equilibria: What can fiscal (and other) policies do? 383OECD countries and spans over up to 52 years, from 1960 to 2011, 
depending on data availability.8 We purposefully used as broad a 
sample as possible, in order not to make results dependent on an 
arbitrarily chosen period or group of countries. We also used the 
GMM estimation technique and only included lagged right-hand 
side variables so as to minimise the risk of reverse causality.  
Most parameter values can be directly inferred from the estima-
tion results, with the exception of the terms a and h appearing in, 
respectively, the growth and interest rate equations. These 
comprise country-specific constant terms as well as the impact of a 
range of control variables on growth and the interest rate, and 
hence vary across countries and over time. 9 
In addition we need to modify the theoretical model to capture 
the threshold effect of public debt on growth that came out signifi-
cant in the econometric results. Specifically, the relevant growth 
equation reads:
(1b)
where M is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the debt ratio is 
above the threshold and zero otherwise and b2 represents the 
growth impact of the debt ratio above the threshold, T. This equa-
tion can be re-written as:
(1c)
in which a’ = a + b2 M × T. This gives us a properly adjusted esti-
mate of the constant term in the equation. 
The numerical parameters inferred from the estimation results, 
averaged for the whole sample in cases where these vary per 
8. The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and United States.
9. The growth equation includes controls for catch-up effects (gauged by the level of per capita 
GDP) and other structural factors such as skill endowments and population growth. The interest 
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Pier Carlo Padoan, Urban Sila and Paul van den Noord384country and/or over time, are reported in Table 1, including for the 
average primary deficit (p) which equals 0.3% of GDP.
The debt threshold, i.e. the level of debt where the kink in the 
growth equation appears, is estimated at 87% of GDP, broadly 
consistent with findings by other researchers. The effect of govern-
ment debt on growth below the threshold is positive (b1 is 
negative), though not statistically significant. Above the threshold, 
on the other hand, the effect becomes more negative and statisti-
cally significant (b2 is positive). 
The effects of the primary deficit and the interest rate on growth 
are also in line with our priors, although the size of the fiscal 
demand multiplier (g = 0.087) may be considered at the low end of 
the spectrum of plausible results—we will turn to this later.  It is 
important to stress that aside from the intercepts a and h all para-
meter values are uniform across countries and time and hence 
reflect the sample average relationships. We will turn to a sensiti-
vity analysis in which this assumption is relaxed below.
The coefficient for variations in the debt ratio in the interest 
rate equation (c = 0.082), finally, indicates that for every 1 percen-
tage-point slowdown in output growth or hike in debt growth the 
sovereign risk premium increases by slightly less than 10 basis 
points. This is again the sample average impact: it may be smaller 
or larger for individual countries and time episodes.    
These parameter estimates allow us to identify the “good” and 
“bad' equilibrium debt levels and the multipliers developed in 
section 3 for the sample.  The results are reported in Table 2. The 
sample average “bad equilibrium” debt ratio equals 106% of GDP, 
which implies that, on average, a country recording a debt ratio 
above 106% would see its debt ratio spiral out of control and its 
economy slump in the absence of offsetting policy action. Conver-
Table 1: Baseline parameters
a’ 0.050 p 0.003
b1 -0.012 f 0.195
b2 0.026 g 0.087
c 0.082 h 0.027
Source: Padoan et al. (2012).
Good and bad equilibria: What can fiscal (and other) policies do? 385sely, the “good equilibrium” to which the debt ratio tends if it is 
below the bad equilibrium threshold, turns out to be 75% of GDP. 
This means that if the debt ratio is in the 75%-106% interval it 
would, on average, be falling towards 75% (and conversely 
increasing towards 75% if it is below that level). It should be 
stressed again, however, that these numbers apply to the average 
of the sample as a whole and not necessarily to individual 
countries or sub-periods, and obviously are surrounded by uncer-
tainty margins. 
The multiplier analysis in Table 2 shows that, again for the 
sample as a whole, structural reform yielding an increase in 
economic growth of 0.1% per annum raises the bad equilibrium 
(i.e. moves out the point B) by 9 percentage points. This is a rele-
vant result as it shows that the contribution that structural reforms 
bring to debt sustainability can be significant. Similarly, a 
sustained cut in the risk premium on the interest rate by 10 basis 
points increases the bad equilibrium debt ratio by 11 percentage 
points. An increase in the primary deficit as a share of GDP by 
0.1 percentage point reduces the bad equilibrium debt ratio by 
8 percentage points. This means that expansionary fiscal policy 
renders the economy, on average, more unstable as the sign of the 
relevant multiplier is negative. The upshot is that a country in bad 
equilibrium should pursue a restrictive fiscal policy.  
Some authors have argued that in very depressed economies the 
fiscal demand multiplier g may be considerably larger than in 
Table 2. “Good” and “Bad” equilibrium and multipliers under 
different assumptions
In %
Good Bad Multipliers with respect to :
equilibrium equilibrium a h p
Baseline 75 106 9 -11 -8
g = 0.5 68 116 8 -10 -3
g = 1 60 129 8 -10 2
g = 1, h = 0.033 60 74 12 -14 -4
Note: Multipliers measure the impact on the bad equilibrium debt ratio of 10 basis points (0.1 percentage point) 
changes of a, h or p.
Pier Carlo Padoan, Urban Sila and Paul van den Noord386normal times, of the order of 1 or even larger (see e.g. DeLong and 
Summers, 2012). Possible reasons invoked are that monetary 
policy offsets of fiscal stimulus are unlikely to be undertaken by 
the central bank and that private saving offsets are small as credit 
constrained households will spend a large share of current income 
on consumption. 
Table 2 reports a sensitivity analysis for different assumptions 
with regard to this parameter. One striking finding is that the 
multipliers of structural reform and financial backstops hardly 
change. However, the sign of the fiscal policy multiplier switches 
when the parameter g is 1. This is assuming that all other parame-
ters of the system are unchanged. This is unlikely to be a reasonable 
assumption for euro area countries under market stress. Unlike 
other high-debt OECD countries in our sample (such as e.g. Japan) 
they do not dispose of a national lender of last resort and/or may 
be seen as vulnerable to exit from the monetary union, thus contri-
buting to a hike in risk premiums beyond the “conventional” 
fundamentals (see for instance De Grauwe and Ji, 2012). 
Against this backdrop we show in the last line of Table 2 the 
impact of an increase in h, the shock term in the interest rate equa-
tion, by half a per cent (50 basis points). The “bad equilibrium” 
debt ratio now falls well below 100% of GDP. The multiplier of 
fiscal policy becomes negative again, suggesting that fiscal consoli-
dation now has a favourable effect on the stability of the economy. 
Perhaps even more strikingly, the multipliers on structural reform 
and financial backstops become larger.
4. Conclusions
If fiscal sustainability is at risk, fiscal action is inevitably 
directed towards consolidation. However, benefits of fiscal consoli-
dation are largely medium to long term, as reducing debt levels 
breed stronger growth. There may also be favorable short-term 
effects to the extent that credible fiscal consolidation programs 
may boost market confidence which translates into lower sove-
reign risk premia. At the same time, in the short term their 
negative impact on demand may depress growth and hence could 
jeopardize debt sustainability. In practice, which of the two short-
run effects of fiscal consolidation prevails is an empirical issue 
Good and bad equilibria: What can fiscal (and other) policies do? 387largely dependent on: (i) the size of the fiscal demand multiplier, 
and (ii) the size of the ratio of debt to GDP beyond which the 
economy enters the “bad equilibrium”, itself a function of the 
stances of structural and financial policies (which is a possible way 
of defining fiscal space). 
If the initial adverse growth impact of fiscal consolidation is 
large (the demand multiplier is one or bigger), fiscal consolidation 
may make it more difficult for a country to escape from the “bad 
equilibrium”. On the other hand, countries in a monetary union 
who have suffered a reputational loss may experience very strong 
adverse confidence effects on sovereign risk premia. In that case 
fiscal consolidation may be stabilising rather than destabilising 
and, as well, the stabilising impact of structural reform and finan-
cial backstops gets stronger. The corollary is that, for countries that 
are under market stress and hence with limited fiscal space, there 
may be no alternative than to consolidate, notwithstanding an 
adverse impact on growth in the short run. In that case the role of 
structural reform alongside financial backstops to contain exces-
sive sovereign risk premia becomes all the more important. 
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THE EUROPEAN MONETARY FUND1
A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM NEEDS A SYSTEMIC SOLUTION
Stephan Schulmeister
Austrian Institute of Economic Research
The deepening of the debt crisis in the euro area is due to three systemic 
causes which national governments are not able to overcome on their own. 
First, being members of a monetary union euro states cannot dampen or even 
reverse the rise in public debt through devaluations. At the same time, they have 
no access to funds from a national central bank. Second, under “finance-capita-
listic” framework conditions, speculators systematically exploit and strengthen 
the fiscal troubles in the weakest countries by driving up CDS premia and inte-
rest rates to unsustainable levels. This development might transform a liquidity 
crisis into a solvency crisis. Third, these speculative activities widen the interest 
rate differentials within the euro area drastically thereby endangering the 
economic and political cohesion of the EMU and even of the EU. 
A systemic solution which restores the primacy of politics over speculation 
needs to stabilize interest rates for all euro countries. It is proposed to transform 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into an agency for financing euro 
states, the European Monetary Fund (EMF). It would provide governments with 
financial means by selling Eurobonds. These bonds are guaranteed by all euro 
countries to an unlimited extent. The EMF would stabilize Eurobond interest 
rates at a level slightly below the level of medium-term economic growth (in 
nominal terms). The Eurobonds are held by investors with the EMF, they are not 
tradable but can be liquidated at any time. The EMF helps to restore sound 
public finances in euro countries in close cooperation with the ECB, the Euro-
pean Commission and national governments. To this end, the EMF provides 
funds for the euro states according to clear criteria (“conditionality”) which are 
not exclusively restrictive.
Keywords: Euro crisis, Monetary union, Dynamic budget constraint, Finance capitalism.
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Stephan Schulmeister390For the third time since 1990 an economic crisis which origi-
nated in the US (1990, 2000, 2007) affects the European economies 
much stronger than the US. This time, the crisis even endangers 
the economic and political cohesion of the European (Monetary) 
Union. These troubles are closely linked to the loss of orientation 
on behalf of the economic and political elites. On the one hand, a 
policy based on the neoliberal paradigm had paved the way for the 
financial crisis, on the other hand, the (austerity) measures to over-
come the crisis are derived from the same paradigm.
This contradiction is much more pronounced in the EU than 
the US. In the EU, e.g., fiscal and monetary policy is bound by rules 
as prescribed by monetarist theory (in contrast to the US). At the 
same time, however, actors in financial markets can expand their 
“finance alchemy” activities without being restricted by rules (the 
US at least passed the Frank-Dodd act).
The spill-over of a fiscal crisis in a small economy like Greece to 
the euro area as a whole is the most telling example of this contra-
diction. The radical austerity policy in Greece (called for by the 
Maastricht rules) has caused the economy to shrink for 4 consecu-
tive years. Speculators were able to exploit this development by 
driving up CDS premia and interest rates which in turn made fiscal 
consolidation impossible. As a consequence, the EU had to set up 
the rescue fund (European Financial Stability Facility, EFSF). The 
rules of the “financial games”, however, have remained 
unchanged. Thus, the interest rate epidemic reached more and 
more countries.
European Policy reacts to the deepening of the crisis by inten-
sifying the symptom therapies, i.e., strengthening the rescue fund 
and adopting more austerity measures. Since government bonds of 
Spain and Italy have already come under speculative attacks, 
causing interest rates to rise, market participants consider these 
measures as insufficient. The ECB tries to mitigate the situation by 
buying bonds of euro countries under attack and by injecting liqui-
dity into the banking system. In order to accommodate “the 
markets”, governments set up new savings packages in Spain, Italy, 
France and Greece. 
The European Monetary Fund 391All these symptom cures can at best provide short-term relief. 
To overcome the crisis, market actors desperately hope for new 
concepts. Having only to offer “more of the same”, politicians in 
fact make the situation worse. As a consequence, the euro area has 
become the only region in the global economy which slides in 
2012 in a recession again. This might cause stock prices to enter 
into a new bear market. The reinforcing interaction between the 
widening of interest differentials in the euro area, the intensifying 
of austerity measures and a global devaluation of stock wealth 
(eventually also of commodity wealth) could cause the European 
Monetary Union to collapse and the world economy to slide into a 
depression.
These dangers call on politicians to develop a comprehensive 
concept which restores the primacy of politics over “finance 
alchemy”, which overcomes the crisis in a sustainable manner and 
which will pave the way towards a new prosperity phase. Such a 
“New Deal for Europe” needs to be based on a diagnosis of the 
systemic causes of the great crisis. 
One core component of a “New Deal for Europe” should be the 
“European Monetary Fund” (EMF). It manages public finances of 
euro countries through the emission of Eurobonds. In contrast to 
the concepts proposed so far, Eurobonds are sold by the EMF at 
fixed interest rates and they are not tradable (like credits taken up 
by the IMF). Instead, Eurobonds are held by investors with the 
EMF. In this respect, Eurobonds are similar to German “Schatz-
briefe”, however, they are fully liquid (investors can always 
exchange them for cash at the fixed price).2
Such a proposal might seem too radical from the perspective of 
the (still) prevailing economic paradigm. However, such a proposal 
can be derived from a systemically oriented analysis of the crisis 
and of the process of its deepening over the recent past.
2. “Schatzbriefe” are time deposits at interest rates which are fixed over the entire maturity of 
6 or 7 years. These instruments are held with the “Finanzagentur des Bundes” (agency for the 
management of government finances in Germany) by private households or enterprises. Since 
the financing costs for the German government have declined so strongly in recent times, it was 
decided that this instrument would only be available until December 31, 2012. 
Stephan Schulmeister3921. A synopsis of the present conundrum
1.1. Destabilizing speculation against sovereign states
Since November 2009 interest rates on government bonds have 
risen dramatically in an increasing number of euro countries. This 
development is brought about by the interaction between the 
changes in the perception of risk, the downgrading by rating agen-
cies and speculation in the CDS and bond markets. On the one 
hand, the interest rate rise reflects higher risk premia, on the other 
hand, speculation increases default risks by driving up interest rates 
(if the perception of risk had been the main reason for the interest 
rate boom, significant interest rate differentials between euro 
countries should have existed from the very beginning of the EMU, 
and they should have widened already years before fall 2009).
Also the stepwise spreading of the “interest rate epidemic” from 
Greece to Ireland, Portugal and then to Spain, Italy and France 
suggests that speculation is the key force, driving up in tandem 
CDS premia and bond rates (Figures 1 and 7). Those banks and 
hedge funds which are specialized in “making money out of 














10/2009   08/2010 06/2011 04/2012
10/2009   08/2010 06/2011 04/2012
10/09   08/2010 06/2011 04/2012
10/09   08/2010 06/2011 04/2012
CDS premia (left scale)

















CDS premia (left scale)














CDS premia (left scale)

















CDS premia (left scale)












The European Monetary Fund 393money” took advantage of high public indebtedness, a fragile 
banking system and/or the lack of competitiveness. CDS specula-
tion against sovereign states has become the most profitable game 
over the past two years.
Speculation based on rational expectations would drive prices 
towards their fundamental equilibrium values. As in other asset 
markets, this was not the case in the CDS and bond markets: 
Within few months, interest rates rose to levels 10 percentage 
points above that level of economic growth (in nominal terms) 
which can reasonably be expected for countries like Greece or 
Portugal over the medium run.3 Such interest rate levels are unsus-
tainable, they do not serve as an enforcement of fiscal discipline 
but rather as a macroeconomic “death sentence”. Even an interest 
rate level of “only” 6% for Spanish and Italian bonds is not sustai-
nable since the economies of both countries will grow at a much 
smaller rate 
To put it differently: The stepwise increase in interest rates in 
several euro countries has produced additional (default) risks 
rather than just compensating for already existing risk.
1.2. Role of the interest-growth-differential
The reason for that is simple: If the rate of interest exceeds the 
rate of growth (in nominal terms), any debtor (sector) has to run a 
primary surplus in order to stabilize the debt-GDP-ratio (“dynamic 
budget constraint”). To achieve such a surplus, the non-financial 
business sector reduces real investment in favour of financial accu-
mulation. At the same time, also financial businesses and 
households run primary surpluses (e.g., private households—a 
creditor sector—save usually more than their net interest income).4
3. Rating agencies then strengthen the rise in interest rates as their downgrading mostly 
follows interest rate movements rather than triggering them (Tichy, 2011).
4. Figure 2 shows the inverse relationship between the financial balances of the non-financial 
business sector and the government sector for Germany and the euro area without Germany (the 
higher is the willingness of the business sector to take up credits the easier it is for the 
government to reduce its deficit). In the case of Germany, the fluctuations of the public budget 
are to a large extent also counter-balanced by the current account. The high and, until 2007, 
rising deficit of the rest of the world (vis-à-vis Germany) facilitated fiscal consolidation in 
Germany (Figure 2). The opposite was the case in most other euro countries due to their current 
account deficit rising significantly between 2003 and 2008. Figure 2 also shows that the non-
financial business in Germany has been running surpluses already since 2004, its primary surplus 
is even higher (as a debtor sector, net interest payments of non-financial business are positive).
Stephan Schulmeister394Under this condition, the government can achieve a primary 
surplus only if the rest of the world runs/accepts a current account 
deficit (the primary balances of all sectors of any country sum up 
to zero). Since the current account (minus net interest payments) 
of the euro area as a whole is roughly in balance (Figure 2), only 
governments of countries with (large) current account surpluses 
(like Germany) have a good chance to achieve primary surpluses. 
The other euro countries do have such a possibility only under 
very restrictive conditions (e.g., if households save less than their 
interest income). Conclusion: As long as the rate of interest 
exceeds the rate of growth significantly, more government saving 
will rather reduce economic activity than the public debt. 
The relevance of the interest-growth-differential for the sustaina-
bility of private and public debt accumulation is confirmed by the 
empirical evidence. Over the 1950s and 1960s, this differential was 
significantly negative; at the same time the public debt declined 
almost continuously relative to GDP (in spite of the fact that the 
welfare state was strongly built-up at that time). Since the early 
1980s, the interest-growth-differential has been almost continuously 
positive in European countries, and the debt-GDP-ratio doubled in 
spite of a more restrictive fiscal policy (Figure 5). Also the develop-
ment in the euro area since 2000 clearly demonstrates the relevance 
of the interest-growth-differential for the dynamics of the public 
debt (compare the development in Germany and Spain in Figure 6).
1.3. Real capitalism and finance capitalism
The switch in the relation between the rate of interest and the rate 
of growth was just one important component of the transformation 
process which fundamentally changed the incentive conditions of 
market economies between the early 1970s and the early 1980s.
During the “golden age of capitalism”, e.g., over the 1950s and 
1960s, stable exchange rates and commodity prices together with a 
negative interest-growth-differential and almost “dormant” stock 
markets channelled the search for profit to the real sphere of the 
economy (“real capitalism”). The business sector used household 
savings to finance the continuous expansion of real investment. 
Given strong and stable economic growth at full employment, 
governments could easily achieve a balanced budget over the 
medium run (it was the business sector which ran permanent defi-
The European Monetary Fund 395cits). Given the negative interest-growth-differential, the public 
debt declined continuously relative to GDP (Figure 5). Even the 
extremely high debt-GDP-ratio of the US, the UK and France after 
WWII (in part exceeding 200% of GDP) could easily be reduced 
under “real-capitalistic” conditions.      
Figure 2. Financial balances in Germany and the euro area
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Stephan Schulmeister396Over the 1970s, the instability of exchanges rates, in particular of the 
dollar rates, and the related instability of commodity prices dampened 
business investment (the two oil price shocks were the OPEC reaction to 
the two preceding dollar depreciations—Figure 3). This effect was 
strengthened by the switch in the interest-growth-differential in the 
early 1980s (due to an extremely restrictive monetary policy in order to 
fight inflation—Figure 5). At the same time, financial innovations, in 
particular derivatives of all kinds, facilitated profit-seeking in financial 
markets. The sequence of “bulls” and “bears” in stock markets (their 
“manic-depressive fluctuations”) is the outcome of (increasingly) short-
term speculation under the framework conditions of “finance capita-
lism” (Figures 3 and 4—see also Schulmeister, 2010a).
All these developments together caused the business sector to 
shift investment activities from the real sphere to the financial 
sphere of the economy. This shift caused four long-term effects 
which reinforced each other (Figures 2, 4 and 5):
— First, non-financial business in all industrial countries 
reduced its financial deficits, in some countries the business sector 
became even a surplus sector (e.g., in Germany, the UK, the 
Netherlands, USA—the primary surpluses of the business sector 
became even higher).
Figure 3. Dollar exchange rate and oil price fluctuations
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The European Monetary Fund 397— Second, economic growth declined and unemployment rose 
in spite of the significant expansion of atypical employment of 
many kinds.
— Third, governments suffered from chronic deficits (the 
households’ surpluses were no longer used up by the business 
sector).
— Fourth, given the positive interest-growth-differential, the 
public debt rose faster than GDP, in spite of strong efforts to limit 
this process (in particular in the EU since the early 1990s).
Hence, the empirical evidence suggests that the development of 
public finances is embedded into the overall economic perfor-
mance (i.e., endogenous). As a consequence, governments need to 
take into account the repercussions of their fiscal policy on the 
private sector. Cutting expenditures and/or raising taxes are 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for consolidation. If 
private demand is weak, an austerity policy will even worsen the 
fiscal stance. This “thrift paradox” had become apparent during 
the depression of the 1930s, in particular due to the savings policy 
adopted in Germany by chancellor Brüning in 1931.
1.4. Finance capitalism and neoliberalism
From a systemic point of view, re-directing the search for profit 
from the financial to the real sphere represents the most efficient 
and sustainable consolidation policy. However, such a strategy is 
difficult to implement for two reasons. First, one has to develop a 
coherent and comprehensive set of measures which would 
dampen “finance alchemy” and would reward entrepreneurial acti-
vities. Second (and more difficult), one has to emancipate oneself 
from the economic paradigm which has been prevailing over the 
past decades. This is so because the economic policy derived from 
this paradigm has shifted the search for profit progressively from 
the real sphere of the economy to the financial sphere.
The most important steps in the transition from a “real capita-
listic” to a “finance capitalistic” incentive structure were the 
giving-up of a system of stable exchange rates (instead of repairing 
the flaws of the Bretton Woods rules), the adoption of a monetarist 
policy of extremely high interest rates (causing a switch in the inte-
rest-growth-differential), the progressive deregulation of financial 
Stephan Schulmeister398markets, the boom of financial innovations (derivatives of all 
kinds), and the privatization of social security, in particular of the 
pension system. 
All these steps were legitimated by the neoliberal paradigm. At 
the same time, the new incentive structure caused the business 
sector to reduce real investment in favour of financial investment. 
As a consequence, economic growth declined relative to the “real 
capitalistic” period, unemployment and the public debt kept rising 
(Figure 5). The prevailing diagnosis and therapy of these problems 
are again derived from the neoliberal paradigm. In the case of the 
public debt the diagnosis is: Governments have control over their 
financial balance and they just live beyond their means. The 
therapy is: Cut public spending.
1.5. Development of the current crisis
Under a “finance capitalistic” incentive structure, “bulls” and 
“bears” of asset prices become increasingly pronounced and exert 
an increasing influence on the real economy. The pre-history of 
the current crisis is an excellent example:
— The boom of stock prices in the 1990s and again between 
2003 and 2007 as well as the boom of house prices between 1998 
and 2005 stimulated the US economy through positive wealth 
effects. At the same time, however, the “twin booms” laid the 
ground for the subsequent “twin busts”.
— After the outbreak of the sub-prime mortgage crisis the third 
“bull market”, i.e., the commodity price boom, accelerated, mainly 
driven by speculation of financial investors in commodity deriva-
tives markets. 
— Since mid 2008 the devaluation process of stock wealth, 
housing wealth and commodity wealth was globally “synchro-
nized”. This process set free several contraction forces, not only 
through wealth effects and balance sheet compression but also via
import reductions on behalf of commodity producers.
The fall of stock prices and commodity prices has been 
strengthened by trend-following technical trading via taking huge 
short positions in the respective derivatives markets. Due to the 
extraordinary strength of these “bear markets”, hedge funds using 
these models reported higher returns than ever before. 
The European Monetary Fund 399The systemic causes of the crisis, e.g., the coincidence of three 
“bear markets”, were not recognized due to the predominance of 
the “free-market-paradigm”. Instead, the crisis was attributed to 
the misbehaviour of certain (groups of) agents, be they greedy 
bankers and hedge fund managers, irresponsible central bankers or 
governments. Hence, the “finance-capitalistic” rules of the game 
remained basically unchanged.
When the global economy approached the brink of collapse in 
fall 2008, economists and politicians activated their long-term 
memory. They reacted to the economic contraction as policy 
should have reacted in the beginning of the Great Depression: The 
banking sector was saved and stimulus programs were adopted. 
However, it was not taken into account that (pseudo-Keynesian) 
deficit spending policies cannot do their job under “finance-capi-
talistic” framework conditions. Banks took advantage of low 
interest rates to borrow from central banks and use the funds for 
speculation (also against sovereign states) instead of financing the 
real economy. In a similar way, non-financial corporations would 
not use additional funds due to tax reductions for real investment 
but could again engage in the game “let your money work”. And 
stock prices as well as commodities prices started to boom again….
Figure 4. Stock markets in Germany, United Kingdom and the USA
















Stephan Schulmeister400As a consequence, the cost-benefit-ratio of the stimulus 
measures turned out to be very disappointing. They prevented the 
crisis of 2008 from turning into a depression but they could not 
pave the way towards a self-sustaining recovery. At the same time, 
this “pseudo-Keynesian” policy increased the public debt signifi-
cantly providing the evidence for a re-interpretation of the crisis as 
a genuine “public-debt-crisis”. The unsustainably high debt levels 
in some countries like Greece or Portugal (where public indeb-
tedness had already been too high when hit by the crisis) seemed 
to confirm this perception.
The different extent of the indebtedness of euro states provided 
the opportunity for financial investors to speculate on the default 
risks of sovereign debtors. Understandably, Greece became the first 
target: Its indebtedness got as high as that of Italy and Belgium, 
and at the same time the Greek government had hidden the truth. 
Between October 2009 and May 2010, CDS premia and interest 
rates on Greek bonds soared (Figure 1) forcing the EU to set up 
EFSF. However, this measure could not prevent the interest 
epidemic to spill over to Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (step by 
step). France was not really hurt. In order to please the markets, 
austerity measures were strengthened but it did not help: CDS 
premia and interest rates continued to rise, economic growth 
started to decline, and this provided the justification for further 
interest rate increases.
1.6. Thrift paradox and the stock market decline
Even though the symptom therapy of austerity is much simpler 
to communicate than the systemic approach, it has two shortco-
mings. First, it does not work under the conditions which prevail 
in reality. Second, market participants lose confidence in a poli-
tical leadership which has no other solution to offer but the 
prescription of “more of the same”.
The fast deepening of the “Greek crisis” is a clear example: As 
result of a too radical austerity policy, the economy shrinks so 
strongly that the fiscal consolidation falls behind the targets (the 
“free-market-paradigm” does not know about the “thrift 
paradox”). As consequence, the “troika authorities” call for more 
austerity measures. This reaction in turn intensifies tensions and 
fears in financial markets as agents know: More of the same won’t 
The European Monetary Fund 401work. At the same time, also the Greek people who initially 
accepted the austerity measures, lost faith in the efficacy of this 
policy (not least because of the tremendous rise in unemploy-
ment). The elections of May 6, 2012 sent a clear signal to EU 
leaders: We are willing to pay back our debts, we want to remain in 
the EMU but we can’t stand the austerity measures any longer!
If the EU leaders react by turning off the transfer of EFSF funds 
and thereby forcing Greece into bankruptcy they will trigger a 
chain reaction leading probably to the collapse of the EMU. 
Germany will regain its monetary hegemony, however, at very 
high costs for all.
The developments in global stock markets seem to confirm the 
fear of investors that more austerity measures will deepen the 
crisis. In July 2011, quarrels over the permissible debt ceiling in the 
US caused stock prices to retreat. This process was accelerated when 
the compromise between Democrats and Republicans was 
announced on August 1: The US government should cut expendi-
ture by 1.5% of GDP over a period of 10 years, tax increases were 
excluded. Within a week, stock prices fell by 13% (S&P 500) and 
19% (DAX). After a short recovery, share prices fell again after 
Merkel and Sarkozy announced on August 16, that every euro 
country should implement the so-called “debt brake”. The third 
downward run was triggered on August 31 when it became clear 
that Greece would miss the budget targets and would intensify the 
savings policy.
In May 2012, the victory of Francois Hollande in the presiden-
tial elections in France, the results of the Greek parliamentary 
elections which were seen as rejection of further austerity measures 
by the Greek people, and the insistence of Merkel on continuing 
such a policy were the most important reasons why stock prices 
declined by almost 10% over just two weeks. These developments 
suggest the following. The distrust in the capability of political 
leaders to overcome the debt crisis and the disappointment that 
they only offered the old recipes, triggered waves of sell-offs. The 
attempt of individual stock investors to save the value of their 
wealth caused in the aggregate a dramatic devaluation of stock 
wealth (Figure 4).
Stephan Schulmeister402Figure 5. Interest rate, growth rate and economic performance – Western Europe
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The European Monetary Fund 403This paradoxical development reflects the loss of orientation on 
behalf of many owners and managers of financial wealth. They no 
longer strive for high returns, they would even accept no returns at 
all if only their capital as such would be safe. Hence, they sell 
bonds of “problem states” and buy US or German bonds, Swiss 
assets or gold. Owners of financial wealth desperately hope for 
clear signals of political leadership, they would welcome Euro-
bonds if only the institutional setting were stable and based on a 
political consensus.
Unfortunately, the political leaders have lost orientation them-
selves. Instead of conceptualizing new approaches to tackle the 
most oppressing problems like financial instability, public debt 
and unemployment in a comprehensive manner (all these 
problems are interlinked), politicians aim at pleasing “the markets” 
by adopting the old recipes. The fiscal compact signed by 25 EU 
head-of-states on March 2, 2012, is the most instructive example.
In more general terms: The sub-system “politics” and the sub-
system “financial markets” have both lost their orientation and 
seek “navigation advice” from the other system. Under this condi-
tion the overall system can easily slide into a downward spiral.
1.6.1. Position of the current crisis in the “long cycle”
In order to answer the question “where do we stand?” it is 
necessary to locate the position of the current crisis in the context 
of the latest “long cycle”.
The trough phase of this cycle was the Great Depression of the 
1930s and its consequences, i.e., the transition period from the 
“finance-capitalistic” conditions of the 1920s to the “real-capita-
listic” conditions of the 1950s.
The learning process enforced by this crisis resulted in a new 
macro-economic theory (Keynesianism), an active economic 
policy focusing on stable growth and full employment, stable 
exchange rates (“Bretton Woods”), de-regulation of goods markets 
(e.g. through the GATT rounds), but strict regulation of financial 
markets. The essential characteristic of the system (“real capita-
lism”) was the following: The driving force of capitalist 
development, striving for profits, was systematically directed 
towards activities in the “real economy”. Under these conditions 
Stephan Schulmeister404the “golden age of capitalism” was realized over the 1950s and 
1960s.
The “monetarist counterrevolution” of the late 1960s got 
support from “big business” because permanent full employment 
had strengthened trade unions as well as the welfare state (too 
much). The stepwise realization of the monetarist/neoliberal 
demand for de-regulation of financial markets (pushed forward by 
Friedman and Hayek) changed the “rules of the game” fundamen-
tally. Under the condition of widely fluctuating exchange rates 
and commodity prices, and of a high interest-growth-differential, 
financial and non-financial business shifted activities from the 
“real economy” to financial investment and short-term specula-
tion (“finance capitalism”). This shift was supported by the 
tremendous amount of financial innovations (i.e., derivatives of all 
kinds) which have been realized since the 1980s.
From this perspective, the current crisis which has been deepe-
ning since 2007 marks the early phase of a transformation process 
from “finance-capitalistic” to “real-capitalistic” framework condi-
tions—in other words: The beginning of the trough phase in the 
long cycle.
















The European Monetary Fund 4052. A “more-of-the-same” scenario
If the political leaders in the EU are unable to propose a funda-
mentally new approach to overcome the debt crisis, and rely on 
“more of the same” instead, the following development is 
plausible:
— The recent (mini)boom in stock prices—triggered by the 
announcement of the “outright monetary transactions” program 
of the ECB (OMT) in September 2012 - turns into a genuine bear 
market, devaluating stock wealth by up to 70% relative to their 
peaks in spring 2011 (as already twice since 2000—Figure 4).
— Entrepreneurs and households reduce their investments and 
consumption, the latter in particular in reaction to the devaluation 
of their pension fund wealth.
— Prices of government bonds of euro countries like Spain, 
Italy, Belgium and France start to fall again, interest rates rise 
(Figure 6). At the same time interest rates on government bonds of 
Germany decline even further.
— The ECB cannot prevent the widening of interest differen-
tials in the euro area as Spain and Italy refuse to accept further 
austerity measures demanded by the European Stability Mecha-
nism (ESM), the ECB is trapped by its promise to purchase only 
bonds of those countries which subordinate themselves under the 
ESM directives). In addition, internal opposition led by the presi-
dent of the Bundesbank hinders the ECB to strengthen confidence 
through a clear leadership.
— The economic and political split within the euro area 
widens, thereby weakening not only the euro and the EMU, but 
also the political coherence of the EU. This development could 
endanger even the German-French axis if interest rates rise in 
France during the coming recession but stay much lower in 
Germany.
— Rating agencies continue to downgrade the most indebted 
euro states as well as those banks which hold a large part of govern-
ment bonds of the respective countries. The whole banking system 
in the EU comes close to a collapse.
— The conflicts within the ECB as well as between EU govern-
ments intensify over how to overcome the euro crisis. As a 
Stephan Schulmeister406consequence, any potentially efficient measures against the aggra-
vation of the economic situation are politically blocked.
— The US from which the great crisis originated, will enjoy the 
lowest interest rates. There are three reasons for this paradox. First, 
investors are confident that the Fed will buy US government bonds 
to an unlimited extent (if necessary).5 Second, the weakness of the 
EMU strengthens the authority of the Fed. Third, the dollar 
remains the unchallenged key currency in the global economy.
— The “safe-haven-assets” like gold cannot absorb the flight of 
finance capital out of stocks and bonds. Demand for cash rises 
which is hoarded at banks. At the same time, the asset side of the 
banks’ balance sheet shrinks due to the devaluation of stocks and 
bonds, the banks’ equity is wiped out.
— Commodity prices continue to fall. The related decline in 
(import) demand on behalf of commodity producers dampens 
(international) trade and production. As in 2008/2009, this effect 
is stronger than the (positive) real-income-effect of falling prices.
— Governments lack financial means to fight the symptoms of 
the crisis by a primitive deficit-spending-strategy as in 2009/2010.
— The EMU breaks down, Germany regains the monetary hege-
mony in Europe—be it in the form of a “Northern euro” or the 
deutschemark—which it had sacrificed in the early 1990s to the 
integration of the former GDR. The economic and political 
tensions rise dramatically within the EU.
These developments will probably lead into a depression 
deepened by the simultaneous devaluation of different types of 
wealth (stocks, government bonds, commodities, and eventually 
houses once again) as between 2007/2009 and 1929/1933.
3. Challenges of the current situation
The transition from “finance-capitalistic” to “real-capitalistic” 
framework conditions, triggered by a stock market crash (e.g., 1873, 
1929, 2007ff), usually takes many “depressive” years (e.g., 1873 to 
5. De Grauwe (2011b) documents in a recent paper that the Fed and the Bank of England have 
served as “lender of last resort“ to their governments to a much larger extent than the ECB. This 
behaviour has obviously strengthened the credibility of both central banks and also the 
attractiveness of US and British bonds.
The European Monetary Fund 407~1890, 1929 to ~1948) as the old “rules of the game” don’t work any 
longer but new rules have not yet been designed and implemented.
The dramatic events of recent months show: The attempts to 
restore the “finance-capitalistic” game by “pseudo-Keynesian” 
means have failed. Preventing a further deepening of the crisis, 
developing a systemic concept for a sustainable recovery, and 
putting such a concept into practice, is almost a “mission 
impossible”.
However, a similar challenge was met after WW II (and in part 
already earlier through Roosevelt’s New Deal): By learning the 
lessons from the Great Depression, economists and politicians 
were able to design new framework/incentive conditions which 
formed the basis for the “golden age of capitalism” in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Why shouldn’t we be able to learn the lessons before a 
depression takes place?
Such a concept for new “rules of the game” or for a “New Deal 
for Europe” has to deal with the following issues:
— The fears of people that their financial wealth, in particular 
their pension capital, will be devalued a third time since 2000, 
must be contained (stock indices still stay roughly 10% below their 
2000 peaks in spite of two bull markets).
— Confidence must be built up that political leaders will be 
able to overcome the debt crisis and the euro crisis in a stepwise 
process.
— The incentive structure has to be changed so as to favour 
entrepreneurial activities and to dampen all kinds of “self-referen-
tial” accumulation of financial wealth, in particular short-term 
speculation unrelated to market fundamentals (“finance 
alchemy”).
— The cohesion of the EU must be strengthened, at the same 
time no country should be put at a disadvantage through a new 
crisis strategy (otherwise the resistance against such a strategy 
would be too strong within member states).
— All that has to be achieved rather quickly and should not 
need large amounts of money.
The most urgent challenge consists in preventing the 
downward spiral in many euro countries from spilling over to the 
EU as a whole due to the interaction between widening interest 
Stephan Schulmeister408differentials and stronger austerity measures. Bringing this process 
to a halt requires in the first place a political consensus on a prag-
matic concept to stabilize interest rates in all euro countries at a 
sustainable level. To this end, the capability of speculators to drive 
up interest rates on government bonds of euro countries must be 
restricted.
This is necessary also for political reasons. These activities play 
euro countries off against each other and, hence, undermine the 
economic and political cohesion of the European (Monetary) 
Union: The more interest rates rise in the “problem countries”, the 
lower they get in the “good countries” in particular in Germany. 
Instead of correctly valuating risk, bond and CDS speculation 
produces additional risk, in particular with respect to the EMU as a 
whole.
In a similar manner, short-term speculation causes exchange 
rates and commodity prices, in particular crude oil and food prices, 
to widely overshoot their fundamental equilibrium values. As part 
of new framework conditions also these prices need to be stabilized 
by economic policy in order to foster the real economy at the 
expense of “finance alchemy”. 
It is no coincidence that the two prices which intermediate 
between the real sphere and the financial sphere of the economy, 
i.e., the exchange rate (in space) and the interest rate (in time), 
were stabilized by economic policy in those periods/countries 
when/where the economic performance was particularly 
successful. These conditions prevailed over the 1950s and 1960s 
and also in present times in successful “real-capitalistic” econo-
mies like China.
The theoretical benchmark for stabilizing interest rates should 
be the (nominal) rate of economic growth to be expected over the 
medium run, for exchange rates the benchmark should be purcha-
sing power parity of internationally traded goods and services 
(tradables). As an intermediate step regarding currency markets, 
the central banks of the US, the euro area, Japan and China (even-
tually also the UK and Switzerland) should commit themselves to 
stabilize their exchange rates within tight bands (e.g., +/-2%), 
taking the averages over the recent past as means (e.g., the average 
exchange rates since the creation of the euro).6
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peculiarities. First, crude oil is an exhaustible resource the price of 
which needs to increase in equilibrium with the rate of interest 
stronger than the general price level (Hotelling rule). Second, the 
use of crude oil is the most important cause of climate change. To 
compensate for these externalities, economic theory suggests that 
oil prices should become permanently more expensive than all 
other goods. In reality, however, the wide fluctuations of crude oil 
prices bring about a waste of this resource, a deterioration of the 
environment and hamper investment in energy saving 
technologies.
Even though one cannot precisely quantify by which margin 
the price of crude oil should rise faster than the general price level, 
it is clear that any steady and reliable increase of oil prices above 
the general inflation rate would do a better job than the market 
which sometimes produces price changes of 50% and more within 
a few months.
To give a concrete example: OECD studies conclude that the 
price of greenhouse gas emissions should rise to 370 € per ton 
CO2-eq if the increase in climate temperature is to be restricted to 
2° C (with such a price increase one would be on the safe side of 
the “low carbon scenario”—EC, 2011a). At a world market price of 
oil price of 100$ these additional cost would translate into an oil 
price for users of 248$.
If this target is to be reached by 2020, the oil price needs to rise 
by roughly 12% per year. Such a stable and reliable price path can 
neither be brought about through emissions trading schemes nor 
through carbon taxes. If, however, the EU would set such an obli-
gatory price path for all users of crude oil (primarily refiners which 
6. It might take some time to find a compromise on “fair“ exchange rate values, in particular, 
as the estimates of tradables PPP would imply a significant revaluation of the US dollar and a 
corresponding devaluation of the euro (as long as one does not also take into account the 
different degree of external indebtedness). In any case, exchange rate stability as such would 
strongly facilitate entrepreneurial activities and restrict speculation. This is particularly clear if 
one recapitulates how strongly currency fluctuations have hampered the real economy since the 
early 1970s. E.g., the overshooting of the dollar exchange rate and of the oil price are inversely 
related to each other, at least during periods of marked “bull markets” and “bear markets” (since 
crude oil is priced in dollars, depreciation of the key currency devalues real oil export earnings - 
this valuation effect in turn strengthens the incentive for oil-producing countries to increase the 
price of their most important export good as 1973 and 1979).
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cing a flexible tax which amounts to the difference between the 
world market price and the target price according to the long-term 
price path, a wave of investments in energy saving would be trig-
gered, from isolation of buildings to new forms of mobility.
The reason for that is simple: These investments become much 
more profitable than today (in terms of avoiding opportunity 
costs) and the rates of return on these investments become calcu-
lable. The latter is extremely important as the amortization periods 
of energy saving investments are particularly long.
In the present situation, the most urgent challenge is the stabili-
zation of interest rates on government bonds at a level below the 
rate of economic growth as this is a prerequisite for fiscal consoli-
dation over the medium and long run, and, hence, for restoring 
confidence in the political and financial system in the EU. The 
markets have proved unable to provide sustainable long-term inte-
rest rate levels. Therefore, this task has to be taken over by the 
European Monetary Fund in a similar way as the ECB controls the 
level of the short-term interest rate.
4. Features of the European Monetary Fund
The European Monetary Fund (EMF) coordinates and manages 
public finances of euro member countries in such a way that the 
crisis in Europe can be overcome in a sustainable manner. This 
crisis is not just an economic crisis but also a social and political 
crisis. It calls for the implementation of new framework conditions 
which would reward entrepreneurial activities on all levels 
(macroeconomic policy, tax policy, regulatory policy, etc.) more 
than finance alchemy. The EMF is one core component of such a 
“New Deal for Europe”.
4.1. Scope and principles
A systemic problem needs a systemic solution which restores 
the primacy of politics over speculation. It is proposed to trans-
form the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) into the 
European Monetary Fund (EMF). The scope of the EMF is fourfold:
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by selling Eurobonds in the capital markets. These bonds are 
guaranteed by all euro countries to an unlimited extent. In addi-
tion, the EMF has full backing by the ECB (if necessary, the ECB 
buys Eurobonds from the EMF).
— The EMF stabilizes Eurobond interest rates at a level slightly 
below the level of medium-term economic growth (in nominal 
terms). The Eurobonds are held by investors with the EMF, they are 
not tradable but can be liquidated at any time. In these two 
respects the present proposal differs most from Eurobond concepts 
already put forward.
— The EMF helps to restore sound public finances in euro 
countries according to a systemic approach and, hence, in close 
cooperation with the ECB, the European Commission and national 
governments. To this end, the EMF provides funds for the euro 
states according to clear criteria (“conditionality”) which are not 
exclusively restrictive.
— The EMF overcomes the split between euro countries caused 
by widening interest rate differentials and strengthens thereby the 
cohesion and credibility of the EMU and of the EU as a whole.
The fundament for achieving these goals has already been built 
by European leaders: The European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) set up in May 2010 could be transformed into the European 
Monetary Fund. Simply enlarging the “fire power” of the EFSF or 
implementing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) already in 
2012 won’t be sufficient by any means.
4.2. Motives
With the deepening of the fiscal crisis in some euro countries 
several proposals have been made to introduce new instruments 
for financing (in part) euro governments (De Grauwe and Moesen, 
2009; Gros and Micossi, 2009; Delpla and von Weizsäcker, 2010; 
Gros and Mayer, 2010; Palley, 2011). These Eurobonds should be 
sold up to a certain limit (e.g., “Maastricht debt limit” of 60% of 
GDP) either by the single countries or by a new institution, backed 
by the guarantee of all 17 euro states (Varoufakis and Holland, 
2011, propose to transfer part of the public debt to the ECB).
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monetary union, member states do no longer have the possibility 
to devalue their currency in case of a (asymmetric) shock and the 
governments do no longer have access to financial means provided 
by “their” central bank. “As a result, a loss in confidence of inves-
tors can in a self-fulfilling way drive the country into default” (De 
Grauwe, 2011a, p. 32).
Pisani–Ferry (2012) argues that “an impossible trinity of no-
coresponsibility over public debt, strict no-monetary financing 
and bank-sovereign interdependence is at the core of Euro area 
vulnerability” (p. 14). In other words, the three conditions, 
namely, the “no bail-out clause”, the prohibition of financing euro 
governments through the ECB and the fact that public finance 
relies to a large extent on the banking system which in turn 
depends on the governments’ fiscal stance (via the market valua-
tion of their bonds) are inconsistent and undermine the stability of 
the euro, in particular in the case of shocks.
Pisani–Ferry (2012) discusses the “corresponding three options 
of reform—a broader mandate for the ECB, the building of a 
banking federation, and fiscal union with common bonds….” 
(p. 14). These options are by no means mutually exclusive, yet, all 
of them are difficult to put in practice for legal, political and 
economic reasons. 
This paper argues that the fundamental contradiction does not 
prevail between the stability of a monetary union and the “trinity 
conditions” but between the former and speculative activities 
which drive interest rates up to unsustainable levels in some 
countries and to extremely low levels in others, thereby 
strengthening the economic divergence in the union as a whole. 
This becomes clear if one assumes that policy succeeds in stabi-
lizing interest rates on government bonds at a level below the rate 
of economic growth. In this case, the problems related to the 
“trinity conditions” would become much less oppressing and 
easier to handle.
The recent massive transfers of deposits from Greek banks to 
banks from other euro countries (almost exclusively to German 
banks), and the take-off of similar developments in Portugal, Spain 
and Italy demonstrate the incompatibility between the stability of 
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development/specialization on the one hand, and completely 
unrestricted financial markets on the other hand. In case of an exit 
of Greece from the EMU these transfers would blow up the target2-
imbalances to an extent which might cause the whole system to 
collapse.
The economic performance under the “real-capitalistic” 
framework conditions of the 1950s and 1960s provides further 
evidence in favour of this incompatibility hypothesis. This is so 
because the Bretton Woods system can be conceived as a fore-
runner of a monetary union insofar as exchange rates were pegged 
(managed adjustments occurred rarely). This arrangement together 
with a strict regulation of short-term capital movements and the 
stabilization of interest rates below growth rates brought about 
stable growth and economic convergence.
Most Eurobond concepts propose limits to the access to Euro-
bond financing for the single countries. The main argument lies in 
the “disciplining effect of the higher marginal cost of borrowing” 
(Delpla and von Weizsäcker, 2010, p. 4). This is so because having 
fully used the capacity of Eurobond financing (“blue bonds” in the 
terminology of Delpla and von Weizsäcker, 2010), the single 
countries need to sell national (“red”) bonds in the capital markets. 
The markets then would discipline irresponsibly acting govern-
ments through high interest rates.
Palley (2011) proposes the foundation of a “European Public 
Finance Authority” (EPFA) which “would continuously issue 
bonds as part of assisting euro zone countries with normal budget 
deficit financing. The goal is to make this a normal element of 
budget deficit financing.” (Palley, 2011, p. 17).
The EMF concept—sketched in Schulmeister, 2010b—is similar 
in spirit to the EPFA proposal but goes beyond it in two respects (the 
first politician who coined the term “European Monetary Fund” 
was the German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble in spring 
2010, the first paper on an EMF concept is Gros and Mayer, 2010)7):
7. For the global economy, Dirk Solte has made a similar proposal already in 2009. His 
proposal focuses on two requirements of a “world financial system in balance”, the need of a 
global lender of last resort and the need to prevent hoarding of international liquidity. The IMF 
should become the global lender of last resort and a “liquidity circulation fund” should be 
established to channel overflowing liquidity to those countries which are in need of liquidity. 
For further details see Solte, 2009.
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determines the long-term interest level in a similar way as the ECB 
determines the level of the short-term interest rate.
— The Eurobonds are held by investors with the EMF, they can 
always be liquidated but they are not traded in capital markets (like 
savings accounts).
There are two main reasons for making also the long-term inte-
rest rate a target as well as an instrument of economic policy.
First, this approach enables economic policy to stabilize the 
interest rate on future credits of euro states at a level below the 
(expected) medium-term growth rate (in the EPFA proposal, this 
could be indirectly achieved through open market operations of 
the ECB). In this way, also the interest rate on corporate bonds 
would be reduced. Such an improvement in the financing condi-
tions for the business sector and the government sector is a 
precondition for a sustained recovery and, hence, for a gradual 
reduction of public indebtedness.
Second, controlling the long-term interest rate enables the EMF 
in cooperation with the ECB and the EC to set the interest rate close 
to the level enjoyed by the “good countries” like Germany. This 
will help to overcome the resistance from national-populist politi-
cians and media within the “good countries” against Eurobonds.
Eurobonds should not be traded in capital markets because 
otherwise financial investors might start to speculate against or in 
favour of Eurobonds relative to government bonds of the US, the 
UK, Japan or some smaller states. Even though this game would be 
less easy than playing off member countries of a monetary union 
against each other, it is nevertheless superfluous. If this proposal 
were put in practice, CDS with reference to debts of euro govern-
ments would disappear as neither hedging nor speculation makes 
sense any longer.
In addition, banks would no longer get rents by borrowing at 
the ECB at low rates and investing in government bonds at high 
rates. This business does not add any value to the overall economy 
(just profits to the banks), in contrast to financing firms where the 
banks’ seeking for the best investment opportunities can—in prin-
ciple—improve the allocative efficiency. It seems reasonable that 
investors finance governments directly.
The European Monetary Fund 415This possibility exists already in many countries (German 
“Schatzbriefe” etc.), it should be generalized at the level of the EMU 
through the foundation of the EMF. Eurobonds can therefore also 
be conceived as fully liquid savings deposits of financial investors 
held with the EMF. The ECB serves as lender of last resort, however, 
to the EMF as intermediary which substitutes private banks.
Stabilizing the values of government bonds might also mitigate 
the fluctuations in the valuation of corporate bonds. The expe-
rience since the 1970s suggests that changes of asset values and the 
related wealth effects have strongly contributed to shifting striving 
for profits from entrepreneurial activities to financial speculation. 
Stabilizing the value of government bonds will help to gradually 
change the incentive structure in favour of the real economy.
But what about the price discovery process provided by capital 
markets? Don’t they fairly evaluate the performance of states and, 
hence, their credibility, supported by rating agencies? The answer 
is: No. The reason for this is simple: States are not corporations. 
The purpose of the latter can—in principle—be reduced to making 
profits and future profits can be reflected in just one variable, the 
stock price, for which markets (supported by rating agencies) can— 
in principle—bring about unbiased estimates. States have multiple 
functions, none of which relates to profit making. Hence, the 
performance and credibility of a state can—in principle—not be 
measured by just one price, the bond price (rate of interest). As a 
positive side-effect of establishing an EMF, the upgrading or down-
grading of the new Eurobonds by rating agencies would become 
largely irrelevant.
If one conceives financing the “res publica” as an investment 
opportunity like any other, one can of course become trapped in 
mixing up firms and states. Once the (economists’) elites have 
emancipated themselves from this neoliberal heritage they can 
devote their intellectual capacity to the complex task of improving 
the management of public affairs. Letting the market punish the 
“delinquents” for mismanagement or reckless spending by raising 
interest rates to “death sentence” levels only makes the situation 
worse (in particular for those who have nothing to do with 
economic policy or “finance alchemy”).
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All euro countries are members of the EMF. The contribution to 
the fund’s equity as well as the voting rights could be allocated 
according to the economic strength of the members or the popula-
tion (or some combination). This issue is left open to the political 
decision process.
As is the case with the ESM, the EMF is governed by the finance 
ministers of the member states and by the European Council as 
regards fundamental decisions (a counter-balance to the ECB 
where central bankers dominate). As regards the operative 
business, the EMF acts as an independent institution (like the IMF). 
The fiscal programs for the member states—aiming at macroeco-
nomic stabilization and financial consolidation—are set up in 
close cooperation with national governments. The distribution of 
funds is strictly bound to several criteria which, however, are not 
exclusively restrictive. This conditionality ensures that no member 
country can act as free rider.
In contrast to most Eurobond proposals (but in line with Palley, 
2011), there should be no general limit for Eurobond financing, it 
should become the normal way to fund euro states as they are 
members of a monetary union.
If a country does not comply with the criteria for EMF funding, 
it will not get funds and, hence, has to rely on selling their 
national bonds for which they would have to pay unsustainably 
high interest. Knowing this in advance, highly indebted govern-
ments will stick to the consolidation measures accorded with the 
EMF and the EC. In other words, the disciplinary power of the EU 
authorities is much higher if government financing is provided by 
the EMF as compared to the extant situation where governments 
could rely on the reckless lending by banks.8
8. A thought experiment might clarify this issue. If any additional credit to an euro 
government had needed the permission of the EC, countries like Greece or Portugal would have 
had much smaller budget deficits than they actually did. It were “the markets” which 
completely failed to “discipline” the debtors. After supporting the misbehaviour of governments 
for years, “the markets” all of a sudden turned from “no punishment” to “death sentences”. 
This behavior is in line with the two fundamental diseases from which the invisible hand suffers 
in financial markets: Over the long run, it suffers from manic-depressive illness, and over the 
short run from strong Parkinson. 
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euro states together with the backing by the ECB ensure that 
defaults on Eurobonds are only possible if the whole financial 
system collapses (in which case it does not matter). In this way, the 
EMU would achieve a similarly strong position vis-a-vis financial 
investors as the US where the Fed backs government bonds to an 
unlimited extent. This is the main reason for the attractiveness of 
US bonds in spite of the weakness of the US economy. Investors 
know that given the Fed’s support, default on US government 
bonds is (almost) impossible.
The present proposal provides the same degree of security for 
Eurobonds. Hence, global demand for these instruments will be 
strong. There are two additional reasons for that. First, only the US 
would supply a comparable amount of public securities to big 
investors in the global economy like central banks and pension 
funds. Second, the real economy in the euro area is stronger than 
in the US (the European weakness stems from fundamental incon-
sistencies in the financial sphere which would be overcome by 
the EMF).
There are three important questions as regards the key objective 
of the EMF, namely, to stabilize the interest rate on government 
debt at a level below the (expected) rate of medium-term economic 
growth. First, what serves as the benchmark for the growth rate 
given the great differences in economic performance between euro 
countries and the related differences in the initial conditions? 
Second, by which margin should the targeted interest rate level be 
lower than the benchmark growth rate? Third, how can the EMF 
enforce (international) investors to buy Eurobonds at such (low) 
interest rates?
Over the coming years, the EMF should focus on the growth 
potential of the “problem regions” in the euro area, i. e., of the 
Mediterranean countries. If one does not only consider supply-side 
factors for economic growth, one will conclude that the GDP of 
these countries will hardly expand faster than by 1% per year over 
the medium run. Taking explicitly the growth potential of the 
weaker regions as basis (and not the expected average over the 
whole euro area) provides additional stimuli for the better perfor-
ming regions, in terms of both, real growth and inflation (for the 
transition period of turning the downward trend into an upward 
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to reach two targets, fiscal consolidation and improvement of the 
competitiveness of the “problem economies” in the euro area).
The optimal size of the targeted interest-growth-differential 
cannot precisely be quantified as it not only depends on the (diffe-
rent) debt-to-GDP ratios as part of the initial conditions but also on 
the state of confidence with respect to entrepreneurs, households 
and (international) investors. For the first years of EMF operations, 
this differential should be kept at a maximum (in absolute terms) 
which is compatible with the willingness of investors to buy Euro-
bonds. A pragmatic approach would be to set nominal interest 
rates between 1% and 2%. This implies slightly negative real rates. 
The example of the US and Germany shows that investors are 
willing to accept such low rates if they believe in the security of 
their investment. The unlimited guarantee of all outstanding Euro-
bonds by all euro states is therefore a necessary condition for 
successfully selling these instruments at very low rates.
The second condition for achieving investors’ confidence is the 
guarantee of the ECB to buy Eurobonds in case the private demand 
falls short of supply at the targeted/fixed interest rate (therefore, 
the EMF determines the nominal Eurobond interest rate in close 
communication/coordination with the ECB). Such a guarantee 
directly contradicts the traditionally monetarist stance of the ECB. 
However, when struggling for survival even conservative institu-
tions are capable of changing their position and trying new 
strategies—the policy of the ECB itself over the last two years is an 
excellent example. 
Given the double guarantee of Eurobonds by governments and 
the ECB, Eurobonds would enjoy the same “security conditions” as 
US bonds and might even become more attractive than the latter. 
This could be so because to many big investors like the Bank of 
China the real economy seems to be stronger in the EU as 
compared to the US (only/mainly the inability of euro govern-
ments to manage their “internal” financial affairs has rendered 
debt instruments of many euro states less attractive in recent years).
The main channel through which the ECB guarantee will foster 
the attractiveness of Eurobonds concerns investors’ confidence. 
Hence, it might not even be necessary for the ECB to actually buy 
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recent years. And even if such purchases would be needed to stabi-
lize interest rates at a very low level they would not contradict EU 
law as the ECB finances the EMF as a supranational EU institution 
and not directly member states.
4.4. Costs of not controlling interest rates on euro governments’ 
bonds
Stabilizing long-term interest rates in the euro area at a level 
below the rate of economic growth will stimulate real investment 
as a prerequisite for a sustained recovery. Only under this condi-
tion can the fiscal stance be improved over the medium and long 
run. Such a development would prevent sovereign defaults and, 
hence, the necessity of “good” countries to bail out the “bad” ones. 
If, by contrast, policy accepts the formal insolvency of an EMU 
member state, much more capital has to be mobilized. Even 
though it might be politically easier to put through tax increases 
within a single nation state to save “our” banks (victims of the 
reckless policy of “bad” countries….) than to bail-out countries like 
Greece or Portugal (no transfer of “our” money to “lazy” 
people……), not preventing defaults will be much more costly— 
not only financially but also socially and politically (see, e.g., 
Cline, 2011; Niechoj et al., 2011).
The resistance of nationalist-populist media and politicians 
could be overcome if one shows that avoiding defaults does not 
need tax-payer’s money but a change in economic policy, i.e., 
transforming the long-term interest rate from a market price to an 
instrument variable. Such an idea will meet strong resistance from 
mainstream economists (like the financial transactions tax). This 
resistance can be mitigated in three ways:
— By looking concretely how the interest rate is determined in 
the CDS and bond markets and which role destabilizing specula-
tion plays in this process. 
— By showing that stabilizing long-term interest rates in all 
euro countries provides the basis for a gradual overcoming of the 
financial and economic crisis. 
— By clarifying that there is no alternative (TINA) to stabilizing 
interest rates.
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of an econometric exercise which simulates the medium-term 
economic development under the rules of the fiscal compact on 
one hand, and under the condition of stabilized interest rates on 
the other hand.
5. Austerity policy versus interest rate stabilization—two 
model simulations9
This section summarizes the results of an econometric simula-
tion of two scenarios using the global model of Oxford Economics 
(OEF, version of February 2012). In the first case it is assumed that 
the rules of the fiscal compact are implemented, beginning in mid-
2012. In the second case it is assumed that the interest rate on euro 
government bonds is stabilized at 2%. 
The fiscal pact scenario is simulated as follows:
— The annual consolidation requirements of the individual EU 
countries are identified on the basis of data for 2011 (including the 
EC estimates of structural deficits).
— It is assumed that the target of a maximum structural deficit 
of 0.5% of GDP is to be reached by 2016 (in analogy with the 
German “debt brake”). 
— 70% of the consolidation measures consist of spending cuts 
in government consumption, public investment and government 
transfers and 30% consist of increases in direct and indirect taxes 
as well as employees’ social security contributions. 
— The consolidation policies are adjusted on the basis of the 
simulation results for 2013. If, for instance, the deficit criterion no 
longer indicates any consolidation requirement, but the debt crite-
rion does, the austerity policy is continued.
The simultaneous austerity policies in almost all EU countries 
would have a strong negative effect on economic growth in the 
euro area GDP would shrink for two years (gross capital formation 
would be most affected), unemployment would rise to more than 
12% in 2014 and from 2015 consumer prices would start to decline 
9. This exercise was part of a joint project of three research institutes, IMK (Düsseldorf), OFCE 
(Paris) and WIFO (Vienna) published in IMK (2012). See this report for further details.
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implementation of the fiscal pact as they are already in a recession.
The disastrous effects of a synchronous austerity policy in the 
EU become obvious in the comparison with an alternative strategy: 
In this simulation, the baseline of the OEF model (February 2012) is 
adjusted in just one respect. It is assumed that the level of long-
term interest rates in all euro countries is stabilized at 2% over the 
entire forecast period (no discretionary austerity measures are 
implemented besides those which were already implemented in 
the February version of the OEF model—this version does not 
include measures called for by the fiscal compact). Under this 
Figure 7. Two scenarios of macroeconomic performance in the euro area
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economy in the euro area would pick up fast, mainly as a conse-
quence of a rebound of investment activity and the unemployment 
would decline steadily from 2013 onwards (Figure 7).
Although net borrowing of the government would improve 
more sharply in the fiscal pact scenario than in the euro bond 
scenario, the government debt ratio would not. The latter would be 
even slightly higher in the fiscal pact scenario than in the low inte-
rest scenario, because nominal GDP growth would be significantly 
higher in the second case (Figure 7).
6. Conclusion
The main causes of the deepening of the euro crisis are systemic. 
The financial crisis of 2008/2009 deteriorated the fiscal stance of 
all countries. However, euro countries as members of a monetary 
union are specifically vulnerable to shifts in investors’ sentiments 
as they have neither the possibility to devalue nor to rely on 
central bank funding (systemic factor I). Under “finance-capita-
listic” incentive conditions, short-term profit-seeking brings about 
“manic-depressive” fluctuations of exchange rates, commodities 
prices, interest rates and stock prices. Speculative activities caused 
interest rates on government bonds of several euro countries to rise 
to unsustainable levels since fall 2009 (systemic factor II). At the 
same time, interest rate differentials within the euro area widened 
drastically. This development endangers the economic and poli-
tical cohesion of the EMU (systemic factor III).
A systemic problem needs a systemic solution which restores 
the primacy of politics over speculation. It is proposed to trans-
form the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) into the 
European Monetary Fund (EMF). The EMF provides euro govern-
ments with financial means by selling Eurobonds in the capital 
markets. These bonds are guaranteed by all euro countries to an 
unlimited extent. The EMF stabilizes Eurobond interest rates at a 
level slightly below the level of medium-term economic growth (in 
nominal terms). The Eurobonds are held by investors with the 
EMF, they are not tradable but can be liquidated at any time. The 
EMF helps to restore sound public finances in euro countries in 
close cooperation with the ECB, the European Commission and 
The European Monetary Fund 423national governments. To this end, the EMF provides funds for the 
euro states according to clear criteria (“conditionality”) which are 
not exclusively restrictive (they should comprise “Marshall-plan-
elements”).
Such a solution does not cost much money. What it costs is the 
efforts to reconsider the most fundamental assumptions of that 
economic paradigm which has been restored over the past four 
decades. Admitting errors is painful, sticking to them even more 
(for others).
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